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ABSTRACT 
RUSSIA’S POLICY OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
IN THE ERA OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC 
WARS, 1792-1806 
Morkva, Valeriy 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
September 2010 
 
 This thesis examines the Ottoman-Russian relations in late 18th – early 19th 
centuries. Chronologically it covers the years between the two Ottoman-Russian 
wars, the starting and final points of the thesis being the Peace Treaty of Jassy (1792) 
and the proclamation of war against Russia by the Porte in late 1806. These years not 
only became an inter-war period in relations between the two empires, but also faced 
a short-lived phenomenon of cooperation and a defensive alliance between the 
Sultan’s and the Tsar’s governments. The primary aim of this work was to study the 
circumstances of the Ottoman-Russian rapprochement at the time and the diplomatic 
strategies of the Porte and St. Petersburg within a wider context of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The thesis argues that during the time under 
discussion Russia conducted towards the Ottoman Empire the policy of preserving a 
‘weak neighbour’, trying to prevent the domains of the Sultan from falling into the 
hands of a strong European power. 
 
Keywords: Kutuzov, Mustafa Rasih Pasha, Ottoman-Russian relations, Ottoman-
Russian alliance, War of the Second Coalition, Ionian Republic.  
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ÖZET 
FRANSIZ İHTİLÂLİ VE NAPOLYON SAVAŞLARI  DÖNEMİNDE RUSYA’NIN 
OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU İLE YAKINLAŞMA SİYASETİ , 1792-1806 
Morkva, Valeriy 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
Eylül 2010 
 
 Bu çalışma 18. yüzyıl sonu ve 19. yüzyıl başı Osmanlı-Rus münasetbetlerini 
incelemektedir.  Kronolojik olarak çalışma iki Osmanlı-Rus savaşı arasındaki 
dönemi kapsamaktadır; Yaş Barış Antlaşması (1792) ve Bâb-ı Âli’nin 1806 yılı 
sonunda Rusya’ya savaş ilanı teze konu olan dönemin başlangıç ve bitiş tarihlerini 
oluşturmaktadır. Söz konusu yıllar Osmanlı ve Rus İmparatorlukları arası 
münasebetlerde iki savaş arası dönem olmasının yanı sıra, Sultan ve Çarlık 
yönetimlerinin kısa süreli bir işbirliği ve savunma ittifakına da tanıklık etmektedir. 
Bu çalışmanın birincil amacı söz konusu dönemde Osmanlı-Rus yakınlaşmasının 
koşullarını ve Bâb-ı Âli ile St. Petersburg’un diplomatik stratejilerini Fransız İhtilâli 
ve Napolyon Savaşları bağlamında ele almaktır. Bu tez, Rusya’nın ilgili dönemde 
Sultan’ın topraklarının Avrupa devletlerinin eline geçmesini engelleme yolunda 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na karşı “zayıf komşuyu” koruma politikası güttüğünü 
savunmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kutuzov, Mustafa Rasih Paşa, Osmanlı-Rus münasebetleri, 
Osmanlı-Rus ittifakı, İkinci Koalisyon Savaşları, Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti. 
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CHAPTER I 
ITRODUCTIO 
 
 
The years that divide the two Ottoman-Russian wars, the last of the 18th century 
and the first of the 19th century, are justly considered to be one of the momentous 
epochs in Modern history. The downfall of ancien régime in France resulted in 
crucial political changes that both shattered the hitherto existing traditional 
framework of international relations and shook the international order at the end of 
the 18th century. To use the words of H. Kissinger, “under the impact of Napoleon, 
there disintegrated not only the system of legitimacy of the eighteenth century, but 
with it the physical safeguards which, to contemporaries at least, seemed the 
prerequisite of stability”.1 The French revolution, the French revolutionary wars and 
later the Napoleonic wars became a crucial factor defining the European politics of 
the time, and, as relates to the topic of the given research, had also influenced the 
Ottoman-Russian relations.  
 
As a result of the changed international situation of the early 1790-s both the 
Ottomans and the Russians were bound to amend their habitual militant politics 
pursued towards each other for most of the 18th century. The Treaty of Jassy (1792) 
not only put an end to the Ottoman-Russian hostilities, but also marked the beginning 
                                                 
1 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the problems of peace, 
(Boston, 1973), p. 2.  
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of a new stage in the relations between Istanbul and St. Petersburg. Fresh from the 
war, the Ottoman Empire and Russia, irrespective of still existing mutual 
apprehensions, prejudices and distrust, for various reasons simply could not afford 
further confrontation. The years following the Treaty of Jassy were to witness the 
Ottomans and Russians being forced to work out a certain mode of peaceful 
coexistence, and later on even the Ottoman-Russian cooperation in warding off the 
French aggression in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean.   
 
The primary concern of this study is to shed new light on and to fill in some 
white spots in the history of the Ottoman-Russian relations at the turn of the 19th 
century by using the original Ottoman and Russian archival documents, along with 
published and unpublished sources in other languages. Among the particular 
questions to be researched are foundations and factual implementation of the 
defensive alliance between the Sublime Porte and St. Petersburg, the activities of the 
Russian diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire, joint military actions by 
the Ottomans and Russians within the framework of the second anti-French coalition, 
various interpretations by both sides of their defensive alliance, the influence of 
international politics upon the Ottoman-Russian relations at the period. 
 
Structurally the study is divided into six chapters followed by a conclusion. 
Chapter 1 discusses the sources and the existing scholarly literature relating to the 
subject of this research. Chapter 2 describes the new situation that arose in the 
Ottoman-Russian relations after the Peace Treaty of Jassy, focusing on the exchange 
of the extraordinary diplomatic missions of Mustafa Rasih Pasha and M. I. 
Golenishchev-Kutuzov. Chapter 3 covers the years between 1794 and 1798, 
3 
examining the Ottoman-Russian relations in the context of the international situation 
of the period. Chapter 4 explains the first stages of the Mediterranean campaign of 
the joint squadron of the Russian and the Ottoman warships under Vice Admiral F. 
F. Ushakov. It also analyses the circumstances under which the defensive alliance of 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire became possible and was concluded, its contents and 
importance for both St. Petersburg and the Porte. Chapter 5 focuses on the Ottoman-
Russian military cooperation during the siege of Corfu and in the Italian campaign. 
Apart from that, it touches upon some circumstances of political reorganisation of the 
Ionian Islands and their importance for St. Petersburg as the first Russian military 
base in the Mediterranean. Chapter 6 traces the dynamics of the Ottoman-Russian 
relations since the conclusion of the allied treaty of 3 January 1799 until the outbreak 
of the Ottoman-Russian war in December 1806. Among the specific subjects under 
discussion are the rivalry of the European diplomacies regarding their influence upon 
the Porte; the problem of the recognition of the imperial title of Napoléon Bonaparte; 
the renewal of the Ottoman-Russian alliance in September 1805; the gradual drifting 
of the Ottoman side from its alliance with Russia and the start of the Ottoman-
Russian war towards the end of 1806.           
 
In view of the existence of voluminous literature dealing usually with the long 
record of traditional rivalry between the Ottoman and Russian Empires, the time of 
their short-lived rapprochement as a response to the aggressive advances of the 
Napoléonic France seems to be under-examined and deserves more analysis. Taking 
into consideration that normally the history of the Ottoman-Russian relations has 
been depicted in terms of permanent confrontation, any examples of mutual 
cooperation, whatever occasional and transient they might be, would always attract 
4 
special attention. In this respect, indicating the phenomenon of the Ottoman-Russian 
diplomatic and military partnership, as well as detailed study of its causes and nature, 
would allow a fresh look at the history of the Ottoman-Russian relations together 
with the possibility of more relevant analysis of the long-standing historical 
narratives still present in contemporary scholarly discourse. 
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CHAPTER II 
SOURCES AD HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE SUBJECT 
 
Τι δε βλέpiεις το κάρφος το εν τω οφθαλµώ του αδελφού σου,  
την δε εν τω σω οφθαλµώ δοκόν ου κατανοείς; 
(Ματθ. 7,3) 
2.1. Sources  
The main body of the unpublished archival material used in this study 
constitute the documents from the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Empire (Архив Внешней Политики Российской Империи) in Moscow. These for 
the most part consist of the correspondence between the Russian embassy in 
Constantinople and the central government in St. Petersburg, including the reports of 
the ambassadors to the Tsar (usually sent twice per month), the instructions of the 
Tsar and the highest officials of the state sent to the embassy, the secret 
memorandums of the Foreign ministry officials concerning the conduct of the 
Russian foreign policy,  the copies of the orders to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
joint Russo-Ottoman squadron F. F. Ushakov, as well as to the authorities of the 
Russian Black Sea Admiralty, copies of various international treaties, the 
correspondence of the Russian ambassador V. S. Tomara with F. F. Ushakov and the 
commanders of the Russian transport ships passing through Constantinople and the 
minutes of the conferences of the Russian ambassadors with the Ottoman authorities.  
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Another group of the archival documents is from the Russian State Military 
Historical Archive (Российский Государственный Военно-Исторический Архив), 
also in Moscow. The documents from this archive mainly include the reports of the 
Russian commanders of the troops, which were going to or stationed in the Ionian 
Republic, addressed to the Emperor. Due to these reports it is possible to trace the 
time of the departures and the arrivals of the Russian armed forces assigned for the 
garrison on the Ionian Islands, as well as the names and the strength of the troops. 
 
As to the Ottoman archival material, I have examined the Hatt-i Hümayun 
register of the Ottoman Archive of the Prime Ministry (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) 
in Istanbul. However, and this remains one of the most important limitations of this 
study, the Ottoman documents were used here insufficiently. Also, I could use some 
amount of documents from the Foreign Affairs Archive (Archive des Affaires 
Étrangères) in Paris, presenting the opinion of some French diplomatic agents in the 
Ottoman Empire regarding the international situation of the time. 
 
Among the most important published collections of the documents, used in the 
given research, first of all should be mentioned the started in 1960-s by the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry and still continued collection of the Russian diplomatic documents 
of the 19-early 20th centuries “Foreign Policy of Russia in the 19th- early 20th 
centuries” (Внешняя политика России XIX и начала XX века: документы 
Российского Министерства иностранных дел). Other materials, published both in 
the Tsarist and the Soviet times in Russia, consist of numerous volumes of the 
private and official document collections (The Archive of Prince Vorontsov (Архив 
князя Воронцова) in 40 volumes, The Archive of Mordvinov Counts’ Family 
7 
(Архив графов Мордвиновых) in 10 volumes, Collection of the Imperial Russian 
Historical Society (Сборник Императорского Российского Исторического 
Общества) in 148 Volumes, published in the Tsarist times; the collections of private 
documents of M. I. Kutuzov and F. F. Ushakov, each of them consisting of 3 
volumes, which were published in early 1950-s in the Soviet Union).  
 
The published diaries, letters and memoirs make an additional and extremely 
valuable source of information. Indispensable for this study was the private 
correspondence of Catherine II with G. A. Potemkin and Joseph II. During the 
research there also have been used the diaries of Heinrich Reimers and Johann 
Struve, two young Russian noblemen who participated in the ambassadorial 
delegation of M. I. Kutuzov to Constantinople and have recorded their memoirs of 
this event. Besides, very useful were the memoirs of M. Ogiński, who was the 
special diplomatic representative of the Polish emigrant circles in Istanbul in 1796. 
As regards the Ionian and Italian campaigns of the joint Russo-Ottoman forces of 
Ushakov, a unique and interesting information can be found in the memoirs of the 
Russian naval officer Ye. Metaxa, who served during the Ushakov’s expedition as an 
aide on the flagship of the Ottoman squadron of Kadir Bey. The memoirs of the two 
French officers, J. P. Bellaire and M.-A.-B. Mangourit are also important because 
they describe the siege of Corfu and Ancona through the eyes of the besieged French 
defenders of these fortresses.  
 
With a view to consult the full texts of the international treaties mentioned in 
this work, were used the respective collections of Martens (Martens, Georg 
Friedrich. Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, 
8 
de commerce, de limites, d'echange etc. Göttingen: Dietrich, 1800. Vol. 6), 
Noradounghian (Noradounghian, Gabriel, ed. Recueil d'actes internationaux de 
l'Empire Ottoman, 4 vols. Paris: F. Pichon, 1897-1903), Testa (Recueil des Traités de 
la Porte Ottomane. 11 vols. Paris: Amyot, Editeur des Archives diplomatiques, 
1864-1911) and the Full Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire (Полное 
Собрание Законов Российской Империи). 45 vols., St. Petersburg, 1830. 
2.2. Historiography  
It is quite difficult to find specific scholarly works concerning the Ottoman-
Russian relations during the short period of 1792-1806. Those existing studies that in 
one way or another relate to the subject of the present research I thought it possible 
to arrange into three larger groups, which are the Russian/Soviet/Post-Soviet, the 
Ottoman/Turkish and the Western historiography.     
 
Of the Russian/Soviet/Post-Soviet authors, whose monographs and unpublished 
dissertations were essential for this research, I would point out D. Miliutin1, A. 
Stanislavskaia2, E. Tarle3, A. Shapiro4, A. Miller5, I. Elterman6 and N. Mun’kov.7 
                                                 
1 D. Miliutin, Istoriia Voiny 1799 g. mezhdu Rossiyey i Frantsiyey. (3 vols.: St. Petersburg, 1857). 
2 A. M. Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deiatelnost’ F.F. Ushakova v Gretsii, 1798-1800 g.g.. 
(Moscow, 1983); A.M. Stanislavskaia, Rossiia i Gretsiia v kontse XVIII- nachale XIX veka: Politika 
Rossii v Ionicheskoi Respublike, 1798-1807 g.g. (Moscow, 1976); A. M. Stanislavskaia, Russko-
angliiskiie otnosheniia i problemy Sredizemnomor’ya (1798-1807) (Moscow, 1962).   
3 E. V. Tarle, Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom more (1798—1800) (Moscow, 1948); E.V. Tarle, 
Ekspeditsiia admirala D.. Seniavina v Sredizemnoiie more (1805-1807) (Moscow, 1954). 
4 A. L. Shapiro, Kampanii russkogo flota na Sredizemnom more v 1805-1807 g. g. Doctoral 
Dissertation. [Sine Loco], 1951.  
5 A. F. Miller, Mustafa Pasha Bayraktar: Ottomanskaia imperiia v nachale XIX veka 
(Moscow;Leningrad, 1947). 
6 I. M. Elterman, Posol’stvo Kutuzova v Turtsii v 1793- 1794 g. g. Candidate Dissertation. Moscow 
State University, Moscow, 1945. 
7 N. P. Mun’kov. Diplomaticheskaia deiatel’nost’ M. I. Kutuzova (1792-1813 g. g.). Candidate 
Dissertation. Kazan’ State Pedagogical Institute, Kazan’, 1958. 
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Very useful were also the articles of G. Kleinman8, Z. Arkas9, N. Kallistov10, V. 
Sirotkin11 and E. Verbitskii.12 Although all these works touched upon some aspects 
of the Ottoman-Russian relations at the time under discussion, no special research 
addressed in detail the problem of the Ottoman-Russian reconciliation in late 18th- 
early 19th centuries in the face of the growing belligerence of France.  
 
The modest article of Kleinman, which was published in 1945, may probably 
serve as one of the few exceptions. The author of the article focused exclusively on 
the problem of the Ottoman-Russian alliance of 1799. First giving a cursory look at 
the international situation of the Ottoman Empire in 1790-s, the author then evaluates 
the character of the Ottoman-Russian relations at the same period. She examines 
what prerequisites were necessary for this alliance to be formed and in the end 
analyses the contents of the alliance treaty. Kleinman concludes her article arguing 
that the alliance between St. Petersburg and the Porte could not be durable because 
the Ottomans were afraid of Russia. In view of Kleinman, it was largely the Russian 
attempts to interfere in the Ottoman internal affairs, as well as the Russian wish to 
turn the alliance into a certain kind of protectorate, that was arousing the concerns of 
                                                 
8 G. A. Kleinman, Russko-Turetskii soyuz 1799 goda.  In Moskovskii Gosudarstvenniy Universitet. 
Istoricheskii Fakul’tet. Doklady i soobshcheniia. Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1945), pp. 9-23.  
9 Z. Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota s 1798 po 1806 god. Zapiski Odesskogo Obshchestva 
Istorii i Drevnostei, 5 (1863), pp. 846-901. 
10 N. D. Kallistov, Flot v tsarstvovaniie imperatora Pavla I. In Istoriia Rossiiskogo Flota (Moscow, 
2007), pp.208-246; Id. Flot v tsarstvovaniie imperatora Aleksandra I In Istoriia Rossiiskogo Flota 
(Moscow, 2007), pp. 247-321. 
11 V. G. Sirotkin, Iz istorii vneshnei politiki Rossii v Sredizemnomorye v nachale XIX v. 
Istoricheskiie zapiski, 67 (1960), pp. 213-233.   
12 E. D. Verbitskii, “K voprosu o blizhnevostochnoi politike Rossii na rubezhe XVIII i XIX vekov (O 
proekte russko-frantsuzskogo soyuza i razdela Ottomanskoi imperii F. V. Rostopchina). In 
Kolonial’naia politika i natsional’no-osvoboditel’noie dvizheniie (The colonial politics and national 
liberation movement). (Kishinev, 1965), pp. 159-193; Id. Peregovory Rossii i Osmanskoi Imperii o 
vozobnovlenii soyuznogo dogovora 1798 (1799) g. In Rossiia i Iugo-Vostochnaia Ievropa. (Kishinev, 
1984), pp. 60-67.     
10 
the Porte. The two articles of Sheremet13 are also quite useful in that they present a 
general outline of the relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire at the time 
of their alliance. These articles, however, are rather brief and lack many particular 
details, which could additionally back the author’s line of reasoning. The article of 
Kudriavtseva14, also dealing with the Ottoman-Russian relations at the turn of the 
18th- 19th centuries, is extremely poor, contains many unallowable mistakes, and 
should be mentioned only due to the attempt of the author to address such a subject. 
A very qualified account of the Ottoman-Russian negotiations throughout 1805 about 
the renewal of the alliance treaty, which has been provided by Verbitskii15, is in its 
own way a unique study on that topic in the Russian historiography and deserves for 
special attention.     
 
In general, though, the Russian and the Soviet historians never specifically 
turned their attention to the fact of the Ottoman-Russian rapprochement, cooperation 
and alliance at the end of the 18th century. More popular among the Russian/Soviet 
historians were the topics related to the heroic exploits of the Russian arms and the 
renowned Russian military and naval commanders like Kutuzov, Suvorov or 
Ushakov. Only within the framework of such studies it is possible to find some 
references to the partnership between the Tsar and the Sultan. Thus, the three 
volumes of the fundamental work of D. Miliutin16 about the war of 1799 mostly 
focus on the military activities of Suvorov in the Northern Italy though also describe 
the Mediterranean campaign of the squadron of Ushakov, and, fragmentarily, 
                                                 
13 V. I. Sheremet, Vneshniaia politika Vysokoi Porty: K vremennomu soyuzu s Rossiyey. In 
Balkanskiie issledovaniia, Vol. 18 (Moscow, 1997), pp. 40-52; Id. Vysokaia Porta vnov’ sblizhayetsia 
s Frantsiyey. In Balkanskiie issledovaniia, Vol. 18. (Moscow, 1997), pp. 159-168. 
14 Ye. P. Kudriavtseva, Rossiia i Turtsiia na rubezhe XVIII-XIX vekov: ot voyn k soyuznym 
dogovoram. oveishaia Istoriia, 6 (1996), pp. 45-59. 
15 Verbitskii, Peregovory Rossii i Osmanskoi Imperii. 
16 General Field marshal D. A. Miliutin was the War Minister of the Russian Empire in 1861-1881. 
See: Voiennaia Entsyklopediia. Vol. 15. (S. Petersburg, 1914), pp. 293-97. 
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provides some information on the joint with the Russians activities of the Ottoman 
ships and soldiers. 
 
In the same way Z. Arkas, N. Kallistov, E. Tarle and A. Shapiro in their 
studies, dealing with the Mediterranean campaigns of Ushakov and Seniavin, 
concentrate on the activities of the Russian naval forces and almost never mention 
the Ottoman allies of the Russians. It seems that the studies of Elterman and 
Mun’kov, both about the diplomatic activities of Kutuzov, had also been undertaken 
not so much in view to shed more light on the history of the Ottoman-Russian 
relations as to illuminate the diplomatic gifts of the celebrated defeater of Napoléon. 
Again, Stanislavskaia in her books examines the Russo-Greek connections in the 
context of the creation of the Seven Islands Republic, calling attention to the 
diplomatic and political talents of Ushakov. The only completely different in this 
respect is the work of Miller, which explains the events relating to the specific 
subject from the Ottoman history, though it largely covers the times after the 
deposition of Selim III, that is, when the new Ottoman-Russian war was under way 
and has little to add to the history of the earlier Ottoman-Russian cooperation.  
 
The studies regarding the Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 19th 
century, like those of Sirotkin17, Ievstignieiev18and Vinogradov19, despite being quite 
interesting and detailed, deal with the general European politics of the period and 
concentrate on relations between Russia, Great Britain and France. In this context the 
                                                 
17 Sirotkin, Iz istorii vneshnei politiki Rossii. 
18 I. V. Ievstignieiev, ‘K voprosu o tseliakh vneshnei politiki Rossii v 1804-1805 godakh’  Voprosy 
Istorii, 5 (1962), pp. 203-10.  
19 V. N. Vinogradov, ‘Razriadka v napoleonovskuyu epokhu. Bonapart i russkiie’ In Balkanskiie 
issledovaniia, Vol. 18 (Moscow, 1997), pp. 77-97; Id. “”Vostochniy roman” generala Bonaparta i 
balkanskiie griozy imperatora Pavla” Ibidem, pp. 53-64. 
12 
Ottoman Empire for the most part remains a blank space, much neglected by the 
authors. Very important in terms of getting the Russian perspective of the Eastern 
question, even though through a bird’s eye view, are the classical work of the 19th 
century written by Zhigarev20 and the collective study of the Soviet historians 
published in late 1970-s.21 
 
To sum up, there is no special study in Russian, except for a few articles, which 
would specifically focus on the subject of the Ottoman-Russian relations during the 
inter-war period of 1792-1806. All existing Russian (Tsarist/Soviet/Post-Soviet) 
works which partly touch upon the issues concerning the interaction between the 
Russian and the Ottoman empires at the given period mostly deal with the Russian 
military and naval victories under command of Ushakov or Suvorov. The works 
dealing with the embassy of Kutuzov to the Ottoman Empire in 1793-1794, though 
are very helpful, also concentrate more than on anything else on the personality of 
the future victorious Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army during the 
Napoléonic invasion in Russia. The fact of the alliance between St. Petersburg and 
the Porte usually plays only a subordinate part in the mentioned studies or can be 
even not mentioned more than in a few lines. The same holds true for the works on 
the diplomatic history of the period. The Russian relations with such leading 
European powers of the period like France, Great Britain or Austria have been more 
or less investigated by many researchers, while at the same time the Russian relations 
with the Porte during the same period remain largely unexplored.   
 
                                                 
20 S. A. Zhigarev, Russkaia politika v Vostochnom voprose (yeyo istoriia v XVI-XIX vekakh, 
kriticheskaia otsenka i budushchiie zadachi) (2 vols.; Moscow, 1896). 
21 Vostochniy vopros vo vneshnei politike Rossii, konets XVIII-nach. XX v. (Moscow, 1978). 
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When it comes to the Turkish historiography of the Ottoman-Russian relations 
during the time of the French Revolutionary and Napoléonic wars, it is not that rich, 
not to say that it hardly exists. The book of Kurat22 is rather a general overview of 
the Ottoman-Russian relations throughout three centuries and does not bring 
anything specific about the period under discussion. The articles of Inalcık23 and 
Uzunçarşılı24 only slightly touch upon some aspects of the Ottoman-Russian 
relations of the time, yet cannot be considered profound studies on the subject. One 
can also mention the article of Bilim25, which is, however, not very original, being 
largely based on the Ottoman publication of Hayreddin Nedim26, describing the 
embassy of Mustafa Rasih Pasha to Russia in 1793-1794. In general, in all these 
works Russia has been depicted only as the universal evil, sometimes in a much 
exaggerated manner. No attempt was ever made to look into any examples of the 
Ottoman-Russian cooperation, which would be contradicting to the overall discourse 
of Russia as an eternal enemy. 
 
Some studies, like the books of Karal27 and Soysal28, as well as the article of 
Süslü29 have been undertaken in regard to the Ottoman-French relations at the end of 
the 18th - early 19th centuries. There are also a few specific works on the Ottoman 
                                                 
22 Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya: XVII.Yüzyıl sonundan Kurtuluş savaşına kadar Türk-Rus 
ilişkileri 1798-1919 (Ankara, 1970).   
23 Halil Inalcık, ‘Yaş Muahedesinden Sonra Osmanlı-Rus Münasebetleri (Rasih Efendi ve Ceneral 
Kutuzof elçilikleri’ Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi, 4 (1946), pp. 195-
203.   
24 Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, ‘Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti’ Belleten, 1 (1937), pp. 627-639.  
25 Cahit Bilim, ‘Mustafa Rasih Paşa’nın Rusya Sefaretnamesi (30.1.1793- 8.2.1794)’ Osmanlı Tarihi 
Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi (OTAM), 7 (1996), pp. 15-36.  
26Hayreddin Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti. (İstanbul, 1333). 
27 Enver Ziya Karal, Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1797-1802 (İstanbul, 1938). 
28 İsmail Soysal. Fransız ihtilâli ve Türk-Fransız diplomasi münasebetleri (1789-1802). 3rd ed. 
(Ankara, 1999). 
29 Azmi Süslü, ‘Osmanlı-Fransız Diplomatik İlişkileri, 1798-1807’ Belleten, 47 (1983), pp. 259-279; 
Azmi Süslü. ‘Rapports Diplomatiques Ottomano-Français, 1798-1807’ Belleten, 47 (1983), pp. 237-
257. 
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state apparatus and the Ottoman diplomatic activities at the discussed period30 that 
contain some information on the Ottoman diplomatic missions abroad.  However, the 
place of Russia in these works is quite insignificant. Possibly the only attempt to 
change the situation has been made recently by Şakul31, whose dissertation, based 
mainly on the original materials from the Ottoman Archive of the Prime Ministry, 
observes the time and the circumstances of conclusion of the Ottoman-Russian 
alliance and the Ottoman-Russian naval expedition in the Mediterranean. However, 
the vast published sources in Russian, as well as the Russian archival materials were 
to a great extent underused by the author. In this way, the Turkish historiography still 
lacks in a great degree the special studies on the relations between the Russian and 
the Ottoman empires in the years of their rapprochement and alliance in late 18th- 
early 19th centuries, which would be based also on the Russian sources and free from 
the traditional Ottoman-Turkish discourse of Russia as a declared enemy of the Porte 
with which any cooperation was impossible in principle. 
 
As for the Western historiography, despite the seeming abundance of the works 
dedicated to the European diplomatic history of the time, covering the last decade of 
the 18th and the first decade of the 19th centuries, there are not so many indeed 
significant studies about the Ottoman and the Russian Empires in the context of their 
bilateral relations. Among those studies that shed some light on the issue one should 
mention, first of all, the books of Puryear32, Shupp33, Saul34, McKnight35, Shaw36, 
Mouravieff37, Bradisteanu38, Herbette39, Marcère40 and Fitzgibbon.41  
                                                 
30 Ercümend Kuran, Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasî 
Faâliyetleri, 1793-1821. (Ankara, 1988); Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri. 
(Ankara, 1987). 
31 Kahraman Şakul. An Ottoman Global Moment: War of Second Coalition in the Levant. Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, 2009. 
32 Vernon John Puryear, apoleon and the Dardanelles. (Berkeley, 1951). 
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Puryear’s study has been based exclusively on the French and the British 
archival materials, and closely investigates the Near Eastern policy of France broadly 
since the proclamation of the Empire until the downfall of Napoléon’s rule and the 
restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in 1815. Being not a special study on the 
Ottoman-Russian relations, in terms of its chronological scope the book of Puryear 
only slightly reveals the circumstances of the last years of the Ottoman-Russian 
alliance. It is important for the present dissertation in terms of providing some 
information on the diplomatic struggle among the European powers about the 
recognition of the imperial title of Bonaparte by the Ottoman government and also 
gives a general account of the renewal of the alliance treaty between St. Petersburg 
and the Porte.  
 
The fundamental research of Shupp is a good record of the diplomatic events 
through 1806-1807, and mainly rests on the British archival materials. The author 
also worked with the French and the Austrian archives. Of the Russian sources, 
Shupp used the collections of the documents from the published Archive of Prince 
Vorontsov42 and the published documents from the Collection of the Imperial 
                                                                                                                                          
33 P. F. Shupp, The European powers and the ear Eastern question, 1806-1807 (New York, 1966). 
34 N.E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean 1797-1807 (Chicago, 1970). 
35 James Lawrence Mcknight, Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The Genesis Of Russia's 
First Balkan Satellite. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1965. 
36 Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and ew: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III.1789-1807 
(Cambridge, 1971). 
37 Boris Mouravieff, L’Alliance Russo-Turque au Milleu des Guerres apoleoniennes (Neuchatel, 
1954). 
38 Stancu Bradisteanu, Die Beziehungen Russlands und Frankreichs zur Türkei in den Jahren 1806 
und 1807. Inaug-diss. Berlin, 1912. 
39 Maurice Herbette, Une Ambassade Turque sous le directoire (Paris, 1902). 
40 Edouard de Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople: la politique orientale de la Révolution 
française (2 vols.; Paris, 1927). 
41 Fitzgibbon, Edward Michael, Jr. Alexander I and the ear East: The Ottoman Empire in Russia's 
Foreign Relations, 1801-1807. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. The Ohio State University, 1974. 
42 Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova. 
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Russian Historical Society43, but the Russian and the Ottoman archives remained 
unexamined. Saul and McKnight studied the Russian involvement in the 
Mediterranean affairs. The former provides a rather detailed outline of the activiries 
of the Russian naval forces under Ushakov and Seniavin in the Mediterranean, while 
the latter looks into the circumstances of the formation of the Ionian Seven Islands 
Republic. Within the framework of their studies Saul and McKnight also necessarily 
discuss some aspects of the Ottoman-Russian relations. Again, the authors use only 
the Western European archival collections along with some published Russian 
materials. The title of Mouravieff’s book, which is supposed to be on the Ottoman-
Russian alliance amidst the Napoléonic wars, does not reflect its actual contents. The 
given study is rather an overview of the European diplomatic history starting from 
the Egyptian expedition of Napoléon until the Vienna Congress. Fitzgibbon’s 
dissertation does not use any unpublished archival materials and is more a reference 
work of the published documents and the secondary sources relating to the topic of 
the Russian Near Eastern politics during the first years of the reign of Alexander I.   
 
Quite helpful is Shaw’s profound study of the Ottoman Empire under the reign 
of Selim III. This book would always be useful for any researcher of the period. This 
works compares favourably in that the author has exhaustively investigated both the 
Western and the Ottoman archival materials pertaining to the subject of his work, 
along with the secondary sources in the main European, Ottoman and Turkish 
languages. Even though it primarily deals with the reforms of izâm-ı Cedîd of 
Sultan Selim, the study of Shaw also provides very much useful hints to the general 
situation of the epoch and to the state of the Ottoman-Russian relations in particular. 
                                                 
43 SIRIO 
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A number of monographs by the French authors such as Driault44, Marcère45, 
Herbette46, published in the early 20th century, give the French perspective on the 
subject. The works of Driault look to be a complete apology to Napoléon and his 
policy of territorial aggrandizement. Despite the fact of the outright French invasion 
of Egypt, which brought about the Ottoman-Russian alliance, Driault never sees it as 
aggression. The essential idea that permeates the monographs of Driault is that 
Napoléon was a single saviour of the Ottoman Empire, while the true aggressor was 
Russia, just waiting for an opportunity to destroy the Ottoman Empire and to capture 
Constantinople. In this sense, the books of Driault clearly suffer from open 
Russophobia, being rather uncritical and resembling more of a political manifesto 
than an impartial scholarly investigation. Marcère’s work is important in that it 
shows the French view of the diplomatic struggle at the Ottoman capital throughout 
1790-s, being based on the French archival materials and widely using the excerpts 
from the French newspapers of the time. Also, one should mention the study of 
Herbette about the Ottoman embassy of Moralı Seyyid Ali Efendi to France during 
1797-1802. 
 
Pisani in his article47 addresses the topic of the French occupation of the Ionian 
Islands after the Treaty of Campo Formio, and the consequent hostilities of the 
French with the Ottoman Empire and Russia, also mentioning the arrests of the 
French citizens by the Ottomans. As regards the joint Ottoman-Russian expedition of 
                                                 
44 E. Driault, La politique orientale de apoléon. Sebastiani et Gardane (1806-1808) (Paris, 1904); 
Id. La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, 1905).  
45 Edouard de Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople : la politique orientale de la Révolution 
française (2 vols.; Paris, 1927). 
46 Maurice Herbette, Une Ambassade Turque sous le directoire (Paris, 1902). 
47 P. Pisani, ‘L’expédition Russo-Turque aux îles ioniennes en 1789-1799’ Revue d’Histoire 
diplomatique, 2 (1888), pp. 190-222. 
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Ushakov, the article of Pisani explains only the most general facts about the 
expedition and in this sense makes many references to Miliutin.48 The author finishes 
his article by reviewing the changes in political status of the Ionian Islands after the 
Ottoman-Russian conquest. The article is of rather informative character and lacks an 
insightful analysis of the described events. Regarding the French perspective of the 
rivalry of the European powers at the Porte in early 19th century, it would be very 
useful to consult the articles of Coquelle.49 
 
In the western historiography the exchange of the extraordinary embassies 
between St. Petersburg and the Porte in 1793-1794 has been reflected in a few 
articles by Clément-Simon50, Grunwald51 and Conermann.52 The article of Clément-
Simon, being not very original, describes only the external side of the ambassadorial 
mission of Kutuzov, including the ceremony of the exchange of the embassies, the 
reception of the embassy in Constantinople, the gifts presented etc. The limitation of 
the article is that the international politics of the time almost not touched upon. 
Grunwald’s article, even though quite informative, has no references whatsoever. 
The article of Conermann about the ambassadorial mission of Mustafa Rasih Pasha 
to St. Petersburg is remarkable by its extensive bibliography relating to the subject of 
the Ottoman diplomatic missions abroad. However, it analyses more the Ottoman 
diplomatic practices, the personality of the Ottoman ambassador to Russia and some 
                                                 
48 Miliutin, Istoriia Voiny 1799 g. 
49 P. Coquelle, ‘L’ambassade du maréchal Brune à Constantinople (1803-1805)’ Revue d’histoire 
diplomatique, 18 (1904), pp. 53-73; Id. ‘La mission de Sébastiani à Constantinople en 1801’ Revue 
d’histoire diplomatique, 17 (1903), pp. 438-455; Id. ‘Sébastiani, ambassadeur à Constantinople, 1806-
1808’ Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 18 (1904), pp. 574-611. 
50 F. Clément-Simon. ‘Un ambassadeur extraordinaire russe à l’époque de Catherine II et de Sélim III’ 
Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 21 (1907), pp. 25-39. 
51 Constantin de Grunwald. ‘Une Ambassade Russe à Constantinople au XVIIIe Siecle’ Miroir de 
l'Histoire, 82 (1956), pp. 491-99. 
52 Stephan Conermann. ‘Das Eigene und das Fremde: der Bericht der Gesandtschaft Musafa Rasihs 
nach St. Petersburg 1792-1794’  Archivum Ottomanicum, 17 (1999), pp. 249-270. 
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of the contents of his ambassadorial report (sefâretnâme), yet does not aim to look 
into the political affairs of the late 18th century. 
 
Among the general works on the history of the Ottoman Empire and the history 
of relations between the Porte and the leading European powers should be mentioned 
the works of Zinkeisen53, Iorga54, Juchereau de Saint-Denys55 and Anderson.56 Apart 
from that, the articles of Findley57, Naff58 and Ragsdale59, dealing with the topics 
related to the present research, should be mentioned.  
 
In the end, there are some works of the Eastern European authors, including 
Goşu60, Reychman61 and Stoilova62 among others, that were useful for this study. 
The monograph of the Romanian historian Goşu is one of a few special studies, 
along with earlier article of Verbitskii63, which is completely dedicated to the issue 
of the renewal of the alliance treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Based 
on the materials of the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry (AVPRI), the book 
of Goşu is for sure an indispensable reading for a researcher of the Ottoman-Russian 
                                                 
53 Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa (Vol. 6, Gotha, 1859; 
Vol. 7, Gotha, 1863). 
54 Nicolae Iorga. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches. ach den Quellen dargestellt. (Vol. 5, Gotha, 
1913). 
55 Antoine de Juchereau de Saint-Denys, baron. Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman depuis 1792 jusqu'en 
1844. (4 Vols.; Paris, 1844); Théophile Lavallée, Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman depuis les temps 
anciens jusq’à nos jours (Paris, 1855). 
56 M. S. Anderson, The Eastern question, 1774-1923: a study in international relations (London, 
1970). 
57 Carter V. Findley, ‘The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginnings of 
Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3 
(1972), pp. 388-416; Id. ‘The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign 
Ministry’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 334-357. 
58 Thomas Naff, ‘Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-
1807’ Journal of the American Oriental Society, 83 (1963), pp. 295-315. 
59 Hugh Ragsdale, ‘Russian Projects of Conquest in the eighteenth century’ In: Hugh Ragsdale, (ed.). 
Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (New York, 1993), pp. 75-102. 
60 Armand Goşu, La troisième coalition antinapoléonienne et la Sublime Porte 1805 (Istanbul, 2003). 
61 Jan Reychman, ‘1794 Polonya İsyanı ve Türkiye’ Belleten, 31 (1967): 85-91. 
62 Tamara Stoilova, ‘La République Française et les diplomates étrangers à Constantinople 1792-
1794’ Bulgarian Historical Review, 1991 19(4), pp. 64-75. 
63 Verbitskii, Peregovory Rossii i Osmanskoi Imperii. 
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relations at the beginning of the 19th century. I thought it possible to refer to the 
article of Reychman, even though it has been published in one of the leading Turkish 
historical journals, as such relating to the Eastern European rather than Turkish, 
historiography. Being quite small, this article explains some facts of indirect and 
secret aid by the Porte to the Polish rebels during the time of the Polish uprising of 
Kościuszko in 1794. Stoilova, relying on the archival materials from AVPRI, made a 
good analysis of the international situation and the rivalry of the European powers in 
Constantinople in the first half of the 1790-s.  
 
What is typical for the Western historiography is that in general the Russian 
imperial policy has been often looked upon one-sidedly and with a biased 
disposition, which seems to be a manifestation of traditional, at times quite 
exaggerated Russophobia.  Such a view obviously presents only one side of the coin.  
Very often in the Western historiography a tendency of the Russian foreign policy 
towards the Ottoman Empire that was oriented on the protection of the Sultan’s 
domains from encroachments of other European states has been ignored.
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CHAPTER III 
REESTABLISHIG OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIOS 
BETWEE RUSSIA AD THE PORTE AFTER THE PEACE 
TREATY OF JASSY (1792-1794) 
Nulla salus bello: pacem te poscimus omnes 
(Publius Vergilius Maro,“Aeneis”, 
Liber XI, 362) 
3.1. Two empires after the Peace Treaty of Jassy  
The last sanguinary encounter of all those that occurred between the two 
neighbouring empires throughout the 18th century could hardly resolve the initial set 
of long-lived controversies it began with. As regards the future of the Ottoman-
Russian relations this war brought about rather more problems than actual solutions. 
The peace treaty, signed by the representatives of both courts in the capital of 
Moldavia1, is notable not so much in itself as for the fact that it once again confirmed 
all the previous agreements concluded between the Russian government and the 
Porte2 over a period of two preceding decades. It was thus not only some new 
                                                 
1 The Peace Treaty of Jassy had been signed on 9 January 1792 (29 December 1791). The full text in 
Russian is available at: Polnoie Sobraniie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (PSZRI). Vol. XXIII, № 17008. 
(St. Petersburg, 1830), pp. 287-292; the text in French: Gabriel Noradounghian, (ed.) Recueil d'actes 
internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman (4 vols.; Paris, 1897-1903), Vol. 2, pp. 16-21; the text in German: 
Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535-1855 (London, 1855), pp. 510-17. 
2 The Article 2 of the treaty states, that “Трактат мира 1774 года июля 10, а Эгиры 1188 года 14 
дня Луны Джемазиель-Еввеля, изъяснительная Конвенция 1779 года марта 10, а Эгиры 1193 
года 20 дня Джемазиель-Ахыра; трактат торговли 10 июня 1783, а Эгиры 1197 года 21 Реджеба, 
и Акт объясняющий присоединение к Российской Империи Крыма и Тамана, и что границею 
есть река Кубань, 1783 года декабря 28 дня, а Эгиры 1198 года 15 Сафара, силою сего мирного 
договора подтверждаются во всех их Статьях, исключая те только, которые сим Трактатом или 
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territorial acquisitions gained by Russia at the expense of the Ottomans in Jassy, but 
the recognition of the whole body of earlier international legal acts regulating the 
new character of relations between the two countries which in their totality marked a 
profound geopolitical shift towards the Russian domination over the Northern 
coastline of the Black Sea.   
 
In this way, at the beginning of 1792, the following major agreements 
constituted the legal base of contacts between the two empires as well as among their 
subjects: The peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (21 July, 1774)3, the Aynalı Kavak 
explanatory convention (21 March, 1779)4, the Manifesto “On the Annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula, etc.”(19 April, 1783)5, the Commerce treaty of Constantinople 
(21 June, 1783)6, the Constantinople Act on peace, trade and borders (8 January, 
1784)7, and the already mentioned peace treaty of Jassy (9 January, 1792).  
 
As for the gist of all these treaties, they step by step confirmed the transfer of 
vast land areas between the mouths of the Dniester and Kuban Rivers, including the 
Crimean Peninsula, under the Russian rule. Also, the Russian merchants were 
guaranteed the privileges of the most favoured nation that were enjoyed heretofore 
                                                                                                                                          
же и прежними в одном после другого отменены”, PSZRI, Vol. XXIII, № 17008 (St. Petersburg, 
1830): 289. (in the original the dates are given according to Julian and Islamic eras). 
3 Russian text: PSZRI, Vol. XIX, № 14164 (St. Petersburg, 1830): 957-967; the text in French: Gabriel 
Noradounghian, (ed.) Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman (4 vols.; Paris, 1897-1903), 
Vol. 1, pp. 319-334; also see: Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535-1855 (London, 
1855), pp. 463-475.  
4 Russian text: PSZRI, Vol. XX, № 14851 (St. Petersburg, 1830): 800-805; the text in French: Gabriel 
Noradounghian, (ed.) Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman (4 vols.; Paris, 1897-1903), 
Vol. 1, pp. 338-344; also, Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535-1855 (London, 1855), 
pp. 480-86. 
5 Russian text: PSZRI, Vol. XXI, № 15708 (St. Petersburg, 1830): 897-98. 
6 Russian text: PSZRI, Vol. XXI, № 15757 (St. Petersburg, 1830): 939-956; the text in French: Gabriel 
Noradounghian, (ed.) Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman (4 vols.; Paris, 1897-1903), 
Vol. 1, pp., 351-373; also see: Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535-1855 (London, 
1855), pp. 486-508. 
7 Russian text: PSZRI, Vol. XXI, № 15901 (St. Petersburg, 1830): 1082-1083. The text in French: 
Treaties Between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535-1855 (London, 1855), pp. 508-509. 
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by the British and French8. It is necessary to point out that the very phenomenon of 
the Russian Black Sea commerce, which simply could not exist before on a 
significant scale, had arisen and only became possible in the train of the overall 
Russian drive to the South. Moreover, in the same year when the Crimea was 
annexed, St. Petersburg gained another political foothold in the Southern Caucasus, 
having established its protectorate over the Eastern Georgian kingdom of Kartli-
Kakheti in line with the treaty of Georgievsk9.   
     
Peace conditions that were agreed upon in the Moldavian capital considerably 
strengthened St. Petersburg’s positions in the Black Sea region vis-à-vis its southern 
neighbour, the Ottoman empire. As mentioned before, the Porte confirmed all of the 
previously concluded Ottoman-Russian agreements, meaning that in addition to the 
newly abandoned territories the Ottoman side de iure accepted the Russian 
annexation of the Crimean Chanate and recognized all changes of the Ottoman-
Russian border that took place since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774). The 
Sultan’s government was also obliged to protect the Russian merchants from attacks 
of the corsairs of Barbary; to prevent the possible abuses of its border authorities as 
regards the territories and inhabitants of the Georgian lands under the Russian 
protectorate; to keep its previous commitments to St. Petersburg on the subject of the 
Danube principalities, on whose behalf Russia gained the right to interfere already in 
1774. In regard to the trade with the Ottoman dominions the Russian merchants, as 
mentioned above, received equal rights with those of the British and French, thus 
enjoying the status of the most favoured nation.  
                                                 
8 The Article 11 of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty; The Article 6 of the Aynalı Kavak explanatory 
convention; The Articles 17, 20, 29, 30, 52, 77 and 81 of the Ottoman-Russian commerce treaty. 
9 The Treaty of Georgievsk had been signed on 4 August (24 July) 1783. The full text in Russian is 
available at: PSZRI, Vol. XXI, № 15835 (St. Petersburg, 1830), pp. 1013-1017. 
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The Jassy peace treaty, in brief, just completed the picture of quite a new 
geopolitical reality on the northern coasts of the Black Sea. Within barely a couple of 
decades the regional status quo changed dramatically. The formerly “Ottoman lake”, 
as the Black Sea used to be described, witnessed the Russian soldiers, merchants and 
diplomats coming to the areas not long ago considered as the sphere of exclusive 
Ottoman influence. 
 
In such an extremely short span of time, within a single generation, it was hard 
for both sides to readjust their bilateral relations in accordance with the new political 
landscape in the Black Sea basin. On the one hand, the lightning speed, with which 
the events marking the Ottoman-Russian confrontation were unfolding, could not yet 
make the Ottomans to forget their recent losses and still kept alive their hopes one 
day somehow to take back everything that had been lost. On the other hand, though, 
the dashing advance of the Russian forces across the Northern Black Sea plains, 
along with the acquisition of the Crimea, whetted in St. Petersburg further appetites 
and fed far-reaching ambitions to drive the Ottomans out of the Balkans10. 
Consequently, the outcome of the war of 1787-1792, though they were in general 
more than satisfactory for Russia, in some points could possibly not even completely 
please the Russian Empress, to say nothing of the Ottomans. At the same time both 
states, each for its own reasons, and witnessing the sparked by the French Revolution 
dramatic changes in European politics, preferred to negotiate a peace treaty to end 
this war. The peace treaty, signed in Jassy, was to become a new point of departure 
in relations between the two countries.   
                                                 
10 The “Greek Project” of early 1780-s provides an illustrative example of the strategic schemes 
designed at the discussed period by the Russian ruling elite as a quite real, even though too 
pretentious, political program. 
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Insofar as the Russian Empire is concerned, it ended the war with certain 
undisputed and quite real gains. First, Russia obtained vast territorial acquisitions; 
second, due to these the Russian empire became an established Black Sea power,  
there were founded new cities and ports in the northern Black Sea region, and there 
had been laid the foundations of Russian Black Sea commerce; third, St. Petersburg 
got more possibilities to exercise its influence on the adjoining parts of the Ottoman 
Empire, and even received the official right to interfere into the internal affairs of the 
Ottoman state on behalf of the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.   
 
Thus, returning to the gargantuan designs of the early 1780-s known in 
historical literature as the “Greek project”11, this remains only a matter of pure 
speculation what kind of ultimate aims about the fate of the Ottoman Empire might 
exist in the heads of some leading figures of the Russian state, including the Empress 
herself. Whatever the plan to oust the Ottomans from Europe could be, the idea was 
not a new one; it existed well before both in West European and Russian political 
thinking.12 “La Grand entreprise”13 of Catherine, considering its indeed boundless 
                                                 
11 The essence of this plan was outlined by Catherine in her letter to Joseph dated by September 21/10, 
1782. She shares here with the Austrian Emperor her ideas about what might be done in regard to the 
Ottoman state, which is in obvious decline. Catherine proposes, should the war with the Ottoman 
Empire happen, to make the Russian border with the Ottoman empire the Northern coastline of the 
Black Sea; to create in place of the Ottoman vassal Danube principalities a permanently neutral 
buffer-state Dacia, whose borders would be Dniester, Danube and the Black Sea; to expel, may it be 
possible, the “enemy of Christian name” from Constantinople and restore the Byzantine empire with 
Catherine’s grandson Constantine at the head. It is known, that somewhat earlier similar ideas were 
already mentioned in a memo prepared by A. A. Bezborodko, at that time the secretary of Catherine. 
See: SIRIO, vol. 26: 385.   
12 T.G. Djuvara, Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281-1913) (Paris, 1914); S. A. Zhigarev, 
Russkaia politika v Vostochnom voprosie (yeyo istoriia v XVI-XIX vekakh, kriticheskaia otsenka I 
budushchiie zadachi) (2 vols.; Мoscow, 1896).   
13 The term “Greek project” was not specifically used at the time and is the product of later 
researchers of the subject, as one of the core objects of this scheme was the restoration of the Greek 
state. Catherine in her correspondence with the Austrian Emperor Joseph II rather refers to her plan as 
the “great enterprise”. See: Catherine II to Joseph II, September 21/10, 1782. A. R von Arneth, (ed.) 
Joseph II und Katharina von Russland. Ihr Briefwechsel (Wien, 1869), p. 156. 
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ambitions and the current overall situation in Europe at the beginning of the 1790-s, 
stayed, however, to be an unrealized ideal scheme much exciting the minds of later 
historians.14 At the time nothing tangible came out of its vast program.  
 
Even if Catherine and her key statesmen might be nurturing some larger than 
life ambitions about the future of the Ottoman Balkan dominions, the war, declared 
by the Ottomans, who had been alarmed of the Russian expansion, came somewhat 
untimely for Russia, and in 1787 Russia was in no position to fulfil the great designs 
of the Greek project. For a number of objective reasons St. Petersburg was seeking to 
finish this war, which it entered without being fully prepared15 and which it had to 
fight on two fronts, as Sweden also unfolded the banner of war in the Baltics one 
year later. Catherine’s own words may serve perhaps the best testimony of her 
intention to conclude peace at the point after three years since the beginning of the 
military operations. While writing to General-Field Marshal G. A. Potiomkin, her 
celebrated favourite and, according to some accounts, her secret husband and a de-
facto co-ruler, the Empress refers to the Peace Treaty of Värälä (14 August 1790) 
with Sweden in the following terms: “By God’s will one paw has been pulled out 
from a swampy place... Now I pray God to help you to do the same with the 
                                                 
14
 One of the most detailed analyses of prehistory, sources and historiography of the question appears 
in: Edgar Hösch, ‘Das sogenannte "griechische Projekt" Katharinas II’ Jahrbucher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas, 12 (1964), pp. 168-206; also see: Hugh Ragsdale, Russian Projects of Conquest in the 
eighteenth century. In: Imperial Russian Foreign Policy. Ed. and trans. Hugh Ragsdale. Woodrow 
Wilson Center Series. (New York, 1993), pp. 75-102; O. P. Markova, ‘O proishozhdenii tak 
nazyvayemogo  grecheskogo proekta (80-e gody XVIII v.)’ Istoriia SSSR, 1958 (4), pp. 52-78; P. V. 
Stegnii, ‘Yeshche raz o grecheskom proekte Iekateriny II. Noviye dokumenty iz AVPRI MID Rossii’ 
oveishaia istoriia, 4 (2002), the same article, published in German: Piotr V. Stegni, ‘Noch Einmal 
Über das Griechische Projekt Katharinas II’ Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 50 
(2003), pp. 87-111; M. A. Petrova, ‘Formirovaniie avstro-rossiiskogo soyuza v pravlenie Iosifa II 
(1780-1790)’ Istoricheskiie zapiski, 128 (2007), pp. 116-138. 
15 ‘Letter of Catherine II to G. A. Potiomkin, 4 December (23 November) 1787’. Catherine says here 
that Austria was not more militarily prepared than Russia, and similarly did not expect war. Published 
in: Yekaterina II i G. A. Potemkin. Lichnaia perepiska. 1769-1791 (Moscow, 1997), pp. 254-55; 
SIRIO, Vol. 27: 453-55.     
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Turks”.16 This peace, Catherine continues, “saved men and money”.17 And a few 
days later almost in the same terms: “We pulled out of the mire one paw. As soon as 
we will pull out the other one, then we will sing Hallelujah”.18   
 
In sum, despite the existing bold projects to drive the Ottomans out of Europe, 
Catherine for the moment wished peace. The difficult overall financial situation, the 
expenses of wars in the North, South, and West, which lasted for several decades, the 
repercussions of the Pugachov uprising, the French Revolution, and the strained 
situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the Constitution (May 3, 
1791) had been proclaimed by the Sejm – all these made Russian Empress to speak 
about the wars with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire as of quagmire, and prefer to 
seek fast peace with the Sultan. On the other hand, so long as Catherine II stayed on 
the throne, there was always a possibility of reconsideration of the objectives of the 
Russian foreign policy and returning to the Greek project program, provided that a 
more favourable political situation turns up.   
 
In the meantime the questions the Ottoman government, and particularly the 
new Sultan Selim III, had to deal with were incomparably more distressing. The ship 
of the Ottoman state seemed to be increasingly falling apart and taking on ever more 
water in the heavy storms of the late 18th century.  Two ill-fated wars with Russia 
and the shocking first ever loss of predominantly Muslim-populated territories just 
reflected the urging necessity to save the empire from the oncoming catastrophe. 
                                                 
16 “Велел Бог одну лапу высвободить из вязкого места… Теперь молю Бога чтобы помог тебе 
сделать то же и с турками”. ‘Letter of Catherine II to G. A. Potiomkin, 16/5 August 1790’. 
Ibidem, p. 425.  
17 Ibidem 
18 “Одну лапу из грязи мы вытащили. Как вытащим другую, то пропоем Аллилуйя”. ‘Letter of 
Catherine II to G. A. Potiomkin, 20/9 August 1790’. Ibidem, p. 426.  
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What became apparent, even if not instantly and only for some narrow group of the 
leading Ottoman statesmen, was that the military defeats were merely the most 
visible outward manifestation of a deeper complex crisis of the whole state system. It 
was hardly an exaggeration when Selim III, while trying in war conditions to find 
some additional sources of financing for the army, asked the Kaymakam Paşa19 of 
sharing thoughts on this issue and wrote bitterly that they were about to lose the state 
(devlet elden gidiyor).20 By the end of the 18th century the domains of the Sultan 
turned into a scene of growing disorder, anarchy, immense corruption and the lack of 
effective control by the central authorities in virtually all spheres of life. 
 
What was clear to Selim was probably even clearer to others, including the 
Russian Empress. Obviously it was the critical situation of the Ottoman state which 
to a great extent influenced the direction of Catherine’s thought concerning the fate 
of the Ottoman European possessions and the Black Sea straits. In that very letter to 
Joseph II, which laid the foundations of what is known as the Greek project, she 
provided a description of the domestic situation within the Sultan’s domains. The 
special importance of this description is that it belongs personally to Catherine, who 
was not only a contemporary of the events she wrote about, but also the head of the 
state most directly involved and most carefully watching the political developments 
within the Ottoman Empire.  
 
                                                 
19 Sadaret kaymakamı, or Kaymakam Paşa –an official, appointed to perform temporarily the duties of 
the Sadrazam, in case of the latter's absence from the central government (because of leading a 
warfare, or for some other reason). While at his post, the Kaymakam Paşa could exercise all powers 
and authority pertaining to the office of the Sadrazam. More detailed information concerning the 
office of Kaymakam Paşa is available at: Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri 
Sözlüğü  (3 vols.; İstanbul, 1983-1993), Vol. 2, pp. 219-222.     
20 Selim wrote also, that he is personally ready to live on dry bread only, if necessary: “Devletin irad 
ve masrafı ve zait sefaheti cümlenizin malûmudur. Eğer bana şimdilik kuru ekmeğe kani ol deseniz 
ben razıyım... Siz bana beyan edin Allah aşkına devlet elden gidiyor sonra faide vermez”. Enver Ziya 
Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları (Ankara, 1999), p. 32.  
29 
So, evaluating the situation from the point of view of her own country, the 
Russian Empress called the attention of the Austrian monarch to the following 
circumstances: the lack of firm state’s control in the Ottoman provinces, with local 
pashas and magnates staying loyal to the centre only in word; aggravation of the 
existing separatist tendencies, that had been influenced by the methods of arbitrary 
confiscations of private properties, often practiced by the Ottoman authorities in 
order to fill the state treasury; the discontent of the majority of the Ottoman Christian 
subjects21; the reign of terror in the countryside, created by the marauding gangs; the 
flight of the rural population to the big cities, which had only increased the cost of 
life and added to the general chaos in the urban areas as well; the widespread lack of 
the discipline in the army and fleet, together with the concomitant notorious 
commercial involvements of the Janissaries; at last, the very Ottoman government, 
the Divan, each year being refilled with people, that were able only in illegal 
amassing of money rather than in looking for the remedies to save their country from 
the present critical situation.22 On the whole, a fairly coherent account by the ruler of 
neighbouring state of what was going on in the once-powerful Ottoman Empire.23 By 
then the Ottoman state, ironically, no longer fitted in fact its official name, Memâlik-i 
mahrusa (which literally means “well protected domains”), as the overall positions 
of the Sultan government grew more and more precarious. In the five years term (the 
quoted Catherine’s letter was written in September 1782) in addition to all of the 
                                                 
21 The Russian Empress also provides here an assertion that of the Ottoman subjects the Christians are 
“at least five-six times more than the Turks”. While this claim sounds rather irrelevant, it obviously 
had to support Catherine II’s overall argument.   
22 ‘Catherine II to Joseph II, September 21/10, 1782’. A. R von Arneth, (ed.) Joseph II und Katharina 
von Russland. Ihr Briefwechsel (Wien, 1869), pp. 152-53.  
23 For special studies dealing with the period and the question of the Ottoman domestic crisis, among 
others, see: Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and ew: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim 
III.1789-1807 (Cambridge, 1971); Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları (Ankara, 1999); 
Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları. izam-i Cedit, 1789-1807 (Ankara, 1988); Fikret 
Sarıcaoğlu, Kendi Kaleminden bir Padişahın Portresi: Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789) (İstanbul, 
2001); Yücel Özkaya, 18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Toplumu (İstanbul, 2007).   
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abovementioned problems, the Ottomans witnessed the Crimean Khanate annexed by 
Russia and found themselves engaged in yet another devastating war on their 
Northern borders.    
 
Selim III thus inherited, apart from other dilemmas and accumulated deep 
troubles, also the war with Russia. Abdülhamid I, Selim’s uncle and predecessor, got 
paralyzed under the influence of the news about the loss in December 1788 of 
Ochakov (Ottom. Özi) fortress24 and died of brain insult some three months later, on 
7 April 1789/ 11 Receb 1203.25 On the same day, Selim became the new Sultan. 
Should one pay attention to this date, it is easy to call to mind an event, which 
happened almost at the same time on the other side of the European continent. On 5 
May 1789 the Estates General were convened in Versailles. What no one could 
know at that point was that Europe came to the verge of momentous changes.    
 
At the outset of his reign, the young Sultan (when he ascended to the throne, 
Selim was 28 years of age) was determined to proceed with the war until the 
victorious end. Winning the war was important not only for the country, but also for 
the Sultan’s personal prestige, since “in the Ottoman Empire a defeated Sultan meant 
a doomed Sultan”.26 Notwithstanding with the demands of several commanders on 
the field who were certain about the weakness of the army and who insisted on 
seeking immediate peace, Selim still hoped to retake the Crimea with the help of 
Sweden and Prussia.  Very meaningful were his words that “I would not give up the 
                                                 
24 Abdülhamid I commented on the loss of Ochakov (Özi) and following massacre of its locals: “İşbu 
takrîr Alîm-Allâh ve kefâ-bihi beni yeniden mükedder eyledi. Bu kadar ehl-i İslâm’ın ricâl ve nisâ, 
kebir ve sağîrleri kefere elinde esir olmak…Yâ Rab senden niyâz-i âcizânem kal’a-i mezbûru yine 
dest-i a’dâdan dest-i İslâma nasîb ettiğin günleri göster…”. Quoted in: Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, Kendi 
Kaleminden bir Padişahın Portresi: Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789) (İstanbul, 2001), p. 35.  
25 About some additional circumstances of the death of Abdülhamid I see: Sarıcaoğlu, Kendi 
Kaleminden, pp. 34-37.  
26 Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları. izam-i Cedit, 1789-1807, p. 156. 
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fight against the Muscovites until the Crimea, with God’s help, will be conquered. I 
would give my consent to the peace negotiations jointly with Prussia and Sweden 
only if [the Muscovites], under the mediation of Prussia, would return without fight 
the Crimea”27, or “there is no peace with Russians, who are the principal enemies of 
the Ottoman state, as long as the Crimea will not be taken”.28  
 
However, the campaigns of 1789-1790 proved to be a complete disaster for the 
Ottomans, who lost the cities and fortresses in Moldavia and Dobruja one after 
another as the Russian forces appeared victorious in 1789 at Galatz (Galaţi), Focşani, 
Rymnik, Akkerman and Bender. In 1790, the Ottomans continued their unhappy 
series of defeats by surrendering to the Russians Kilia, Tulcea (Tulça), Isaccea 
(İsakçı), İsmail. On the Eastern front in the Caucasus, in summer 1791, the Ottomans 
lost Anapa29, the last Ottoman stronghold on the Northern shores of the Black Sea. 
The war on the sea was in the same degree disappointing for Bâb-i Âli and ended in 
the domination of the Russian fleet in the area after the victories at Fidonisi, Kerch 
Strait, Tendra and Cape of Kaliakra. In addition, having concluded peace with 
Sweden (14 August, 1790), St. Petersburg got opportunity to concentrate more 
resources for war in the South. Another Ottoman ally, Prussia was not as much anti-
Russian as it was anti-Austrian, and having made sure that the Austrians would quit 
this war without any substantial gains it had no reason to support the Ottomans and 
upset for the sake of the Porte its relations with Russia. Moreover, because of the 
revolutionary events in France no one, neither Prussia nor England or some other 
                                                 
27 “Ben dahi Kırımı avn-i Hakla teshir edinciyedek Moskoflu cenginden fâriğ olmam. Eğer Kırımı 
Prusya tavassutu ile cenksiz verirse Prusya ve İsveç beraber olarak müsalâhaya olvakit ruhsat 
veririm”. Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları (Ankara, 1999), p. 42.   
28 “... Kırım alınmadıkça Devleti Âliyenin asıl düşmanı olan Rusyalu ile sulh yoktur”. Ibid. p. 43. 
29 According to the Jassy peace treaty was given back to the Ottomans, eventually taken over by 
Russia in 1829. 
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country could render the Porte at this time any effective assistance. Thus, Selim’s 
wishes to make peace with Austria and to use all remaining forces of the Empire and 
its allies against the Russians ended in nothing. It was clear that the Ottoman state 
needed a breathing space to pull itself together, to cut war expenses and to use that 
money for the critical internal reforms conceived by the Sultan. What is more, the 
discipline in the Ottoman troops had fallen so low that the Janissaries were fleeing 
from the battlefield, and then were telling fantastic stories of their own exceptional 
bravery in Istanbul coffee-houses.30 Finally, Selim III himself became convinced in 
the fruitlessness of further fighting, and realized that recovering the Crimea in the 
present situation was beyond his powers. Thus, he sought for urgent peace before the 
massive desertion of Janissaries from the front would destroy the remains of the 
Ottoman army.31   
 
Consequently, the ensuing Ottoman-Russian negotiations led to the signing of 
the peace treaty in Jassy on 9 January 1792. Though Russia got new territorial 
acquisitions and commercial advantages for its merchants, it was far from being able 
to realize the boundless geopolitical schemes designed by the Russian and Austrian 
monarchs in the early 1780-s. As for the Ottomans, they, apart from failing to 
achieve their primary aim in the war, which was to get the Crimea back, suffered 
even further territorial losses and another serious blow to their state prestige.  
 
It was not only the Ottomans who were willing to conclude peace. For 
Catherine the current war, even if victorious, was rather untimely, and the Russian 
Empress was also interested in ending the conflict for all the practical reasons cited 
                                                 
30 Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları (Ankara, 1999), pp. 44-45. 
31 “Bari askerin cümlesi dağılmadan musalâhayı bir gün evvel akdetmeğe çalışasın”. Ibid., p. 46. 
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above. As soon as the peace of Jassy was signed, the former belligerents faced the 
new task to build up relations with each other based rather on the sober demands of 
the present moment, and not on the chimerical, albeit desirable, massive political 
projects. For this reason the statesmen of both empires were well aware of the 
necessity to work out a new modus vivendi for the time being acceptable for each 
party involved.  
3.2. Extraordinary Embassies of Mustafa Rasih Pasha and M.I. 
Golenishchev-Kutuzov  
3.2.1. General observations 
Following the stipulations of the 10th article of the Jassy peace treaty both the 
Tsar’s and the Sultan’s courts had to send their extraordinary representatives 
reciprocally, to exchange ratifications of the treaty and “to confirm the peace and 
true friendship between the two empires”. In order to get an idea of what could be the 
tasks of the ambassadors, it is fundamental to look once again at the driving motives 
behind the politics of the both states following the peace of Jassy. 
 
As it has been already said, neither side wished to continue the war at the 
moment. Regarding the Porte, it simply faced a defeat. The Ottoman traditional 
military organisation proved extremely inefficient in the battlefields against the 
Russian standing army that was trained, organised and commanded along the 
European lines. It refers equally to the organisation of the navy, the modern naval 
battle tactics and the superiority of the skills of the Russian Sea officers. The overall 
condition of the Ottoman military was only a reflection of the deep crisis of the entire 
Ottoman state, which literally was on the verge of survival. Therefore, instead of 
34 
continuing the costly and pernicious war, Selim III needed peace to have a time to 
engage in his long-before planned reforms known as izâm-i Cedîd.  
 
Catherine II for the time being was likewise in need of peace on her southern 
borders, not only in view of the damaging impact inflicted upon the Russian 
economy by the incessant wars (including the Pugachev uprising) that Russia had 
been waging for several decades32, but also by taking into consideration the 
dramatically changed state of international affairs. While the developments of the 
French Revolution arrested the attention of the whole Europe, for Russia no less 
important were also the affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. While the 
Russian government was preoccupied with the war against the Ottomans, the Sejm of 
the united Polish-Lithuanian state succeeded in adopting the Constitution of 3 May, 
1791, which threatened to diminish the heretofore unlimited Russian influence in the 
Commonwealth. Having finished the war in the South, Catherine would “get her 
hands untied”33 to interfere in the Polish-Lithuanian affairs and again to take control 
over the situation in the country. By the end of 1791, at the point of concluding the 
peace with the Sultan, the Russian Empress already planned to march her army of 
about 130.000 men from the Ottoman front into the Commonwealth territories in the 
right-bank Ukraine34 to suppress the May 3rd Constitution. Correspondingly, it was 
much important for Russia that at the moment the Ottomans would be keeping peace. 
Very revealing in this respect were the words of V. P. Kochubey, who wrote to S. R. 
                                                 
32 According to Veidemeier, the war of 1787-1792 did cost Russia over 60 million roubles, while the 
expenses made during the first Catherine’s war with the Ottomans (1768-1774) are estimated at about 
7 million roubles. See: A. Veidemeier, Dvor I zamechatelniie liudi v Rossii vo vtoroi polovinie XVIII 
veka (2 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1846), p. 98.        
33 Emanuel Rostworowski, Obalenie dzeła Sejmu czteroletniego przez Targowicę i interwencję 
carską. Drugi Rozbiór (1792-1793) In: Stefan Kienewicz and Witold Kula (Eds). Historia Polski 
(Warsaw, 1958), Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 297. 
34 Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, Polska w czasie trzech rozbiorów 1772-1799 (Warsaw, 1903) Vol. 3, p. 
104.   
35 
Vorontsov, Russia’s decades-long ambassador in London: “Vis-à-vis de la Turquie 
nous désirons sincèrement de conserver la tranquillité, et toutes nos actions 
démontrent la sincérité de nos intentions”.35 
 
In accordance with the aforesaid concerns of both states, their peace aspirations 
were very much real and yet, paradoxically enough, this alone could not guarantee a 
firm peace between them.  Each party had well-founded reasons not to trust the other 
and as a result felt insecure. No one could make the Ottomans to ignore the potential 
danger of a Russian attack and the numerous apparent manifestations of Catherine’s 
grande entreprise. In the same way, Russia could never be sure that the Ottomans, 
supported by some European power, would not decide to unfold the Holy Banner of 
the Prophet (Sancağ-i Şerif) once again, at the most undesirable moment. Such a 
situation, quite in line with the classical maxim si vis pacem para bellum, necessarily 
required from the statesmen of both countries that they still should be prepared for 
war even while contemplating the peace negotiations. 
 
It appears from this, that probably the most important task for the extraordinary 
envoys, which were to set off on a long journey, would be to reassure the other side 
of the peaceful and amicable intentions of their sovereigns. The envoys and their 
entourages, enjoying the status of the “legal spies”, would also clearly perform 
intelligence tasks so that to collect as much information as possible on the country of 
their stay. Apart from that, many practical questions relating to the recent war, like 
the fate of the prisoners of war, restitution of the arrested property of the Russian 
merchants, the new Trade Tariff etc. were to be dealt with. To represent their 
                                                 
35 ‘V. P. Kochubey to S. R. Vorontsov, 14 / 3 October, 1792’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (Moscow, 
1880), Vol. 18, p. 59.  
36 
countries in the capacity of extraordinary envoys at the foreign courts were chosen 
Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov and Mustafa Rasih Pasha. 
 
3.2.2. The Envoy of the Russian Empire 
The Russian court first planned in February 1792 to send to Constantinople 
Count Alexander Nikolaievich Samoylov, a nephew of all-powerful Potiomkin. 
Owing to Samoylov’s later appointment in September36 to the office of General-
Prosecutor (General-prokuror) of the Senate37 it was decided to assign the 
ambassadorial mission to M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, a prominent General and a 
hero of two previous Russo-Ottoman wars.38 The official orders in that respect had 
been issued on November 5, 1792.39  
 
The Russian representative at the High Porte, Poruchik General40 M. I. 
Golenishchev-Kutuzov was 47 years of age by the time of his appointment, having 
spent his entire life in the Russian military service and making a brilliant soldier 
career. At the age of twelve Kutuzov had been enlisted in the Artillery and 
Engineering School in St. Petersburg, then in 1761, being a 15 years old teenager, 
                                                 
36 ‘V. P. Kochubey to S. R. Vorontsov, 17 / 6 September, 1792’ Ibidem, p. 47. 
37 General- Prokuror was the highest office in the central administration of imperial Russia, 
established by Peter the Great in January 1722. The General-Prokuror had a seat in the Senate, acting 
there as the “tsar’s eye”, to supervise all activities. After the establishment of the ministries in 1802 
the minister of justice was entrusted with the duties of the general-prokuror. See: Sergei G. Pushkarev, 
Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh century to 1917 (New Haven; London, 
1970), p. 19; Entry ‘General-Prokuror’ In: Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopediia (16 Vols.; 
Moscow, 1961-1976), Vol. 4, columns 192-93.  
38 The personality of M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov is probably the most known for his successful 
command of the Russian military forces at the point of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812.  
39 I. M. El’terman. Posol’stvo kutuzova v Turtsii v 1793-1794 g.g. Dissertatsiia na soiskaniie uchenoi 
stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk. Moscow State University, 1945. [El’terman gives the date of 
Kutuzov’s appointment according to Julian calendar (October 25), though throughout her work she 
never specifies which system of reckoning, Julian or Gregorian, she uses; See also the letter of V. P. 
Kochubey to S. R. Vorontsov, dated November 7 (October 27), 1792.  Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova 
(Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, pp. 65-66. 
40 Генерал-поручик – A military rank existing in Russian army since 1730 through 1798, which 
corresponded to that of Lieutenant General.   
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started his service in the regular army. Gradually growing in ranks, Kutuzov took 
part in military operations against the Polish confederates. On several occasions 
before and right after the annexation of the Crimea, he took part in suppressing the 
Crimean Tatar uprisings in the peninsula, and also participated in both wars against 
the Ottoman Empire under Catherine II.  
 
During these wars Kutuzov was twice heavily wounded in the head and each 
time miraculously survived. First wound happened on 4 August, 1774 (by then the 
Küçük Kaynarca Peace Treaty (21 July) had been already signed and the war in fact 
ended, though the news did not reach the troops yet), in the middle of the pursuit of 
the Ottoman detachment, which two days earlier landed on the Crimean coast near 
Alushta. The bullet ran through Kutuzov’s head entering at the left temple, went 
behind his eyes, and came out at his right temple. Everyone expected Kutuzov to die 
in a few days, but he, though lost his right eye, survived. The second wound, got by 
Kutuzov at the siege of Ochakov (Özi) on 29 August, 1788, was almost identical to 
the first one. Again bullet passed behind the eyes, by some unexplainable miracle 
leaving the brain and the eye nerves untouched. Kutuzov, already a General, was still 
able to continue his service in the army and distinguished himself in December 1790 
at the assault on the Ottoman fortress of Izmail (Ismail).41 Immediately after the 
peace of Jassy Kutuzov was ordered to enter the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
                                                 
41 P. A. Geisman, Golienishchev-Kutuzov-Smolienskii Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ (25 vols.; St. 
Petersburg, 1903), Volume 9 ‘Knappe-Kiukhel’becker’, pp. 628-695; Entry ‘Kutuzov’ In: Sovietskaia 
istoricheskaia entsiklopediia (16 Vols.; Moscow, 1961-1976), Vol. 8, columns 335-337; some general 
information is also available at:  ‘Kutuzov, Mikhail Illarionovich, Prince’ The ew Encyclopedia 
Britannica. Micropaedia. 15th edition. 1995. Volume 7, p. 49.      
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and throughout the summer of 1792 he fought against the Polish insurgents to 
suppress the May 3 Constitution.42 
 
What is striking about the Russian extraordinary envoy is that Kutuzov was a 
very skilled soldier rather than a professional diplomat. For many even in St. 
Petersburg such an appointment was somewhat unexpected.43 On the other hand, an 
experienced officer could far better evaluate the military potential of the Ottomans. 
As it had been said earlier, along with the peace negotiations it was as much 
important for both sides to get intelligence on each other’s strength, dispositions and 
plans. The language of Catherine’s secret instruction was quite explicit and gives a 
good clue to why Kutuzov had been chosen:  
We had also considered that, due to Your skills in the art of war, You 
will not miss to make all those surveillances, which at the proper time 
can be useful and necessary to us (italics are mine; V. M.), as regards the 
location of the places, the roads, the population, the fortifications, the 
troops dispositions, the ammunition reserves and all that relates to the 
ground and sea forces.44 
 
Thus by entrusting the ambassadorial mission to Kutuzov, the Russian Empress first 
of all was relying on his immense military experience in order to sound the ground 
about the Ottoman fighting potential and whether and to what extent the Ottomans 
would be able to attack the Russian borders in the near future. Second, as one can 
see from the quote above, despite her obvious need for peace Catherine II still was 
                                                 
42 Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, Polska w czasie trzech rozbiorów 1772-1799 (Warsaw, 1903), Vol. 3, pp. 
176-77. 
43 V. P. Kochubey to S. R. Vorontsov, 7 November (27 October), 1792.  Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova 
(Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, pp. 65-66.  
44 “Имели мы и то уважение, что по искусству Вашему в ремесле военном не упустите 
сделать все те наблюдения, кои в свое время для нас полезны и нужны быть могут о 
положении мест, о дорогах, о населениях, укреплениях, расположении войск, запасах военных и 
о всем к воинской части сухопутной и морской принадлежащем”. Directive of Catherine II to M. 
I. Kutuzov, with a secret instruction “On political matters”. 4 March  (21 February), 1793. In: L. G. 
Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich. Dokumenty (Moscow, 1950), p. 199.    
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leaving open the possibility of further fighting with the Ottomans, this time in all 
likelihood in the Balkans. 
 
3.2.3. The Envoy of the Sublime Porte 
Just like his Russian counterpart, the extraordinary envoy of the High Porte to 
the Tsarist court Mustafa Rasih Pasha45 was not a professional qualified diplomat. 
What makes a huge difference between the two embassies is that the Russian side at 
this point had already had opened its mission in Istanbul again, headed by chargé 
d'affaires ad interim, Colonel Alexander Khvostov. In this way, upon his arrival 
Kutuzov could easily get acquainted with the overall situation in the Ottoman capital 
and would have at his disposal the trained diplomatic personnel of the Russian 
embassy. Moreover, even though Kutuzov was not a career diplomat, he could be 
quite useful as an experienced soldier, and Catherine’s instructions leave no doubts 
about the advisability of Kutuzov’s appointment. In case of Rasih Mustafa Pasha, he 
purely and simply lacked both the necessary diplomatic skills and experience, and 
did not have all the advantages that were at the disposal of his Russian colleague. In 
view of the then existing Ottoman diplomatic practices it could not, in fact, be 
otherwise.  
 
                                                 
45 Mustafa Rasih normally had the title of Efendi.  For the time of his special ambassadorial mission in 
Russia Rasih was conferred the rank of Rumeli Beylerbeyi, with the title of Pasha. See: 
Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî yâhûd Tezkire-i meşāhir-i 'Osmāniyye (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1311), 
Vol. 2, p. 348; Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1278), Vol. 5, p. 274. 
Upon his return to the High Porte, Mustafa Rasih continued his service using again the title of Efendi 
and is mentioned by Mehmed Süreyya in “Sicil-i Osmanî”, well-known compendium of biographies 
of the celebrated Ottoman statesmen, as Rasih Mustafa Efendi: 
Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî yâhûd Tezkire-i meşāhir-i 'Osmāniyye (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1311), 
Vol. 2, pp. 347-48. 
A biography of Mustafa Rasih has been also given at “Halifetü-r Rüesa”, a collection of brief life 
accounts of the Ottomans, who at different times were performing the duties of Reis-ül-Küttab, an 
Ottoman vague semblance of  the Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ahmed Resmî, Halifetü'r-Rüesâ veya 
Sefinetü'r-Rüesâ (İstanbul, 1269), pp. 140-41. 
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For long centuries, the Ottomans never troubled themselves with establishing 
permanent diplomatic missions abroad. More than that, they were not much 
interested in what was going outside the vast, mighty and majestic domains of the 
Sultan, the abode of the most magnificent civilization and the only true religion. 
Convinced in their own a priori cultural superiority over all other states and peoples, 
especially the Christian infidels, the Ottomans considered their state absolutely self-
sufficient. To use the mot juste of Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, to the Ottomans 
even in the second half of the 18th century “the world of Islam was still the world”.46 
In other words, such a worldview was based on the premise that the others may need 
and seek support, good will and generosity of the Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman 
Empire does not need anyone. Consequently, little value was attached to the 
diplomatic art, which resulted in the fact that the Ottoman statesmen knew almost 
nothing about the outer world neither did they possess any understanding of the 
fundamentals and practices of European diplomacy. Under the given circumstances, 
all practical issues concerning the relations of the Porte with other states were 
always discussed and settled in Istanbul, in an environment of constant intrigues and 
conspiracies, bred by contending parties of European ambassadors and those of the 
Ottoman statesmen alike. 
 
By the end of the 18th century, however, it was growing more evident that the 
Ottoman government could no longer afford the attitudes it used to display a few 
centuries before and happily ignore the later developments in European politics. 
Within a wide-ranging set of reforms conceived by Selim III, some fundamental 
changes were to be made as well in the heretofore completely disregarded field of 
                                                 
46 Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote. Mubadele: an Ottoman-Russian exchange of ambassadors 
(Chicago, 1970), p. 13. 
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diplomacy.47 Yet, at the moment, the Ottomans did have neither their own abroad 
embassies nor trained and skilled diplomats.48  
 
In this context, the Ottoman envoy to Russia could not be something other than 
what he was: bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of the bureaucratic system of 
the Ottoman state. Appointed to be the Sultan’s extraordinary and plenipotentiary 
representative at the court of the Russian Empress in the end of May 179249, Mustafa 
Rasih Efendi  was about the same age as his Russian fellow ambassador, or a couple 
of years older.50 Unlike Kutuzov, Rasih made his career not on the battlefields but 
serving and getting experience in the chanceries of the Ottoman central state 
apparatus. Starting as a junior clerk at the Chancery of the Grand Vizier, and 
apparently owing to his marriage with daughter of Âtıfzade Ömer Vahid Efendi, a 
very influential high-standing bureaucrat during 1760-1770-s51, Rasih could easier 
                                                 
47 For Ottoman traditional diplomatic practices and reforms consult: Thomas Naff, ‘Reform and the 
Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807’ Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, 83 (1963), pp. 295-315; J. C. Hurewitz, ‘The Europeanization of the Ottoman 
Diplomacy: The Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century’ Belleten, 
XXV (1961), pp. 455-66; Carter V. Findley, ‘The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The 
Beginnings of Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II’ International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, 3 (1972): 388-416; Idem, ‘The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman 
Foreign Ministry’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 334-357; Faik Reşit 
Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ankara, 1987); Ercümend Kuran, Avrupa’da Osmanlı 
İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faâliyetleri, 1793-1821 (Ankara, 1988); Hasan 
Korkut, Osmanlı Elçileri Gözü ile Avrupa (İstanbul, 2007); Chapters in books: ‘Window to the West’, 
in: Stanford Shaw,  Between Old and ew: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III.1789-1807 
(Cambridge, 1971), pp. 180-99; ‘Diplomasi Alanında Islahat’, in: Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün 
Hatt-ı Hümayunları. izam-i Cedit, 1789-1807 (Ankara, 1988), pp. 163-86.  
48 The only exception in this case could be Phanariotes, the subjects of the Sultan originating from the 
wealthy Greek Orthodox families, traditionally very much influential in the Ottoman administration, 
who also composed the majority of the dragomans at the Porte and at the foreign missions in Istanbul.  
49 Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ankara, 1987), p. 164. 
50 The year of Kutuzov’s birth, given in most of his biographies, is 1745. The age of Mustafa Rasih 
can be guessed from the data provided in his official biography by Mehmed Süreyya. It is stated there, 
that Rasih died on 14 Cemâziyelevvel, 1218 / 1 September, 1803, being sixty years old:  
Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî yâhûd Tezkire-i meşāhir-i 'Osmāniyye (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1311), 
Vol. 2, p. 348. Thus, according to this information, Mustafa Rasih must have been born around 1743. 
51 Mustafa Rasih’s father-in-law, among his other state offices, at different times occupied the posts of 
Tersane emini (Supervisor of the Naval Arsenal), Reis-ül-küttap (Director of Foreign affairs), 
Defterdar-i şıkk-i evvel (First Treasurer). For biographies of Ömer Vahid Efendi see: 
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get his further promotions as Topçu kâtibi (Scribe in the Artillery corps), Süratçı 
nâzırı (Superintendent in the Rapid-fire rifle corps), Tezkire-i sani (Second secretary 
of the Grand Vizier) (1787-1788), Tezkire-i evvel (1788-1789) (First Secretary of the 
Grand Vizier) and Rikâb-i hümâyûn kethüdası (Chief Attendant of the Sultan’s 
retinue) (1790-1792), Rasih’s last post before being appointed ambassador. Having 
received on 28 January, 179352 in the audience at the Sultan’s court the Royal letter 
(âme-i Hümâyûn) of Selim III to the Russian Empress, Mustafa Rasih set out on 
his journey two days later, on 30 January, 1793.53 
 
Conermann argues that in view of the high offices held by Mustafa Rasih, it is 
also possible to consider him a person who belonged to the narrow circle of the 
reformers of Selim III. He reinforces this argument by drawing attention to the fact 
that Mustafa Rasih was among the limited number of those higher officials, which 
upon the special request of the Sultan presented at the Imperial Council their own 
reform proposals (lâyiha) to launch the izâm-ı Cedîd reforms.54 Though not taking 
an active part in the reforms, Rasih obviously was closely connected with the key 
figures of the izâm-ı Cedîd, including the Sultan himself. Being thus at least to 
some extent a confidant of the Ottoman reformers’ circle with Selim III at the head, 
Rasih was expected, apart from the declared official purposes of his mission, to 
                                                                                                                                          
Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî yâhûd Tezkire-i meşāhir-i 'Osmāniyye (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1311), 
Vol. 3, pp. 594-95; Ahmed Resmî, Halifetü'r-Rüesâ veya Sefinetü'r-Rüesâ (İstanbul, 1269), pp. 116-
18. 
52 Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1278), Vol. 5, p. 274; Hayreddin Nedim. Bir 
elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti. (İstanbul, 1333), p. 10. 
53 Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1278), Vol. 5, p. 274. 
54 Stephan Conermann, ‘Das Eigene und das Fremde: der Bericht der Gesandtschaft Musafa Rasihs 
nach St. Petersburg 1792-1794’, Archivum Ottomanicum, 17 (1999), p. 263. More detailed account on 
the personalities of the izâm-i Cedîd reformers and their reform proposals has been given by 
Stanford Shaw, in chapter ‘The Reformers’ of his book: Stanford Shaw,  Between Old and ew: the 
Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III.1789-1807 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 86-111. The texts of 
lâyihas have been published in: Enver Ziya Karal, Nizâm-i Cedid’e dair lâyihalar Tarih vesikaları, 1 
(1941- 1942), pp. 414-25; Tarih vesikaları, 2 (1942-1943), pp. 104-11, 342-51, 424-32. The 
propositions made by Mustafa Rasih are also available here, at: Enver Ziya Karal, Nizâm-i Cedid’e 
dair lâyihalar. Tarih vesikaları, 2 (1942-1943), pp. 107-8, 425-7. 
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provide the Porte in as much as he could with his observations on all the spheres of 
life in the country of his stay.  
 
It should come then as no surprise that Rasih’s official ambassadorial report 
(sefâretnâme)55 presented to the Porte upon his return includes very detailed 
intelligence information on Russia. It is a rather extensive description of the Russian 
economy, society, army and state, and is far different from usual Ottoman 
sefâretnâmes, which were normally concentrated on ambassadors’ technical tasks, 
diplomatic ceremonial procedures, many smaller formalities of protocol and how the 
ambassadors were doing their best to defend the honour of their monarchs. What is 
remarkable, the sefâretnâme of Mustafa Rasih touches not only upon the current 
affairs, but also upon the events of the Russian relatively recent history, telling about 
the all-encompassing reforms of Peter the Great and their beneficial effect on the 
results of the Northern war Russia waged at the Peter’s time against Sweden.56 
These recordings of the Ottoman official, no doubt, are in close connection with the 
new reform movement of Selim III, giving an idea how Russia at the dawn of the 
18th century managed to cope successfully with the problems similar to those the 
                                                 
55 The Sefâretnâme of Mustafa Rasih Pasha’s embassy was actually written not by the envoy himself, 
but by Seyyid Abdullah Efendi, a scribe at the mission: Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve 
Sefaretnameleri (Ankara, 1987), p. 163. The Latin transcription of the given sefâretnâme’s original 
Ottoman text is available at: Uğur İyigünler, Mustafa Rasih Efendi’nin Rusya Sefareti ve 
Sefaretnamesi. MA thes., Kırıkkale University, 1998. The author of this MA thesis for the most part 
has only transcribed the Ottoman manuscript into its more easily readable, rendered in printed Latin 
characters, verbatim version. No attempt of some analytical evaluation of its contents has been made, 
though.  
56 “Kral-i mesfûr [Peter the Great; V. M.] … imparatorluğa nasb ve intihâb olunduğu helâlde 
Rusya’nın her hâlde fünûn ve harf ve sanâyi'i nâkıs ve nâ-tamâm ve bi’l- cümle idâre-i umûr-i 
mülkiyye ve askeriyyesi bî-râbıta ve intizâm memleketin nizâmı… ancak bi'n-nefs Avrupa memâlikini 
geşt ü güzar ile… ahâli ve asâkire lâzım ve mühimm olan hâlât ve keyfiyyâtı mu'âyene ve tedkîk 
husûsuna muhtâc olduğunu mülâhaza itmeğle… kadîmden makarr-i devletinde müstakarr olan 
merâsim ve kavâ'idin ekserâsını tağyîr ve tebdîl ve emr-i ticâreti tervîc ve tekmîl ve ma'tûf-i 
askeriyyesin tertîb ve fünûn-i harbiyyeyi tefhîm ve ta'lîm ve edevât ve levâzım-i beriyye ve merâkib-i 
bahriyyesini tanzîm ve ahâlî-i diyârînin ziyy ve libâsların deşiğdirmek îkâ' iderek vaktinde İsveç 
Devletile âğâz-i muhâsama ve muhârebe eyledikde kendünün verdiği nizâma ve râbıtadan küllî intifâ' 
eylediğinden ihlâfı dahi eserine iktifâyı iltizâm itmişlerdir”. Uğur İyigünler, Mustafa Rasih Efendi’nin 
Rusya Sefareti, pp. 6-7. 
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Ottomans were trying to solve presently. Among other things, special attention in 
Rasih’s report was paid to the organization of the Russian army along the European 
patterns.57 It can be said without any risk of exaggeration that, actually, one of the 
most tangible results achieved by the mission of Mustafa Rasih to Russia in 1793-
1794 was that it gave the Ottoman government certainly by no means an exhaustive, 
but more or less detailed first-hand account of the Russian society. 
 
At the same time, the capacities of the Ottoman embassy were quite limited 
from the very beginning. Mustafa Rasih, a high-standing bureaucrat going on a 
foreign mission, was supposed only to discuss the fate of the Ottoman prisoners of 
war. Neither having any diplomatic experience or knowing Western languages he 
likewise hardly could and in fact did not contact other European ambassadors at the 
Russian court.58 The actual diplomatic game as regards the line and preferences of 
the Ottoman foreign policy, with participation of the diplomatic representatives of 
the main European powers, was traditionally going on at Istanbul. 
 
3.2.4. Exchange of Embassies 
It was not for the first time when under much the same circumstances the 
extraordinary embassies were reciprocally exchanged between the Ottoman and 
Russian states. A couple of decades earlier, in compliance with the Küçük Kaynarca 
peace treaty (1774) provisions, Abdülkerim Efendi (like Mustafa Rasih granted for a 
term of his mission the title of Pasha) on the part of Bâb-i Âli and General in Chief 
Prince Nikolai Vasil’evich Repnin on the part of the Russian court visited each 
                                                 
57 İyigünler, Mustafa Rasih Efendi’nin, pp. 27, 29, 31, 49.  
58 At least, as Hayreddin Nedim reasonably points out, should Mustafa Rasih have some meetings 
with other foreign ambassadors it would certainly be reflected in the Seafaretname and his letters to 
the Bâb-i Âli. However, any evidences of this kind are missing: 
Hayreddin Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti. (İstanbul, 1333), p. 107. 
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other’s countries in 1775 as extraordinary and plenipotentiary representatives of their 
monarchs.59 The similar exchange of embassies took place even earlier, in 1740, 
when after the Belgrade peace treaty (1739) Mehmed Emin Efendi and General in 
Chief Alexander Ivanovich Rumiantsev were sent to Russia and the Ottoman Empire 
respectively.60 So, in terms of the ceremonial procedures to be held at the exchange 
of embassies, the sides had already the set precedents to follow.  
 
The large trains61 of both embassies left their capitals in winter-early spring of 
1793, and, with many rest stops on their way, moved at a slow pace towards the 
border dividing two countries. It took a few months for each embassy to reach the 
borderland areas of their empires. By the month of April the Ottoman plenipotentiary 
and his entourage encamped in the Moldovan town of Bender, situated on the right 
bank of the Dniester River that served as a boundary between the Ottoman and 
Russian domains. The Russian ambassador’s headquarters were established in 
Elisabethgrad (nowadays- Kirovohrad, Ukraine), a town, only recently founded 
amidst the vast plains on the former Cossack-Tatar border and called to be the centre 
of the Southern steppe region newly acquired by Russia. At this point, as the distance 
between the embassies grew less, their correspondence became more intense.62 The 
sides were preparing for the official ceremony of exchange, though at the same time 
                                                 
59 A detailed account on both these embassies, Ottoman and Russian, is available at: Norman 
Itzkowitz and Max Mote, Mubadele: an Ottoman-Russian exchange of ambassadors (Chicago, 1970). 
60 P. A. Geisman, Rumiantsov Aleksandr Ivanovich. Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ (25 Vols.; 
Petrograd, 1918), Volume 17 “Romanova-Riasovskii”, p. 471. 
61 The Russian embassy, for example, consisted of 476 only officially appointed members, not 
counting all kinds of lackeys and servants. Suffice it to say, that the team of musicians and the choir 
singers alone included 98 men. For the full list of the Russian embassy see: Personale des Gefolges 
der nach Constantinopel gehenden Gesandtschaft, in: Heinrich Christoph von Reimers, Reise der 
Russisch-Kaiserlichen Ausserordentlichen Gesandtschaft an die Othomanische Pforte im Jahr 1793. 
(St. Petersburg, 1803), Vol. 1, pp. 7-11. El’terman provides the figure of more than 650 people being 
enrolled with the Russian delegation: I. M. El’terman, Posol’stvo Kutuzova, p. 70.      
62 The questions concerning the time and place of the exchange ceremony, as well as on which side’s 
raft (the exchange was to be made in the middle of the Dniester River) it should take place, became 
the centrepiece of the given correspondence: 
Hayreddin Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti. (İstanbul, 1333), pp. 14-27. 
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some strange rumours about a possible break-up between the empires were floating 
in the air.63 However trustworthy or not these rumours could be, in view of the 
officially declared intentions of both governments, they do clearly indicate that the 
fear of a new war was still widely shared by many people.  
 
April and May passed in final preparations of all the necessary equipment and 
in waiting when the roads would dry out from the spring rains.64 Meanwhile the 
place and the date of the prerequisite exchange ceremony were also being discussed. 
It was finally decided, in accordance with the request of the Russian side, that the 
exchange should be made in the vicinity of Dubossary,65 a small border town situated 
on the left bank of the Dniester and only one year before, by virtue of the Jassy peace 
treaty, incorporated into the dominions of the Russian Empire. As for the date, the 
Russians at first proposed to chose 14 June. Considering that this day was falling on 
Friday (the day of obligatory public worship in Islam) it was agreed that the 
exchange ceremony would take place on the next day, that is, on Saturday, 15 June, 
1793 / 6 Zilkade, 1207.66 
                                                 
63 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, p. 41.  
64 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, p. 43.  
65 Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II on the designation of the place for the “exchange” of the 
Russian and the Ottoman ambassadors. 8 May (27 April) 1793. In: L. G. Beskrovnyi, (Ed.) Kutuzov 
Mikhail Illarionovich. Dokumenty (Moscow, 1950), p. 207-8; ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II 
on the agreement about the place of the “exchange” of ambassadors. 21 / 10  May, 1793’. Ibidem, pp. 
208-9.   
66 Ibidem, p. 57; ‘Letter of M. I. Kutuzov to A. S. Khvostov (Russian Charge d’Affaires in 
Constantinople). 10 June (30 May), 1793’. In: L. G. Beskrovnyi, (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich. 
Dokumenty (Moscow, 1950), p. 211; ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II about the designation of 
the place for the “exchange” of the ambassadors. 12/1 June, 1793’. Ibidem, p. 211-12; Ahmed Cevdet, 
Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1278), Vol. 5, p. 306.  
It is amazing, but the vast majority of the authors, who were writing on this topic (See: F. Clément-
Simon, ‘Un ambassadeur extraordinaire russe à l’époque de Catherine II et de Sélim III’ Revue 
d’histoire diplomatique, 21 (1907), pp. 25-39; Halil İnalcık, ‘Yaş Muahedesinden Sonra Osmanlı-Rus 
Münasebetleri (Rasih Efendi ve Ceneral Kutuzof elçilikleri)’ Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-
Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi, 4 (1946), pp. 195-203; I. M. El’terman, Posol’stvo Kutuzova v Turtsii v 
1793-1794 g. g.. Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk. Moscow 
State University, 1945. N. P. Mun’kov, Diplomaticheskaia deyatel’nost’ M. I. Kutuzova (1792-1813 
g.g.) Kazan’ State University, 1958) went along rather uncritically with the issue of dates, and the 
repeated wrong, or rather unclear, dates are simply passing from one article to another. This problem 
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The exchange of the two embassies has been described by many authors, but 
probably one of the most exhaustive and original accounts belongs to Heinrich 
Christoph von Reimers, a 25 years old Russian nobleman, who was then a member 
of the Russian delegation.67 Another young Russian official employed at the 
embassy, Johann Christian von Struve, has also left a very informative and important 
written description of his travels with the Russian ambassadorial train, where among 
other things he tells about what he saw on 15 June 1793 on the banks of the Dniester 
near Dubossary.68 The most comprehensive Ottoman account of the exchange 
ceremony is given in the work of Hayreddin Nedim, published in 1914/1915 and 
thoroughly based upon the Ottoman documentary materials, and in the first place 
upon the sefâretnâme of Mustafa Rasih’s embassy.69  
 
As far as the ceremony proper is concerned, it replicated the one held in 1775 
down to the smallest detail.70 It seems that both the Ottoman and the Russian courts 
                                                                                                                                          
is, unfortunately, quite typical when it comes to the Russian history and the Russian sources. In many 
cases even the Russian historians forget that it was the Julian calendar that remained in use in Russia 
up until 1918, and that it a little differs from the Gregorian one. For that reason, the dates in sources 
are usually given according to the Julian system of time reckoning (though at times the dates provided 
can be Gregorian as well). Thus it is advisable to check any specific data, so that not to mix the Julian 
and the Gregorian calendar systems. Sometimes a comparison with the Hijri dates, if available, is very 
helpful.               
67
 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, 1803, pp. 58-64. This is, in the strict sense, a collection of letters written 
throughout the embassy journey to an unknown friend in St. Petersburg. The French article of 
Clément-Simon in its part, which describes the exchange of the ambassadors, is obviously largely 
based on Reimers’ evidence, and as well as in many other places it looks to be very close to the text of 
Reimers, even to the point of uncritical repetition of the Julian dates used by Russian official: F. 
Clément-Simon, ‘Un ambassadeur extraordinaire russe à l’époque de Catherine II et de Sélim III’ 
Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 21 (1907): 25-39. 
68 Johann Christian von Struve, [published anonymously]. Travels in the Crimea; a History of the 
Embassy from Petersburg to Constantinople in 1793, including Their Journey through 
Krementschuck, Oczakow, Walachia & Moldavia with their Reception at the Court of Selim the Third. 
(London, 1802), pp. 74-6. 
69 The Ottoman description of the exchange ceremony is available at: Hayreddin Nedim, Bir elçinin 
tarihçe-i sefareti. (İstanbul, 1333), pp. 28-9. 
70 ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II about the “exchange” between him and the Turkish 
ambassador. 18 / 7 June, 1793’ In: L. G. Beskrovnyi, (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich. Dokumenty 
(Moscow, 1950), pp. 212-13.  
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in this case, like in many others, never spared money for their imperial prestige. The 
splendour and magnificence of the ceremony must have been indeed amazing. In this 
respect an observation of Reimers looks interesting and deserves to be mentioned. A 
young Russian says, that throughout his life he was an eyewitness of many 
remarkable ceremonies, including the Betrothal of the Doge of Venice to the Adriatic 
Sea in 1788, the address of the Pope to about 26 thousand of believers gathered on 
the St. Peter’s Square in Vatican and the Opening session of the Estates-General on 5 
May 1789 in Versailles, though still the Exchange of the Ottoman and the Russian 
embassies on the Dniester in terms of its grandeur surpassed everything he had seen 
before.71  
 
After the two delegations in dazzling pomp arrived at their sides of the 
Dniester, the ceremony of the exchange began. It was started with a cannon shot 
from the Russian bank that was immediately answered from the Ottoman territory.72 
The ambassadors, slowly moving with their entourages to the banks, were again 
greeted by ten cannon rounds fired on each side of the border. Mustafa Rasih Pasha 
and Kutuzov, accompanied by the exchange commissars and interpreters, at the same 
time took off from the opposing banks of the river and simultaneously disembarked 
at the big raft fixed in the very middle of the Dniester, on the invisible yet real border 
line between the two empires.  
 
The ambassadors, two men of almost the same age, sat down in the armchairs 
prepared for them on the raft since the early morning. A weathered soldier, father of 
five little daughters, and a practised bureaucrat, father of three sons, two of whom 
                                                 
71 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, pp. 58-9. 
72 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, p. 60; Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 28.    
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were following him on his foreign mission73, met in this way on the edge of the vast 
expanses of their countries. They greeted each other through the interpreters, and for 
a short time had a formal conversation. Then, again synchronously, Mustafa Rasih 
and Kutuzov stood up, and, each taken by the hand by their own commissars74, were 
handed over to the commissar of the opposite side.75 After that the Russian envoy 
and his entourage proceeded to the Ottoman bank, while his Ottoman colleague 
crossed the river in the opposite direction and stepped on the Russian territory.   
 
Upon crossing the Dniester the ambassadorial trains stayed in their camps for 
another ten days, the Ottoman on the Russian side and vice versa, so that some 
curious young folks from the Russian embassy had even the time to visit the 
Ottoman camp. A French renegade in the Ottoman service, who was a physician of 
the ambassador, showed them the camp.76 Finally, on 25 June 1793 each embassy set 
off to continue their journeys. Kutuzov’s delegation moved in the direction of the 
Sultan’s capital, and that one of Mustafa Rasih took the road through Yelizavetgrad, 
Kharkov and Moscow to St. Petersburg.77  
3.3. Ottoman Embassy in the Russian Empire  
As to the duties of Mustafa Rasih’s embassy, they were very much formal and 
had been confined to the delivering of the Sultan’s Imperial letter to the Empress, 
                                                 
73 Two sons of Mustafa Rasih, Mehmed Nuri Efendi and Ibrahim Edhem Efendi were members of the 
Ottoman ambassadorial delegation: Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 11. 
74 The commissars at the ceremony of the ambassadorial exchange were the Commandant of the 
Bender Fortress (Bender Muhafızı) Hasan Pasha on the Ottoman side, and the Governor General of 
Belorussia, General in Chief Piotr Bogdanovich Passek on the Russian side. 
75 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, p. 64; Mun’kov, Diplomaticheskaia deyatel’nost’, pp. 44-5; For description 
of the previous similar exchange of the extraordinary ambassadors that took place in 1775 see: 
Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, Mubadele: an Ottoman-Russian exchange of ambassadors 
(Chicago, 1970), pp. 125-9. 
76 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, p. 72. 
77 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, p. 75. 
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along with the presents for Catherine II and her courtiers. In accomplishing the 
norms of the ceremonial protocol, the Ottoman envoy was once again to confirm 
before the Russian government the peaceful intentions of the Porte. In addition, 
Mustafa Rasih had to discuss the issue about those Ottoman war prisoners that were 
still staying in Russia and apparently to gather more information on various Russian 
state and social institutions, which could be of interest for the Sultan and his circle of 
izâm-i Cedîd reformers. In view of the traditional attitudes towards the diplomatic 
art held for centuries at the Porte, the Ottoman extraordinary envoy to Russia was 
not supposed to conduct complicated political negotiations. According to the usual 
practice, as the Ottomans never had their own regular diplomatic representatives at 
other European courts, the matters concerning the foreign policy of the Porte were 
discussed in Istanbul at the conferences with the European ambassadors residing in 
the Ottoman capital.         
 
Mustafa Rasih had been appointed to his ambassadorial mission to Russia in 
May 179278, though due to the fact that the Russian side finally decided upon the 
appointment of its own envoy only in autumn79, the actual preparations for Mustafa 
Rasih’s departure started at the beginning of 1793. On January 23, 1793 the Ottoman 
envoy received the presents he would deliver to the Russian Empress and other 
Russian state officials. The presents included very precious aigrette (چوغرس), 
gemstones, gilded belt, carpet (طاسب) , the horse harnesses gilded and studded with 
gemstones, stirrups, three gilded tea-services ( مقاط نيرز لاط ), Chinese silks, various 
ointments and fragrances, with rose oil and balm from Mecca among these, and a 
huge costly nomad tent made of muslin and embroidered with a gold thread and 
                                                 
78 Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ankara, 1987), p. 164. 
79 Kutuzov was assigned to his post on November 5, 1792.  
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pearls.80 It took ten four-horse carriages in order to carry all of the presents.81 The 
overall importance attached by the Ottomans to their diplomatic mission that was to 
be sent for St. Petersburg could also be seen in a single fact that the High Porte had 
spent for it, despite its grave financial situation, more than 600,000 guruş.82 On 
January 28 Mustafa Rasih was given the Royal Letter (âme-i Hümayun) of the 
Sultan to Catherine II, and departed from Istanbul on January 30, 1793.83   
 
Upon the exchange ceremony that took place in the middle of the Dniester 
River in the vicinity of the city of Dubossary on 15 June, 1793 Mustafa Rasih Pasha 
entered the Russian soil. On the Russian side of the Dniester a special tent was 
already prepared for the Ottoman ambassador, wherein he proceeded in the company 
of the Commissar at the Exchange ceremony General in Chief Piotr Passek and the 
Guiding Officer (Mihmandar- Ottom.; Pristav- Russ.) Major General Il’ya 
Bezborodko, brother of the Russian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bezborodko. Inside 
the tent all of the guests were served coffee, fruits and sweets.84 Both the Ottoman 
and the Russian embassies stayed for another ten days on the opposing banks of the 
Dniester, and then on the same day, 25 June 1793, embarked on their further 
journeys across the foreign lands.85            
 
The road of the Ottoman delegation was going through Elizavetgrad, Aleksopol 
(nowadays Tsarychanka village in Dnipropetrovs’k region, Ukraine), Kremenchuk, 
                                                 
80 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 10. 
81 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 11. 
82 Thomas Naff, ‘Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-
1807’ Journal of the American Oriental Society, 83 (1963), p. 304. 
83 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 10-11. 
84 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 31. 
85 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, p. 75. 
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Poltava, Kharkov, Kursk86 and then Tula and Moscow towards St. Petersburg. All 
the way the envoy of the Sultan and his mission due to their status were rendered 
special attention by local authorities. Whenever the embassy happened to pass by the 
Russian fortresses the latter honoured the Ottoman ambassador with artillery rounds 
and fireworks.87  
 
As the delegation proceeded on its way, from time to time it was approached by 
the Muslim prisoners of war, men and women, who applied for protection at the 
embassy. Apparently, the first and foremost question Mustafa Rasih asked his guides 
as soon as he crossed the Russian border was the situation with those Ottoman 
prisoners of war, which still stayed in the Russian captivity. Much to his regret, the 
envoy of Selim III could not get any satisfactory answer as the Russian guiding 
officers refused to talk about this matter saying that they did not know anything 
about it and that the whole issue was not in their responsibility.88 Mustafa Rasih put 
all his complaints on paper, largely exaggerating the grievances he suffered, in his 
opinion, from the Russian side. The Sultan himself noted that his ambassador was 
unnecessarily making things more complicated than they actually were.89 Be that as it 
may, Mustafa Rasih during the whole term of his stay in Russia still had that serious 
problem of the Muslim prisoners, those he gave refuge at the embassy and those 
which remained in Russia as ostensibly newly baptized Orthodox Christians.   In this 
respect the ambassador experienced continuous quarrels with his guiding officers, 
both en route and after arrival at St. Petersburg.   
                                                 
86 P. Kititsyn, ‘Turetskoie posol’stvo v 1793 godu’ Kievskaia starina, 23 (1888), № 10, pp. 26-9; 
Idem., ‘Proiezd chrez Yekaterinoslavskoie namestnichestvo turetskogo posol’stva, v 1793 godu’ 
Zapiski Odesskogo Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei (ZOOID), 10 (1877), pp. 504-6. 
87 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 31. 
88 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 33. 
89 Upon one of Mustafa Rasih’s reports Selim III wrote: “Rasih Paşa ama çok hadis yazmış”. Nedim. 
Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 33. 
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 On the way to the Russian capital among the most remarkable places visited by 
the embassy were Tula, traditional centre of Russian “military-industrial complex” 
since the times of Peter the Great, and Moscow, the ancient capital of the Muscovite 
principality. As the Ottoman delegation came in late July to the town of Tula, the 
ambassador and other members of his entourage (two sons of Rasih, Hazinedar 
(treasurer) of the embassy, the author of embassy’s sefâretnâme Abdullah Efendi, 
and some other persons from the mission) were shown eight Tula arms factories 
(alât-i harbiye kârhaneleri), which were working on the energy of moving water and 
produced rifles, pistols, sabres and all kinds of ironware. The Ottoman guests noted 
the industrial specialization of the factory workers and the high quality of the 
manufactured products.90 Following this visit the ambassador was presented with a 
gift of two skilfully made pistols, a pen-case, and a polished steel rosary. For other 
visiting members of the Ottoman delegation there were given two pairs of pistols and 
three double-barrelled rifles. Then Mustafa Rasih and his companions were shown 
the Arsenal (cebhane) situated in the centre of the town.91 Apparently, such a display 
of modern weaponry manufacture, apart from reasons of usual hospitality, would 
pursue the objective to proudly show the Ottoman side the successes of Russian 
modernization. 
 
 Mustafa Rasih’s embassy departed from Tula on 1 August, 1793 / 23 Zilhicce, 
1207, and bypassing Serpukhov, the ancient fortress of the Muscovite principality, 
on 7 August, 1793 / 29 Zilhicce, 1207 arrived at Moscow.92 It looks that the whole 
                                                 
90 “Maharet kasdiyle sarf-i dikkat itmeleri muayene-i ma’mulat san’atleri olmuşdur”. Nedim. Bir 
elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 34. 
91 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 34. 
92 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 35. 
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month of Muharram the embassy stayed there, since the date of its departure from the 
first capital of the Muscovite state is given in the official ambassadorial record as 5 
Safer93, which falls on 12 September 1793. While in Moscow, the Ottoman 
delegation were shown the ancient treasury of the Russian crown, and particularly 
the throne of the Muscovite monarchs, the chambers filled with jewels and precious 
stones, ancient suits of armour, chain-mails, gold and silver utensils, rifles and 
pistols. The soldier guardian, whether trying to aggrandize the history of his state in 
the eyes of the foreigners, or, what is probable, not knowing himself the earlier 
history of the Muscovite principality, told the Ottoman guests that the presents in the 
treasury are being collected for a fabulous period of 800 years.94  
 
      Despite all of the distortions and misspellings of the Ottoman orthography, 
as well as extremely hard for an ear of the Ottoman scribes Russian place-names, it is 
quite possible, having armed oneself with maps of modern Tula, Moscow, Tver, 
Novgorod and Leningrad oblasts of the Russian Federation, to trace down the way of 
Mustafa Rasih’s mission, as it is given in the ambassadorial record. It is amazing, but 
the smaller places the Ottoman embassy had been passing by more than two hundred 
years ago did not change their names neither during the tsarist, nor Soviet, nor post-
Soviet times. More than that, the general route by which the Ottomans were moving, 
obviously due to the local topographic features, almost completely corresponds to the 
web of the modern high roads. 
 
Accordingly, the Ottoman embassy proceeded through Klin (nowadays a town 
in Moscow oblast), village of Zavidovo (Konakovo district, Tver oblast), village of 
                                                 
93 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 36. 
94 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 35-36.  
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Gorodnia (Konakovo district, Tver oblast), Tver, village of Mednoye (28 km West of 
Tver), Torzhok (Tver oblast). At this point, in Torzhok, the Ottomans encountered 
with the Russian winter, since they were right there when the snow first fell that year, 
on 13 Safer, 1208 / 20 September 1793.95 Then the mission of Mustafa Rasih 
continued its way making stations at Vydropuzhsk, Vyshniy Volochek (both- in Tver 
oblast), then across the Msta River the embassy headed for the village of Khotilovo 
(Tver oblast), Yedrovo (Valday district, Novgorod oblast), Valday, Yazhelbitsy, 
Krestsy, villages of Zaytsevo and Bronnitsa (all- in Novgorod oblast). On 29 Safer 
1208 / 6 October 1793 Mustafa Rasih Pasha arrived at Novgorod.96 From here 
Mustafa Rasih sent the letters to the leading Russian officials in St. Petersburg (to 
Chancellor Ivan Osterman, Foreign Minister Alexander Bezborodko and the 
Tsarina’s minion (imparatoriçe cenabına musahib ve mukarreb) General Platon 
Zubov) informing about his arrival. This was done in correspondence with the 
precedent of the previous Ottoman embassy to Russia of Abdulkerim Pasha, who, 
while he had been away from Moscow at approximately the same distance, also sent 
the similar letters to the Russian government.97 On the next day, 1 Rebiülevvel 1208 
/ 7 October 1793, Mustafa Rasih left Novgorod and, going through Podberez’ye, 
Spasskaya Polist’ (both-Novgorod oblast) and Liuban’ (Leningrad oblast), on 12 
Rebiülevvel 1208 / 18 October 1793 finally arrived at St. Petersburg.98 Thus the 
Ottoman embassy reached the capital of the Russian Empire after four months since 
it entered the Russian lands. In two days (on 20 October) the extraordinary 
ambassador of the Sultan paid a visit to the Chancellor (Başvekil) Ivan Andreievich 
Osterman. Then, on the next day, Mustafa Rasih was a guest of the Foreign Minister 
                                                 
95 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 36. 
96 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 37. 
97 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 38. 
98 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 38. 
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(Hariciye aziri, or also at times called in the Ottoman text Vekil-i Sani, the Second 
minister) Alexander Andreievich Bezborodko.99      
 
By coincidence, the Ottoman delegation entered the Russian capital at the 
special moment. Nine days earlier St. Petersburg had become the scene of wedding  
of the grandson of Catherine II, 15-year-old Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich 
(future Emperor Alexander I),100 and the festivities that were organized on this 
occasion  (vürudumuzden mukaddemce velime-i tezvic) still continued at the time of 
the arrival of Mustafa Rasih’s embassy.101 The Ottoman guests were also invited to a 
masquerade with illumination (came-i tebdil fişenk şenliği), where they could see in 
the evening sky along with the fire flowers and various figures of motley colours the 
flaming names of the Empress, heir apparent and the closest courtiers.102         
 
On 19 Rebiülevvel 1208 / 25 October 1793 the reception at the Empress’ 
palace took place. Mustafa Rasih arrived at the palace with the presents, which were 
placed on thirty two plates and trays. After the greeting speeches made by the 
ambassador and the Russian chancellor Osterman, Mustafa Rasih handed over to the 
Russian authorities the imperial letter (âme-i Hümayun) of Selim III103 that after the 
numerous official titles of the Russian Empress and the Ottoman Sultan was 
containing the general wishes to stop the enmity and keep the eternal peace between 
the two countries.      
 
                                                 
99 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 46. 
100 Kititsyn, Turetskoie posol’stvo, p. 28. On 9 October, 1793 Alexander married 14 year old Louise of 
Baden, who took the name Elizabeth Alekseievna.  
101 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 47. 
102 The description of the festivity and illumination is available at: Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i 
sefareti, pp. 46-47. 
103 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 47-48. 
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In this way, in delivering the Sultan’s imperial letter to the Russian Empress the 
Ottoman envoy accomplished the official duty of his mission. Mustafa Rasih was 
now waiting for the Empress’ answer to the Sultan and he concerned himself with 
another important issue that was in his responsibility, namely the fate of the Muslim 
prisoners of war (or, to use the Ottoman term, üsera-i muharebe). According to the 
8th Article of the Jassy Peace Treaty all of the prisoners of war who did not change 
their religion were to be set free without any ransom. The issue seems to be much 
complicated in view of the fact that sometimes the conversions on both sides could 
be forceful as well, and in realities of the time along with the change of religion the 
individual also changed his/her name. Moreover, as far as the Ottoman prisoners are 
concerned, the Christians who fought in the last war on the Ottoman side, like the 
subjects of the two Danubian principalities, Poles, Greeks, Georgians etc. were also 
to be released from captivity. Mustafa Rasih Pasha had instructions to help such 
people, who would address him during his stay in Russia, with clothing and money, 
and to secure their return back home.104 
 
 It can be said without any doubt that this question embittered the whole stay of 
Mustafa Rasih in St. Petersburg. During the first month of his sojourn in the Russian 
capital, the Sultan’s envoy met with his guiding officer, Major General Il’ya 
Andreievich Bezborodko and the Russian career diplomat and dragoman Sergei 
Lazarevich Lashkarev on several occasions105, to discuss the sore subject of the 
                                                 
104 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 40. 
105 In the Ottoman records, and respectively in some few Turkish publications relating to the subject, 
Sergei Lashkarev appears as mysterious “Ceneral Serciyus”. Lashkarev, though born in Russia, was 
of the Georgian descent, and in his youth years was enlisted at the Russian Collegium of Foreign 
Affairs (predecessor of the Foreign Ministry) as a student in the Oriental languages. Having finished 
his studies and knowing ten languages (most of which were the Near Eastern ones, like Turkish, 
Persian, Arabic, Tatar, Georgian, Armenian), Lashkarev since 1760-s started his service at the Russian 
Embassy in Istanbul. By the early 1790-s he had already a unique experience, being probably the most 
knowledgeable Russian expert in the sphere of Russian affairs with the Ottoman court. Lashkarev was 
58 
Ottoman captives.106 Again, like with the issue of the customs tariff (see the section 
on the Russian embassy in Istanbul), the arguments of the Ottomans rather referred 
to the initial spirit of the concluded treaties, while the position of the Russian side 
was based on the formal observance of their clauses. Mustafa Rasih argued that those 
people who were addressing to his embassy were in fact Muslims, as they came to 
the Ottoman embassy on their own free will, testified their Muslim religious 
affiliation, and thus should be released according to the 8th article of the Jassy treaty. 
The Russians simply replied that, of course, Mustafa Rasih was right, and the 
Muslim prisoners in accordance with the treaties should be returned back home. 
However, those people whom the Ottoman ambassador was talking about and whom 
he by force held in the building of the embassy were all Orthodox Christians now. 
Therefore the Ottoman side has no right to claim these people, and they as serfs will 
stay in Russia with their masters.       
 
Mustafa Rasih ordered his dragoman to compose the list of the prisoners in 
French and to hand it over to Alexander Bezborodko, Russia’s Foreign Minister and 
brother of Il’ya Bezborodko. The Ottoman ambassador became enraged with the fact 
that the dragoman of the embassy, who was supposed to discuss the same problem 
with Alexander Bezborodko, due to various excuses made by the Russian side for 
one month could not get through to the Russian minister. Another point, which 
incurred the displeasure of Mustafa Rasih, were the guards put at the street entrance 
                                                                                                                                          
also the third Russian representative (murahhas-i salis), who signed the peace treaty of Jassy. A rather 
exhausted and very interesting biography of Lashkarev has been published in Russia in late 1980-s: G. 
L. kessel’brenner, Khronika odnoi diplomaticheskoi karyery: Diplomat vostokoved S. L. Lashkariov i 
ego vremia (Moscow, 1987).  
106 See the minutes of conferences held by Mustafa Rasih with Il’ya Bezbordko and Sergei Lashkarev 
at: Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 52-55. 
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and at the stairs of the embassy building, so that nobody would neither freely enter 
nor come out of the embassy.107     
 
Finally, on 16 November 1793 / 11 Rebiülahir 1208 the Foreign Minister 
received the Ottoman dragoman. Bezborodko did not say anything new, agreeing that 
the Muslim prisoners should be returned, whereas Mustafa Rasih should not keep by 
force anyone in his embassy and to give all of the prisoners who applied to the 
Ottoman ambassador to the Russian authorities. Then there will be made an 
investigation, and the Muslims would be given back to the Ottoman side, while the 
Orthodox would be returned to their masters (vaftiz ve hıristiyan olan sahibine 
virilür).108 As to the complaints of Mustafa Rasih about the guard, which had been 
stationed at the entrance to the building of his embassy, the Russian side replied that 
even the palace of the Empress was being guarded and that there is nothing special 
about it. This was done exclusively from considerations of safety of the Ottoman 
guests, so that no one would disturb them.109  
 
Besides the general demands, the Ottoman ambassador would also wish the 
Russians to extradite him the two special prisoners that fell into the Russian hands 
during the last war. The first was Janikli Tayyar Bey110, of the Janikli dynasty of the 
local notables of North Eastern Anatolia. He and his father, Battal Hüseyin Pasha,111 
during the last war with Russia were appointed to defend the Caucasus and Anapa. 
                                                 
107 “Konağımızı vefret üzere soldatlar (nöbetçiler) mahsur idüb tarafımıza bir kimesne gelüb 
gidemez”, Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 59. Also, see: Uğur İyigünler, Mustafa Rasih 
Efendi’nin Rusya Sefareti, pp. 2-3. 
108 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 60-61. 
109 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 59. 
110 He is mentioned in the large compendium of the biographies of the renowned Ottoman officials, 
composed by Mehmed Süreyya, as Tayyar Mahmud Pasha: Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî yâhûd 
Tezkire-i meşāhir-i 'Osmāniyye (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1311), Vol. 3, pp. 258-259.  
111 Some information on Battal Pasha’s biography is available at: Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî 
yâhûd Tezkire-i meşāhir-i 'Osmāniyye (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1311), Vol. 2, pp. 217-218. 
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Because of internecine feuds and feeling offended by the Ottoman government in 
their rights to succeed the Trabzon governorship after the death of Janikli Ali Pasha 
(the founder of Janikli dynasty), instead of defending Anapa Battal and Tayyar 
surrendered it to the enemy, and themselves also defected to the Russian side. While 
after the peace of Jassy Battal Pasha due to the Russian patronage was restored on his 
posts at Sinop and Janik, Tayyar remained in Russia.112 Another important prisoner 
whom Mustafa Rasih mentioned during his conferences with the Russian 
government was Sheikh Mansur (Ushurma), the leader of the Caucasian 
mountaineers who raised an anti-Russian uprising in the Northern Caucasus in 1785 
and was captured by the Russians at the fall of the Ottoman fortress of Anapa in 
summer 1791.  
 
In both cases, the Russian government claimed that the demands of the High 
Porte were groundless. Alexander Bezborodko brought to notice of the Ottoman 
dragoman that Tayyar Bey was not a prisoner and fled to Russia on his own free will 
out of fear for the Porte. Thus he was not a prisoner of war, but a refugee, and in this 
way wass not a subject to extradition. At the moment Tayyar Bey has a military rank 
of Russian colonel, and those having such a rank would certainly not be given by 
Russia to some other state.113 As for Sheikh Mansur, he simply was declared a 
criminal, who, in addition, was not a subject of the Ottoman Sultan.      
 
The reports of Mustafa Rasih addressed to Reis-ül-Küttab (dated by 11 January 
1794114 and 26 January 1794115) provide a distinct idea of the character of further 
                                                 
112 More detailed account of Janikli Battal Hüseyin Pasha and Janikli Tayyar Pasha is available at: 
Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and ew, p. 216.  
113 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 61-62. 
114 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 101-104. 
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negotiations with the Russian authorities, which continued throughout December 
1793 and January 1794. The Ottoman ambassador bombarded the Russian 
government with many notes and each note, much to the indignation of Mustafa 
Rasih who had to wait again and again, was answered in the term of ten to fifteen 
days. Nothing new appeared, however, in the argumentation of the Russian side, 
whose position was still firm and unchanging. Except may be for Tayyar Bey, about 
whom the Russian officials said that the Russian state did not accept him and that no 
one knew where he was at the present moment.116 
 
Fruitless discussions continued, the Cossacks with the approval of the Russian 
government were arresting the Muslim prisoners on the streets of St. Petersburg117, 
and Mustafa Rasih was angered by his own inability to intervene. Having no 
necessary diplomatic experience, all the Ottoman extraordinary envoy could do was 
to complain on and on, at times rather excessively, to his government in Istanbul. 
These complaints were of little use and not welcomed by the Sultan.118 
 
One more very symptomatic event that came upon Mustafa Rasih during his 
mission in Russia should be mentioned. While still on the way, the personnel of the 
embassy in best traditions of the Janissary revolts refused to move further until they 
were paid additional salary. Having arrived at Moscow they told the ambassador that 
the previous embassy of Abdülkerim Pasha came only to Moscow, and in order to 
make his personnel go to St. Petersburg Mustafa Rasih must pay one hundred guruş 
more for each of them. Should the ambassador not do this, they would feel free to 
                                                                                                                                          
115 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 78-79. 
116 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 79. 
117 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 76. 
118 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 64, 74. 
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ask this money from the Russian Empress. Thus in the letter to Reis-ül-Küttab 
Mustafa Rasih informs his government that he had to spend additional 8.500 guruş. 
Later on, already in St. Petersburg, the ambassador allotted for the living expenses of 
the whole personnel the sum of 1000 roubles. And once again the officials of the 
embassy protested, saying that previously each member of the delegation was given 
150 roubles. All attempts of the Ottoman ambassador to appeal to their conscience, 
to remind them that they dishonour themselves, their state and their sovereign were 
of no avail.119  
    
As one would clearly see the members of Mustafa Rasih’s ambassadorial train 
even in Russia remained an integral part of the over-corrupted Ottoman state 
machine. The embassy personnel, in the same way as the smaller drop of water still 
is a part of the bigger ocean, had brought to Russia a small piece of the Ottoman 
Empire. All those practices Selim III so ardently tried to change and to get rid of in 
his domains manifested themselves even on the Russian soil, many miles away from 
the Ottoman borders. It seems that for the overwhelming majority of the embassy 
personnel their own well-being was much more important than anything else, 
including the pride for their country. The Ottoman envoy, initially inexperienced in 
the diplomatic art, apart from having continuous complicated debates with the 
Russian officials, had also to cope somehow with his own personnel, which were 
supposed to help him.  
 
The formal answer of the Russian government to the Imperial Letter (âme-i 
Hümayun) of Selim III was finally transferred to Mustafa Rasih on 21 January 
                                                 
119 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 68-69. 
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1794.120 His official duty at the Russian court thus could be considered finished. On 
8 February 1794 the Ottoman embassy left the Russian capital121, and in the end of 
May122 came to Dubossary. There, on 5 June 1794123 the exchange ceremony with 
the Russian embassy of Kutuzov, who was also returning back home, took place. 
Upon his return Mustafa Rasih was deprived of his temporary title of Pasha, and 
again assumed the title of Efendi.124 Stephan Conermann rightly calls the 
ambassadorial mission of Mustafa Rasih Efendi one of the highest points of his 
career.125 However, it was surely not the highest one. Mustafa Rasih was yet to 
become twice the Reis-ül-Küttab,126 though not due to some exclusive merits. A 
portrait, given to Mustafa Rasih by Thomas Naff in the context of his activities as the 
head of the Ottoman foreign affairs office, would also explain much with respect to 
his mission in Russia: 
An ineffectual, upright individual who was incapable of comprehending 
general political affairs, to say nothing of the intricacies of diplomatic 
relations. Rasih had, in fact been appointed, as a compromise candidate 
acceptable to the various rival political factions.127 
 
Returning to the embassy of Mustafa Rasih in Russia, it is possible to observe 
that throughout the three months since his arrival to St. Petersburg the Ottoman 
                                                 
120 The text of the answer of Catherine II to the Sultan’s Nâme-i Hümayun is available at: Nedim. Bir 
elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 74-75. 
121 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 88. 
122 Kititsyn, Proyez chrez Yekaterinoslavskoe namestnichestvo, p. 505. 
123 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 88-89. 
124 Nedim. Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, p. 91; Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî yâhûd Tezkire-i 
meşāhir-i 'Osmāniyye (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1311), Vol. 2, p. 347.  
125 Stephan Conermann, ‘Das Eigene und das Fremde: der Bericht der Gesandtschaft Musafa Rasihs 
nach St. Petersburg 1792-1794’ Archivum Ottomanicum, 17 (1999), p. 263. 
126 First term: 17.08.1796- 18.08.1797; second term: 14.04.1799 -24.07.1800. See: Ahmed Resmî, 
Halifetü'r-Rüesâ veya Sefinetü'r-Rüesâ (İstanbul, 1269), pp. 140-41. 
127 Thomas Naff, ‘Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-
1807’ Journal of the American Oriental Society, 83 (1963), p. 297. The narrow-mindedness and 
indecision of Rasih when he occupied the post of Reis Efendi are also mentioned by the French 
ambassador to the Porte in 1796-1797 Aubert du Bayet and the representative of the Polish émigrés 
Micha³ Ogiñski who stayed in Istanbul at the same period. See: İsmail Soysal, Fransız ihtilali ve Türk-
Fransız diplomasi münasebetleri (1789-1802) (Ankara, 1999), p. 154; Michał Kleofas Ogiński, 
Mémoires de Michel Oginski sur la Pologne et les Polonais, depuis 1788 jusqu’à la fin de 1815. (4 
vols.; Paris, 1826), Vol. 2, p. 209. 
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ambassador was engaged in futile discussions concerning the situation of those 
Ottoman prisoners of war who were still staying in Russia. Being unable to change 
something, or to influence somehow the Russian side, Mustafa Rasih was simply 
continuously, at times in a childish manner, complaining about innumerable 
injustices he suffered from the Russian bureaucrats. Even Selim III became 
somewhat irritated at these permanent complaints. At the same time Mustafa Rasih 
made no political negotiations or meetings with the ambassadors of other countries, 
neither did other foreign ambassadors visit him.128 In general, without the necessary 
diplomatic experience and not knowing any European languages, Mustafa Rasih did 
not become something more than just a technical envoy, whose mission appeared to 
be confined to delivering of the royal letter of his sovereign to the foreign court and 
receiving the official answer to it. Another most tangible result of Mustafa Rasih’s 
mission were the detailed observations of the Russian economy, finances, army and 
society collected in sefâretnâme, the ambassadorial report presented at the Porte 
upon the mission’s return.  
 
3.4. Russian Embassy in the Ottoman Empire 
Since the very beginning, as it is seen from the secret instruction “On political 
matters”, signed by Catherine II and given to Kutuzov before his departure129, the 
plans of the Russian court as regards the Ottoman state were of a two-fold kind. On 
                                                 
128 For example, Mustafa Rasih wrote to the Porte, that no one of the foreign ambassadors visited him 
since his arrival. However, it looks like the Ottoman ambassador was only waiting until his other 
colleagues from the diplomatic corps would pay him their visits, making no attempts to meet with 
them: “Şimdiye kadar [this relates to mid-November 1793; V.M.] kübrai devletlerinden kimesne ile 
görüşülüb söhbet olamadı. On güne mütecavirdir bir kimesnenin tarafıma geldiği yokdur”, Nedim. 
Bir elçinin tarihçe-i sefareti, pp. 66-67.  
129 ‘Directive of Catherine II to M. I. Kutuzov with a secret instruction “On political matters”. 4 
March (21 February) 1793’ In: L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, pp. 195-203. 
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the one hand, right at the moment Catherine needed peace. On the other hand, 
though, it was as well clear that she was not going to give up her earlier projects 
concerning the fate of the Ottoman Empire, and under the different circumstances 
would take a chance to put them into practice. 
 
So, in view of the heavy financial burden inflicted upon the treasury by all the 
recent wars, and being preoccupied by a whole set of troubles in and around the 
Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian government regarded the new war 
with the Ottomans at this point much undesirable. Therefore, Kutuzov got clear-cut 
instructions to do his best to prevent any possibility of the Ottoman entrance into 
war. In practice this meant to counteract the influences of other foreign diplomats, 
first and foremost the French, who might be and indeed were trying to drag the High 
Porte into another open conflict with Russia. Moreover, aware of the reform 
movement of Selim III, St. Petersburg was very interested to know about the combat 
capability of the Ottoman army and to what extent the Sultan could progress with his 
military reforms.130 A career soldier, Kutuzov was the right man to make his own 
observations and conclusions on that matter. 
 
It was also important that the Ottomans would stay indifferent to the 
developments going on in Poland. The ambassador was recommended not to raise 
the Polish issue at all, unless the Ottoman side itself touches upon this subject. In this 
case Kutuzov was to answer that he has not any idea about it, and that his only duty 
is to reinforce friendly relations between his own government and that one of the 
Sultan. Should the Ottomans still insist, Kutuzov had to resort to the veiled threat. 
                                                 
130 L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 196. 
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Acting secretly through his agents in order not to risk the reputation of his embassy, 
the Russian ambassador was to inculcate the Ottoman officials indirectly with the 
thought that interfering into the matters that were so unrelated to those of their own 
would be quite dangerous for the Ottoman state itself.131  
 
At this very point, while seeking peace with the Porte, the Russian government 
by no means abandoned the idea that someday the war against the Ottomans would 
be resumed, and, should that day come, it wanted to be properly prepared. First, it 
was quite a logical step to acquire more sympathizers inside the Ottoman society. 
Catherine’s instructions to Kutuzov prescribed her extraordinary envoy by all means 
to maintain good relations with the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, encourage the 
anti-Ottoman feelings among them and to reassure in Russia’s unchanging 
sympathies towards its coreligionists. Making allusions on the history of the 
Muscovite Principality and suggesting that it got its independence from the Golden 
Horde in an open fight, Kutuzov was to make it clear, though, that in order to get rid 
of the Muslim oppression (igo agarianskoie) the Ottoman Christians should only be 
using every effort on their own.132 In other words, the Russian envoy was instructed 
to gain and nurture the sympathies of the Ottoman Orthodox subjects by confining 
himself only with broad promises of support. Needless to say, that all these activities 
were to be conducted with an extreme caution and kept in the deep secrecy.  
 
Further still, another specific activity common in the work of all diplomatic 
missions has to be mentioned. Sending an embassy to the Ottoman Empire was 
naturally viewed in St. Petersburg as a superb opportunity to gather vast first-hand 
                                                 
131 L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, pp. 197-98. 
132 L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, pp. 198-99. 
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intelligence information on the country. Along with all kinds of secretaries, 
interpreters, quartermasters, musicians, doctors and servants, a large group of 
military experts, engineers, topographers and draughtsmen had been also included 
into the Russian ambassadorial delegation. Among these, in particular, were 
Lieutenant Colonel (Podpolkovnik) Korf, First Major (Premier Maior) Len, Captain 
Derenikin, Naval Lieutenant (Flota Poruchik) Petinioti, Navigator (Shturman) Lepini 
and Engineer Lieutenant Colonel (Inzhener-Podpolkovnik) Trusson.133  
 
In the same time when the embassy was slowly moving on through the 
Ottoman lands, many of its staff thus were busy reconnoitring the local topographies, 
drawing maps, calculating natural resources, getting the plans of fortresses and 
composing the schemes for conducting war operations in the area all the way to 
Istanbul. Hardly this hypothetical new war with the Ottoman state was regarded by 
Russia as defensive, in view of the fact that it was the territories of the Ottoman 
Balkan possessions that were viewed as a potential theatre of hostilities.134 As to the 
usual snail pace with which the ambassadorial train was crawling for the whole 
summer of 1793 towards its destination, doing many rest breaks on the way135, it 
must have greatly facilitated the work of the Russian military experts.  
 
                                                 
133 I. M. El’terman, Posol’stvo Kutuzova, p. 70. 
134
 Very remarkable in this context is a description of the way from Ruschuk (now Ruse in Bulgaria) 
to Istanbul, quite specific in terms of its contents and aims, made in 1793 by an anonymous member 
of Kutuzov’s entourage. This manuscript, published in the tsarist Russia in 1878 (a year when yet 
another Russo-Ottoman war broke out) provides a more than eloquent testimony of the fact that 
Catherine II at the point of making peace was exploring the possibilities of the offensive warfare 
against the Ottomans. See: ‘ Podrobnoie opisanie puti chrezvychaynogo i polnomochnogo rossiiskago 
imperatorskogo posol’stva, posle Yasskago mira, ot Rushchuka chrez Shumlu v Konstantinopol’, v 
1793 godu. S voiennymi zamechaniyami o zemle, s pokazaniem sposoba provest’ i prodovol’stvovat’ 
ot 30-ti do 40-ka tysiach voiska’ Russkaia starina, 21 (1878), pp. 100-124.   
135 A thorough roster of the journey with the stations, distances between them and the time spent at 
each place is available at: Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, pp. 203-205. Between the village of Kriulen on the 
right bank of the Dniester and Istanbul the Russian embassy had made in total 52 resting stations.     
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What is more, by crossing in such a manner the dominions of the Sultan, the 
embassy officials could see with their own eyes the real state of affairs in the 
Ottoman Rumelia. Both Reimers and Struve equally mention that the Rumelian 
countryside was infested with the highway robbers, and the Porte despite 
implementing severe punishments could not cope with that situation. Throughout 
their way the Russian officials saw many by then already putrefied in the summer 
sun bodies of the criminals, who were impaled alive and exposed to the general 
public to serve as a striking example of the fate awaiting those who disobeyed the 
central authorities.136 However, as the Russian officials observed, even such brutal 
repressive measures were useless in preventing disorders and chaos in the Ottoman 
provinces.       
 
The Russian delegation finally arrived at Istanbul on 7 October 1793137 and, as 
it turned out later, was to stay in the Sultan’s capital for almost half a year. Its 
numerous staff with Kutuzov at the head had been quartered in Pera138, a suburb 
district of Istanbul known as a home of large European community. It was right here, 
on the other side of the Golden Horn, where resided most of the European merchants 
as well as members of the diplomatic corps. The building of the Russian embassy 
was likewise situated in Pera.  
 
                                                 
136 Johann Christian von Struve, [published anonymously]. Travels in the Crimea; a History of the 
Embassy from Petersburg to Constantinople in 1793, including Their Journey through 
Krementschuck, Oczakow, Walachia & Moldavia with their Reception at the Court of Selim the Third 
(London, 1802), pp. 141-42; Reimers, Reise, Vol. 1, pp. 185-186. 
137 Struve, Travels, p. 158; Reimers gives the Julian date, which is 26 September: Reimers, Reise, Vol. 
1, p. 207. 
138 Nowadays this area is known as Beyoğlu district, which is the very heart of the bustling modern 
metropolis of Istanbul, lying to the North of the Golden Horn inlet of the European bank of the 
Bosporus. 
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On the next day after the Russian mission’s arrival to Istanbul the First 
Dragoman of the Porte visited the Russian embassy and on behalf of the Grand 
Vizier handed over the presents for Kutuzov and his entourage. During the next few 
days the representatives of the diplomatic corps of other foreign powers accredited at 
the High Porte also paid courtesy visits to the Russian extraordinary ambassador.139 
In return, observing the usual formality, Kutuzov in the same way visited his 
colleagues the ambassadors of the European states resident in Istanbul. Not only an 
interesting, but also a very meaningful detail to point out is the order of priority 
according to which Kutuzov’s official visits to other foreign representatives had been 
made. The first European diplomat Kutuzov went to see was the British ambassador 
Sir Robert Ainsley. Then the ambassadors of other countries had also been visited, in 
the following order: Venetian, Austrian, Prussian, Swedish and some days later 
Neapolitan, Danish and Spanish.140 The yet formally unrecognized by the Ottomans 
representative of the French Republic Citizen Marie Louis Henri Descorches for 
quite obvious reasons was ignored. More than that, it was strictly forbidden for all 
personnel of the Russian embassy to have any contacts whatsoever with the French 
republicans.141  
 
The official reception at the Porte was to take place only some month later after 
the arrival of the Russian delegation, by the mid-November. In the meantime 
Kutuzov was paying visits to his colleagues-ambassadors, taking over the 
ambassadorial duties from the Charge d’Affaires Colonel Khvostov and writing 
reports to the Russian Empress, while many people of the numerous staff of his 
mission had an opportunity to explore the beauties and places of interest of the 
                                                 
139 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 19. 
140 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 24. 
141 Mun’kov, Diplomaticheskaia deyatel’nost’ M. I. Kutuzova, p. 57.  
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Ottoman capital. Some of them were interested, though, not only in beauties of 
nature or old relics and monuments.   
 
Owing to the written accounts left by the members of the delegation, Reimers 
and Struve, a historian has a unique possibility to look in detail at the circumstances 
of the Russian embassy’s stay in Istanbul in autumn 1793- winter 1794 through the 
eyes of ordinary officials of Kutuzov’s mission. Having come to the ultimate 
destination of their journey, the people of the embassy staff each had their own set of 
responsibilities, which determined the type of work they were doing and eventually 
their free time. Quite naturally, the lesser officials had more time to walk around the 
city and to learn about the daily life of the Ottoman society. For many of them their 
duties with the embassy consisted for the most part in attendance at numerous 
official ceremonies.  
 
The inner side of the embassy work like gathering the intelligence information 
or conducting various political negotiations was a special realm accessible only to a 
limited group of persons among the whole number of the embassy staff. While the 
auxiliary personnel were enjoying the sights of Istanbul, the ambassador and his team 
continued to fulfil their duties without a break either during the journey through the 
Ottoman Balkan dominions nor, and all the more so, in the Ottoman capital proper. 
Understandably, the Russian military experts were doing their own specific job as 
well. For example, Reimers, who obviously did not have a special aim to describe 
this sort of activities, incidentally gives a clue about what some members of the 
Russian embassy were occupied with when in Istanbul. A Russian Engineer with a 
rank of Lieutenant Colonel made a trip along the Bosporus taking the plans of its 
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coasts. Then being invited by a commandant of the Ottoman fortress situated at the 
entrance into the Black Sea, this Russian Lieutenant Colonel made his observations 
about the fortress and its strong and weak points.142 Similarly, Struve in his travel 
notes mentions that when the Russian embassy was already returning back home, in 
April 1794, Kutuzov sent to the local commandant in Silivri (an area close to 
Istanbul, along the Sea of Marmara coast) a Colonel of artillery accompanied with 
two officers ostensibly to thank for an escort of two hundred men he provided for the 
Russian ambassadorial train, and to give him the presents of gratitude. On the other 
hand, as Struve puts it, “the secret motive of his mission was to observe the works of 
the fortress and to bring away the plan of it”.143   
 
It should be mentioned that the usual practice at the time was to use the 
services of paid agents, and the embassy of Kutuzov was not an exception to the rule. 
The Russian ambassador was secretly getting information from an engineer named 
Kaufer, who was employed in the reinforcement of the Ottoman Danube 
fortresses.144 Besides, the secretary of the Kapudan Pasha Küçük Hüseyin, Hançerli, 
even though Kutuzov had reasons not to trust him completely, provided the Russian 
ambassador with the secret materials about the proceedings at the Divan from time to 
time.145  
 
Outwardly the stay of the Russian delegation in Istanbul might have looked as 
an unending succession of receptions and balls, organized by various Ottoman 
officials, other European diplomatic representations and Kutuzov himself. The first 
                                                 
142 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 42-43. 
143 Struve, Travels, p. 248. 
144 ‘Letter of M.I. Kutuzov to P. A. Zubov, on condition of the Turkish border fortresses. 13 / 2 July 
1793’ In: L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 216.  
145 I. M. El’terman, Posol’stvo Kutuzova, pp. 122-23. 
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formal audience at the High Porte was held on 9 November 1793, when the Russian 
delegation was received by the Grand Vizier.146 Three days later, on 12 November, 
took place Kutuzov’s audience with the Sultan.147 These ceremonies were 
accompanied with reciprocal exchange of fabulously expensive presents148, serving 
the purpose of showing the wealth and dignity of both empires. Formal assurances of 
both courts’ peaceful intentions had been made, and during the audience with Selim 
III, which in the very strict sense lasted not more than fifteen minutes149, the Russian 
extraordinary envoy handed over the imperial letter of his monarchess addressed to 
the Sultan.      
 
Following the ceremony at the Topkapı Palace150, Kutuzov attended the galas 
especially organized in his honour by all of the highest statesmen of the Ottoman 
Empire in turn. First Kutuzov was a guest of the Grand Vizier (18 November)151, 
then of the Kapudan Pasha (Grand Admiral) (28 November)152, the Kâhya Bey 
(Minister for Home Affairs) (3 December)153, the Yeniçeri Ağası (Commander in 
chief of the Janissary corps) (9 December)154, the Defterdar (Minister of Finance) (14 
                                                 
146 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp.  46-50; Struve, Travels, pp. 173-78.     
147 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 53-65; Struve, Travels, pp. 178-81. 
148 I. M. El’terman, Posol’stvo Kutuzova, pp, 72. The presents delivered to the Sultan included the 
brilliant pen studded with various jewels valued at 40.000 roubles, golden incense-burner, as well 
studded with diamonds, emeralds and other precious stones (24.316 roubles), a tray, also decorated 
with gemstones (12.000 roubles); among the gifts for the Grand Vizier there were a dagger in golden 
sheath with gemstones, a ring and a clock. Besides, rich presents were given to all of the leading 
Ottoman statesmen. The overall value of the presents for all Ottoman officials reached the sum of 
more than half a million roubles.  
149 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 65. 
150 Famous official residence of the Ottoman Sultans until 1853.     
151 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 70-76; Clément-Simon, Un ambassadeur extraordinaire, p. 32. 
152 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 84-92; Struve, Travels, pp. 185-90; Clément-Simon, Un ambassadeur 
extraordinaire, p.33;  ‘Letter of M. I. Kutuzov to his wife, E. I. Kutuzova. 18 / 7 December  1793’ In: 
L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 270. The witnesses unanimously agree, that 
the gala made by the Kapudan Pasha exceeded in its splendour even the one organized by the Grand 
Vizier.   
153 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 95-98; Struve, Travels, p. 190; Clément-Simon, Un ambassadeur 
extraordinaire, p. 34. 
154 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 102; Struve, Travels, p. 191; Clément-Simon, Un ambassadeur 
extraordinaire, p. 34. 
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December)155 and the Reis-ül-Küttab (Minister for Foreign Affairs) (26 December)156 
respectively.      
 
As an extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoy of the Russian Empire Kutuzov 
was giving the official receptions as well as visiting them. One of the most 
impressive receptions in the Russian embassy occurred on the occasion of the Saint 
Catherine’s day (the Patron Saint of the Russian Empress) on 5 December 1793.157 
Made mainly for the European diplomatic corps, it witnessed also some Ottoman 
officials, present incognito. These included the mihmandar158 of Kutuzov Abdullah 
Bey159, the Kapudan Pasha and the Topçubaşı (Master-General of the Artillery).160 
On this and other similar occasions no expenses were spared to demonstrate the 
grandeur of the Russian state and its Empress. In letter, written to his wife, Kutuzov 
indicates, that on that day the evening meal was served for 200 persons.161      
 
Against the background of all the mentioned festivities but behind the scenes, 
as is usually the case, the important political issues involving the interests of the 
main European powers had been addressed. Among the most pressing themes 
regarding the relations of the two neighbouring empires there were the fears of both 
sides of the new war. Neither the Ottomans nor Russians each for their own specific 
reasons wished at the time to engage into a new massive conflict. The former 
                                                 
155 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 103. 
156 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 127-34; Struve, Travels, pp. 191-92. 
157 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 98-100; Struve, op. cit., p. 183; Clément-Simon, Un ambassadeur 
extraordinaire, p. 35-36. The Russian Orthodox Church commemorates the day of St. Catherine on 24 
November (Julian style), which corresponds to 5 December (Gregorian style). 
158 An officer, appointed to receive and escort foreign ambassadors on their way through the Ottoman 
territories 
159 Abdullah had the title of Kapıcıbaşı, which in the Ottoman court-rank system was meaning the 
Head of the Palace door-keepers. 
160 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 99; Clément-Simon, Un ambassadeur extraordinaire, p. 36. 
161 ‘Letter of M. I. Kutuzov to E. I. Kutuzova. 18 / 7 December  1793’ In: L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) 
Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 270. 
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embarked on large-scale reforms and were facing a number of serious challenges 
inside the country, whereas the latter following the abolition of the 3 May 
Constitution faced the uprising of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility and currently were 
busy with the Second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian state.162  
 
St. Petersburg was greatly concerned about the possible reaction and the stand 
of the Porte regarding the affairs in Poland, as it was seen from the instructions, 
which Kutuzov got from the Empress. These concerns were even more substantiated 
in view of the fact that the representative of the French Republic Descorches, who 
arrived to Istanbul that very year exactly four months earlier than Kutuzov, on 7 June 
1793163, did his best to make the Ottomans to recognize the French republican 
government and to persuade them again to declare war on Russia. Descorches 
promised the Ottomans that they would not stay alone within a wider framework of 
anti-Russian coalition including the Poles, Swedes, Tatars and Cossacks, which 
could easily be created with the help of France.164 On 19 October 1793 the French 
representative even presented to the Porte a note proposing an alliance between 
France and the Ottoman Empire.165 Thus, insofar as the Russian ambassador was 
concerned, the main aims of his activities in Istanbul, apart from mentioned earlier 
gathering of intelligence, were first, to secure the Ottoman neutrality in Polish 
affairs; and second, to counteract and whenever possible to downplay the French 
                                                 
162 The Russo-Prussian Convention about the second partition of Rzeczpospolita had been signed on 
23 January 1793, and finally confirmed by the Grodno Sejm in the end of September 1793, i.e. 
approximately at the time of Kutuzov’s arrival to Istanbul.   
163 Soysal, Fransız ihtilâli, p. 117. 
164 See, for example, the instructions of the French Foreign Minister Lebrun given to Descorches on 
19 January 1793, before the departure of the latter from Paris to the Ottoman Empire: Soysal, op. cit., 
p. 99.  
165 Constantin de Grunwald, ‘Une Ambassade Russe à Constantinople au XVIIIe Siecle’ Miroir de 
l'Histoire, 82 (1956), p. 496. 
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influence at the Porte. Throughout the 1790-s both remained the primary objects of 
the Russian diplomatic activities in Constantinople.      
 
The Sultan’s government, in its turn, acting in line with its own interests and 
not with those of the Russian, French or some other ambassadors, was to frame a 
course of policy which would correspond to the Ottoman perspective of the current 
international situation. Despite the traditionally strong French influence at the Porte 
and personal pro-French sympathies of many Ottoman statesmen, including the 
Sultan himself, the Porte was persistent in its desire to stay neutral and avoid conflict 
with any of the warring states in Europe. In this respect the French projects to draw 
the Ottoman state into a new war against Russia, for the third time after two defeats, 
in its present troubling times, in face of wide European anti-French coalition, stood 
very little chance of success.  
 
All these were explained again and again by the leading Ottoman officials at 
their conferences with the French representative in winter-spring 1794.166 
Objectively the Ottoman Empire was in no position to enter into alliance with France 
and to support the cause of the Polish insurgents openly, although its sympathies 
were with them and it even secretly assisted them financially.167 This fact, as well as 
diplomatic support of other diplomatic missions of the anti-French in Constantinople, 
without a doubt played in the hands of the Russian diplomacy. The recent 
developments on the international arena and in Ottoman domestic politics largely 
facilitated the tasks assigned to Kutuzov and his embassy. The Ottomans themselves 
                                                 
166 Soysal, Fransız ihtilâli, pp. 123-25; Grunwald, Une Ambassade Russe, p. 497. 
167 ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II, about the order received from Turkey by the Moldovan 
Hospodar M. Soutzo to deliver 120 thousand chervonniie (gold coins) to T. Kościuszko. 6 June (26 
May) 1794’ In: L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 337.    
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were not going to fight against Russia, neither were they ready to put to risk their 
own chance for peace on behalf of Poland, or France, or both of them.      
 
Besides, there were some vexed questions remaining in the Ottoman-Russian 
relations which still gravely threatened the durability of the newly concluded peace. 
These were by no means resolved and continued to be a bone of contention between 
the two empires well until the end of 1790-s when a new international situation 
emerged. Furthermore, they could even potentially trigger a new conflict at any 
moment, leaving both countries poised for a war continuously, notwithstanding all of 
the mutual peaceful assurances. Should any party decide to go to war it would 
already have a number of convenient pretexts at hand.168 Still, in large part due to the 
unwillingness of both sides to escalate the existing tension at this point, a new 
Ottoman-Russian war did not ensue.  
 
The controversial affairs were simply pending without being resolved for years, 
though not leading to any dangerous and massive confrontation. One of the most 
disputed issues was concerning the customs tariff on import and export duties for 
Russian merchants trading with the Ottoman Empire. According to the Ottoman-
Russian Commercial treaty of 1783169 (Article 20) the customs tariff was established 
at 3 per cent of total value of the imported/exported products. The value of the 
products had been calculated in prices existing in 1783. In view of inflation, ten 
                                                 
168 The French, as it could be expected, tried to make use of this fact for their propaganda purposes. Le 
Moniteur Universel, the official newspaper of the French Republic, in particular published the 
following comments of an anonymous author as regards the Ottoman-Russian negotiations in 
Istanbul: “Catherine II a, selon son usage, caché dans ses derniers traités avec la Porte les semences 
de querelles toujours prêtes à revivre à sa volonté. Déjà des explications ont eu lieu sur des tariffs de 
douanes et sur demarcations de frontières, source commode et interminable de chicanes politiques”, 
Le Moniteur Universel, № 130, 10 pluviôse, l’an II (29 January 1794). Quoted in: Edouard de 
Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople : la politique orientale de la Révolution française (2 vols.; 
Paris, 1927), Vol. 2, p. 86.   
169 Russian text: PSZRI, Vol. XXI, № 15757, columns 939-56. 
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years later the actual prices quite naturally increased, whereas on paper, according to 
the fixed treaties, they stayed just the same as used to be a decade ago. In this way 
the duties that were paid were in fact much less than those specified by the treaty. No 
wonder that the Ottoman government sought, while keeping the tariff of 3 per cent 
unchanged, to reconsider the customs duties according to the current prices. The 
Russian side defended its own position through referring to the legal basis, insisting 
that all the earlier treaties had been recognized by the Porte at Jassy and thus nothing 
should be changed at all.170 In the end the Ottomans stepped back from their claims 
in June 1794171, although the issue on the whole came to a deadlock and stayed 
unresolved throughout 1790-s. 
 
Another sore, and by no means minor, subject in the Ottoman-Russian relations 
were the raids of the Circassian tribes into the Russian territory across the Kuban 
River. The Circassians who were nominally the subjects of the Ottoman Sultan 
during 1792-1796 made a number of raids against the Black Sea Cossacks inflicting 
the latter certain damage. The Russian side through its ambassadors demanded from 
the Porte compensation, which had been finally paid in 1798.172 
 
Yet the most important issue for St. Petersburg, one way or another, was to 
know whether there was any possibility that the Ottomans could attack. The reports 
Kutuzov addressed to the Empress and other Russian officials regularly touched 
upon this subject and always the extraordinary envoy voiced an opinion that the 
declaration of war on the part of the Ottoman Empire was very much unlikely. The 
                                                 
170 G. A. Kleinman, Russko-Turetskii soyuz 1799 goda.  In Moskovskii Gosudarstvenniy Universitet. 
Istoricheskii Fakul’tet. Doklady i soobshcheniia. Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1945), p. 16. 
171 Nicolae Iorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Gotha, 1913), Vol. 5, p. 111.  
172 Kleinman, Russko-Turetskii soyuz, p. 16. 
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line of argumentation of Kutuzov came down to the following basic points. First, as 
an experienced soldier Kutuzov pointed out the fact that the Ottomans were still 
militarily unprepared, the reinforcements of the fortresses of Ruschuk, Bendery and 
Ismail were uncompleted, and it would be an absolute folly to start war under such 
conditions.173 Second, the Porte was struggling hard to assert central authority all 
over the Empire; the Russian envoy mentioned the movements of Abd-al-Wahhab, 
Mahmud Pasha of Skutari, the uprising near Trapezund (Trabzon) and the general 
chaos in Rumelia among other troubles. Kutuzov stated that Mahmud Pasha was 
currently so strong that the Porte simply could not think of war with Russia or some 
other state.174 Third, the issue of customs tariff, whatever important it may be, would 
not alone make the Porte to put in danger the advantages of peace. The Ottomans 
would not be silent, they would continuously protest, but would not risk going 
further.175  
 
Thus, at least in the most important respect, the embassy of Kutuzov brought 
the Russian Empress certain additional reassurance that despite all the circulating 
rumours currently there was not much danger of the Ottoman attack. However, no 
radical overall improvements in the Ottoman-Russian relations took place. Catherine 
II due to various circumstances apparently just postponed her earlier aggressive 
projects as regards the Balkan domains of the Sultan and was not going to refuse 
from them completely, the proof of which could be seen in taking the plans of the 
roads, places and fortresses on the Ottoman soil; there were still unresolved vexed 
                                                 
173 ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II, 1 September (21 August) 1793’ In: L. G. Beskrovnyi 
(Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, pp. 225-26. 
174 ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II, 31 / 20 December 1793’ L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov 
Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 275-77; ‘Letter of M. I. Kutuzov to A. V. Suvorov, 17 / 6 March 1794’ L. G. 
Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 317.  
175 ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II, 31 / 20 December 1793’ L. G. Beskrovnyi (Ed.) Kutuzov 
Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 275-77. 
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issues (customs tariff, border skirmishes between the Kuban Cossacks and the 
Circassians), which at any time could exacerbate the relations between the two 
empires and even grow into a new conflict. The spectre of yet another war, much 
undesired in St. Petersburg in view of the complications in Poland, was even more 
threatening for the Ottoman side, which tried to complete the military preparations 
and reinforcements of the border fortresses as soon as possible.      
 
In the meantime, the concentration of the Russian troops within the borders of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, just like the Ottomans’ armaments along their 
borders with Russia, would not contribute to feelings of security on both sides of the 
Dniester. Even though decreased, the potential threat remained and had to be counted 
with by both neighbouring powers. Departing back home, Kutuzov left his successor 
Viktor Pavlovich Kochubei, appointed to be the Russian permanent ambassador at 
the Porte, a lot of work to do.    
 
By the early spring of 1794 the official mission of the extraordinary Russian 
embassy with General Kutuzov at its head was completed. On 11 March 1794 the 
Russian envoy, followed by 17 men from his delegation, bade a farewell to the 
Sultan Selim III.176 In two days, on 13 March, Kutuzov took leave of the Grand 
Vizier,177 and on 26 March the embassy train set out on the way back to Russia.178 
The exchange ceremony with the Ottoman embassy of Mustafa Rasih that was 
returning from its mission at the Russian Empress’ court took place on 5 June179, 
                                                 
176 Mun’kov, Diplomaticheskaia deyatel’nost’ M. I. Kutuzova, p. 83. 
177 Mun’kov, Diplomaticheskaia deyatel’nost’ M. I. Kutuzova, p. 84. 
178 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 201. 
179 ‘Report of M. I. Kutuzov to Catherine II about the exchange ceremony with the Turkish 
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while one and a half months later, on 13 July 1794180, Kutuzov arrived in St. 
Petersburg.  
3.5. Conclusions 
The peace Treaty of Jassy marked the beginning of a new era in the Ottoman-
Russian relations. It confirmed the crucial geopolitical changes that took place in the 
Black Sea region as a result of the earlier Ottoman-Russian wars waged throughout 
the 18th century. The Black Sea, which for centuries used to be virtually an Ottoman 
lake, faced on its northern shores the rise of a new mighty power of the Muscovites. 
Within a few generations the old Muscovite principality became the nemesis of the 
Ottomans and grew into the huge Russian Empire that placed under its control the 
vast territories along the northern coast of the Black Sea, including the Crimean 
Peninsula. The long history of the Ottoman-Russian confrontation could not develop 
in both nations other feelings than those of mutual distrust and hatred. While the 
notorious grand entreprise of Catherine II contemplated the ousting of the Ottomans 
from the Balkans, the Ottoman side with Selim III at the head was determined to 
bring back the territories lost to Russia. Especially grievous in this sense was the 
recent loss of the Crimea, which became the first predominantly Muslim territory 
under the Ottoman suzerainty that fell into the hands of the infidels. 
 
Despite all of the previous conflicts and animosity, by the early 1790-s St. 
Petersburg and the Porte appeared in a situation when to wage war against each other 
would be equally destructive for both. For Russia the difficult financial situation, the 
expenses of almost unceasing wars that continued for the last several decades, the 
                                                 
180 Mun’kov, Diplomaticheskaia deyatel’nost’ M. I. Kutuzova, p. 86. 
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serious consequences of the Pugachov uprising, the unpredictable unfolding of the 
French Revolution and the Polish problems were a sufficient cause to seek an 
agreement with the Ottoman Empire.  
 
In regard to the Porte, by the time under discussion it had to deal with a serious 
internal crisis threatening the very existence of the Ottoman state. By the end of the 
18th century the central Ottoman authorities could not effectively cope with the 
growing disorder and anarchy in virtually all spheres of life, the Ottoman countryside 
being dependent on the Sultan’s government only in name. Even though he might 
cherish secret hopes to return the Crimea and other lost territories, Selim III was not 
going to aggravate his already very precarious positions with a new war. For another 
thing, the Porte badly needed a breathing space for the projected large-scale reforms 
of izâm-i Cedîd.  
 
According to the 10th article of the Jassy Peace Treaty, the extraordinary 
ambassadors were to be sent reciprocally to Constantinople and St. Petersburg in 
order to confirm the recently concluded peace treaty and to assure the opposite side 
in peaceful intentions of their sovereigns. The secret part of both missions, however, 
was gathering of intelligence information on the countries of their stay. Both 
neighbouring powers could not exclude the possibility when the war one day would 
be renewed and for that reason continued with their war preparations even while 
seeking peace.   
 
It is worthy of note that the Russian side was represented by M. I. 
Golenishchev-Kutuzov, a very experienced military commander and not a career 
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diplomat. Apparently, a professional soldier like Kutuzov could far better than any 
diplomat evaluate the military potential of the Ottoman state along with the current 
fighting capacity of the Ottoman army, and thus to calculate whether the Ottomans 
would be able to attack Russia in the nearest future. For St. Petersburg it was 
especially important to know this in the context of the Polish affairs and the planned 
last partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In order to gather the secret 
information such as the location of the places, the roads, the population, the 
fortifications, the dispositions of the troops, the ammunition depots etc., the Russian 
delegation included a large group of military experts, engineers, topographers and 
draughtsmen. Moreover, the slow movement of the embassy train through the 
Balkans helped the Russian specialists to do their job in the most effective way. 
Considering the fact that it was the territories of the Ottoman Balkan possessions that 
were viewed as a potential theatre of hostilities, the hypothetical war the Russians 
were preparing for was expected to be offensive. Obviously, with the same end in 
view the Russian extraordinary envoy was instructed to secretly cultivate the 
sympathies of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. 
 
Just like Kutuzov, the Ottoman envoy Mustafa Rasih Pasha was not a 
professional diplomat either. In accordance with a long tradition of handling its 
affairs with other countries, the Porte by this time simply had neither experienced 
diplomatic staff nor permanent diplomatic missions abroad. The extraordinary 
embassy to Russia was thus entrusted to a high standing Ottoman bureaucrat, initially 
lacking the necessary experience, and who had no trained diplomatic personnel at his 
disposal. Notably, the members of the Ottoman delegation instead of supporting the 
envoy rebelled on their way to the Russian capital, demanding the increased salaries 
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and not caring at all about the prestige of their state. Having delivered the letter of 
the Sultan (âme-i Hümâyûn) to the Russian Empress, Mustafa Rasih Pasha 
completed the formal part of his mission. As to the negotiations with the Russian side 
about the Muslim prisoners of war still kept in Russia, they continued for the whole 
three-month stay of the Ottoman envoy in St. Petersburg and ended inconclusively. 
Probably one of the most important results of the embassy of Mustafa Rasih Pasha 
was the ambassadorial report (sefâretnâme) of his mission, containing a rather 
extensive description of the Russian economy, society, army and state. This kind of 
information, no doubt, was of special interest for the Sultan Selim’s circle of the 
izâm-ı Cedîd reformers. 
 
Following the exchange of the extraordinary embassies the Ottoman-Russian 
relations remained strained. Apart from continuous distrust, there were still some 
unresolved practical issues, like revision of the Trade Tariff or the raids of the 
Circassian tribes, which negatively influenced the relations between the two empires. 
The threat of a new war was still a big concern for both parties. However, both 
extraordinary embassies confirmed the mutual wish of St. Petersburg and the Porte to 
maintain the current status quo. In a way, both sides could be satisfied. The Russians 
had now their hands untied in order to deal with the Polish question, and the 
Ottomans gained an opportunity to use the advantages of peace for their massive 
internal reforms.      
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CHAPTER IV 
WAR CAOT BE PEACE, 1794-1798 
 
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum  
(Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, 
 “Epitoma Rei Militaris”, Liber III) 
 
4.1. Arrival of V. P. Kochubei to Istanbul and the Polish-Lithuanian 
question 
To handle its affairs with the Porte St. Petersburg appointed Viktor Pavlovich 
Kochubei, a scion of the noble Ukrainian Cossack family of Tatar descent and 
nephew of the influential Catherinian statesman Alexander Andreievich Bezborodko. 
It was, actually, to the latter circumstance that the new Russian ambassador in 
Istanbul owed his appointment, which was made when Kochubei still was 23 years 
old (he celebrated his 24th birthday exactly one month later).1 At the age of 8 
Kochubei was taken from his native home in Ukraine and subsequently brought up in 
the house of his uncle in St. Petersburg. When he was sixteen, Kochubei got his first 
                                                 
1 Kochubei was born on 22 / 11 November, 1768 and the Decree of his appointment as the Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Constantinople had been signed on 22 / 11 October, 
1792. For this and other details of Kochubei’s biography see: N. Chechulin, Kochubei Voktor 
Pavlovich. Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ (25 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1903), Vol. 9 “Knappe-
Kiukhelbecker”, pp. 366-82; the date of Kochubei’s appointment has also been confirmed by himself, 
in letter to S. R. Vorontsov, written on the next day of this event. See: ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. 
Vorontsov, 23 / 12 October, 1792’ In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, 
p. 63.  
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diplomatic experience, being sent for two years to Sweden. In 1784-1786 he stayed 
at the Russian mission in Stockholm, at the same time attending lectures at Uppsala 
University. After a short return to Russia and escorting the Empress during her 
famous trip to the Crimea, Kochubei had been again appointed to the Russian 
mission abroad. In the spring of 1789 he arrived at London, where at the request of 
his uncle he was put under the special care of the Russian ambassador in the Great 
Britain, Semion Romanovich Vorontsov. For the rest of his life, Kochubei retained a 
close friendship both with the ambassador Vorontsov and the whole Vorontsov 
family, the best proof of which is the voluminous correspondence published in “The 
Archive of Prince Vorontsov”.   
 
In summer 1792 Kochubei was called back to Russia, in view of the plans of 
Bezborodko regarding his nephew’s further career. Among the existing options there 
were ambassadorial posts in Madrid or Istanbul, though the whole issue of the 
expected Kochubei’s appointment was known then only to a very limited circle of 
the highest Russian officials. While Bezborodko and Catherine II were willing to see 
Kochubei as the Russian envoy at the Porte, Bezborodko’s nephew himself would 
rather prefer Madrid and was not much enthusiastic about his prospected sojourn in 
the Ottoman capital. In his letters, regularly written to London, Kochubei was 
constantly conferring on this subject with S. R. Vorontsov2, asking for his advice 
whether to accept the post of ambassador in Istanbul or to wait for some other 
position.  
 
                                                 
2 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 28 / 17 August, 1792’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 40; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 4 September (24 August), 1792’ 
Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, pp. 42-45. 
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Despite the fact that the place prepared by Bezborodko for his nephew was 
both highly prestigious and very profitable, the doubts of Kochubei about accepting 
this post were quite explainable. The young man of his age, lacking experience, was 
from the very beginning to be faced with a vast field of difficult and complicated 
work demanding huge responsibility and sound professional background. Moreover, 
Kochubei was afraid that his tenure in Istanbul would estrange him in his young age 
from society and the social environment he used to live in while in St. Petersburg and 
Western Europe (“la vie qu’on mène dans la capital turque me rendra étranger à la 
société”) and would not allow him, still, any leisure time to proceed with the studies 
of some other subjects he was interested in.   
 
Even though Bezborodko’s nephew was not too eager to go to the Ottoman 
Empire, it is clear from his own correspondence with S. R. Vorontsov that his 
appointment was already decided in principle between his uncle and the Empress. It 
simply remained for him to wait throughout the summer and autumn of 1792 for the 
official imperial order, which at last had been issued on 22 / 11 October, 1792. 
Awaiting in St. Petersburg for his final appointment, young Kochubei stroke up a 
friendship with the heir apparent to the throne Pavel Petrovich (future Emperor Paul 
I) and his son, crown prince Alexander Pavlovich (future Emperor Alexander I). 
Later on, this detail of Kochubei’s biography would also have an important effect 
upon his life.  
 
Upon the completion of all formalities, in late 1792 Kochubei left St. 
Petersburg for Vienna, where he was again to wait, for the whole summer and 
autumn of 1793, when the extraordinary mission of General Kutuzov would be 
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finished. The slow pace with which Kutuzov’s embassy was moving, and then its 
rather long stay in Istanbul, was the object of some private complaints by Kochubei 
who felt at a loose end in the Austrian capital and would prefer to start his duties 
immediately.3  
 
Finally, in late February of 1794 the new Russian ambassador arrived at the 
shores of Bosporus. Kutuzov’s mission by this time was closing to the end though 
the huge Russian delegation still remained in Istanbul. Heinrich Christoph von 
Reimers, one of the numerous members of Kutuzov’s extraordinary embassy, left a 
short comment of his general impression about Kochubei when the latter just came to 
his new post. Reimers speaks of the nephew of Bezborodko as “a nice, young, well-
educated man of about 26-27 years of age (Kochubei was 25 then; V. M.), who was 
brought up mostly in France and then spent a few years in England. He owes this 
important office to his uncle, Count Bezborodko”.4 As was the usual practice, upon 
his arrival Kochubei paid on 1 March (18 February) an official visit to the Grand 
Vizier, followed by an audience with the Sultan, which took place on 4 March (21 
February), 1794.5 In this way, the young Russian ambassador, who in view of his 
family name (Kochubei’s name was of Turkic origin, being a derivative of “Küçük 
bey” or, “little lord”) sometimes had been called in joke “Büyük bey” (big lord) by 
the Ottomans6, started to serve on the first post of high responsibility in his 
subsequently long and successful career.7 
                                                 
3 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 31 / 20 July, 1793’ In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, pp. 11-12. 
4Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 188.  
5 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, pp. 192-99. Reimers, who in accordance with the order of Kutuzov together 
with some other members of the Russian delegation had joined the entourage of the new ambassador 
during the latter’s visit to the Sultan, gives an expanded account of this particular audience.   
6 Reimers, Reise, Vol. 2, p. 189. 
7 V. P. Kochubei, as a close friend of Emperor Alexander I would later become a quite influential 
person in Russian foreign and domestic policy, being a member of the celebrated Alexander’s Privy 
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Kochubei was destined to appear in Istanbul in those early spring days of 1794 
when the rest of Europe witnessed the ever-accelerating course of both appalling and 
fascinating developments of the French revolution, and on the East of the continent 
the Polish rebels with General Kościuszko at their head were preparing to engage 
into heroic but largely doomed attempt to liberate their country from foreign 
oppression. The Polish uprising officially started on 24 March 1794, as General 
Kościuszko at the market of the ancient Polish capital, the city of Kraków, declared 
its beginning and took a solemn oath to stand at its head. At the same time in France, 
the period of unrestricted authority of the Committee of the Public Safety, known as 
the Reign of Terror, reached its climax, which meant as well the highest point of the 
revolution. The summer month of Thermidor, however, was also closing in.  
 
On the very day when Kościuszko was taking his oath in Kraków, the 
execution of such an iconic revolutionary figure as Jaques Hébert took place in Paris. 
A few weeks later, on 5 April, there were guillotined other living symbols of 
revolution Georges Danton and Camille Desmoulins. Moreover, the war France had 
been waging against almost all Europe was still underway. Thus, in terms of their 
foreign policy both the Polish patriots and the French revolutionary government at 
the moment were very much interested in gathering international support of any kind. 
Both hoped to find it first of all at the court of the Ottoman Sultan. For Russian 
ambassador in Istanbul, respectively, the principal task was to prevent the possibility 
of the Polish-Ottoman or Franco-Ottoman alliance and to derail the attempts of the 
French diplomacy to set the Ottoman and Russian Empires at loggerheads.  
                                                                                                                                          
Committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1801-1802), twice the Minister of the Interior (1802-1807 
and 1819-1823) and the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers (1827-1832), to name just the most 
important of his future offices. 
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When still waiting in Vienna for the departure to the place of his new duty, 
Kochubei shared the general nature of instructions he got for the forthcoming 
diplomatic mission in Istanbul with S. R. Vorontsov. These instructions 
unambiguously prescribed the Russian ambassador to maintain amicable relations 
with the Ottomans, indicating the wish of St. Petersburg to avoid any conflicts on the 
Southern border of the empire at this point. For all that, Kochubei was not to make 
whatever concessions the Ottoman side might demand in some controversial issues, 
but insist on the strict adherence to all previously concluded treaties.8  
 
It should be mentioned as well that the current desire of St. Petersburg for 
peace did not exclude other more aggressive plans for settlement of the Eastern 
question, which were, no doubt, also contemplated by the Russian Empress. There 
are many evidences, like the earlier ideas of grande entreprise, specific instructions 
of Catherine II to Kutuzov, persistent rumours about the impending war, which may 
serve as a proof of bellicose attitudes towards the Ottoman state existing in Russia. 
What is more, some Russian noblemen at the beginning of 1794 believed that the war 
was unavoidable. For instance, F. V. Rostopchin, in the future the Foreign minister 
of Paul I and the governor of Moscow during the Napoléon’s invasion, who was at 
this time only a young courtier close to the heir apparent Pavel Petrovich, and who 
was not much liked by Catherine, wrote to S. R. Vorontsov: 
Il me semble que la guerre est inévitable pour la Russie, puisque 
l’Impératrice la veut, malgré les réponses modérées et pacifiques de la 
Porte. Elle persiste dans l’intention de parvenir à son but et de remplir 
les gazettes du bombardement de Constantinople. Elle dit, à sa table, 
                                                 
8 V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 18 January, 1794. In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 75. 
90 
qu’elle perdra un jour patience et fera voir aux Turcs qu’il est aussi aisé 
d’aller à leur capitale que de faire le voyage de la Crimée.9  
 
That the expectations of the new war in the 1st half of 1794 were quite real can also 
be clearly seen in the official correspondence between St. Petersburg and the 
Headquarters of the Black Sea Admiralty Department in Nikolayev (currently 
Mykolayiv, Ukraine), concerning the combat readiness of the Black Sea fleet. In 
January 1794 Catherine II issued the order to the then Chief of the Black Sea 
Admiralty Department Admiral Nikolay Semionovich Mordvinov to get the fleet 
fully operational in the event of war with “the enemy of the Christian name”.10 
Whereas in the first lines of this document it is implied that the Ottomans, 
encouraged by the French incitements and the current imbroglio in Poland, may 
break the peace and attack Russia, it had also been prescribed for the Black Sea fleet 
not to confine itself only to defensive operations, but to be ready as well to deliver a 
preventive strike on the Ottoman naval forces dispersed in the area, so that the latter 
would not have enough time to join up. Nevertheless, the general contents of some 
other related documents suggests, that the Russian Empire was rather more agitated 
by the possibility of the Ottoman aggression, and first of all sought to ensure the 
security of its own borders, rather than embark on offensive campaign, still having 
unresolved problems in Poland and experiencing substantial financial difficulties 
caused by the last war.11 The clear-cut supposition of Rostopchin indicates, though, 
that the Russian Empress despite the requirements of current situation still could 
entertain some designs about the Ottoman Empire. 
                                                 
9 ‘F. V. Rostopchin to S. R. Vorontsov, 20 / 9 March, 1794’ In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 24, p. 260. 
10 ‘Order of Catherine II, 27 / 16 January, 1794’ R. N. Mordvinov (ed.) Admiral Ushakov (3 vols.; 
Moscow, 1951) Vol. 1, pp. 597-600.  
11 ‘Letter of N. S. Mordvinov to P. A. Zubov, 20 / 9 May, 1794’ In: Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, 
Vol. 1, pp. 604-605; ‘F. F. Ushakov to N. S. Mordvinov, 1 July (20 June) 1794’, Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 1, pp. 611-12. 
91 
 
Thus one of the driving forces behind the Ottoman war preparations was the 
anticipation of the Russian assault, much as the similar military preparations of the 
Russian side were triggered in no small part by the apprehension of the Ottoman 
attack as a result of the hypothetical alliance of the Porte with France and/or the 
Polish insurgents. For that reason the Ottoman-Russian relations at the moment could 
hardly be called unstrained. The representatives of both the Sultan and the Russian 
Empress while speaking at the conferences about mutual peaceful intentions clearly 
could not rule out in their minds the still existent possibility of war.  
 
The whole situation may be defined by a formula “war cannot be peace”, and it 
was up to both sides to decide where to put comma, after the first word or before the 
last one. Despite their own ideal preferences both the Ottomans and Russians, taking 
into consideration their best interests and the circumstances of the current moment, 
were more inclined to choose the second, peaceful option. Another war would be 
madness and come equally destructive for each side.  
 
Particularly deplorable was the situation of the Ottoman state. After having 
stayed for about half a year in the Ottoman Empire Kutuzov, for instance, was quite 
positive that the Ottomans by no means would start the new war on their own will. 
Upon his return the Russian extraordinary ambassador was pointing out that the 
Ottoman fortresses were not yet prepared to meet full defensive requirements, the 
Ottoman fleet was not yet strong enough, the reformative activity of the government 
was still immature, and, above all, the Ottoman state was harassed by domestic 
disturbances in all parts of the vast empire from the Balkans to the Arabic peninsula. 
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As a result, Kutuzov was making a conclusion that the declaration of war would be 
against any common sense and for sure not in the interests of the Ottoman 
government.12  
 
An attitude, taken by the Porte in regard to the Polish uprising along with the 
climb-down over the issue of the new Trade Tariff in summer 179413 offer a sharp 
evidence of the Ottoman wish to stay out of war. At the conferences with the Russian 
ambassador throughout spring and summer 1794, the Ottoman officials repeatedly 
assured Kochubei that the Porte would always keep its neutrality in the Polish affairs. 
Kochubei, in his turn, tried to soothe the concerns of the Ottoman side about the 
Russian armaments in close vicinity to the Ottoman border and on the Black Sea.14 
Meanwhile the French representative in Istanbul Marie Louis Descorches15, acting 
also on behalf of the Polish insurgents, unsuccessfully sought to gain from the Porte 
the official recognition of the French Republic. At the moment this seemed highly 
unlikely, the same as an open support by the Porte of the Polish uprising. To do that 
would mean for the Ottomans to incur the enmity not only of Russia but also the 
other two co-participants of the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - 
Austria and Prussia, as well as all adversaries of the French, that is, the whole 
Europe.  
                                                 
12 ‘M. I. Kutuzov to General Field-Marshal P. A. Rumiantsev, 11 June (29 May) 1794’ In: 
Beskrovnyi, Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 339; Mun’kov, Diplomaticheskaia deyatel’nost’, pp. 
74-75.  
13 The Porte gave up its claims regarding the new Trade Tariff on 26 June. See: Iorga, Geschichte des 
Osmanischen Reiches, Vol. 5, p. 111; Also see: ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 July, 1794’ In: 
Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 79. 
14 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 26 April, 1794’ In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 31; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 June (30 May), 1794’ Arkhiv 
kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, pp. 32-34; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. 
Vorontsov, 10 June, 1794’ (the date is the same as that one of the previous letter). Arkhiv kniazia 
Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, pp. 34-36. 
15 Since the French Republic by then was not officially recognized by the Ottoman government, 
Descorches stayed in Istanbul incognito, as a simple merchant and under an assumed name, d’Aubry. 
See: Onnik Jamgocyan, ‘La Révolution Française Vue et Vécue de Constantinople (1789-1795)’ 
Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, 282 (1990), p. 465.  
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Neither the long-standing sympathies for France, nor the attractive, albeit 
chimerical, propositions of Descorches, nor the French help with military instructors 
and engineers, nor even the deep anti-Russian feelings, could make the Ottoman side 
to openly discard the adopted principle of neutrality in the international politics. 
Also, the above mentioned advantages of the French side seemed even more not at 
all that convincing as compared with the most telling Russian trump card, which was, 
by a witty observation of Kochubei, 60 thousand men and count Suvorov on the 
Ottoman borders.16 The policy implemented at this point by the Ottoman government 
in its foreign relations appeared to be the best advisable under the given 
circumstances, that is, not to interfere into any rivalries of big European powers and 
in the meantime to concentrate on its own military preparations. 
 
It is beyond any doubt that the Sultan’s government, despite the urgent 
necessity of the moment to keep neutrality, could not remain indifferent to the events 
in the neighbouring Poland. Yet to openly declare itself a champion of the Polish 
independence and to start war, as it had happened in 1768, was absolutely impossible 
for the Porte. According to Kochubei, the Ottomans apparently were sympathising 
with the Polish uprising since it diverted the attention and resources of St. 
Petersburg, which otherwise could be used against the Ottoman Empire. On the other 
hand, evaluating the chance of the Ottoman interference into the Polish affairs, the 
Russian ambassador deemed that the Ottomans could hardly lend a substantial 
support to the rebels of General Kościuszko.17  
 
                                                 
16 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 June, 1794’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 
1879), Vol. 14, p. 35. 
17 Ibidem. 
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Descorches, who had not so long ago been the French ambassador in Warsaw18, 
was doing his best to call attention of the Ottoman highest officials to the Polish 
question. On 11 May 1794 the representative of as yet unrecognised French Republic 
delivered a note to the Reis-ül-Küttab Mehmed Rashid, asking for assistance to the 
Poles. Then Descorches was once again accepted by the Reis-ül-Küttab on 29 July. 
Mehmed Rashid reassured him that the well-being of Poland was very important for 
the Ottoman Empire, that the Porte felt great sympathy for Poles, but at the present 
moment could not help them. At the same time Reis Efendi gave his word that the 
Ottomans, even though not rendering direct assistance to the Polish patriots, in the 
same way would not prevent the secret attempts to provide them a helping hand.19 
 
In fact, while constantly emphasizing to the Russian ambassador in Istanbul 
their expressed neutrality in the Polish question, the Ottomans whenever possible 
indeed were facilitating the struggle of the Polish insurgents. Many political refugees 
from Poland as well as the rebellious Polish officers in search of asylum, much to the 
annoyance of the Russian side, were accepted on the Ottoman territory. Furthermore, 
a sum of 20 thousand Flemish ducats had been secretly sent to Kościuszko through 
the agency of the Moldovian Hospodar Michael Soutzos (Mihai Suţu).20 Another by 
no means unimportant point is that already by its own continuing military 
preparations the Ottoman Empire indirectly aided the cause of the Polish rebels, as 
                                                 
18 Marie Louis Descorches, or d’Escorches de Saint-Croix (after the Revolution he changed the 
aristocratic spelling of his name) served as the French ambassador to Poland during July 1791- August 
1792. Catherine II issued a special order (27 / 16 August 1792) to the Russian military commander in 
Poland General Kachowski, prescribing him to make sure that the French representative would be 
expelled from Poland. See: Władysław Smoleński, Konfederacya Targowicka (Cracow, 1903) pp. 
307-308, 370-71. 
19 Jan Reychman, ‘1794 Polonya İsyanı ve Türkiye’ Belleten, 31 (1967), pp. 87-88. 
20 Reychman, 1794 Polonya İsyanı, pp. 88-89; ‘M. I. Kutuzov to General Field-Marshal P. A. 
Rumiantsev, 11 June (29 May) 1794’ In: Beskrovnyi, Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich, p. 339.  
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Russia was thus bound to keep a sizeable part of its troops on the Ottoman border, 
instead of using them in Poland.      
         
On the whole, by the autumn of 1794 the relations of Istanbul and St. 
Petersburg remained just distrustful as earlier, though neither side was willing to rush 
into both devastating and unnecessary war. At the end of September Kochubei wrote 
to S. R. Vorontsov that the Russian court is “full of good will to keep the best 
possible terms with the Porte” and the Ottomans at the moment “want to stay in 
tranquillity”. Kochubei for this reason was making a conclusion that until winter 
nothing would change, and only then it would be possible to judge more or less 
thoroughly about the further intentions of the Porte.21 In other words, everything was 
going just as the Russian diplomatic representatives in Istanbul, first Kutuzov and 
then Kochubei, envisioned it in their reports. The Porte obviously could not run the 
risk of breaking the peace with Russia, becoming after the suppression of the Polish 
uprising in the end of the year more and more convinced that the line of policy it 
chose was the only one possible.   
 
All of the indefatigable efforts of Descorches to win the Ottomans on his side 
appeared in vain. On the verge of the final defeat of Kościuszko’s armies Piotr 
Krutta, former interpreter (tercüman) at the old embassy of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth appointed to act in the capacity of plenipotentiary of the Polish 
insurrectionist government (Rada ajwyższa arodowa), arrived at Constantinople. 
Having come to the Ottoman capital early in November, Krutta was to give the Porte 
the first hand information about the uprising and to ask for help with one thousand 
                                                 
21 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 22 / 14 September, 1794’ In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 
vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, pp. 85-86. 
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ducats and 40 thousand rifles.22 By this time not only Kościuszko had already been 
captured by Russians for about one month (after the battle of Maciejowice, on 10 
October), but also Warsaw fell (on 5 November). The fight was over and before long 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would be wiped out from the map of Europe 
for good.23     
 
The military success in Poland evidently strengthened the Russian positions in 
Istanbul and caused additional difficulties for Descorches. In Kochubei’s opinion, the 
Ottomans even earlier never thought to interfere into the Polish affairs seriously. As 
he put it, they “were listening to the Swedes and to the French, they may be were 
giving some hopes, and that is all”.24 By the end of November, the Russian 
ambassador at the Porte was fully confident that, after receiving the news about the 
capture of Kościuszko and overall defeat of the Polish uprising, the Ottoman 
government, would certainly not dare to open hostilities against Russia at least until 
the next year. Kochubei was positive that if Russia would take the whole Poland, not 
to mention undertaking another partition, there would be no need to be afraid of the 
Ottoman attack.25  
 
The subsequent developments showed that the Russian ambassador was right in 
his assumption. As Iorga observes, the Ottoman government received the news of the 
destruction of Poland with great sorrow, as it might mean a grave omen for the Porte 
itself as well. However, Descorches still did not manage to persuade it into declaring 
                                                 
22 Reychman, 1794 Polonya İsyanı, p. 90. 
23 The third, and last, partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth officially took place on 24 
October 1795, when the three partitioning powers (Russia, Prussia and Austria) signed a treaty, 
dividing the remaining territories of the Commonwealth. 
24 ‘V. P. Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, 27 / 16 November, 1794’ In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 
vols.; Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 37. 
25 Ibidem; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 December (24 November), 1794’ In: Arkhiv kniazia 
Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 40. 
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a war on Russia.26 The only thing, which the Porte could afford at the moment was a 
protest against “the massacres in Poland” made by Reis Efendi to Kochubei in 
December 1794.27 To risk its own interests for the sake of the doomed Poland, 
though, would be a complete folly. Without breaking their neutrality, trying to keep 
up peaceful relations with Russia and not seeking war, the Ottomans simply felt 
bound to prepare for it as best as they could, all the more after the downfall of 
Poland. 
4.2. Diplomatic struggle at the Ottoman capital throughout 1795-
1796 
Meanwhile the French Republic was gradually gaining the upper hand against 
its enemies at the western end of the European continent. At the very beginning of 
1795 the Batavian Republic, the first among the French client states of the epoch of 
the Revolutionary wars, had been proclaimed.28 On 5 April, in Basel France signed 
peace with Prussia. The Prussian king recognised the French Republic and all of its 
territorial acquisitions on the left bank of Rhine. Somewhat later, in summer, the 
similar treaty had been signed with Spain, terminating the War of the Pyrenees.29 As 
for the Ottomans, who earlier were in no haste to recognise the French revolutionary 
government as long as some other state would do it first 30, the recognition of the 
                                                 
26 Iorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, Vol. 5, p. 111. 
27 Edouard de Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople: la politique orientale de la Révolution 
française, (2 vols.; Paris, 1927), Vol. 2, p. 144. 
28 19 January, 1795. 
29 War between Spain and the French Republic, waged throughout 17 April 1793- 22 July 1795.  
30 Many times the officials of the Sultan’s government were explaining to Descorches that the 
Ottoman Empire would not be the last state to recognise the French Republic, though at the same time 
it could not be the first one. For example, see: Onnik Jamgocyan, ‘La Révolution Française Vue et 
Vécue de Constantinople (1789-1795)’ Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, 282 (1990), 
p. 465. 
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revolutionary France by Prussia, one of the bigger European powers, cleared the way 
for the Porte to follow the same path. 
    
Therefore, when Raymond de Verninac31, the new diplomatic representative of 
the National Convention, arrived on 14 April to Istanbul32 the hearsay was floating in 
the air that the Porte may recognise the French Republic and Verninac as its official 
ambassador quite soon. In a letter written to S. R. Vorontsov on 10 May 1795, i.e. 
one week before the recognition of Verninac, Kochubei shared with his friend and 
senior colleague his apprehension that the Porte might follow the example of Prussia, 
though he hoped that there were still chances for this not to happen.33 The Russian 
ambassador in Istanbul noted at the same time that all the French projects to raise the 
Ottomans against Russia and the Habsburg Empire could by no means be achieved 
this year, since the Porte was not yet ready either on sea or on land.34 Regarding the 
Swedish diplomatic cooperation with the French in the attempts to bring the Ottoman 
government into some kind of anti-Russian coalition, Kochubei thought that the 
Swedes rather wished to obtain both the French and Ottoman subsidies than to fight 
against Russia. Kochubei concluded his letter by deriving a clear satisfaction from 
the fact that at the moment the Porte more than ever before distrusted the Christian 
powers and suspected all of them. Such a state of affairs when the Porte trusts no 
one, concludes Kochubei, was very favourable for Russia as the Ottoman 
                                                 
31 Raymond de Verninac Saint-Maur (1762-1822) before his appointment to Istanbul represented 
France at the court of the Swedish king, in 1792. Apart from being a diplomat he was also a poet. It 
may worth remarking that Verninac was brother-in-law of famous French painter of the 19th century 
Eugène Delacroix, as he married the older sister of Delacroix. See: Maurice Tourneux, A foreword to 
“Journal intime de l’abbé Mulot”. In: Mémoires de la Société de l’histoire de Paris et de l’Île-de-
France, 29 (1902), p. 26. 
32 Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople, Vol. 2, p. 247. 
33 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 May, 1795’ In: Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 50. 
34 Ibidem, p. 51. 
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government in any case never trusted the Russians as its natural enemies (n’a jamais 
eu de confiance en nous, comme dans son ennemi naturel).35  
 
    As expected, Verninac was recognised by the Porte as plenipotentiary of the 
republican France on 18 May 1795. “The Porte recognised the French Republic”, - 
this was the very first sentence Kochubei wrote in his next letter to S. R. Vorontsov. 
From now on, as the Russian ambassador characteristically puts it, “the door of 
Verninac was decorated with the coat of arms of anarchy, of which he was a 
representative”.36 A natural consequence of such an event would be an even more 
increased diplomatic activity of France within the Sultan’s domains. Despite this 
fact, Kochubei once again repeated his opinion that the Porte would retain its 
neutrality at least until the end of the current year, remaining an “indifferent 
spectatrix” of the developments going on in Europe.37 Moreover, the very personality 
of Verninac compared poorly to that one of Descorches. As Iorga stated, the Porte 
after all the solemn ceremonies was not taking Verninac seriously and his cause 
seemed to be lost from the very beginning.38 Kochubei, already after Verninac’s stay 
in Istanbul for more than one year, also thought that Descorches had been a much 
more talented person than his successor.39 Not everything depended on the French 
ambassador alone, though. 
 
   For the time being, the Ottoman government used the peace as an opportunity 
to continue its military preparations and the large-scale reformative programme of 
                                                 
35 Ibidem, p. 52. 
36 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 26 / 15 May, 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 53. 
37 Ibidem; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 June (30 May), 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova 
(40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 93. 
38 Iorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, Vol. 5, p. 113. 
39 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 25 / 14 August, 1796’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 116. 
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izâm-ı Cedîd. In general, the two widespread concerns among the people of the 
Ottoman Empire at this time were the childlessness of Selim III and his various 
innovations.40 The scope of the work to be done was extensive, including the 
attempts to create new troops trained and organised along the European lines, 
building new battleships for the navy, the reinforcement of the old border fortresses 
(Bender, Akkerman, Ismail) and the construction of the new ones (in Burgas, at the 
mouth of the Danube, and at the entrance of the Black Sea), the creation of the new 
factories for production of the gunpowder and artillery foundries.41 This drove the 
need for many experts in the respective areas, able to perform the required tasks. 
Quite understandably these were to be invited from abroad. It is worthy of note, that 
the Porte, guided by its own interests, was using the engineers, workers, military and 
naval instructors from the Western Europe quite regardless of their nationality. In the 
Ottoman Empire at the same time were working the French, the British and the 
Swedes, i.e. the representatives of the states currently fighting with each other in 
Europe jointly served the Sultan.42  
 
Touching upon the subject of the European military instructors serving in the 
Ottoman army, one simply cannot avoid mentioning the fact that in September 1795 
a young French General Napoléon Bonaparte, then aged twenty-six and having no 
inviting career prospects in France, also presented a report to the National 
Convention expressing his wish to go to the Ottoman Empire in the capacity of an 
                                                 
40 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 May, 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 
1879), Vol. 14, p. 51.  
41 Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople, pp. 139-44. 
42 In this way, the British engineer White and six Swedish naval officers arrived to serve at the 
Ottoman Empire in summer 1795. See: ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 25 / 14 June, 1795’ 
Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 55; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. 
Vorontsov, 10 August (30 July), 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, 
pp. 95-96; Soysal, Fransız ihtilâli, p. 160.   
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artillery instructor.43 A bit more than a fortnight after this request, when Bonaparte 
was already preparing for departure to the domains of the Sultan, a fateful event 
occurred in Paris that changed all of these plans and young General Bonaparte’s 
future life and career altogether. The successful suppression of the royalist 
insurrection in Paris on 13 Vendémiaire an IV (5 October 1795) under the direct 
command of Bonaparte paved the way for the young General’s fast rise to 
prominence. As a result, Napoléon Bonaparte was to step on the Ottoman land 
somewhat later and in quite different circumstances.            
 
It is easy to notice that the majority of the Ottoman fortresses and other 
strategic locations to be fortified in the first place were either situated not far from 
the Russian border (like Bender, Akkerman, Ismail or Khotyn) or could easily be 
exposed to a hypothetical Russian aggression (the Ottoman Black Sea littoral). 
Objectively, even in time of peace, Russia remained the most serious external threat 
for the Ottoman state and the vast military preparations rather of defensive than the 
offensive character, made by the Porte, were a good proof of the Ottoman living 
concerns about the Russian attack.  
 
To sum up, the continuing reforms, the military unpreparedness, the internal 
crisis, the decentralization tendencies and ineffectiveness of the central authorities, 
the growing wide dissatisfaction with the reformative movement of the Sultan, the 
lack of security for life and property of the subjects, and on top of that the spread of 
plague44 would not allow the Ottoman Empire to wish at this point something other 
                                                 
43 The full text of this request, dated 17 September 1795, is given in the Turkish translation at: Soysal, 
Fransız ihtilâli, p. 162.   
44 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 August (30 July), 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 
vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 96-97. 
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than tranquillity and peace. Despite all of the ongoing armaments, the declaring of 
war against Russia was for the Porte out of the question.45  
 
For the same reason, the Ottoman reaction to the third and final partition of the 
Polish-Lithuanian state in the end of 1795 was in full accordance with the earlier 
predictions of the Russian ambassador made already a year before.46 After the 
partition had been completed, Kochubei commented in December 1795 on the 
Ottoman attitudes towards this issue:  
Our Polish affair has been accepted here as a grievous and 
predestined event... For now I am even more assured that it [the Porte; 
M.V.] would keep the tranquillity with us for long, and, without any 
unexpected occurrences, neither the French nor the Swedes would 
manage to shake the beards that belong to here [meaning the beards of 
the Ottoman officials; M. V.](не удастся поколебать здешних 
бород).47 
 
Although the defeat of the Polish insurrection and the ensuing final partition of 
the Commonwealth further undermined the chance of involving the Ottomans into 
any kind of military anti-Russian alliance, the French diplomacy kept working 
towards its goals. The first and foremost was the conclusion of an offensive alliance 
between Paris and the Porte. In spite of this primary objective of the French the only 
thing Verninac managed to achieve by the spring 1796 was a project of a defensive 
alliance, adopted by Selim III and then additionally discussed and agreed upon by the 
Consultative Council (Meclis-i Meşveret) under the presidency of the Grand Vizier 
                                                 
45 The idea that the Ottoman Empire badly needs peace and would not declare war on Russia on its 
own will constantly recurs in the letters of Kochubei, written throughout the summer-autumn 1795. 
Check: ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 August (30 July), 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova 
(40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, pp. 94-97; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 3 November, 
1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, pp. 97-100; ‘V. P. Kochubei to 
S. R. Vorontsov, 24 / 13 December, 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 
18, pp. 100-103.    
46 ‘V. P. Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, 27 / 16 November, 1794’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 37. 
47 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 24 / 13 December, 1795’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 102.  
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on 19 May 1796.48 On 24 May, it was signed by the Reis-ül-Küttab Ratıb Efendi and 
Verninac. According to this project, France was assuming the obligation to aid the 
Ottoman Empire, should it be attacked by some other state, with the army of 30 
thousand men, or eight ships of the line and twelve frigates, or the subsidy in the 
amount necessary for maintaining of such a military force. The Ottoman side also 
guaranteed that the Black Sea would be opened to the French commercial vessels. By 
a special clause the Kingdom of Great Britain was excluded from the countries this 
treaty would be directed against. In other words, instead of the offensive treaty, 
which had been expected in Paris, Verninac could sign only a defensive one. What is 
more, according to the project of treaty the Porte was not obliged to help France in its 
war against Britain.  
 
On 28 May 1796 (7 prairial an IV) Verninac sent the text to the Foreign 
minister Charles-François Delacroix, his future father-in-law,49 asking to accept the 
conditions of the proposed Ottoman-French defensive alliance.50 The given treaty, 
being rather exclusively in the interests of the Ottoman state and not exactly the one 
Paris hoped for, was not ratified by France. At the beginning of August Verninac 
received the negative answer from his ministry, of which he had to inform the 
Ottoman government. The Porte, understandably, remained stunned upon learning 
this news.51 In such a manner by August 1796 the French Directory had discredited 
itself enough in the eyes of the Ottomans.               
 
                                                 
48 Soysal, Fransız ihtilâli, p. 142. 
49 In 1798 Raymond de Verninac would marry Henriette Delacroix, the only daughter of Charles-
François Delacroix (the French Foreign minister in 1795-1797) and the older sister of painter Eugène 
Delacroix. A. Dry [Fleury Adrien]. Soldats ambassadors sous le Directoire, an IV- an VIII (Paris, 
1906), p. 41. 
50Dry, Soldats ambassadors, pp. 142-43. 
51 Dry, Soldats ambassadors, p. 144. 
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While Verninac was occupied with the ill-fated project of the allied treaty, a 
representative of the Polish emigrant circles appeared on the shores of the Bosporus 
as well. Already in early November 1795, Michał Kleofas Ogiński departed 
incognito from Venice for Istanbul.52 It is impossible not to mention that Ogiński, 
aside from his diplomatic duties, was also a composer and is the very same author of 
the immortal sounds of the polonaise “Farewell to the Homeland” (Pożegnanie 
Ojczyzny) for which he is more widely known than for his other activities. In fact, 
with the aid of the French consul (then not yet a political term) in Livorno Ogiński 
sailed off from this port only on 5 February 1796 and arrived at Smyrna (Izmir) after 
about one and a half months of the sea trip.53 In the end Ogiński came to Istanbul, 
judging by his own memoirs, somewhere in April 1796.         
 
As is seen from the written directives54 given to Ogiński by the Polish emigrant 
committee based in Paris, the objectives of his mission much corresponded with 
those of Verninac. In the first place, as it might have been expected, the Polish 
émigrés aspired to restore the Polish state and for that reason were seeking the 
military support from any country which could be regarded as a potential ally. 
Among the most general tasks formulated in Ogiński’s instructions were to work for 
the Ottoman recognition of independent Poland and conclusion of an offensive 
military alliance between the Poles and the Ottomans that was to be directed against 
the common enemies. This actually meant that the High Porte was supposed to take 
the burden of fighting against the three co-participants of the Polish-Lithuanian 
                                                 
52 Ogiński left Venice on 4 November 1795 accompanied by another Polish émigré, Brigadier General 
Kolysko. Both used the false British passports and the assumed names.  Michał Kleofas Ogiński, 
Mémoires de Michel Oginski sur la Pologne et les Polonais, depuis 1788 jusqu’à la fin de 1815 (4 
vols.; Paris, 1826), Vol. 2, p. 115.  
53 Ogiński, Mémoires, pp. 120-21.  
54 The full text of the orders sent to Ogiński by the Polish emigrant committee is available at: Ogiński, 
Mémoires, pp. 104-113.     
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partitions. To bring the Ottomans to the prospected alliance, Ogiński, much like the 
French ambassadors, was recommended to entice the Porte with the promises to 
return the Crimea and all of the territories that had been lost during the recent war.  
 
Besides, it was planned to create a broad anti-Russian coalition including 
France, the Polish insurrectionists, Sweden, Denmark and the Ottoman Empire. 
Along with such a fundamental purpose Ogiński had more specific orders, like to 
securing asylum for the Polish émigrés in the Danubian principalities of the Ottoman 
Empire and creating an effective combat unit from them to continue the fight for 
independent Poland. Should the Ottoman government agree to give asylum for the 
Polish insurrectionists, Ogiński was also to procure the Porte’s permission to 
transport through the Ottoman territories the French munitions and artillery, which 
Paris might have sent in military aid for the Poles. In addition, the instructions of the 
Polish emigrant committee prescribed Ogiński to keep correspondence with two 
other Polish diplomatic agents in Stockholm and Copenhagen, and to act in close 
cooperation with the French ambassador. 
 
On the day of his arrival to Istanbul, Ogiński was met by dragoman from the 
French embassy, citizen Dantan, who carried him to the Hôtel de France55 to meet 
with Verninac. This was the time of intensive negotiations over the eventually failed 
Franco-Ottoman treaty of alliance, mentioned earlier. The French ambassador, then 
still waiting for the Ottoman reply to his propositions, told Ogiński that he had orders 
to help the representative of the Polish emigrants, and he suggested to join their 
efforts, and advised Ogiński to be careful and to avoid other foreign diplomats 
                                                 
55 The building of the French Embassy in Istanbul, where Verninac was officially residing 
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residing in Istanbul in order not to disclose his incognito.56 It was Verninac who 
organized the meeting of Ogiński with the First dragoman (Baş Tercüman) of the 
Porte Gheorghe Moruzi (Mourousis),57 which took place on 13 June 1796. That day 
Ogiński visited Moruzi at his home at seven in the evening,58 and the conversation, 
focused on the Polish question, lasted deep into the night.          
 
The First dragoman voiced the position of the Porte regarding the affairs of 
Poland, which did not add to the optimism of the emissary of the Polish emigrants. 
Ogiński became assured that the Ottomans were paying careful attention to 
everything which was going on in Poland. Much to Ogiński’s surprise, Moruzi 
described him the characters of all principal figures of the Polish politics in detail 
and told that the Porte had its secret agents there and was receiving the necessary 
information through the Danube principalities.59 The Ottoman official assured that 
his government, beyond all doubt, sympathized with the Poles and had no reasons to 
like Russians, but this could not change anything at the moment. Moruzi also pointed 
out that if it were not for the Ottomans who indirectly helped the Poles by diverting 
certain part of the Russian forces from the battlefields in Poland to the Russo-
Ottoman border, the Kościuszko uprising would have been suppressed far earlier.60 
Moreover, the First dragoman reproached the Poles for lack of unity among them, 
showing Ogiński a huge batch of letters, memoirs and projects proposing mutually 
                                                 
56 Ogiński, Mémoires, pp. 125-26. Despite these precautionary measures the arrival of the Polish agent 
was well known to the Russian ambassador, and Ogiński all the time was under the strict watch of the 
spies working for the Russian embassy. Kochubei, the ambassador, was perlustrating all 
correspondence of the Polish diplomatic representative. Later, in 1802 Kochubei himself told about 
this to Ogiński when the latter returned to Poland, which remained under the Russian rule. See: 
Ogiński, Mémoires, p. 199.    
57 His brother Alexander Moruzi was the Hospodar of Wallachia (1793-1796; 1799-1801) and 
Moldavia (1792; 1802-1806; 1806-1807). 
58 Ogiński, Mémoires, p. 165.  
59 Ogiński, Mémoires, pp. 166-68. 
60 Ogiński, Mémoires, p. 171. 
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exclusive measures and sent to the Porte by many separate groups of Polish 
emigrants. Upon that Moruzi quoted the French ambassador in Basel Bartélemy, 
noting that the latter had reason in saying that il fallait tout fair pour les Polonais, 
sans les Polonais.61 In Moruzi’s opinion, it was not fair of the Poles to accuse the 
Ottomans of indifference towards the Polish cause, and it was in fact France who 
forgot about Poland while signing the Basel peace treaty with Prussia. On the other 
hand, the First dragoman asked whether the Poles would expect the Ottoman Empire 
fighting for their cause against the three co-participants of Poland’s partitions 
alone.62  
  
Approaching to the issue rather more from the Polish perspective and obviously 
ignoring the Ottoman considerations in this respect, Ogiński in return replied that if 
the Porte would not confine itself to passive military demonstrations and would 
attack Russia during the uprising of Kościuszko, there would be more chances for the 
Poles’ victory. As a result, the strong Poland would always keep Russians on the 
alert, which meant that the Ottoman Empire could also be less worried about possible 
Russian aggression. The Polish agent reminded Moruzi of Catherine’s intentions to 
create an Orthodox state in the Balkans for her grandson, adding that the Porte would 
be sorry for its current indecisiveness when Russia would occupy Moldavia and 
Wallachia, excite the Greeks, augment its naval forces on the Black Sea.63 It was 
hard not to agree with Ogiński, whose arguments looked quite logical and consistent. 
Indeed, a strong Poland would be a good ally for the Porte, and to cancel out the 
consequences of the last war with Russia would be in itself a perfect idea. The evil 
was, as usual, in the details. 
                                                 
61 Ogiński, Mémoires, p. 173. 
62 Ogiński, Mémoires, pp. 173-74. 
63 Ogiński, Mémoires, pp. 176-177. 
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In course of his conversation with the Ottoman First dragoman Ogiński grew 
more and more convinced that the Porte assumed a wait-and-see attitude and was not 
going to undertake any serious steps to change its current policy of neutrality in 
international affairs. In point of view of the Ottoman side any hasty moves would be 
disastrous. All what was needed was to continue with the yet unfinished military 
preparations in order to face the dangers so dramatically described by Ogiński. The 
Ottoman official was not at all surprised by the gloomy predictions he heard, but 
remarked that the Sultan’s empire still had enough resources to frustrate the 
threatening projects of the Russian empress, and a lot of water will flow in the 
Danube till these plans could be realized.64 As for the Poles, Moruzi once again 
assured in the Ottoman sympathies towards them, promised that in case of the 
successful Swedish diversion against Russia the Ottomans would also start 
hostilities, and for the time being wished the Poles to keep patience and prudence. In 
practice the meeting ended in nothing but vague promises made by the Ottoman side 
and the increased the disappointment of the Polish agent at his clear inability to 
change the Ottoman resolution to stay away from the war.  
 
In the meantime, according to the testimony of the Russian ambassador in the 
Ottoman Empire Kochubei, in spring-summer 1796 the rumours about the close 
break-off between the Porte and Russia, spread in large part by the French 
emissaries, became quite an ordinary event in Istanbul.65 However, it seems that 
                                                 
64 Ogiński, Mémoires, p. 178. 
65 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 25 / 14 May, 1796’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 110; ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 9 July (28 June), 1796’ Arkhiv 
kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 113. 
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these rumours did not result in any detrimental consequences on the general 
character of the Ottoman-Russian relations then.  
 
Both the Ottomans and Russians simply continued to monitor each other’s 
motions closely, without embarking on hostilities. Thus the Ottoman authorities were 
well aware of the inspection tour of General Suvorov made in summer 1796 to 
examine the Russian forces quartered along the Ottoman border, despite the fact that 
Suvorov moved rather fast and was followed by the staff of not more than 15-20 
men. The route of Suvorov went through Kamyanets’ (Ott. Kamaniçe) and Zhvanets’ 
(Ott. İjvaniçe, situated on the left bank of Dniester in front of the Ottoman fortress of 
Khotyn; nowadays a village in Kmelnytskyi oblast’, Ukraine), then the Russian 
commander marched past the Ottoman fortress of Bender and moved further to 
Khadjibey (Ott. Hocabey; nowadays Odesa, Ukraine) and the Crimea.66 Apparently 
the Porte could not but be alarmed by any military developments in the immediate 
vicinity of its borders, even though the Russians, in contradiction with their actual 
deeds, kept telling about their amicable dispositions and that there was no danger for 
the Ottoman Empire. In any case, according to the observation of Kochubei, the 
Ottomans seemed to be nurturing pacific dispositions, in spite of the fact that, as 
Kochubei puts it, “Suvorov and his army did everything to bring about the 
contrary”.67    
  
As a matter of fact, the Porte just continued the policy best suited for its own 
interests, seeking to avoid an untimely conflict with the Northern neighbour. The 
                                                 
66 A report addressed to the Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army, dated 17 Safer 1211 (22 
August 1796). T. C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry of the 
Republic of Turkey], Hatt-i Hümayun, Dosya no. 201, Gömlek no. 10314.  
67 ‘V. P. Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, 12 / 1 August, 1796’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 66. 
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French and the Polish diplomatic agents, having not reached their objectives of 
dragging the Ottoman Empire into an offensive military alliance against Russia, 
usually made reference to the increased Russian influence in Istanbul by the second 
half of 1796. Such a view seems to be somewhat exaggerated, as it ascribes the 
Ottoman neutral stance on the international arena almost exclusively to the intrigues 
of the Russian diplomacy and some transcendental treacherousness of the Ottoman 
side, refusing to look at the problem from the Ottoman perspective.  
 
Appointed to the post of the French consul in Bucharest and waiting in vain for 
the Ottoman approval of his appointment, Constantine Stamaty (Konstantinos 
Stamatis) wrote about the Ottomans in summer 1796: “One had to be Russian or 
German to be well received by this vile and grovelling canaille”.68 Neither was 
optimistic the Polish representative Ogiński, noting towards the end of summer that 
the influence of the French ambassador declined while that one of his Russian 
counterpart augmented. The dismissal of the pro-French Reis-ül-Küttab Ebubekir 
Ratib Efendi69 and the Grand Dragoman Gheorghe Morouzi, which took place on 19 
August 1796 (14 Safer 1211)70, and their replacement with Mustafa Rasih Efendi and 
Constantine Ypsilanti (Konstantinos Ypsilantis; the son of the then Hospodar of 
Wallachia) respectively, who were both deemed to be pro-Russian, normally was 
considered as a token of growing influence of Russia at the Porte.71 Another 
inauspicious sign for the French and Polish diplomacy was the Russo-Swedish 
                                                 
68 “Il faut être russe ou allemand pour être bien reçu par cette canaille vile et rampante”. Letter of 
Constantine Stamaty to M. -L. Descorches, 22 Thermidor an IV (30 July 1796). In: Marcère, Une 
ambassade à Constantinople, p. 285. 
69 More information about Ebubekir Ratib’s career is available at: Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i 'Osmânî, 
Vol. 2, p. 346; Ahmed Resmî, Halifetü'r-Rüesâ, p. 139. 
70 Recep Ahıshalı, Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtında Reisülküttâblık (XVIII. Yüzyıl) (İstanbul, 2001), p. 45. 
71 On the next day, 20 August 1796, Ogiński discussed this occurrence with a French renegade at the 
Ottoman service, named Ibrahim. Ogiński, Mémoires, Vol. 2, p. 209; Also see the letter of V. P. 
Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 25 / 14 August, 1796. Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 
1880), Vol. 18, p. 116.    
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rapprochement, and, consequently, the estrangement between the French and 
Swedish embassies in Istanbul.72        
  
Inability of the French to make the Porte to come out openly on their side, 
beyond all doubt, played into the hands of St. Petersburg and its representative at the 
Ottoman capital. For all that, it was largely not due to the special wish of the 
Ottoman officials to listen to the Russian ambassador that the Sultan’s government 
refused to accept the French propositions of the offensive anti-Russian alliance. A 
number of external and domestic factors had been necessarily reflected in the 
Ottoman foreign policy making, determining that discreet attitude the Porte had 
adopted. Among these were the fear of the Russian aggression, substantiated by the 
Russian military presence on the borders of the Empire, the overall strengthened 
strategic positions of Russia after partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian state, the 
Ottoman own massive internal crisis and ongoing large-scale reforms. Taking into 
account the abovementioned circumstances it would be more logical to speak not 
about the increased Russian influence at the Sultan’s court, but rather of inefficiency 
of the French and Polish political propaganda. 
 
Despite all odds, the French diplomacy continued its attempts to win the 
Ottomans to its side. By the end of 1796 the mission of unsuccessful Verninac was 
taken over by Jean Baptiste Annibal Aubert-Dubayet.73 The new ambassador of the 
French Republic was quite a conspicuous figure, holding the rank of General and 
being both soldier and politician. Born in 1757 in New Orleans, then a part of the 
                                                 
72 Letter of Constantine Stamaty to M. -L. Descorches, 22 Thermidor an IV (30 July 1796). In: 
Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople, Vol. 2, p. 285. 
73 Some details of his biography are available at: Charles Gayarré, Aubert Dubayet or the Two Sister 
Republics (Boston, 1882); Dry, Soldats ambassadors, pp. 347-486. 
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overseas French colony of Louisiana (New France), Aubert-Dubayet took part in the 
American War for Independence under command of the famed General Lafayette, 
during the French Revolution was elected to the National Legislative Assembly, and 
for two weeks even held the office of its President (8-22 July 1792). Following the 
establishment of the Directory and before nomination to the post of ambassador in 
the Ottoman Empire, Aubert-Dubayet was the War Minister of France (3 November 
1795 - 8 February 1796). The new French ambassador arrived to his Istanbul 
residence on 2 October 179674, at seven in the evening, whereupon on the same day 
was introduced by Verninac to the Polish diplomatic agent Ogiński. Aubert-Dubayet 
explained Ogiński that among the objectives of his mission were the restoration of 
Poland and the retrieval of the Crimea from Russia.75 As is seen from instructions 
given to Aubert-Dubayet in Paris, the French ambassador was to work towards 
conclusion of the defensive and offensive alliance with the Ottomans, to which it was 
planned to bring also Sweden, Denmark and Prussia. Moreover, it would also be 
helpful to stir up a rebellion among the Cossacks and the Tatars.76      
 
Along with Aubert-Dubayet arrived a large group of military experts, engineers 
and craftsmen of all trades, mainly to work at the Ottoman naval construction 
facilities.77 However, it did not help Aubert-Dubayet to persuade the Ottomans to 
                                                 
74 Ogiński, Mémoires, p. 220; Soysal, Fransız ihtilâli, p. 151; Aubert-Dubayet was accompanied by 
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accept the alliance with France. The majority of these people stayed in Istanbul not 
more than half a year, and left the Ottoman Empire in June 1797.78   
 
Since the very beginning of his arrival Aubert-Dubayet experienced both vague 
and ambiguous ways in which the Ottoman side preferred to talk. Only a few days 
after his arrival, answering to Ogiński’s question about how he felt in Istanbul, the 
French ambassador replied that he could not stand the word “bakalım” (Ottom./ Tur.: 
We will see). It was this word Aubert-Dubayet always heard from the Ottoman 
officials as a reaction to all his propositions. The time was passing by and at each 
meeting with Ogiński Aubert-Dubayet used to repeat ironically “bakalım”.79 
Apparently this meant nothing other than unwillingness of the Ottomans to commit 
themselves to the obligations France asked from them for the moment, and which 
they could not carry out into practice under the current circumstances.  
 
Thus, the proposition of an offensive alliance made by the French ambassador 
in early November 1796 was declined by the Porte.80 Equally unsuccessful were the 
two Persian emissaries, who came to Istanbul in mid-January 1797 and also sought to 
drag the Ottomans into the war against Russia.81 The Ottoman government at the 
time was more preoccupied with the danger of the Russian aggression rather than 
planning its own attack. As Kochubei put it, the Ottomans “think, see and dream 
about nothing but us.”82 In this respect great attention was paid by the Porte, among 
other things, to enlargement of its naval forces so that to make them able to compete 
                                                 
78 Soysal, Fransız ihtilâli, p.  159. 
79 Ogiński, Mémoires, p. 226. 
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with the Russian Black Sea fleet. On the other hand, the Porte was equally disturbed 
by the recent successes of the French arms in Europe by the end of 1796.83          
4.3. Two empires after the death of Catherine II: A thaw in 
relations, 1797-1798 
On 17 November 1796 at about ten in the evening84 the reign of Catherine II, 
which proved to be so disastrous for the Ottoman state, ended. The Russian Empress 
passed away, and was succeeded by her son Pavel, who had been known to be 
unloved by his mother. This news was received by the Ottomans with unconcealed 
joy as well as with some credence for Pavel’s peaceable intentions.85 Upon his 
ascending the throne, Paul I indeed declared his amicable dispositions towards all of 
his neighbours and in the first place turned to domestic affairs, in all earnestness 
trying to get rid of the abuses that were taking place during the rule of his mother.  
 
The Russian ambassador in Istanbul hoped that under the new emperor the 
relations between two countries would change for the better and that he himself 
would also feel much more tranquil.86 Kochubei wrote to S. R. Vorontsov, his senior 
colleague in London, about his personal satisfaction with the “wise system, which we 
have adopted for our policy with the Porte.”87 “The instructions I have received and 
                                                 
83 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 25 / 14 November, 1796’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 122. 
84 ‘F. V. Rostopchin to S. R. Vorontsov, 18 / 7 November, 1796’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1876), Vol. 8, p. 157; ‘A Note of Prince Rostopchin about the last day of life of Empress 
Catherine II and the first day of reign of Paul I’ Ibidem, p. 170.  
85 ‘V. P. Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, 26 / 15 February, 1797’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 74. 
86 Ibidem. 
87 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 February, n.s., 1797’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 128. 
115 
the frank manner of the Emperor to express himself”, continued Kochubei, “make 
me believe that all we wish is to have peace with all our neighbours.”88  
 
In general, the tension in the Ottoman-Russian relations began gradually 
subside starting from the end of 1796. At the time the Ottomans continued to follow 
the political developments in Europe closely and kept reinforcing their land and 
naval forces. The Russian side in its turn had any reason to believe that the risk of an 
Ottoman assault was minimal, if any. This did not mean, however, that the necessary 
defensive measures were not taken. With a view to protect Russia from any 
unexpected dangers, in case of a hypothetical Ottoman-French attack, the 
commanders of the Russian Black Sea fleet were given orders to regularly monitor 
the situation in the Ottoman Empire and on the borders, to strengthen the coastal 
fortifications as well as patrol the Black Sea along the Russian coastline.89 What is 
worth noticing is that the instructions to the Russian naval forces at the given point 
look to be of exclusively defensive character. Even the doctrine of preventive naval 
strike, quite common a couple of years ago during the rule of Catherine II90, had been 
not mentioned. Preparing to protect his Empire from the smallest possibility of 
foreign aggression, Paul I himself did not contemplate any aggression of his own 
then.       
 
A good example of Ottoman-Russian peaceful coexistence at the moment may 
be seen in the situation around the frigate “Tsar Konstantin”, a vessel of the Russian 
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Black Sea fleet that had to spend the winter of 1796-1797 in Istanbul. In November 
1796 “Tsar Konstantin” headed out to the sea from Ochakov, carrying various cargos 
for Sevastopol. Because of heavy weather she sustained a serious damage and had 
been drifted to the Ottoman coast, after which she had to enter Bosporus and to stay 
there for the whole winter.91 The officers of “Tsar Konstantin”, apart from the 
Ottoman naval preparations that were going on in Istanbul with the participation of 
some French specialists, also noted in their reports the kind treatment afforded them 
by the Ottoman side. These officers of the Russian navy “except friendliness did not 
notice anything that would indicate at the hostile attitudes on the part of the Porte”, 
and, according to their evidence, “one could not see any troubles in Constantinople” 
and the Russian merchant vessels were treated with the “utmost politeness, quietude 
and pleasantry”.92  
 
“Tsar Konstantin” arrived in Sevastopol only in late April 1797. The Ottoman 
official who escorted the Russian ship received a warm welcome in Sevastopol and 
was offered a gold watch, fox fur and 200 roubles as a present.93 Moreover, Vice 
Admiral F. F. Ushakov, a hero of the recent Ottoman-Russian war and for that 
moment the Deputy Head of the Black Sea Admiralty, asked the Russian ambassador 
at the Porte V. P. Kochubei to express his gratitude personally to Kapudan Pasha 
(the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Navy).94 Ushakov also ordered to send to the 
Ottoman Admiralty two anchors and two naval ropes, which had been lent by the 
Ottomans instead of those the Russian frigate lost in the storm.95 The occurrence 
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with “Tsar Konstantin” is yet more proof showing that by spring-summer 1797 the 
Ottoman-Russian relations experienced even if not an outright warming, at least 
certain détente. 
 
When it comes to the further French military successes in Europe, the Porte 
obviously could not turn a blind eye to the new territorial acquisitions made by 
France throughout 1796. At a time when the bellicosity of the French Republic kept 
growing and General Napoléon Bonaparte started to gain one by one his first 
victories as an army commander on the battlefields in the Northern Italy, the 
potential French expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean necessarily raised the 
Ottoman concerns. These concerns proved well-founded especially after the French 
secured themselves a foothold not only on the Apennine Peninsula, but also on the 
Ionian Archipelago not far off the coast of continental Greece and Albania.  
 
In spite of the fact that the Ionian Islands were officially transferred to France 
in the Treaty of Campo Formio, signed on 17 October 1797, the French had de facto 
occupied them already in summer.96 Such a neighbourhood naturally disturbed the 
Porte, as the Russian ambassador Kochubei put it, “not because it [the Porte; V. M.] 
suspects the intentions of the Directory, but because the French orders are dangerous 
on their own”.97 The Sultan’s government grew more anxious with the forthcoming 
evidences of the French revolutionary propaganda among the Ottoman subjects in the 
Balkans. Moreover, the French emissaries were seeking contacts with the powerful 
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Ottoman local power magnates Osman Pazvantoğlu and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, who 
were de facto independent rulers in their Balkan possessions.98 
 
The governor of Morea Hasan Pasha informed the Porte in late 1797 about the 
surreptitious French propaganda activities in Greece. Hasan Pasha even assumed 
that, together with the Ionian Islands, France could be secretly guaranteed other old 
Venetian territories in the Mediterranean including Crete and Morea, which had later 
been conquered by the Ottomans in the 17th century. No matter how wrong the 
assumptions of the Morean Pasha could be, his report only added to the Ottoman 
suspicions in regard to the French intentions.99 Somewhat later, the Ottomans also 
intercepted the proclamation of General Bonaparte inciting the Greeks and Albanians 
to rebellion. In reply to the queries submitted by the Ottomans to the French 
government Talleyrand on 15 March 1798 (i.e. when the project of Egyptian 
expedition had been already officially confirmed) falsely assured that the Directory 
never engaged in anything like that and would always be a good friend of the 
Ottoman state.100 Obviously, that evasive answer of the French Foreign minister 
could hardly satisfy the Ottoman side.    
 
As one would expect, the anxiety of the Porte about the French vicinity to the 
Ottoman borders and possible pernicious consequences of such a neighbourhood was 
gladly observed by the Russians. V. P. Kochubei wrote in September 1797, that the 
Ottomans were very anxious in view of the neighbourhood of the French. So, the 
Ottoman authorities monitored the trip of some French officers from the Island of 
Zante to Patras in the Peloponnese Peninsula with utter suspicion. It was generally 
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accepted in Istanbul that under the pretext of the touristic curiosity they could have 
well used their journey for field reconnoitring.101 From the Russian point of view, 
sure enough, the more distrust would appear between the French and the Ottomans 
the more favourably would stand the Russian positions at the Porte. In this respect 
Kochubei noted that the Sultan’s government was quite satisfied with Russia and he 
would like to see the French “occupy our place in their [the Ottomans’; V.M.] hearts 
and mouths”.102 What is more, Kochubei by the end of September 1797 did not even 
exclude the possibility of the Ottoman – Russian alliance: 
La Porte s’est très-bien conduite dans cette occasion, et je puis assurer 
votre excellence que ses intentions à notre égard sont on ne peut pas 
meilleures. Elle se méfie et craint les Français depuis qu’ils sont venus se 
nicher dans les îles vénitiennes, et je ne serais même pas surprise, bien 
entre nous soit dit, qu’elle voulût se rapprocher beaucoup plus 
intimement de nous. Une alliance avec les Turcs serait sans doute un 
événement assez singulier en politique.103    
 
It came to the point when the Russian ambassador at his secret meeting with Reis 
Efendi on 8 December 1797 in a friendly way warned the Ottoman minister about the 
disturbing activities of the agents of General Bonaparte in Greece and Albania. 
Kochubei, in spite of his personal opinion that the French would not have enough 
forces to attack the Balkans, still recommended the Ottomans to be always ready to 
face such a possibility. Besides, Kochubei advised the Porte to send the secret agents 
to Italy and to dispatch the necessary instructions to its ambassador in Paris, Esseyid 
Ali Efendi.104 Somewhat later, in January 1798 Kochubei again was admonishing the 
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Ottoman side against the dangerous diplomatic intrigues of Paris, which Esseyid Ali 
Efendi with the best will in the world could not cope with.105    
 
Under the present circumstances, the prospect of a new Ottoman-Russian war 
had increasingly diminished. The new Russian Emperor consistently made it clear 
that he was not going to engage in risky projects of his mother, whereas for the 
Ottoman government the war with Russia was also out of the question. The Porte 
appeared to be faced at this time not only with the new threat stemming from the fact 
of the common borders with the French Republic, but also found itself in an open 
armed conflict with rebellious governor of Vidin Osman Pazvantoğlu by the end of 
1797. In the full sense of the word this was a real wide-scale war that had been 
taking the most of attention and resources of the central Ottoman government 
throughout the second half of 1797- the first half of 1798. Quite obviously, the Porte 
was simply in no position to embark on hostilities also with Russia.  
 
Despite the apparent anxiety of the Ottoman government as to the immediate 
neighbourhood with the French Republic the possibility that the Ottomans may 
conclude an alliance with France, albeit out of mere fear of the French might, had 
also been considered in St. Petersburg. In the end of 1797 Paul I issued the order 
demanding that the Russian Black Sea fleet should be prepared at any time to fend 
off a hypothetical Franco-Ottoman attack. Equally the Russian army in the Crimea 
under the command of General Mikhail Vasilievich Kakhovskii received the orders 
to concentrate in the Peninsula around Karasubazar and the River of Salğır in order 
to prevent the chances for landing of the foreign troops in the Crimea. What is worth 
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of attention is that all the above mentioned defensive measures were to be taken 
secretly, with an obvious aim not to affect the currently pacific relations with 
Istanbul.106  
 
Along with having apprehensions about a possible Franco-Ottoman alliance, 
the Russian side also kept an eye on the developments around the rebellion of 
Pazvantoğlu in Rumelia. A selfdependent rule of the latter over the large territories 
between the Danube and the Balkan range remained the source of a constant 
headache for the Porte, and, as it was already said, the strained relations between the 
Vidin governor and the central Ottoman government escalated by the end of 1797 to 
the point of war. When it comes to Russia, its chief concern lied in the presence of 
sizeable Ottoman military forces in close vicinity from the Russian border. Thus the 
regular fortnightly reports of V. P. Kochubei to St. Petersburg necessarily included 
the observations of the Porte’s military preparations against Pazvantoğlu. 
 
At the very beginning of 1798 Kochubei informed Paul I about the meeting that 
took place on 4 January (24 December 1797, Old style) between the dragoman of the 
Russian embassy Fonton and the Reis-ül-Küttab Rashid Efendi. The Ottoman 
minister was authorised by the Sultan to officially notify the Russian ambassador on 
the measures taken by the Porte to subdue the disobedient Governor of Vidin. The 
conversation that followed reflected the wish of the Ottoman government to reassure 
the Russian side that it did not have any hidden motives behind the sending of a large 
army to the Danube area and to emphasize once more the peaceful character of 
relations between the two empires. Rashid Efendi told that he would also like to 
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dispel the rumours about the purposes and final destination of the squadron of three 
or four combat ships ready to set off from Istanbul. This was to proceed to Varna and 
enter the mouth of the Danube, being sent exclusively against the Pazvantoğlu 
rebels.107  
 
On the next day, on 5 January 1798 (25 December 1797, Old style), Kochubei 
sent his answer to the Reis-ül-Küttab in which indicated that all these peaceful 
assurances made by the Porte were unnecessary, and that he personally never had 
any doubts as regards to the true purpose of the ongoing Ottoman armaments. In 
Kochubei’s words, addressed to Rashid Efendi, it was not Russia, but France and the 
French policy oriented towards the total domination everywhere 
(“владычествовать везде”) that constituted a real threat for the Ottoman state. The 
Russian ambassador continued that Paul I, on the contrary, intended to preserve the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which appeared necessary for keeping the existing 
balance of power in Europe.108  
 
It is very interesting and ironical, though to some extent may be wandering off 
the point, that approximately at the same time when Kochubei sent his note to Rashid 
Efendi, the opinion of certain French diplomatic agents regarding the Ottoman 
Empire was quite similar to that one of the Russian ambassador. The only difference 
was that according to the French perspective the Ottoman dominions were threatened 
by “the ambitious views of the two Powers [meaning the courts of Vienna and St. 
Petersburg; V. M.], which for a long time have been coveting these beautiful 
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lands”109 and it was the French Republic alone who could save the integrity of the 
Ottoman state.   
 
Turning back to the note of the Russian ambassador to Reis-ül-Küttab, apart 
from the declarations of friendship and warnings against the potential French 
encroachments, Kochubei even offered the Ottomans the Russian help. He pointed 
out that in view of the different religions in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and 
some related to this difference circumstances, he was not proposing the assistance 
with the army, but should the communication between Istanbul and the Danube 
region be interrupted, Russia could help the Porte with delivering munitions, 
artillery, rifles etc.110 However, this was nothing more than a tricky diplomatic move, 
as Kochubei himself in his report to the tsar wrote that “the offer like that... was 
made by me in full persuasion that it would not be accepted”.111 
 
As a matter of fact, Russia was not willing to upset relations neither with the 
Porte nor with Pazvantoğlu. General A. A. Bekleshov, the Military Governor of 
Kamenets-Podolskiy (nowadays Kamyanets-Podilskyi, Ukraine) exercising control 
over Volhynian, Minsk and Podolsk Provinces, and the highest commander of the 
troops located on the South-Western borders of the Russian empire, received the 
respective instructions from Kochubei in January 1798. The ambassador demanded 
that in case if Pazvantoğlu suffered a defeat and applied to the Russian border 
authorities for asylum, he should be denied access to Russia under the pretext of the 
border quarantine. The orders concerning this delicate subject, continued Kochubei, 
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should be issued with the utmost care so that neither the Porte nor Pazvantoğlu 
would know about the abovementioned Russian decision. On the one hand, the Porte 
could feel offended as on this occasion it would definitely like to see Pazvantoğlu 
arrested and given over to the Ottoman authorities. On the other hand, should the 
rebellious Vidin Governor learn of the intentions of the Russian side, the interests of 
the Russian merchants conducting trade across the Danube would be seriously 
jeopardized.112  
 
When for Russia it was sufficient to know that nothing threatened its southern 
borders for the moment, for the Sultan’s government the conflict with Pazvantoğlu 
became the most central issue of the first half of 1798. Meticulous preparations of the 
costly punitive expedition against Vidin, under the Kapudan Pasha Küçük Hüseyin, 
continued throughout the winter and spring. The Porte spent about 28 thousand 
purses, or 14 million gurushes for the whole expedition.113 In compliance with the 
advice of the court astrologers the departure of Küçük Hüseyin and his expedition 
from Istanbul took place on 9 April at six hours and eighteen minutes in the 
morning.114 Having gathered his forces at the place called Davutpaşa, Küçük 
Hüseyin Pasha moved on 12 April towards Vidin.115 The army amounting to about 
80 thousand men116 besieged Pazvantoğlu in his well-fortified capital city of Vidin. 
For all that, to gain a victory over Pazvantoğlu appeared not that easy. Due to the 
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lack of coordination among the Ottoman forces117 and the impregnable fortifications 
of Vidin, the rebellious Pasha  managed to withstand the siege. Upon the news of the 
French aggression against Egypt in summer 1798 the siege of Vidin became even 
more inefficient and did not bring the desired results.    
 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ottoman-Russian border the Russian 
authorities kept watching the events that were taking place on the Danube. Even 
though the chances of the serious threat to the Russian dominions were quite small, if 
at all, the Russian Black Sea fleet still had the orders of Paul I to stay on high alert. 
Taking into consideration that the Porte intended to send a naval squadron to the 
Black Sea, which was to proceed to Varna and then to the mouth of the Danube with 
the alleged aim of acting against Pazvantoğlu, the Russian emperor demanded from 
the Black Sea fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral N. S. Mordvinov to place both the 
fleet and the coastal fortifications in operational readiness.118 
 
Moreover, upon receiving the news about the martial preparations going on in 
the Ottoman Empire, there appeared some rumours on the Ottoman-Russian border 
to the effect that these would be directed not against the governor of Vidin, but rather 
against Russia. The commander of the Russian Dniester army General Bekleshov, 
shared his concerns in this respect with Kochubei, asking whether it was possible 
that the Ottomans could give a free passage to the French troops moving towards the 
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Russian borders. The Russian ambassador at the Porte, in his turn, ruled out such a 
possibility completely. Kochubei believed that the French merely did not have the 
necessary amount of troops in the Adriatics and, furthermore, the Ottomans would 
have never accepted the French into their domains inhabited by the Christian peoples 
who could easily be affected by the “ideas of freedom”. In conclusion, Kochubei 
wrote: “You should not be surprised on hearing that the Divan and a part of people 
look on us, may be, as on their best friends”.119        
 
Following the principle that caution is the parent of safety, the Russian side in 
winter – spring 1798 obviously still sought to exclude all surprises on the part of the 
Ottomans. First, although the Russian ambassador in Istanbul reported in January 
1798 that the Sultan’s government at the moment was greatly satisfied with Russia 
and would hardly conclude an alliance with France,120 St. Petersburg never 
abandoned the concerns about the preponderance of the French influence upon the 
Porte, in which case it could lead to the latter’s decision to open war on Russia.121 
Second, the fact of the presence of the Ottoman naval squadron not far from the 
Russian coasts was itself a reasonable cause for the Russian authorities to increase 
the vigilance on the borders. Together with this, the instructions of Paul I to his 
commanders emphasized the wish of the Russian Emperor that “all the good 
harmony that exists now with the Ottoman Porte and there would be not the slightest 
pretext to upset it” should be observed.122 In this way, even while taking the 
necessary precautions against a surprise attack, St. Petersburg preferred to keep the 
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existing peaceful state of affairs with the Ottoman Empire and tried not to provoke 
undesired conflicts on its southern borders.      
 
Consequently, as regards the Ottoman-Russian relations during the discussed 
period, neither party intended to attack the other and both had all reasons to be 
satisfied with their neighbours. On the other hand, one still had to take the necessary 
defensive precautions in order to be ready for any unexpected surprises that might 
come up. It is important to note that both the Ottomans and the Russians were not 
planning any offensive moves and were in the first place preoccupied with 
considerations of their own security. 
4.4. Arrival of V. S. Tomara, the new Russian ambassador at the 
High Porte  
Vasilii Stepanovich Tomara (1746 – 1819)123, the successor of Kochubei at the 
ambassadorial post in Istanbul, and like him also of the Ukrainian origin, had been 
appointed ambassador to the Porte under the imperial decree signed by Paul I on 8 
June (28 May) 1797.124 The instructions concerning Tomara’s future mission, dated 
by 25 / 14 October 1797, once again clarified the focal points of the Russian policy 
towards the Ottoman Empire. Paul I ordered his new ambassador to further maintain 
good relations with the Porte, as well as continue to counteract the French attempts to 
restore the former influence of Paris on the shores of the Bosporus. “Our main wish 
is to preserve peace and good harmony with the Ottoman Porte... Any spirit of 
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conquest is alien to us...”, were the words of the Russian Emperor addressed to 
Tomara,125 who finally arrived at the Ottoman capital on 24 / 13 March 1798.126 
 
In a week the previous ambassador Kochubei paid a farewell visit to the Grand 
Vizier (2 April (22 March) 1798)127 while Tomara was first received by the Grand 
Vizier (16 / 5 April 1798)128 and then by the Sultan (24 / 13 April 1798).129 On 25 / 
14 April 1798, that is, the day after the new ambassador had been presented to the 
Sultan, his predecessor Kochubei departed from Constantinople.130 The latter soon 
afterwards became a member of the board of the College of Foreign Affairs, Vice-
Chancellor, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and in 1802 took the post of the 
first Minister of the Interior of Russia. 
 
Tomara descended from the Ukrainian Cossack aristocratic family of Greek 
origin. As it was usual at that time in Russia, he received his first education at home 
(outstanding Ukrainian philosopher of the 18th century Hryhorii Skovoroda is 
reported to be his tutor) and continued his studies in Italy and Germany. Since 1768, 
at the age of 22, Tomara started his diplomatic career at the College of Foreign 
Affairs. Then, in 1772, during the war with the Ottoman Empire, Tomara was 
assigned to serve at the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army P. A. 
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Rumiantsev- Zadunaiskii, and took part in the negotiations of the Küçük Kaynarca 
Peace treaty. Thereupon he was attached to the office of the Russian Charge 
d’Affaires in Istanbul Kh. I. Peterson as a translator. At that point, it was yet 
unknown that this 28 years old young man would return to Istanbul some quarter of 
century later, in the capacity of the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of 
Russia at the Porte.  
 
For one year (1777-1778) Tomara served at the Russian embassy in Madrid, 
and left his mark in history as the person who brought the ratified copy of the 
Georgievsk Treaty (1783) from the Caucasus to St. Petersburg.131 He later 
participated in the war of 1787-1792 staying at the headquarters of the Russian and 
the Austrian armies. At the very end of the war, early in 1791, Tomara was appointed 
by Prince Potemkin to command the Russian flotilla in the Aegean Archipelago, 
composed partly of the vessels bought in Europe and armed in Syracuse, and partly 
of the squadron of the Greek vessels of Lambros Katsonis. However, due to the fact 
that in August 1791 truce had already been signed, Tomara was not able to engage 
into the sea combats. Having not received any new appointment, Tomara resigned in 
May 1796, half a year before the death of Catherine II. As it happened to many other 
state officials buried in oblivion during the Catherinian times, during the reign of 
Paul I Tomara had been remembered and appointed the Russian ambassador to 
Constantinople.               
 
From the very beginning of Tomara’s arrival to the Ottoman capital, the new 
ambassador continued the line of conduct, which had earlier been adopted by 
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Kochubei. Like Tomara himself put it in his first report to the Tsar, “for some time 
past my predecessor here had adopted the tone of Minister of a state, which was 
sincerely interested in prosperity of the Porte”.132 Accordingly, since the notification 
of his arrival, Tomara pursued the same aim, which was defined by Kochubei in the 
letter addressed to his successor as “to consolidate the amicable dispositions of the 
Porte towards Russia, to remove her suspicions against Russia, and to strengthen her 
belief in Russia’s sympathy towards her”.133 Assurances of mutual friendship were 
repeated once and again by both the Russian diplomatic representatives and the 
Ottoman officials. For instance, in April 1798 at the reception on the occasion of the 
notification of the ambassador’s arrival, the first dragoman of the Porte told the 
counsellor of the Russian embassy Iakovlev: “What a difference we came to see in 
our affairs with Russia; formerly each your word caused distrust, and now this is one 
of the most friendly powers for us”.134 Even though these words could be somewhat 
exaggerated, the very fact that they had been pronounced was by no means 
unimportant. 
 
The audience of the newly arrived Tomara with the Sultan took place, as was 
mentioned before, on 24 / 13 April 1798. At 4.30 in the morning the ambassador left 
his residence in Pera, followed by the retinue, mihmandar (an Ottoman official 
assigned to the foreign delegations as a guide) and a company (orta) of the Janissary 
honour guard. The Russian delegation came down to the shore of the Golden Horn at 
the Tophane quay, crossed to the other side of the gulf and moved on to the Topkapı 
Palace, the celebrated residence of the Ottoman Sultans. After having approached the 
                                                 
132 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 12 / 1 April, 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 
89/8. Delo 871, f. 2 ob. 
133 Kleinman, Russko-Turetskii soyuz, p. 17. 
134 Ibidem, f. 2. 
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Procession Pavillion (Ottom. Alay Köşkü) the Russian ambassador, in conformity 
with tradition, stopped and waited for the Grand Vizier to come. Then Tomara was 
taken inside the palace. There, at the second gate, the ambassador dismounted and 
was met by the First Dragoman of the Porte. Then, he sat on the bench waiting for a 
permission to proceed to the Divan.      
 
After waiting for some time, Tomara continued his way, now met by the 
Çavuşbaşı, and while approaching to the Divan the ambassador was welcomed by 
the Kapıcılar Kâhyası. As Tomara entered the Divan, from the side-door appeared 
the Grand Vizier, who delivered a greeting speech to the ambassador through the 
Dragoman of the Porte. When the official part of the ceremony was over, the tables 
were brought and the meeting in the Divan ended with a meal. The ambassador was 
invited to the table of the Grand Vizier, whereas other members of the delegation 
occupied two other tables together with the Defterdar and the işancı Efendi. Upon 
the completion of the meal, sprinkling with rose water and fumigation, the master of 
ceremonies guided the Russian ambassador to the third gate, where Tomara was clad 
in a sable fur coat, and the rest of the delegation members were also given fur coats. 
Once again the ambassador was to wait.  
 
Then, as the Grand Vizier came to the Audience Chamber, the ambassador and 
twelve members of his retinue, each accompanied by two guardians, were taken in. 
The Sultan was sitting on the throne, with the Grand Vizier and Miralem (since the 
Kapudan Pasha was away in the expedition against Pazvantoğlu) on his right and the 
Eunuchs on his left. Tomara, after bowing for three times, gave a speech whereupon 
handed over his letter of credence to Miralem, the latter passed it to the Grand Vizier, 
and the Grand Vizier upon a sign made by the Sultan put the credentials of the 
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Russian ambassador on the throne near his monarch. Afterwards the Grand Vizier 
made a speech in return, and the audience ended. Tomara, followed by the Ottoman 
guardians, and again having made three bows, walked backwards until he left the 
Audience Chamber.135  
 
Following the ceremonial receptions, there started the normal day-to-day 
diplomatic activities of the new Russian ambassador. Thus, one and a half week after 
the audience with the Sultan, on 4 May 1798, Tomara met with Reis-ül-Küttab 
Ahmed Atıf Efendi, who also only recently took up his post.136 For about of two 
hours they talked on the mutual friendly approaches, and the situation around the 
Pazvantoğlu’s uprising. The Russian ambassador especially tried to draw attention to 
the threat of the French revolutionary propaganda, equally pernicious “for all the 
thrones in the world”, including the Ottoman one.137 In this regard, the Ottoman 
statesman chose to speak in the same vein as the Russian ambassador, mentioning 
the threat of the French republican system, somewhat flattering the Russian side. 
Ahmed Atıf Efendi told Tomara, for example, that “the only means to protect oneself 
from the influences of the visible, though secret, enmity of this nation [the French; V. 
M.] is the close, and not overshadowed by any kind of cupidity, mutual friendship of 
the great sovereigns”.138 To what extent was Reis Efendi sincere with the Russian 
ambassador is not clear, though it is obvious that the Ottoman side was rather 
interested in the yet unresolved issue of the trade tariff, as Ahmed Atıf Efendi 
                                                 
135 ‘Zapiska bytnosti Chrezvychainogo Poslannika i Polnomochnogo Ministra Tomary na audiientsii 
Ego Sultanova Velichestva Aprelia 13 / 24 1798 года’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with 
Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 871, f.f. 25- 26 ob. 
136 Ahmed Atıf Efendi had been appointed to the office of Reis-ül-Kittab on 5 March, 1798 after the 
unexpected death of his predecessor, Mehmed Raşid Efendi. Ahıshalı, Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtında 
Reisülküttâblık, p. 45. 
137 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 12 / 1 May, 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 
89/8. Delo 871, f. 32 ob. 
138 Ibidem, f. 33. 
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touched upon it in the further conversation.139 Together with this, both the Russians 
and the Ottomans by spring 1798 were indeed much alarmed with the growing might 
of the French and the potential French threat, first of all to the domains of the Sultan.  
4.5. On the way towards further Ottoman- Russian rapprochement 
Not only the fact of the French possessions adjoining the Ottoman border but 
also the preparations of the French fleet that were going on in Toulon raised a great 
deal of suspicion in Europe as regards the plans and intentions of France. Some 
rumours ascribed the preparations in Toulon to the aim of aggression against the 
Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. According to other comments one could also expect 
the appearance of the French fleet in the Black Sea. Besides, even the French agents, 
in order to conceal the real destination of the squadron anchored in Toulon (i.e. 
Egypt), were themselves spreading various rumours concerning the potential aim of 
the prepared expedition. Neither the Russian nor the Ottoman Empires could ignore 
such a threat, all the more when it was looking quite plausible. So, already in 
February 1798 the Ottomans were contemplating the defensive measures in case of 
the French aggression against the Morea,140 while Paul I ordered Vice-Admiral F. F. 
Ushakov to set the Russian Black Sea fleet ready for a possible appearance of the 
French combat ships in the vicinity of the Russian shores.141 Even if it seemed very 
unlikely that the Porte would give the French fleet a free passage to the Black Sea, 
Paul I preferred to be prepared for any challenge that might occur. The Russian 
Emperor in a similar order to Ushakov, issued in early July 1798, compared the 
situation with an approaching storm when, regardless of whether it would rain or not, 
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one should still think of rain protection.142 For all that, the relations between Istanbul 
and St. Petersburg remained more amicable than ever before.   
 
Despite the rumours coming from time to time from Wallachia, saying that the 
armies of the High Porte after the victory over Pazvantoğlu would turn against 
Russia, Tomara assured the Tsar that such rumours were completely unfounded and 
thus fully rejected any possibility of the Ottoman aggression. The Russian 
ambassador in Istanbul wrote to Paul I in his report of 19 April 1798: “I cannot fail to 
notice in every their [the Ottomans’; V. M.] deed both towards my predecessor and 
towards me, the apparent feelings of respect towards Your might and forces, the 
great credence to Your practices, as well as the inclination for inertness and rest”.143 
Tomara also added that the Porte was respecting Paul I not under constraint, as it had 
been the case with Catherine II, but due to the difference of his policy. As regards the 
rumours of an imminent war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, the Russian 
ambassador addressed the Porte asking to prevent their spreading, and the latter 
issued the necessary orders.144 
 
When it comes to the Ottoman view of the international situation that had 
developed in Europe by the spring 1798, a very valuable piece of information can be 
retrieved from a memo composed at this time by Reis-ül-Küttab Atıf Efendi.145 
Starting with an analysis of the recent past, the Ottoman minister in the first instance 
spoke about the calamitous consequences of the French revolution that set all of 
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Europe aflame. The establishment of the republican form of government, the anti-
monarchical fervour and the massive campaign of dechristianisation, followed by the 
purposeful spread of the revolutionary propaganda abroad made several European 
nations to unite against France. By then, it was only Britain and Austria that left in 
the anti-French coalition. Even though the British naval forces could gain the upper 
hand over France and its allies on the high seas, Austria alone could not resist the 
French armies on the land and necessarily had to conclude a peace agreement with 
Paris.  
 
Atıf Efendi argued that the declarations of the French stating that they did not 
have any aggressive intentions towards their neighbours were simply a blatant lie. 
The Ottoman statesman recounted the territorial acquisitions made by the French 
Republic, which included the Netherlands (where the political regime was changed 
on the French model146), the region of Savoy taken from Sardinia, the Spanish colony 
of Santo Domingo in the New World, Northern Italy (where again the French 
satellite Cisalpine Republic had been created147), the left bank of the Rhine. The 
Venetian Republic, despite its neutrality, had been split by General Bonaparte 
between France and Austria. In such a way, the first part of Atıf Efendi’s memo 
explicitly indicated that the Porte was quiet well aware of the inherent dangerous 
character of the ideas of the French revolution along with the ever growing 
aggressivness of the French Republic in Europe.  
 
                                                 
146 Tavır-i hükümetini tebdil ve Fransa’nın usul-i hükümetine tatbik itdirdiler... Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-
i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1294), Vol. 6, p. 313.  
147 Fransa’nın nizamına mümasil kavanin ve ahkâm vaz’ iderek Çizalpin namile suret-i istiklâlde 
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Having outlined the process of the recent French expansion all over the 
European continent, Reis-ül-Küttab approached the central for the Porte question 
whether or not the Ottoman Empire was exposed to the same threat like other 
European countries. Atıf Efendi pointed out that even though the Sultan’s 
government remained all the time neutral, this neutral stance amidst the flames of the 
general European war became in fact a moral support (manevî ianet) to France. 
Moreover, apart from moral support the French Republic, which had remained 
isolated from the rest of the continent and experienced the food shortages during the 
years of revolution and war, received supplies from the Ottoman Empire that helped 
the revolutionary France to cope with the problem of famine.148 Meanwhile, after the 
partition of the Venetian Republic, France occupied the Ionian Islands along with the 
small coastal strip of the former Venetian possessions on the Balkan Peninsula 
including the towns of Butrinto (currently Butrint, in Southern Albania), Parga, 
Preveza and Vonitsa (the latter three are located today in the Northern Greece). Such 
a neighbourhood opened the way to the malicious French revolutionary propaganda 
among the Ottoman Christian subjects, in the first place among the Greeks. Atıf 
Efendi also mentioned the French preparations that were going on in Toulon, on the 
Mediterranean coast. In opinion of the Ottoman minister, the Ottoman Empire had to 
continue with its own military preparitions in order to defend itself should it appear 
necessary.149    
 
                                                 
148 Fransanın ziyade müzayakası ve kemal-i kaht ve cu’a ibtilâsı hengâmında Memalik-i mahrusa’dan 
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hareketlerini taharri ve tecessüsden hali olmamak vacibat umurdandır... Ibidem. 
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Considering these circumstances of the growing French threat the Reis-ül-
Küttab went so far as to accept the theoretical possibility of the alliance between the 
Porte and its traditional enemies Russia and Austria. Ahmed Atıf Efendi argued that 
any state should have two modes of foreign politics. While one of these is constant 
and founded on tradition, the other is dictated by the current conjuncture and the 
current state interests. In this respect both Russia and Austria were traditional 
enemies of the Porte which normally should be fought against, but depending on the 
situation and the given specific circumstances, another and more suitable mode of 
foreign policy could be adopted. When the dangerous situation would change, one 
could again return to the traditional political mode of behaviour.150      
 
In this way by the spring of 1798, the prospects for further Ottoman-Russian 
rapprochement grew more visible. At the time when one of the key figures in the 
Ottoman government accepted the theoretical possibility of the joint action with the 
traditional enemies of the Porte, the Russian Emperor instructed his ambassador in 
Istanbul to make a proposition for the Ottoman side to send an authorized 
representative to Sevastopol151 so that the latter could inspect everything what was 
going on there and thus to assure the Porte that Russia had no aggressive intentions 
whatsoever against the Ottoman Empire.152  
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In fact, everyone in Europe during the spring 1798 was greatly alarmed by 
General Bonaparte in view of his military successes in Italy, the occupation of the 
Ionian archipelago and, above all, the ongoing warlike preparations in and around the 
French Mediterranean port city of Toulon. Equally, neither the Ottomans nor the 
Russians knew for sure the final destination of the huge naval squadron that had been 
prepared there. One had to expect anything and the Russian Emperor Paul I already 
in March and April proposed the Ottoman side his help against the potential French 
attack with the object to preserve the integrity and security of the Ottoman Empire. 
These propositions, however, were declined by the Porte at that time.153 In the 
meantime on 12 June (1 June Old style) the Russian Black Sea fleet got the orders to 
start patrolling the sea and to return to the ports by mid-August.154  
 
Tomara, in line with the instructions of Paul I, in May once again notified the 
Ottoman government about the decision of his Emperor to offer help. In order not to 
raise suspicions of other diplomatic representatives in Istanbul by frequent meetings 
with the Reis-ül-Küttab, Tomara preferred to make his notification through Fonton, 
the First dragoman of the Russian mission. The Porte was to be informed that upon 
the news of the French intentions to send a strong squadron to the Aegean Sea,155 the 
Russian naval forces received the order to patrol the basin of the Black Sea and Paul 
I would gladly help the Ottoman state with his Black Sea fleet in the event of a 
French aggression. Fonton on 24 May 1798 talked to the First dragoman of the Porte 
Ypsilanti and the latter promised to communicate with the Reis-ül-Küttab about the 
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proposal of the Russian side.156 In less than two weeks the Porte made known its 
answer to the Russian Emperor.  
 
At the conference with Tomara that took place on 9 June (29 May) 1798, the 
Reis-ül-Küttab told the Russian ambassador that the Porte would accept the offered 
help and in case of necessity would ask for it.157 Ahmed Atıf Efendi closed the 
meeting with the statement that both the Russians and the Ottomans were the 
enemies of the French, and that in Russia he saw a protection for the Ottoman 
Empire.158 Selim III after having read the proceedings of the given conference 
expressed his readiness to start consultations with the Russian side concerning the 
Ottoman participation in the anti-French alliance.159 The capture of Malta by 
Napoleon (12 June 1798) and, above all things, the landing of the French troops at 
Alexanderia (1 July 1798) largely accelerated the pace of the Ottoman-Russian 
negotiations. The news that Bonaparte attacked Egypt first came to Constantinople 
on 17 July, though at that point there still remained some hope that it was only yet 
another rumour.160  However, as the same information reached the Ottoman capital 
again a week later161, the Porte became this time seriously worried. Finally, on 24 
July Ahmed Atıf Efendi made an official request to Tomara, asking the Russian side 
in accordance with earlier propositions of Paul I to send the promised naval squadron 
to Istanbul. Besides, the Sultan wished to conclude with the Tsar an alliance, and 
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ordered the Reis-ül-Küttab to begin the negotiations on that matter with Russia,162 
which started on 28 July.163  
 
The Russian Emperor expected the Sultan to accept his offer and was also 
going to lend his help for the Porte not only with the naval forces, but also with the 
regular army, should the circumstances require that. It is very notable that Paul I on 
17 August (and yet not knowing that the Porte officially requested the Russian help), 
issued the instructions to the Governor General of Kiev, General I. V. Gudovich, to 
wait for the news from the ambassador in Istanbul Tomara and be ready to enter the 
Ottoman territories and to proceed where it would be deemed necessary, in case of a 
special invitation in that respect from the Porte.164 Ironically, already on the next day 
Paul I was to send his orders to Gudovich and other military and naval commanders 
again, as the news reached St. Petersburg that the French took Alexanderia and that 
the Ottoman Sultan had agreed to accept the Russian aid.  
 
On 18 August, already knowing that the Porte officially requested the Russian 
aid, Paul I issued a number of orders concerning the possible expedition of the 
Russian troops abroad to lend a helping hand to the Ottoman Empire. General 
Gudovich was to inform the Russian ambassador in Istanbul and through him the 
Sultan’s government about his readiness to come to the help of the Porte.165 The 
Quartermaster General of the Russian army Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich 
Hermann, to whom the commander of the Ottoman forces in Kuban Battal Pasha had 
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surrendered in 1790, and later the commander of the unfortunate Russian expedition 
against the Batavian Republic in 1799, received the orders to follow Gudovich.166 
Count Mikhail Vasilievich Kakhovskii, the commander of the Taurida division, was 
to communicate with Gudovich and stay responsible for the security of the Russian 
borders.167 It was very important in this situation that the Russian frontier territories 
newly acquired from Poland remained under the watchful eye of the government and 
that the troops leaving abroad were to be replaced. Accordingly, the Governor 
General of Moscow, Field Marshal Ivan Petrovich Saltykov the Second, was to be 
prepared to move on Kiev in order to assume the duties of Gudovich in case of 
need.168  
 
An almost unthinkable event in the European politics, that is the alliance 
between the Ottoman and the Russian empires, was thus in the making. There 
certainly were the fresh memory of the recent wars and mutual distrust. However, 
both sides still were unwilling to stir up new hostilities under the new international 
conjuncture. Throughout the 1790s Constantinople and St. Petersburg simply 
preferred to maintain the existing status quo that satisfied them both. Even despite 
the certain thaw in relations a full-fledged alliance would sound as something rather 
chimerical and surely not applicable in real life. Real life, however, appeared more 
unpredictable than expected.    
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4.6. Conclusions 
Throughout the years between 1794 and 1798 the two empires were balancing 
on the verge between peace and war, and were very much interested in preventing a 
new conflict. In mid-1790s one of the central issues defining the agenda of the 
European diplomatic representatives in Constantinople was the Polish question. 
While being busy with the affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and 
preparing its last partition, St. Petersburg sought to secure the neutrality of the Porte. 
On the other hand, the French diplomacy, supported by the Polish emigrant circles, 
tried by all means to involve the Ottomans into an offensive alliance against Russia.  
At this point the interests of Russia and the Ottoman Empire to avoid war 
coincided. All attempts of the French ambassadors Descorches, Verninac and 
Aubert-Dubayet to drag the Ottomans into an anti-Russian alliance ended in failure. 
The Porte in view of the deepest internal crisis and the ongoing reforms of izâm-i 
Cedîd simply could not risk breaking its peace with Russia for the sake of the 
restoration of Poland. The Ottoman government at the time was more preoccupied 
with the danger of the Russian aggression rather than planning its own attack. 
Following the death of Catherine II and the ascension of Paul I to the Russian throne 
the threat of the Ottoman-Russian war decreased even more. 
 
Unlike his mother, the new Russian Emperor was not going to wage any wars 
with the Ottomans, having embarked on extensive domestic reforms. Paradoxically 
enough, while the relations between the Porte and its inveterate enemy Russia 
towards the end of 1790-s were slowly improving, the Ottomans were increasingly 
concerned with the growing aggressiveness of their traditional friend and ally, 
France. According to the Peace of Campo Formio (1797) the French gained control 
143 
over the Ionian Islands along with the small coastal strip of the former Venetian 
possessions on the Balkan Peninsula. This meant that France now had a common 
border with the Ottoman Empire and became a potential threat to Balkan possessions 
of the Sultan. Moreover, the French revolutionary propaganda could be more easily 
spread among the Ottoman Christian subjects, raising the serious concerns of the 
Porte.         
 
Thus, in spring 1798 there appeared a memo of the Reis-ül-Küttab Atıf Efendi, 
allowing the theoretical possibility of an alliance of the Ottoman Empire with Russia 
and Austria. The opinion of the Ottoman minister was that even though both these 
monarchies historically were the biggest enemies of the Porte, under extraordinary 
circumstances they could become allies. As the preparations of a huge French naval 
squadron were going on in Toulon, everyone in Europe was anxious about its final 
destination. Among the possible targets of General Bonaparte, according to many 
speculations, could be the British Isles, Egypt or the Balkans. Even before the actual 
French descent in Egypt took place, the Russian Emperor proposed (in March and 
April 1798) his military aid to the Ottomans. Following the occupation of Egypt the 
Porte agreed to accept the Russian proposition and in late August 1798 the Black Sea 
squadron of Vice Admiral Ushakov sailed off from the Crimea to Constantinople. In 
this way, the French aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean brought about a 
heretofore unthinkable thing such as the Ottoman-Russian military cooperation and 
paved the way to conclusion of a defensive alliance between the Sultan and the Tsar.  
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CHAPTER V 
BIRTH OF THE ALLIACE 
 
Nichts Bessers weiß ich mir an Sonn- und Feiertagen  
Als ein Gespräch von Krieg und Kriegsgeschrei,  
wenn hinten, weit, in der Türkei,  
Die Völker aufeinander schlagen. 
(J.W. von Goethe, “Faust”, I) 
5.1. Russian fleet visits the Ottoman capital 
On 18 August 1798 the Russian government received the news about the 
French landing in Egypt, along with information about further plans of General 
Bonaparte to spread his conquests over the holy cities of Mecca, Medina and 
Jerusalem and even to restore in the latter the Jewish Republic.1 Apart from this, Paul 
I learned about the final decision of the Sultan to ask the Russian aid against the 
French, or, in terms of Pavel, “the enemies of all kingdoms and the destroyers of the 
general order”.2 While the military commanders of the Russian armed forces 
quartered in the close vicinity of the Ottoman border were ordered to stay prepared 
for a possible campaign abroad at the request of the Porte, the naval squadron under 
the command of Vice Admiral Ushakov was to proceed directly to the Bosporus in 
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order to act jointly with the Ottoman and the British fleets.3 Besides, Paul I ordered 
to form one more reserve squadron, which in the absence of Ushakov until further 
notice was to patrol the Russian Black Sea coastline. Rear Admiral Ivan Tikhonovich 
Ovtsyn had been appointed the commander of this reserve squadron.4  
 
It can be clearly seen, that even having the official request of the Ottoman side 
for aid, St. Petersburg did not forget to take the necessary precautions regarding the 
security of the Russian borders, as well as the safety of Ushakov’s squadron. When 
sending the promised naval force to Istanbul the Russian government was still unsure 
about how the Porte would behave in respect to its new ally. Together with the Tsar’s 
order Ushakov was provided with a detailed instruction of the Vice-President of the 
Admiralty Board (Admiralteistv-Kollegiia) Grigorii Grigorievich Kushelev,5 which 
demanded from him the utmost care and attention. Kushelev once again reminded 
Ushakov a number of reasons for being extremely cautious in communicating with 
the Ottomans. First, the alliance between the Porte and the Russian Empire was quite 
a novel matter. Second, there should be remembered long previous rivalry of the two 
nations. Third, one could not be sure to what extent would the Ottomans keep their 
loyalty to a Christian state.  
 
Taking into consideration the abovementioned circumstances Ushakov was 
given certain practical instructions. So, the Russian Admiral before entering the 
Bosporus was to make sure that the Porte would guarantee his free return back to the 
                                                 
3 ‘Paul I to F. F. Ushakov, 18 / 7 August 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. 
Delo 1289, f. f. 25-26; the same document can also be found at: AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople 
Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396, f. f. 25-25 ob. 
4 ‘Paul I to N. S. Mordvinov, 18 / 7 August 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 
90/1. Delo 1289, f. 24. 
5 ‘G. G. Kushelev to F. F. Ushakov, 18 / 7 August 1798’ Ibidem, f. f. 23-23 ob.; this document has 
been published at:  Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 91-92. 
146 
Black Sea. Among other things recommended to Ushakov was to merge the Russian 
and the Ottoman ships, so that the experienced Russian crews would set an example 
to the Ottomans, restraining them from escape. Also, the Russian side was concerned 
with the fact that many French specialists were then serving the Porte. Should it 
appear necessary to defend the Dardanelles from a French attack, Ushakov was to 
recommend the Ottomans to take care that there should be no French engineers in the 
coastal fortresses, for they might betray the Porte in favour of their fellow 
countrymen. As the latter directive implies, St. Petersburg at this point still pondered 
the possibility of the French invasion of other parts of the Ottoman Empire, including 
the Black Sea Straits. Further lines in the instructions explain that while preparing 
them one of the highest officials of the Russian Admiralty was yet unaware of the 
battle of Aboukir Bay (1-2 August 1798), that the French fleet had been destroyed 
there and that the threat of Bonaparte’s landing at another point of the Ottoman 
coastline ceased to exist.6         
 
Meanwhile on 23 August 1798 Vice Admiral Ushakov in accordance with the 
received orders before his own departure sent to Istanbul a light dispatch boat 
“Panagia Apotomengana” under the command of Lieutenant Tiesenhausen. Her task 
was to deliver to the Russian ambassador Tomara the letter informing that the Black 
Sea squadron set out towards the Bosporus in order to carry out the duties assigned to 
it by the Emperor.7 Ushakov together with his whole sqadron departed from Akhtiar 
(Sevastopol) on the next day.8 In his letter to Tomara the Russian naval commander 
asked the ambassador to notify the Porte of his impending arrival. Ushakov wrote, 
                                                 
6 Ibidem. 
7 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 23 / 12 August 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. 
Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 6-7.  
8 D. Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799 g. mezhdu Rossiyey I Frantsiyey (3 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1857), 
Vol.1, p. 68. 
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that he will stay in the close vicinity of the Straits waiting for the return of Lieutenant 
Tiesenhausen with the permission of the Ottoman government to enter the Bosporus 
and the instructions defining the exact place where the Russian squadron should drop 
anchor in Istanbul. In his secret letter Ushakov specified the reasons for which he 
would not enter the Straits until the return of the dispatch boat, asking Tomara to 
confirm at the Porte the right of free passage back to the Black Sea and to send 
Ushakov detailed written instructions in that respect.9 On 3 September 1798 the 
Black Sea squadron of Vice Admiral Ushakov, including six battleships, seven 
frigates and three dispatch vessels that were carrying altogether 7476 men,10 
approached the Bosporus. Having received the explanatory letter from the 
ambassador Tomara11 on the same day, Ushakov still asked for yet another assurance 
that he could freely return to the Black Sea.12 Finally, on 5 September the Porte 
issued a declaration about the free passage of the Russian war and commercial ships 
through the Straits.13  On the same day (5 September 1798) the Russian squadron 
entered the Straits and dropped anchor at Büyükdere, on the European coast of the 
Bosporus.14   
 
                                                 
9 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 23 / 12 August 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. 
Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 9-10. 
10 For full roster of Ushakov’s squadron see: The Table of the Black Sea Fleet squadron including the 
general officers, staff-officers and company-officers serving on the battleships, frigates and other 
vessels [Табель Эскадры Черноморского корабельного флота о состоящих на кораблях, 
фрегатах и других судах господах генералитете, штаб и обер офицерах служителях] Fond 90. 
Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral 
Ushakov), f. f. 60-62; With some minor differences it has been published at: Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 87-90. 
11 . ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 3 September (23 August) 1798’ Ibidem, f. 11. 
12 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 4 September (24 August) 1798’ Ibidem, f.f. 12-13. 
13 Declaration of the Turkish government about the free passage of the Russian war and commercial 
ships through the Straits, the reciprocal extradition of the deserters, and the assistance on the sanitary 
measures to avoid the spread of the infectious diseases. 5 September (25 August) 1798.  Mordvinov, 
Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 78-79.  
14 Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1288), Vol. 4, p. 58. 
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The Russian squadron had hardly hauled down the sails when the ambassador 
Tomara appeared on the flagship of Ushakov “Sviatoi Pavel”. There, the ambassador 
and admiral had a long conversation, after which there also came an Ottoman official 
(kâhya) sent by the Grand Vizier. He congratulated Ushakov on the happy arrival of 
the Russian Black Sea fleet to Istanbul and as a token of high esteem presented the 
Russian admiral lots of flowers and fruits. On the same evening the Sultan himself 
came incognito on the six-oared boat to examine the ships of the Russian squadron. 
Selim III especially liked the design of the flagship “Sviatoi Pavel”, and the sketches 
of it were immediately sent to the Sultan through the agency of Tomara.15        
 
Next day, on 6 September, at 8 p. m. the First Dragoman of the Porte Ypsilanti 
also paid a visit to Ushakov. In the name of the Sultan Ypsilanti presented Ushakov a 
snuffbox encrusted with diamonds. The First Dragoman in addition handed over to 
Admiral the declaration granting the Russian vessels the free passage through the 
Straits, issued by the Porte one day ago.16 Besides, when standing at Büyükdere, the 
Russian fleet was provided by the Ottoman side the technical assistance. The 
unreliable rudders of the ship of the line “Sviatoi Pavel” and the frigate “Sviatoi 
Nikolai” were taken to the shore, and the Liman Reisi (the Head of the Port) was 
asked to take care that the new ones would be made. Upon this request the workmen 
from tersane (naval docks) were immediately sent to make the new rudders for the 
Russian ships.17   
 
                                                 
15 Ie. Metaxa, Zapiski flota kapitan-leitenanta Iegora Metaksy, zakliuchayushchiie v sebe 
povestvovaniie o voiennykh podvigakh Rossiiskoi eskadry, pokorivshei pod nachal’stvom admiral 
Fiodora Fiodorovicha Ushakova Ionicheskiie ostrova pri sodeistvii Porty Ottomanskoi v 1798 i 1799 
godakh (Petrograd, 1915), p. 12. 
16 Ibidem. 
17 Ibidem. 
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A few days before the arrival of the Russian fleet to the Ottoman capital, on 2 
September, there had been issued a fetva authorizing the declaration of war against 
France.18 Apart from this, the French charge d’affaires Pierre Ruffin had been called 
to the Porte. He was arrested and closed together with other members of the French 
mission in the Seven Towers fortress, a traditional Ottoman move meaning the 
declaration of war. Interestingly enough, the British ambassador Lord Elgin chose to 
settle down in the former building of the French mission 19. Other French officials 
who were residing in the Ottoman Empire (like the consuls in Smyrna, Bucharest, 
Jassy and the personnel of their consulates) and merchants were also arrested and 
transferred to the fortresses in the Black Sea coast area such as Amasya, Samsun, 
Sinop and Giresun.20 Moreover, the Porte had created a special commission headed 
by Moralı Osman Efendi, appointed to search for the property of the French citizens 
in the Ottoman Empire.21  
 
It was at this point that the report of Moralı Esseyid Ali Efendi came to 
Istanbul. As it turned out, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris was still deceived by the 
French diplomacy and personally by Talleyrand in regard to the Egypt expedition of 
General Bonaparte and remained anaware of the real state of affairs between France 
and the Ottoman Empire. The report of Esseyid Ali, which reached Istanbul on 4 
September, got the famous note of Selim III about its author: “What a foolish 
jackass!” (e eşek herifmiş).22 Not long after that (12 September 1798)23 the 
                                                 
18 Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1288), Vol. 4, p. 58.  
19 For more details see: Henri Dehérain, ‘La rupture du gouvernement ottoman avec la France en l'an 
VI’, Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 39 (1925): 9-43; Also see: Maurice Herbette, Une Ambassade 
Turque sous le directoire. (Paris, 1902), p. 238. 
20 P. Pisani, ‘L’expédition Russo-Turque aux îles ioniennes en 1789-1799’ Revue d’Histoire 
diplomatique, 2 (1888), p. 207. 
21 ‘V. S. Tomara to A. A. Bezborodko, 27 / 16 October 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations 
with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 881, f. 45. 
22 Soysal, Fransız ihtilâli, p. 242. 
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Ottoman government announced a manifest declaring war on France to all diplomatic 
missions in Istanbul.24     
 
Now when the Russian war ships were waiting at Büyükdere, the highest 
Ottoman officials, the Russian and the British ambassadors, along with Admiral 
Ushakov gathered to discuss how to use the newly arrived Russian naval squadron. 
After the two conferences on 8 and 10 September25 it was decided that the Russian 
fleet of Ushakov would join forces with the Ottoman fleet commanded by Kadir Bey 
and then under Ushakov’s general command would proceed to the Ionian 
Archipelago in order to take it from the French. The joint Russo-Ottoman squadron 
was also to protect the Balkan coastline of the Ottoman Empire against the possible 
French descents, which could be any time expected from the French-controlled 
Italian town of Ancona. Apart from that, two Russian and two Ottoman frigates were 
separated from the main forces to escort ten Ottoman gunboats to the Rhodes and 
then, should these gunboats appear to be necessary for the British navy operating 
along the coast of Egypt, to move there.  
 
As good hosts the Ottomans invited Ushakov to examine their fleet anchored at 
Beşiktaş, not far from the Sultan’s palace, and visit the naval docks (tersane) of 
Istanbul. Having inspected these on 12 September Ushakov wrote in his report to 
                                                                                                                                          
23 Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1288), Vol. 4, p. 58. 
24 Herbette gives the text of the Manifest in French: “Manifeste de la Sublime Porte Ottomane relative 
à la guerre contre la République Française”. Herbette, Une Ambassade Turque, p. 313-24. Following 
the text in Herbette’s book there are two dates for document, 1 Rebiülakhir 1213 and 9 September 
1798. However, a Hijri date does not correspond to that one of the Gregorian calendar, which should 
be 12 September.   
25 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I. 29 August (9 September) 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 
81-83; ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I. 31 August (11 September) 1798’ Ibidem, pp. 85-86.  
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Paul I26 that everywhere he was received with the utmost kindness and trust. The 
Russian Admiral found the Ottoman fleet “even though not flawless on comparing to 
the European fleets, but by far better than earlier, and partly in perfect order”.27 The 
only criticism was about the cannon balls, which Ushakov judged to be 
unsatisfactory and advised the Ottoman side to change them. At the naval docks 
Ushakov was shown in all details the newly built 120-cannon ship as well as the 
ships which were still under construction.28 Made on the French pattern, the Ottoman 
vessels in a technical sense, according to the observation of the Russian guest, little 
differed from the French ships.29 Thus the same person who less than ten years ago 
was successfully fighting in the open sea with the Ottoman fleet, was now inspecting 
it and even giving advices how to improve its fighting efficiency.   
 
Upon spending two weeks in Istanbul the Russian squadron on 19 September 
1798 at noon 30 departed from Büyükdere and moved to the Dardanelles.31 Having 
arrived to the Dardanelles Ushakov joined forces with the Ottoman squadron of Vice 
Admiral32 Kadir Bey. Here the Russian and the Ottoman commanders made one 
another’s acquaintance33, and Ushakov expressed a very favourable opinion of his 
                                                 
26 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I. 17 / 6 September 1798’ Ibidem, pp. 98-100. Also, the fact of Ushakov’s 
inspection of the Ottoman fleet and naval installations had been published by the Russian newspaper 
of that time: Moskovskiie Vedomosti, Saturday, 16 October, 1798 (the date is given here as it stands in 
original, i.e. according to the Julian style, this corresponds to 27 October of the Gregorian calendar) 
27 Ibidem, p. 99. 
28 Ibidem, p.98. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 21; The date for the departure of the Russian fleet from Büyükdere provided by 
the Ottoman historian Ahmed Cevdet is 8 Rebiülahir 1213, which also corresponds to 19 September 
1798: Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1288), Vol. 4, p. 59. 
31 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 26 / 15 September 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople 
Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 
69-69 ob.; ‘F. F. Ushakov to Admiralty College, 26 / 15 September 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 106.  
32 The title, Ushakov uses while reporting to Tomara on his meeting with the Ottoman commander 
33 On 22 September Kadir Bey together with the Dragoman of Kapudan Pasha (The Chief 
Commander of the Ottoman Navy) and some other officials paid his first visit to Ushakov. Next day, 
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Ottoman colleague.34 At the request of Kadir Bey, in order to maintain better 
communication between the Russian and the Ottoman squadrons four Russian 
mariners had been appointed by Ushakov to serve on the flagship of the Ottoman 
Admiral.35 Lieutenant Yegor Metaxa, a Greek by origin who also knew Ottoman 
Turkish, was to be an aide-de-camp of Kadir Bey. Two former midshipmen degraded 
to seamen, Alexander Oleshev and Karl Uexküll, as well as one sub-steersman 
(podshturman) from frigate “Soshestviie Sviatogo Dukha” were assigned to help 
Metaxa in his mission.36 In this way, by the end of September 1798 the joint Russo-
Ottoman squadron was ready to leave the Dardanelles and embark on its further 
journey. The following are the full lists of both the Russian and Ottoman squadrons 
gathered at the Dardanelles by 25 September 1798 under command of Vice Admiral 
Ushakov: 
Table 1. The Russian Squadron. Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, 2, p. 112. 
RUSSIAN SQUADRON 
Ships of the line 
74-cannons, “Sviatoi Pavel”, Vice Admiral Ushakov and Captain Sarandinaki 
74-cannons, “Sviatoi Piotr”, Captain Seniavin 
74-cannons, “Zakharii i Yelizaveta”, Captain Selivachov 
72-cannons, “Bogoiavleniie Gospodnie”, Captain Aleksiano 
72-cannons, “Sviataia Troitsa”, Rear Admiral Ovtsyn, Commander Poskochin 
68-cannons, “Maria Magdalina”, Commander Timchenko 
Frigates 
50-cannons, “Grigorii Velikiia Armenii”, Lieutenant-Commander Shostak 
48-cannons, “Sviatoi Mikhail”, Commander Sorokin 
46-cannons, “Sviatoi Nikolai”, Lieutenant-Commander Marin 
44-cannons, “Soshestviie Sviatogo Dukha”, Lieutenant-Commander Konstantinov 
44-cannons, “Kazanskaia Bogoroditsa”, Lieutenant-Commander Messer 
                                                                                                                                          
the Russian Admiral, made a reciprocal visit to the flagship of his Ottoman colleague. Metaxa, 
Zapiski, p. 28.   
34 “The Commander of the Turkish squadron... seems to be a very gentle and polite person, and we 
decided everything in a friendly manner. As regards his courtesy and our mutual consent in taking 
decisions I express to Your Excellency my gratitude and commendation...I hope that, as it can be seen 
at the beginning, should this continue in the same way we would be contented with each other and one 
may expect the good results owing to this...” ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 26 / 15 September 
1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of 
Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 69-69 ob. 
35 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 28. 
36 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Ye. P. Metaxa, 26 / 15 September 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 
107. 
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40-cannons, “Navarkhiia Vozneseniie Gospodnie”, Lieutenant-Commander Count 
Voinovich 
Repeating frigate  
32-cannons, “Shchastlivyi”, Lieutenant-Commander Baillie 
Dispatch boats 
18-cannons, Akat “Sviataia Irina”, Lieutenant Vlito 
14-cannons, Transport ship “Krasnoselie”, Lieutenant Riabinin 
14-cannons, Transport ship “Panagia Apotumengana”, Captain of the sea battalions 
Skandrakov  
                                                                                     
                                                                                    Total: Ships ........................ 6 
                                                                                              Frigates ..................... 7 
                                                                                              Small vessels ............ 3 
                                                                                     Grand Total: .................... 16 
 
Table 2. The Ottoman Squadron. Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 113. 
OTTOMAN SQUADRON 
Ships of the line 
86-cannons, under the flag of Kapitan Bey, Kadir Bey  
80-cannons, under the flag of Patron Bey (Vice-Admiral) 
76-cannons, under the flag of Real Bey (Rear Admiral) Ahmet Bey 
74-cannons, Captain İbrahim 
Frigates 
1- Captain Hüseyin 
2- Captain Abbas 
3- Captain Zeynel [Zeyner] 
4- Captain Süleyman 
5- Captain Kerim [Kherim] 
6- Captain Ahmet 
Corvettes 
1- Captain Mustafa 
2- Captain Hüseyin 
3- Captain Ali Bey 
4- Captain Mehmet 
14 gunboats 
 
                                                                                    Total: Ships ........................ 4 
                                                                                              Frigates ..................... 6 
                                                                                              Corvettes .................. 4 
                                                                                              Gunboats ................ 14 
                                                                                     Grand Total: .................... 28 
 
The first vessels that left the Dardanelles (on 25 September 1798) were two 
Russian (“Sviatoi Mikhail” and “Kazanskaia Bogoroditsa”) and two Ottoman 
frigates, under Commander Alexander Andreievich Sorokin.37 These were to escort 
                                                 
37 ‘F. F. Ushakov to A. A. Sorokin, 24 / 13 September 1798’. Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, 
pp. 103- 104.  
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ten Ottoman gunboats to the island of Rhodes, and, should the mentioned gunboats 
prove to be necessary for the British navy of Vice Admiral Nelson operating in the 
vicinity of the Egyptian coasts, to proceed further to Egypt.  
 
In a few days the rest of the Russo-Ottoman joint fleet would also set the sails 
and take off in the direction of the Ionian islands. In the meantime, its Commander-
in-Chief Ushakov was preoccupied with writing and sending numerous reports, 
dealing with the supplies issues38, and making consultations with his Ottoman 
colleagues regarding the plan of the future combat operations.39 The final departure, 
which had been initially fixed for 27 September, due to the unfavourable weather 
conditions was postponed until 1 October. On that day, the Russo-Ottoman squadron 
left the Dardanelles40 and entered the Aegean archipelago.    
5.2. Start of the Mediterranean Campaign 
In light of the current situation the actual military cooperation between Istanbul 
and St. Petersburg started in the absence of a formal treaty of alliance. The passage 
of the Russian battleships through the Black Sea Straits was only regulated by a 
special declaration of the Porte issued on 5 September 1798.41 As the diplomatic 
                                                 
38 In view of the changed climate and water some of the Russian crew began to fall sick. To prevent 
the spread of sickness among the crew a certain amount of the grape wine and vinegar were mixed 
with the drinking water. In this respect Ushakov informed Tomara that he would need a lot of both the 
wine and vinegar, and requested an additional sum of at least 60 thousand roubles. Besides, the money 
was also needed for salary of the officer personnel. ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 26 / 15 
September 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of 
Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 71-71 ob.    
39 At the consultations with Kadir Bey and another Ottoman naval commander about the prospected 
operations it was decided that the Russo-Ottoman squadron would additionally require the help of up 
to twelve gunboats. The Ottoman Admiral promised to inform of this issue the High Porte, whereas 
Ushakov asked Tomara to submit to the Porte the same request. ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 26 / 
15 September 1798’ Ibidem, f. f. 70-70 ob.   
40 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 1 October (20 September) 1798’ Ibidem, f. 74. 
41 Declaration of the Turkish government about the free passage of the Russian war and commercial 
ships through the Straits, etc. Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. p. 78-79.  
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preparations of the treaty were still underway both the Russian and the Ottoman 
fleets already began to carry out their duties.  
 
Tellingly, Paul I even at this point did not entirely confide in his new allies, 
though the Russian Emperor equally did not wish to worry the Porte in any way. In 
his instruction to Tomara, dated 22 September 1798, Paul I specified that when after 
the end of the military operations against the French the squadron of Ushakov would 
have to return, and should the Porte at that time refuse to give the Russian navy a 
free passage back to the Black Sea, the duty of the Russian ambassador would be to 
convey to Ushakov the order to return back home together with the British navy, 
through the Gibraltar Straits.42 A fortnight later the Emperor wrote also to Ushakov 
in regard of recruiting the Greeks, mostly Ionians, to the Russian service:  
I order that you should try to avoid making any excessive demands 
on the Porte, and not forget that, while helping it, we should not become 
a burden for it. I believe... being sure that you would care... to preserve 
the best impression about us both in the Sultan and his Ministry, as well 
as among the common people.43  
 
The instructions of Paul I given at the end of September to his ambassador in 
Istanbul and the commander of his fleet clearly showed a very characteristic feature 
typical for the Ottoman-Russian relations of the period. The inability to overcome the 
still present distrust to the opposite side was combined with the practical necessity to 
cooperate and the unwillingness for that reason to jeopardize the existing level of 
bilateral relations. 
 
 Be that as it may, the Russian and the Ottoman fleets, having left the Straits of 
Dardanelles on 1 October 1798 took the course towards the Ionian Islands. It was en 
                                                 
42 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 22 / 11 September 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 2. Internal College Affairs. Op. 2/2. 
Delo 205, f. f. 107-107 ob. 
43 ‘Paul I to F. F. Ushakov, 6 October (25 September) 1798’ Ibidem, f. f. 133-133 ob.  
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route when the Russian Admiral finally learned from his Ottoman colleague about 
the battle of Abukir Bay and the complete destruction of Bonaparte’s fleet.44 Quite 
soon Ushakov’s squadron would also engage in its first combat encounter with the 
enemy. 
 
A former Venetian island of Cerigo (Kythira), lying to the south-east off the 
coast of the Peloponnese peninsula, became the starting point of the Ionian campaign 
of the Russo-Ottoman fleet.45 On approaching the island, Ushakov sent ahead two 
frigates (“Grigorii Velikiia Armenii” and “Shchastlivyi”, reinforced with some of the 
landing troops46) under the leadership of Lieutenant-Commander Shostak. On 9 
October 1798 the frigates of Shostak reached Cerigo and after a short bombardment 
took the small fortress at the Bay of St. Nicholas. The French garrison of the fortress, 
consisting of 36 privates and one corporal, in view of the outnumbering enemy (the 
total crew of only the two Russian frigates brought by Shostak consisted of 710 men) 
lowered the flag and fled to the main fortress on the island, called Kapsali. Of these 
the two French soldiers were killed and fifteen were taken prisoners, of whom seven 
were captured by the Ottoman landing force.47 Whatever small this first encounter of 
the campaign may be, this was probably as well the first precedent of the joint 
military operation of the Russian and the Ottoman troops in history.    
 
As the bulk strength of the Russo-Ottoman squadron came to Cerigo, Ushakov 
and Kadir Bey sent the landing party to start preparations for attack on the Kapsali 
                                                 
44 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 1 October (20 September) 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople 
Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. 74.  
45 See the report of F. F. Ushakov regarding the taking of the island of Cerigo: ‘F.F. Ushakov to Paul 
I, 21 / 10 October 1798’ Ibidem, f. f. 76-78 ob.  
46 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 34. 
47 ‘F.F. Ushakov to Paul I, 21 / 10 October 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. 
Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. 76. 
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fortress. Because of the mountainous terrain of the island the Russian and the 
Ottoman soldiers had to carry all munitions and several cannons on their shoulders. 
To lead the operation Ushakov again appointed Lieutenant-Commander Shostak, 
while the Ottoman landing force of 250 men was commanded by Fettah Bey. As the 
French garrison (the total number of defenders of Kapsali fortress, as it appeared 
later, was 75 men) refused to capitulate, the siege started at dawn on 12 October 
1798. By 12 p.m. the fortress waved the white flag in two places and the assault was 
over. According to the official report of Ushakov, during the siege seven French 
were killed, on the Russo-Ottoman side there were no casualties. In order to avoid 
the unnecessary bloodshed the Russian Admiral agreed to accept the capitulation and 
transport the French prisoners to Ancona or Marseille on condition that they would 
swear an oath not to take up arms again for one year and a day.48 In this way, the 
Russo-Ottoman fleet gained the first victory of the campaign. Of the two flags of the 
captured fortresses, one was sent to the Russian Emperor and the other to the 
Sultan.49 
 
Following the occupation of Cerigo Ushakov and Kadir Bey issued in three 
languages (Russian, Ottoman Turkish and Greek) the proclamation to the inhabitants 
of the island, inviting them to choose the temporary local administration until the 
time when all Ionian Islands would be cleaned from the French. Then the two 
powers, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires would jointly decide upon the future 
status of the islands.50 Before moving further, Ushakov left on Cerigo eleven Russian 
soldiers with Lieutenant (poruchik) Diamanti at the head. Also, there had been left 
                                                 
48 Ibidem, f. 77; Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 36. 
49 ‘F.F. Ushakov to Paul I, 21 / 10 October 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. 
Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. 77-77 ob. 
50 Proclamation to the inhabitants of the island of Cerigo, 14 / 3 October 1798. Ibidem, f. f. 79-79 ob. 
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the equal number of the soldiers and one officer from the Ottoman squadron.51 On 17 
October 1798 Ushakov departed from Cerigo and took the course to the western tip 
of the Peloponnese peninsula.52 
 
In a week, on 24 October 1798, the Russo-Ottoman fleet of Ushakov 
approached the Island of Zante (Zakynthos). Again, as during the assault at Cerigo, 
Lieutenant-Commander Shostak was ordered to control the whole operation. There 
were prepared two landing parties, from the Russian and the Ottoman squadrons 
respectively. The former was to be commanded by Major Ivanov, and the latter had 
been put under command of Lieutenant Metaxa53, a Russian naval officer appointed 
at the very beginning of the campaign to serve on the Ottoman flagship. Due to the 
fact that the local inhabitants were informed about the arrival of Ushakov’s squadron 
in advance, many of them came to the shore to meet it. Both Ushakov and Metaxa 
tell that because of the shallow waters and the hidden reefs the boats carrying the 
landing troops could not approach the island. On seeing that the enthusiastic 
Zantiotes were going into the sea and, not allowing the Russo-Ottoman landing 
troops to walk through water, carried the Russian and the Ottoman soldiers on their 
shoulders as far as the shore.54      
 
In the meantime the frigates “Grigorii Velikiia Armenii” and “Shastlivyi” 
destroyed by the fire of their artillery the coastal batteries of the enemy. The French 
garrison locked themselves up in the fortress, situated on a high mountain range. The 
                                                 
51 ‘F.F. Ushakov to Paul I, 21 / 10 October 1798’ Ibidem, f. 77 ob. 
52 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 100. 
53 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I (Report about the taking of Zante), 1 November (21 October) 1798’ 
AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador 
Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. 81; Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 43.   
54 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I (Report about the taking of Zante), 1 November (21 October) 1798’ 
AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador 
Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. 81 ob; Metaxa, Zapiski, pp. 43-44. 
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attackers, assisted by the local population, besieged the fortress and prepared to 
assault it. Having no hope for successful defence, the French asked for capitulation 
on the same day at eleven in the evening. On 25 October 1798, the garrison 
(numbering 441 men, including 47 officers) left the fortress and surrendered. Some 
of the officers who had wives and children (18 families) were allowed to leave for 
Ancona, on condition that they would not fight against Russia and the Porte neither 
against their allies.55 The rest of the prisoners three days later were sent to Patras in 
Morea.56 
 
Without losing any time Ushakov, while staying with the main forces on Zante, 
sent smaller detachments from his squadron to occupy other two islands of the Ionian 
archipelago, lying in the north next to Zante and along the western coast of the 
continental Greece. On the same day when the French garrison on Zante capitulated, 
Commander Ivan Stepanovich Poskochin, given one ship of the line (“Sviataia 
Troitsa”) and three frigates (“Soshestviie Sviatogo Dukha”, “Shchastlivyi” and one 
Ottoman frigate), sailed off to Cefalonia (Kefalonia). Four days later, on 29 October 
Captain Dmitrii Nikolaievich Seniavin, at the head of two ships of the line (“Sviatoi 
Piotr” and one Ottoman ship) and two frigates (“Navarkhiia” and one Ottoman 
frigate), also left Zante and moved towards the island of Santa Maura (Lefkada). 
Furthermore, on 31 October Captain Ivan Andreievich Selivachev, at the head of 
three ships of the line (“Zakharii i Yelisavet”, “Bogoiavlieniie Gospodnie” and one 
Ottoman ship) and three frigates (“Grigorii Velikiia Armenii” and two Ottoman 
                                                 
55 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I (Report about the taking of Zante), 1 November (21 October) 1798’ 
AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador 
Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 82-82 ob.; Metaxa in his memoirs states that the garrison of 
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frigates), was ordered to go to Corfu to start blockading the biggest and the most 
important island of the Ionian archipelago.57 
 
The Russo-Ottoman squadron, which jointly launched an attack on Zante, thus 
appeared to be divided into four parts. Apart from the bulk force of Ushakov and 
Kadir Bey, three detachments of Poskochin, Seniavin and Selivachev had been sent 
to Cefalonia, Santa Maura and Corfu respectively, each with its own mission. As to 
Ushakov, during his one-week stay on Zante he was given a warm welcome on the 
part of the local population. The Zantiotes were very enthusiastic about the arrival of 
their Orthodox coreligionists and even asked Ushakov to take them under Russian 
protection. According to Metaxa, the Russian Admiral had to explain the islanders 
that this was impossible in view of the Emperor’s obligations to his allies, which in 
no way could be broken.58 Having addressed the population of Zante with the 
proclamation59 similar to that one issued earlier on Cerigo, Ushakov together with his 
whole squadron (except for the small number of soldiers left as a garrison on 
Zante)60 departed for Cefalonia on 1 November.61 
 
When the Russo-Ottoman squadron of Ushakov arrived at Cefalonia on 3 
November, Ushakov already knew from the report of Commander Poskochin that the 
                                                 
57 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I, 1 November (21 October) 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople 
Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 
86-87.  
58 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 51.  
59 ‘Proclamation to the inhabitants of the island of Zante, 31 / 20 October 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. 
Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral 
Ushakov), f. f. 85-85 ob. 
60 Midshipman Vasiliev had been appointed the commandant of the Zante fortress, and among those 
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island of Cefalonia was taken.62 At this point on 8 November came the news from 
Captain Seniavin. He reported Ushakov that the fortress on Santa Maura was still 
under siege and due to a lack of troops the capture of the island might be delayed.63 
Now when only two significant targets remained, which were the islands of Santa 
Maura and Corfu, before his departure to help Seniavin Ushakov did also sent 
reinforcements to the detachment of Selivachev (sent earlier to blockade Corfu).64 
Then, on 9 November the Russian Admiral left on Cefalonia a small Russo-Ottoman 
garrison,65 along with a dispatch boat “Krasnoselie”, commanded by Lieutenant 
Riabinin66, and moved further to Santa Maura and Corfu.67 
 
At the moment when Ushakov’s squadron came to Santa Maura (11 November) 
Seniavin was holding negotiations with the commandant of the fortress. The arrival 
of Ushakov quite obviously did make a difference and in three days, on 14 
November, the French capitulated. On the next day the garrison marched out of the 
fortress. According to the conditions of capitulation the officers of the fortress 
garrison kept their weapons and were set free on parole. Other French prisoners, 
                                                 
62 Metaxa informs that while Ushakov was still on Zante, he received the report of Poskochin sent 
with midshipman Tsymbal, saying that Cefalonia was occupied by the Russo-Ottoman forces. 
Besides, midshipman Tsymbal brought the keys and the flag from the French fortress on Cefalonia. 
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Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with 
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63 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 1, p. 101. 
64 On 8 November 1798 the ship of the line “Sviataia Troitsa”, two Ottoman frigates and one Ottoman 
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Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 151-52.  
67 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I, 9 November (29 October) 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople 
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numbering 512 men, were transported to Patras.68 The casualties of Ushakov’s side 
during the siege of Santa Maura were two men killed and six wounded among the 
Russians, and four killed Ottomans.69 While Ushakov stayed on the island of Santa 
Maura, he was visited by the inhabitants of two smaller islands of the Ionian 
archipelago, Ithaca and Paxos. They declared that, because there were no French 
troops on their islands, they simply raised the flags of the allied powers and now 
were asking to accept them with the same rights which would be given to other 
Ionian islands.70 In this way, by mid-November 1798 out of seven islands of the 
Ionian archipelago six (Cerigo, Zante, Cefalonia, Santa Maura, Ithaca and Paxos) 
were under control of the allies. It was the only one island remaining, though the 
biggest and the most important. 
 
On 18 November 1798 Ushakov sailed off from Santa Maura to Corfu.71By this 
time the island had been already besieged for two weeks. The squadron of Captain 
Selivachev (3 ships of the line and 3 frigates) arrived at Corfu on 4 November, and 
immediately began patrolling the approaches to the island. Then, in a week, on 11 
November the squadron of Commander Poskochin (one ship of the line, 2 frigates 
and one corvette) came to the aid of Selivachev. Finally, Ushakov himself (4 ships of 
the line and 2 frigates) dropped anchor in the waters of Corfu on 19 November 
                                                 
68 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Lieutenant-Commander K. Konstantinov, 17 / 6 November 1798’ Admiral 
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1798.72 Thus towards the end of November the total number of the ships taking part 
of the siege of Corfu reached 8 ships of the line, 7 frigates and a few smaller vessels.  
 
The fortress of Corfu was defended by a garrison of 3 thousand men and 630 
cannons, under command of General Louis Chabot. Moreover, under the shelter of 
the fortress artillery there were 2 battleships (84-cannon “Le Généreux”, 60-cannon 
“Léander”), 40-cannon corvette “La Brune”, 24-cannon bomb vessel “La Frimaire” 
and 6-cannon brigantine “L’Expédition”.73 Having not enough landing troops neither 
the siege artillery, Ushakov for the time being continued blockading the island and 
waiting for reinforcements. According to the promises of the Porte, these were to be 
provided to him from the mainland by the local Ottoman pashas. Two days after his 
arrival, Ushakov wrote to Russian ambassador in Istanbul that the fortress was very 
strong and it was not sure yet whether it could be taken or not, since the French had 
ample amount of ammunition and provisions.74 
 
First smaller encounter between the defenders of the fortress and the forces of 
the Russo-Ottoman squadron took place on 23 November 1798, when the French 
ship “Le Généreux” (Captain Le Joysle) tried from the safe distance to attack some 
of the Ushakov’s ships. Without much success, “Le Généreux” retreated to the cover 
of the fortress cannons again.75 Then on 25 November Ushakov in his turn sent to the 
island a landing command of 128 men under Captain Kikin76 in order to organize a 
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9-cannon coastal battery on the northern side of the fortress.77 The similar orders 
were given to Lieutenant Ratmanov, who together with 13 soldiers and 6 
artillerymen landed on the southern side of the fortress on 29 November and also 
built a coastal battery equipped with 3 cannons.78 These batteries were to cut off the 
communication between the French ships and the fortress as well as to prevent the 
French from plundering the surrounding countryside in search of forage.  
 
Following the installment of two Russian batteries in the vicinity of the fortress 
the French launched an attack at the smaller southern fortification. At the morning on 
1 December 1798 a detachment of 600 men with 2 cannons, lead by the commandant 
of the fortress General Chabot himself, rushed at the battery. In view of the 
advancing regular French force, 1500 men of the unorganized local militia who were 
defending the battery, turned back, leaving to the enemy 17 Russian soldiers and 3 
cannons. Elated with their first success, the French made a second attack in the 
afternoon, now against the northern battery. This time the number of attackers was 
more than 1000, including 40 cavalrymen, and the fight continued until the evening. 
The defenders of the northern battery consisted of 310 Russian soldiers, up to 200 
Ottomans, and 30 Albanian levies. As a result of the battle the French attack on the 
battery had been repulsed, with the French casualties reaching about 100 killed and 
many wounded. The defenders lost 31 men killed (26 privates, 2 sub-officers and 
three cannoniers) and 72 wounded, including 3 officers (Captain Kikin, Sub-
Lieutenant (podporuchik) Chernyshev and Artillery Lieutenant Ganfeld). In report to 
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the tsar Ushakov mentioned also the courage of the Ottoman forces, which were 
taking part in the battle.79  
 
Metaxa recounts in his notes an interesting story, which happened right after 
the abovementioned French attack of 1 December 1798 on the allied battery. As it 
became known through the whole Russo-Ottoman squadron about the wounds of 
Captain Kikin, some four days later the Ottoman chief staff doctor named Mehmed 
addressed Metaxa (who served then on the Ottoman flagship) with a request to take 
him to the wounded Captain. Since the Ottoman staff doctor had never visited him 
before, Metaxa was surprised, but he was surprised even more when Mehmed spoke 
to him in the purest Russian. It emerged that the chief staff doctor of the Ottoman 
squadron once was a serf of Kikin’s family, Kondrashka80, conscripted into the 
Russian army and taken prisoner during the last Ottoman-Russian war. Being a 
horse-doctor in his own village, he managed to earn good money by healing the 
Ottoman sailors, adopted Islam, married in Istanbul, and fathered in this marriage 
five children. As Metaxa remarks, Captain Kikin despite great pain could not help 
laughing on seeing his former serf Kondrashka as a richly dressed Ottoman official, 
wearing huge turban, and named now Mehmed.81   
 
Quite soon, on 5 December took place the exchange of prisoners. One French 
Captain and fifteen privates were returned to the fortress garrison in exchange for 
those Russian soldiers who fell into the hands of the French during the attack on the 
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smaller allied battery. Of then captured seventeen Russian soldiers, fifteen were 
returned, and two wounded men remained with the French. These were to be 
exchanged at the time when they would get better for two French, kept in 
imprisonment on Ushakov’s flagship “Sviatoi Pavel”.82 
 
Never again did the French garrison of the Corfu fortress ventured to embark 
on a wide-scale attack at the allied positions, having only small occasional clashes 
with the besiegers during their attempts to collect provision from the surrounding 
villages. One such raid, for instance, occurred on 14 December and cost the French 
side from five to ten killed.83 The fortress was blockaded both on land and sea, and 
the garrison of General Chabot had little if any hopes for the help from outside. 
 
The ring around the fortress of Corfu continued to grow ever tighter, as the new 
ships of Ushakov’s squadron were arriving throughout the month of December. Two 
ships of the line (“Sviatoi Piotr” and one Ottoman ship) and two frigates 
(“Navarkhiia” and “Soshestviie Sviatogo Dukha”) under Captain Seniavin, which 
were earlier left at Santa Maura, came on 3 December.84 Those two Russian frigates 
(“Sviatoi Mikhail” and “Kazanskaia Bogoroditsa”) that had been sent to Egypt at the 
very beginning of the campaign also returned on 20 December and joined Ushakov’s 
squadron.85 Apart from this, as early as on 6 November two new ships of the line 
(“Mikhail” and “Simeon i Anna”) commanded by Rear Admiral Pavel Vasilievich 
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Pustoshkin departed from Akhtiar (Sevastopol), carrying 1000 men, and sailed off to 
the assistance of the joint Russo-Ottoman squadron at Corfu.86 However, because of 
severe weather conditions of winter Pustoshkin managed to arrive in Corfu only on 
10 January 1799.87 In this way, by mid-January 1799 all forces of Ushakov’s 
squadron were gathered at Corfu, consisting of twelve ships of the line, eleven 
frigates and a few smaller vessels. 
 
Not everything was that smooth in the camp of the besiegers. The additional 
troops that were to be sent in pursuance of the promises of the Porte by the local 
pashas from the mainland Balkan Ottoman possessions by the end of the year had not 
arrive yet. The unreliable behaviour of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, the Ottoman governor 
of Yanina (Ioannina) and an independent in all but name ruler of significant parts of 
Albania and continental Greece, combined with chronic interruptions in supplies 
deliveries, made the blockading of the Corfu fortress not an easy enterprise that 
continued throughout the whole winter of 1798-1799.  
 
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha’s ambitions knew no bounds and extended everywhere 
he could enlarge his possessions. Since after the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797) the 
French gained the Ionian Islands, as well as the mainland outposts of the Republic of 
Saint Mark on the Adriatic coast in Greece and Southern Albania (the cities of 
Preveza, Parga, Vonitsa and Butrinto), they came into contact with their new 
neighbour Ali Pasha Tepedelenli. Secretly positioning himself as a potential ally of 
the French, Ali Pasha changed his political commitments, though, soon upon 
learning of the defeat of Napoléon’s fleet at Abukir Bay and Russia’s aid to the 
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Porte. Under the pretext of fighting with the enemies of the Sultan, and in fact using 
a good opportunity to expand his territories, Ali opened hostilities against the four 
former Venetian coastal cities, which passed into the hands of the French the 
previous year. By the end of October 1798 Butrinto, Preveza and Vonitsa, the three 
out of four, fell into the hands of the most powerful Ottoman notable in the Western 
Balkans. A particularly horrible fate befell the Christian population of Preveza, 
almost thoroughly massacred without distinction of age or sex by the soldiers of Ali 
Pasha. The last remaining target of the governor of Yanina was Parga, located on the 
Greek coast of the Ionian Sea about 60 km northwest of Preveza and less than 30 km 
across the sea from the island of Corfu. 
 
It was at this moment, as the inhabitants of Parga were preparing for a mortal 
fight with the outnumbering forces of Ali Pasha, that the news about the presence of 
Ushakov’s fleet in the Ionian archipelago reached their ears. Immediately the 
Pargiotes sent their delegates to the Russian Admiral, who met with Ushakov on 5 
November 1798 when the latter was staying in Argostoli, the capital city of 
Cefalonia. The representatives of Parga desperately asked to take the city under the 
protection of the Russian tsar, or, otherwise, they would kill their wives and children, 
shut themselves in the fortress, and would fight with Ali’s troops until the last man.88    
 
Bound with the allied obligations towards the Ottoman government, Ushakov 
apparently was in no position to decide in his sole discretion whether or not to take 
Parga under the Russian protection. To refuse the request of the Pargiotes, though, 
would mean their imminent and the most terrible death at the hands of Ali’s cut-
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throats. Ushakov thus opted to agree that the inhabitants of Parga would raise the 
Russian flag over the walls of the city fortress, but on condition that it would be 
raised side by side with that one of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the Russian 
Admiral sent Ali Pasha a letter, composed in a friendly manner and laying emphasis 
on the alliance between the Russian Empire and the Porte.89  
 
The aim of Ushakov was, on the one hand, to save the Pargiotes from the 
atrocities of Ali Pasha, and on the other hand, to stay on peaceful terms with the 
despotic governor of Ioannina. So the Russian Admiral pretended as if Ali were a 
loyal vassal of the Sultan, stating that the Russians and the Ottomans were fighting 
together against the common enemy. As for the inhabitants of Parga, they 
communicated both with the Russian and the Ottoman Admiral, and showed their 
willingness to obey the orders of the allies. Accordingly, Ushakov recommended the 
Pargiots to subordinate themselves to the authority of Ali Pasha, as the friends and 
allies of the Ottoman Sultan and the Russian tsar. The letter was ending in a 
statement that the common task at the moment was to take the fortress of Corfu, and 
if the assistance of Ali Pasha be needed the commander of the Russo-Ottoman joint 
forces will address him again. 
 
Ali Pasha still disregarded the mentioned letter of Ushakov and continued to 
threaten Parga already after it raised both the Russian and the Ottoman standards. On 
seeing that, Ushakov four days later wrote another letter90, this time in a form 
resembling an ultimatum. Ali Pasha was informed that, since the inhabitants of the 
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city of Parga proclaimed themselves to be under protection of the two powers by 
raising the flags of Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Ushakov and the Ottoman 
Admiral Kadir Bey had sent there a certain number of mariners together with a part 
of the Ottoman troops, a few cannons and a combat vessel. Ushakov also learned that 
during the assault on Preveza Ali’s men took captive the former Russian consul at 
Malta Collegiate assessor (kollezhskii asessor)91 Dmitrii Lambros, who happened to 
be at that time in the city. Ushakov demanded to return Lambros, allegedly kept in 
fetters on a galley, to his special representative Lieutenant Metaxa whom he sent to 
deliver Ali this letter. Should Ali not carry out Ushakov’s demands, both the Russian 
and the Ottoman government would be informed about this behaviour of the Pasha of 
Ioannina. The unequivocal tone of the message and the visit of Lieutenant Metaxa to 
the residence of Ali Pasha92 finally produced the effect desired by the Russian 
Admiral. The Lion of Ioannina reluctantly complied with the demands of Ushakov, 
left the Pargiotes in peace and subsequently returned the consul Lambros.93 
However, following the above mentioned dissensions with Ushakov Ali Pasha was in 
no haste to help the allied fleet in its siege of the fortress of Corfu.              
 
The double-faced behaviour of Ali had been fully confirmed as the joint Russo-
Ottoman forces took hold of Santa Maura (15 November 1798). As a result of this, 
all secret correspondence between Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and the French garrison of 
the Santa Maura fortress fell into the hands of Ushakov. It appeared that for a long 
time Ali Pasha not only coveted the island so closely adjoining to his possessions, 
but also proposed the French side to pay 30 thousand ducats and to transport the 
                                                 
91 The rank in the Russian civil service corresponding to that one of Major in the army 
92 For description of this mission see: Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 132-46.  
93 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 147. 
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garrison of Santa Maura to Corfu in exchange for the island, before the arrival of the 
Russo-Ottoman fleet. The French declined Ali’s offer.94 
 
 As one may see, the semi-independent ruler of Ioannina quite apparently could 
not welcome the arrival of Ushakov and his squadron at the Mediterranean. The 
Russian Admiral became a real thorn in Ali Pasha’s side when he denied the latter 
the possibility to snatch the island of Santa Maura or, even more evidently, the so 
coveted Parga. Ushakov, in his turn, had every reason not to trust Ali. That being 
said, both of them still had to face reality and tolerate the neighbourhood of each 
other. Ushakov badly needed the auxiliary troops in order to launch a successful 
assault on the fortress of Corfu, and these troops could be assuredly provided only by 
the governor of Ioannina. Ali Pasha, plain and simple, had to reckon with the force of 
Ushakov’s squadron as well as to consider all possible political implications of an 
open conflict with the Russian Admiral.  
 
Without sufficient number of the siege troops the allied squadron could not 
start the active siege operations, confining only with the sea and land blockade. 
Ushakov was desperately reminding Ali Pasha, as well as his own companion the 
Ottoman Admiral Kadir Bey, of the necessity of auxiliary troops promised by the 
Ottoman government.95 By the end of the year nothing changed much and Ushakov 
wrote to the Tsar that “our operations and successes against the enemy, due to the 
                                                 
94 James Lawrence Mcknight, Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic. The Genesis of Russia's 
First Balkan Satellite. PhD Dissertation. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1965, p. 101; ‘F. F. 
Ushakov to Paul I, 29 / 18 December 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 
1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. 145 ob. 
95 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Ali Pasha of Ioannina, 7 December (26 November) 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 221; ‘F. F. Ushakov to Kadir Bey, 13 / 2 December 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 229.  
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lack of forces, had stopped”.96 Ali was not hurrying to meet the requests of Ushakov, 
though the total number of troops from time to time sent by him under the walls of 
the Corfu fortress, by the end of December reached 1500 Albanians.97 Considering 
that Ushakov and Kadir Bey demanded and expected from the Balkan pashas up to 
12 thousand men98, the amount of the auxiliary troops remained insufficient to 
embark on active operations.  
 
Ushakov had enough time to learn of hypocrisy and unreliability of Tepedelenli 
Ali Pasha, yet despite everything he needed Ali’s troops. In report to the ambassador 
Tomara, written on 29 December 1798, Ushakov noted that “Ali Pasha is quite 
unreliable as regards his loyalty to the Ottoman Porte, and ... is only afraid of my 
presence here with the Russian squadron as well as our joint forces” and “under the 
guise of politeness he tries to flatter and lie to me”.99 Ushakov also emphasised the 
hatred of the Greeks towards Ali, saying that on condition that the Russian fleet 
leaves Corfu without taking it, the local population would rather join the French in 
order to defend themselves from the encroachments of Ali. The Admiral added that 
he too was afraid of taking a significant number of troops from him (Ali), and it was 
only the mere necessity which made Ushakov to accept a small amount of Ali’s 
troops against the strong will of the locals.100  
 
For the allied squadron the end of the year, accordingly, passed in waiting for 
the arrival of the promised reinforcements and continuation of the blockade. What is 
                                                 
96 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I. 29 / 18 December 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 
90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 145-145 ob. 
97 Ibidem, f. 146 ob. 
98 Ibidem, f. 144 ob. 
99 Ibidem, f. 149 ob. 
100 Ibidem, f. f. 149 ob- 150 ob. 
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more, cold and rainy winter weather was significantly hindering the siege.101 
Besides, the issue of poor supplies deliveries remained equally problematic. The 
Ottoman government made a commitment to provide the necessary provisions, by 
sending respective orders to Morea and having appointed a special official, Şükrü 
Efendi. The latter would go to Patras and control the process of storage and delivery 
of supplies for Ushakov’s forces. At the same time the Porte did not have effective 
means to influence the situation and the supplies were delayed for months.  
 
Throughout the whole campaign Ushakov constantly bombarded everyone he 
could, including the Ottoman Admiral Kadir Bey102, Şükrü Efendi103, Ali Pasha104, 
the Russian ambassador in Istanbul Tomara105, and even the Emperor106 with letters 
concerning the lack of provisions in the squadron. Both the Russian and the Ottoman 
crews suffered from the same problem, whereas Ushakov and Kadir Bey were 
collectively trying to find a solution. The Ottoman Admiral started to buy wheat for 
the squadron with the last remaining money, send it to the mills and to look together 
with Ushakov for the ways of baking bread. Even so, Kadir Bey did not have enough 
money left, the supplies on the island were limited, and what could be found was on 
high prices. Moreover, the communication with the mainland was hindered because 
of heavy winter conditions.107 In his memoirs Metaxa mentions that in such a 
                                                 
101 Ibidem, f. 146 ob. 
102 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Kadir Bey, 26 / 15 November 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 
206; ‘F. F. Ushakov to Kadir Bey, 13 / 2 December 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol.2, p. 
230.    
103 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Şükrü Efendi, 2 January 1799 (22 December 1798)’ Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 269. 
104 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Ali Pasha of Ioannina, 19 / 8 December 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, 
Vol. 2, p. 240. 
105 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 29 / 18 December 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople 
Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 
152-153 ob., the same latter has been published at: Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 256-58.  
106 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I, 29 / 18 December 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 
90/1. Delo 1396 (Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 142-143 ob. 
107 Ibidem. 
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difficult situation the Ottoman soldiers were sharing with the Russians their last 
provisions: “The Turks, seeing our shortages and themselves having bread remained 
only for a few days, shared with us magnanimously their very last rations”.108 Only 
by the end of December and throughout January the supplies, consisting mainly of 
biscuits and bulgur109, started to arrive gradually from Morea.110  
 
By the beginning of the new 1799 year the allied Russo-Ottoman forces under 
the leadership of Ushakov managed to get possession of the six islands of the Ionian 
archipelago while the last and the most important was yet to be taken. Having not 
enough the siege troops and supplies, Ushakov besieged Corfu and was waiting for 
the arrival of reinforcements in order to start the closing phase of the Ionian 
campaign, that is the storming of the Corfu fortress.  At this point there came the 
letter from ambassador Tomara, informing Ushakov that the Russian Empire and the 
Porte finally concluded on 3 January 1799 (23 December 1798) a defensive 
alliance,111 and that a copy of the treaty was sent to the commander of the joint 
Russo-Ottoman squadron.   
5.3. The Alliance Treaty: background, contents and implications 
Politics is the art of the possible. This famous maxim was yet to be spoken by 
one of the most outstanding European statesmen of the 19th century, when in 1798 
Europe witnessed a rather surprising and seemingly impossible alliance concluded 
                                                 
108 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 154. 
109 Boiled and pounded wheat  
110 ‘V. S. Tomara to F. F. Ushakov, 11 January 1799 (31 December 1798)’ Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 283-84; Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 154. 
111 ‘V. S. Tomara to F. F. Ushakov, 11 January 1799 (31 December 1798)’ Mordvinov, Admiral 
Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 285. The exchange of ratifications took place on 7 January 1799 (27 December 
1798). 
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between the two states least expected to do that. Less than seven years ago the 
Ottoman and the Russian empires were at war with each other, for the fifth time 
throughout the last century. History has rare examples when in such a short period 
the two states turned from enemies into allies.112   
 
Hardly anyone, and even the statesmen of both countries, could expect to find 
St. Petersburg and the Porte fighting on the same side. It is notable that their military 
alliance would not be something formal and symbolical. The Ottoman and the 
Russian soldiers in the true sense of the word would go shoulder to shoulder into the 
battlefields, sharing the hardships of the war time. In this context the words of the 
Grand Chancellor Bezborodko, time and again quoted by historians, give an idea to 
what extent the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was unbelievable 
even for one of the highest Russian officials and that it was only the direct French 
aggression against the Ottomans that brought the Sultan and the Tsar together. 
Bezborodko wrote to the Russian ambassador in London, Count Semyon 
Romanovich Vorontsov: 
Now such monsters like the French were to appear to bring forth a thing, 
which I would not expect to see not only during my service in the 
ministry, but for my whole life, that is our alliance with the Porte and the 
passage of our fleet through the Channel.113   
 
That is, if it were not for the French Egyptian expedition of General Bonaparte the 
Ottoman-Russian alliance most probably would have never occurred. On the other 
hand, in order to conclude such an alliance the sides had to have the necessary 
                                                 
112 However, for the Russian Emperor Paul I this sufficiently unexpected step in politics was kind of a 
family tradition. The father of Paul I, Piotr III, during the Seven Years’ War upon his ascension to the 
throne in 1762 not only notoriously returned to Prussia all previously conquered territories including 
the Prussian capital Berlin, but also concluded with Friedrich II an alliance. Russia turned against its 
yesterday’s allies on the side of its yesterday’s enemy. 
113 “Надобно же вырость таким уродам как французы, чтоб произвести вещь, какой я не только 
на своем министерстве, но и на веку своем видеть не чаял, то есть: союз наш с Портою и 
переход флота нашего через канал”. ‘A. A. Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, 26 / 15 August, 1798’ 
Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1879), Vol. 13, p. 405.  
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preconditions for rapprochement. Despite all external factors, should the relations 
between the two states remain extremely bad their supposed alliance would also be 
out of the question. 
 
Starting from the second part of 1790s, the Ottoman-Russian relations began to 
improve gradually. While still not much trusting each other and even being mutually 
afraid of a possible aggression of the opposite side, Istanbul and St. Petersburg 
sought to avoid unnecessary confrontation. Neither country, each for its own specific 
reasons, could afford at the moment the luxury of a new war. The Porte had too 
many grave internal problems to deal with, and certainly was in no position to 
entertain at that point some expansionist projects. Even though the notorious grande 
entreprise of Catherine II remained an expression of her preferred policy towards the 
Ottoman Empire, the current political situation was far from being that favourable in 
order to allow the Russian Empress to embark on realization of her cherished over-
ambitious plans of dismantling the Ottoman state. The Russian government, for that 
matter, also needed peace in view of the dire financial situation caused by incessant 
wars waged during Catherine’s reign, Russia’s involvement in the partitions of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the urgent necessity to suppress the uprising 
of Kościuszko in Poland. 
 
An improvement in the relations of the two empires appeared more visible 
since the end of 1796. When the news about the death of the Russian Empress, so 
odious and so obnoxious for the Ottomans, reached Istanbul it was received there 
with great joy.114 The new Emperor of Russia Paul I commenced his reign with clear 
                                                 
114 ‘V. P. Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, 26 / 15 February, 1797’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 74. 
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indications that he was not going to follow the habitual ways of his mother, including 
the bellicose foreign policy. Full of enthusiasm for internal reforming, Paul I 
preferred to maintain peaceful relations with all his neighbours. In this respect the 
fact that the Emperor at the beginning of 1797 called off the expeditionary corps of 
Count Valerian Zubov sent by Catherine against Persia115 could serve a good 
example of intentions of Paul I to revise the politics of his imperial predecessor. The 
ascending to the Russian throne of the new Emperor also gave way to the hopes for 
further normalisation of the Ottoman-Russian relations, as Paul I made it plain that 
he would like to keep peace with the Porte116.  
 
Contrary to the gradual reconciliation between St. Petersburg and Istanbul, the 
French advances in the Eastern Mediterranean grew ever more disturbing for the 
Ottoman government. The victories of General Bonaparte in Italy and the acquisition 
by the French Republic according to the Treaty of Campo Formio of the former 
Venetian territories adjoining the Ottoman Balkan possessions aroused the natural 
anxiety of the Porte. By the end of 1797 – early 1798 such official persons as the 
Russian ambassador in Istanbul V. P. Kochubei and the Ottoman Reis-ül-küttab Atıf 
Efendi in theory entertained a possibility of an Ottoman – Russian aliance, no matter 
how incredibly it sounded for both.117 What is notable is that, even though in view of 
the growing aggressiveness of France in Europe, the abstract idea of alliance had 
been expressed somewhat earlier than the Egyptian expedition of Bonaparte actually 
took place. 
                                                 
115 I. I. Radozhitskii, ‘Istoricheskoie izvestiie o pokhodie Rossiiskikh voisk v 1796 godu v Dagestane i 
persii pod komandoyu Grafa Valeriana Aleksandrovicha Zubova’ Otechestvenniie zapiski, 31 (1827), 
p. 301.  
116 ‘V. P. Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, 10 February, n.s., 1797’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1880), Vol. 18, p. 128. 
117 V. P. Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, 26 (15) September, 1797. Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; 
Moscow, 1879), Vol. 14, p. 90; The memo of Atıf Efendi: Muvâzene-i politikaya dâir Reis-ül-Küttab 
Atıf Efendi’nin lâyihası. Ahmed Cevdet, Târih-i Cevdet (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1294), Vol. 6, pp. 311-17. 
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The practical advantages for both sides from their hypothetical cooperation 
were indisputable. Generally speaking, it is always better to have a bad peace than a 
good war, and a neighbour state in the role of an ally is more preferable than that one 
having unambiguously hostile intentions. For Russia it was important to counteract 
the further spread of the French influences in Europe, and in particular St. Petersburg 
was disturbed at the real possibility of the French penetration to the Balkans and the 
Eastern Mediterranean. In such a case Russia’s own influence in the Balkans would 
be greatly diminished and, moreover, the Russian southern borders would also be 
endangered. Even though the Ottomans opted at the moment to remain neutral, the 
serious French successes could finally lure them into entering anti-Russian alliance, 
which had been long since brooded in Paris. Alternatively, should the French choose 
simply to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and take hold of its European possessions, 
the French-controlled Balkans or the Black Sea Straits would be a much undesirable 
spectacle, if not a nightmare for St. Petersburg. Thus the neighbourhood of the weak 
and overwhelmed by many internal problems Ottoman state was more preferable for 
Russia than the neighbourhood of some strong European power. From this point of 
view the strong Russian wish to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire118, 
despite the contemporary French propaganda and the latter numerous Western 
European authors looked quite logical and consistent. 
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 The Russian politics to preserve and support the Ottoman rule in Europe generally applied in the 
first half of the 19th century, for example,  has been severely criticized from extreme nationalistic and 
even Turkophobic positions by Zhygarev, who called such a politics “mistaken” and any allies 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire “absolutely useless”. See:  S. A. Zhigarev Russkaia politika 
v Vostochnom voprosie (yeyo istoriia v XVI-XIX vekakh, kriticheskaia otsenka i budushchiie zadachi) 
(2 vols.; Moscow, 1896).  
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In so far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, for it the potential French 
descent in the Balkans objectively was even more dangerous. While for Russia this 
would mean only an increased threat to its southern borders, for the Ottoman Empire 
such an attack on its Balkan possessions would put into question no more and no less 
than its very existence. Moreover, for the Porte to have Russia in the capacity of an 
ally meant that it would not act as an enemy. According to a witty remark of Saul, 
the presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean itself would be a 
sufficient guarantee against the Russian hostility.119 With that, the Ottomans would 
not risk to accept the Russian aid with munitions, let alone the regular army, against 
the rebellious Governor of Vidin Osman Pazvantoğlu. The respective propositions of 
the Russian side had been politely declined.120 Thus, the French threat to the Balkans 
equally affected the interests of both Russian and the Ottoman states, constituting the 
point of departure for their hypothetical alliance. 
 
By force of circumstances the actual military cooperation between the two 
empires started five months before the official alliance was signed. Already in spring 
1798 the propositions of Paul I concerning the Russian aid were passed to the Porte 
several times.121 The Russian side made it clear that it would wait for an official 
request of the Porte for military aid, and would be ready to lend the necessary 
support with both the fleet and the regular army. Finally, on 24 July 1798, that is 
after the French attack on Egypt, the Ottoman government officially asked Russia to 
send a naval squadron for the protection of the Sultan’s domains against the 
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French.122 Thus, on 5 September 1798, the Russian fleet arrived at Büyükdere, the 
suburb of Istanbul.123 After joining forces with the Ottoman fleet, as it has been 
mentioned previously, the joint Russo-Ottoman squadron departed to the 
Mediterranean. At this point, the already started actual cooperation was to be 
regulated by the formal treaty of alliance, which, however, was not yet concluded. 
 
Former Russian ambassador in Istanbul V. P. Kochubei, who upon his return to 
St. Petersburg took up the post of the Vice Chancellor of the College of Foreign 
Affairs (Kollegiia Inostrannykh Del), composed a special memo where he formulated 
the recommendations regarding the position of the Russian side at the negotiations of 
the allied treaty.124 In the preamble of his memo Kochubei characterized the general 
situation in the Ottoman Empire, emphasizing the great chaos prevailing in the 
Ottoman state apparatus. Among other things he pointed out that one might hardly 
expect the effective Ottoman aid with the army or money, and on the whole any 
Ottoman aid would be of little use. Apart from this the Russian statesman wrote that 
one should also keep in mind the ignorance and numerous prejudices of the 
Ottomans, the frequent changes among the Ottoman ministers and, the changes of the 
propositions made by the Porte. As regards the supplies deliveries for the Russian 
fleet, in Kochubei’s view, one should not place much reliance on that, as “the Turks 
do not have any orderliness in this field”125. 
 
                                                 
122 A. M. Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deiatel’nost’ F. F. Ushakova v Gretsii, 1798-1799 (Moscow, 
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125 Ibidem, f. 288. 
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Then the memo of Kochubei continues with eleven points he proposes to be 
considered by the Russian side during the negotiations. So, the initial position was to 
assure the Ottoman government that the Russian fleet would not make any harm to 
the Porte, and that Russia wished nothing in exchange for its aid. At the end of the 
war, when the compensation of the war expenditures would be discussed, Russia will 
try to get some compensation also for the Porte. Second, the Porte was to be 
persuaded immediately to declare war on France, and, consequently, to arrest the 
French vessels, goods and merchants. Third, it was necessary to agree on the point of 
financing the supplies for the Russian fleet, and the Porte was expected to provide 
the necessary resources at least for three months. 
 
Other technical issues to be discussed were the assistance to the Russian ships 
in the Ottoman ports and the appointment of the Russian admiral to command the 
joint Russo-Ottoman squadron. Kochubei especially specified the point that it was 
much desirable that the Kapudan Pasha (The Chief Commander of the Ottoman 
Navy) would not be present in the Ottoman squadron, or otherwise he “would wish 
to issues all the orders in his own way, and this would badly influence the whole 
enterprise”.126 As for the passage through the Black Sea Straits, the ambassador 
Tomara was to assure the Porte that the Russian fleet would pass through the narrows 
not otherwise than by agreement with the Ottoman side. Currently, though, the 
Russian vessels were needed to be granted a free passage everywhere. Furthermore, 
Tomara was to make sure that having entered the Bosporus the Russian squadron 
would be able to return back to the Black Sea.  
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The diplomatic issues of the memo included the necessity to inform the Porte 
that Russia would propose the British and the Austrian courts to join the alliance 
with the Porte. The Russian ambassador was recommended to take up an attitude of a 
“sincere adviser of the Porte”, who would “know everything, and interfere in 
everything”. All the most important issues discussed with the Porte were to be 
formalized in written documents. The last point advised by Kochubei concerned the 
person of the Swedish ambassador Mouradgea d’Ohsson127, well known by his anti-
Russian dispositions, and whom the Russian side would like to see recalled from his 
post. Such was, in short, the platform for the treaty negotiations proposed by the 
Russian Vice Chancellor. 
 
By the end of October 1798 the preliminary articles of the treaty were agreed 
upon. On 31 October Tomara sent the text of the treaty128, consisting of 13 articles to 
which were appended 13 separate and secret articles to St. Petersburg’s 
confirmation.129 The final ratification of the alliance treaty took place two months 
later, on 3 January 1799. 
 
Having concluded the treaty of alliance, the Ottoman and the Russian side apart 
from declarations regarding the general allied obligations reciprocally confirmed the 
Jassy peace treaty (Article 2), guaranteed the inviolability of each other’s borders and 
                                                 
127 Ignatius Mouradgea d’Ohsson, or Muradcan Tosunyan, was of Armenian Catholic origin, serving 
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took upon the responsibility of rendering mutual military assistance and sharing the 
strategic plans of military operations (Article 3). The military and transport ships of 
both states gained the right during the time of war to enter any allied ports, for repair 
or other necessities (Article 10). In accordance with the last two main clauses of the 
treaty, the Ottoman-Russian alliance was defined as such that had been aimed not for 
foreign conquests, but “for the protection of the integrity of both empires” (Article 
12), and was signed for the term of eight years (Article 13). 
 
Additional separate and secret articles clarified the main part of the treaty with 
more specific details concerning the practical cooperation of St. Petersburg and 
Istanbul. The Russian help to the Porte would consist of 12 ships, which, upon 
joining the forces with the Ottoman squadron, were to enter the Mediterranean and to 
start hostilities against the French, acting together with the British fleet (Secret 
Article 1; in fact, this clause was included post factum, as the Russo-Ottoman fleet of 
Ushakov was already operating in the Ionian archipelago). The Article 10 of the 
main treaty had been specified by the Secret Articles 2 and 3, which stipulated the 
free passage for the Russian ships through the Straits, and its conditions. In this 
respect the Secret Article 3 is very important, as it states that  
His Imperial Majesty promises that the passage of His fleet from 
the Black Sea to the White Sea [the Mediterranean; V. M.] through the 
Channel of Constantinople, free communication for the war ships… and 
return of that fleet to the Russian Black Sea ports, by no means should 
serve a right or an excuse to acquire for the future time the right of the 
free passage through the channel for the war ships, all this being granted 
exclusively in view of the common war (italics are mine; V. M.)…130  
       
As it is seen, the right of the Russian ships to pass through the Black Sea Straits was 
plainly defined by the necessities of the war time. Both signatories of the treaty 
agreed to consider the Black Sea closed for the ships of all other states (Secret 
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Article 4). The Secret Article 5 clarified the procedure of supplies deliveries to the 
Russian squadron, obliging the Porte to provide it with provisions for four months 
upon the arrival of the Russian fleet to Istanbul, and to continue sending the supplies 
later, so that the naval squadron of Ushakov would always have the supplies 
sufficient at least for two months. Rather technical character had the Secret Articles 
7, 8 and 9. The signatories agreed not to accept the deserters from each other’s 
armies, to conclude neither a separate peace nor an armistice, and during the future 
peace negotiations to serve each other’s interests.  
 
Quite special was the Secret Article 6, concerning the possibility of using the 
Russian land army against the hypothetical French attack on the Ottoman dominions. 
In such a case Russia would send an army of 75-80 thousand men supported by 
artillery. Should this happen, the delivering of supplies to the Russian army would be 
determined by a Separate and Special Act regarding the subsistence of the land 
army.131 According to this document the Ottoman government instead of supplying 
provisions was to allot 16 thousand purses, or 8 million gurushes per year, making 
payments to the Russian ambassador each three months. Then the commander of the 
Russian forces himself was to care about purchasing and storing of supplies. The 
Ottoman government was to appoint one or two special officials whose responsibility 
would be to deal with the local Ottoman authorities and to facilitate the commander 
of the Russian force the whole process of the supplies preparation. 
 
The seemingly impossible Ottoman-Russian defensive alliance came to be 
concluded. It remains much understudied in the historical literature, and the existing 
                                                 
131 Ibidem, f. 87. 
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works dealing with this topic are almost always written not without a smack of 
Russophobic views prevalent among some Western European and the Turkish 
historians during the last two centuries. In general, the comments of the treaty 
usually boil down to the statements that it was a conjunctural rapprochement and 
thus it did have neither a sound foundation nor any future.  
 
Typically in such works132 Russia has been described as a pure aggressor, 
covetously seeking to use any opportunity to annex Constantinople and the Black 
Sea Straits. The similar statements are primarily based on the abstract speculations of 
their authors, made within the traditional Western European discourse of “Russia as 
the universal evil”, and normally stay without much of a documentary proof. In 
opinion of some French authors, for example, even while concluding the alliance 
with the Porte Russia did not abandon its aggressive schemes and together with the 
British under the pretence of helping intended to make a partition of the Ottoman 
territories. Furthermore, the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, in view of Marcère, 
was undesired by France and much wished by Russia and Britain.133 Thus, France 
was being presented as the only savior of the Ottomans,134 notwithstanding 
Bonaparte’s quite real and not hypothetical aggression in Egypt. Though Pisani never 
calls the French attack on Egypt an aggression, but rather “les progrès des 
Français”.135 In this way, the triumphant meeting of the Russian fleet at Büyükdere 
                                                 
132 For example, see: Edouard de Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople: la politique orientale de 
la Révolution française, (2 vols.; Paris, 1927); P. Pisani, ‘L’expédition Russo-Turque aux îles 
ioniennes en 1789-1799’ Revue d’Histoire diplomatique, 2 (1888), pp. 190-222; Edouard Driault, La 
question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours (Paris, 1905); Enver Ziya Karal, Fransa-Mısır 
ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1797-1802. (İstanbul, 1938).  
133 Marcère, Une ambassade à Constantinople, pp. 331-332. 
134 Ibidem, p. 363; Pisani, L’expédition Russo-Turque, p. 205. 
135 Pisani, L’expédition Russo-Turque, p. 204. 
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harbour is said to be nothing more than a show. The Ottomans in fact did not trust 
Russia, were afraid of it, and very well perceived its “true intentions”.136 
 
To sum up, the existing scanty comments of the Ottoman-Russian defensive 
alliance of the late 18th century usually agree on the following: this was a situational 
rapprochement without any future, Russia always maintained the aggressive dreams 
of capturing Constantinople and the Straits, and even having concluded the alliance 
with the Porte St. Petersburg kept dreaming to partition the Ottoman state and as a 
result to swallow as much as possible of the Sultan’s possessions.  
 
The works of Kleinman, Saul and especially Stanislavskaia present a somewhat 
different opinion as regards the nature of the alliance under discussion. Kleinman 
thinks the alliance to be important in that it proved that the allied relations between 
the Russian and the Ottoman Empires were possible in principle.137 Norman Saul, an 
American historian, pointed out at the strong bond of common interests connecting 
the two empires, and that the Ottoman-Russian alliance lasted, in fact, longer than 
the second anti-French coalition.138 Stanislavskaia went even further, arguing that for 
all practical purposes the alliance with Russia saved the Ottoman Empire from 
partition and even, most probably, from destruction.139     
 
It is pointless to deny here the traditional and mutual distrust and even hatred, 
the long time obvious characteristics of the relations between the Ottoman and the 
Russian empires. This does not automatically mean, though, that one should a priori 
                                                 
136 Pisani, L’expédition Russo-Turque, p. 205. 
137 Kleinman, Russko-Turetskii soyuz, p. 15. 
138 Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, p. 69. 
139 Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deyatel’nost’ F. F. Ushakova, pp. 87-89.  
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to ascribe to one or both signatories of the discussed alliance treaty any hostile 
intentions, especially when there is not a vestige of documentary evidence to justify 
such an assumption and, vice versa, the remaining documents contain many proofs to 
the contrary.   
 
Sure enough, the Ottoman-Russian defensive alliance had its own specific task 
stemming from the common interests of the signatories, i.e. the defence of the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and this task eventually had been accomplished. 
The accusations of Russia at this point look and sound quite logical except for one 
thing. All of them, as a rule, are based on hypotheses and not on documents. 
Meanwhile the vast volume of correspondence between the Russian diplomatic 
representatives in Istanbul and the College of Foreign affairs in St. Petersburg proves 
the strong wish of Paul I at that particular time to preserve the Ottoman Empire, in 
view of Russia’s own strategic interests, from possible encroachments of the French 
Republic. Taking into consideration a very grave situation the Ottoman Empire 
found itself by the end of the 18th century and the opinion of many contemporaries 
that the days of the House of Osman were numbered the alliance with Russia of 
1799, paradoxically enough, indeed might have prolonged the existence of the 
Ottoman state during those stormy years of the European history.        
5.4. The exchange of ratifications of the Alliance Treaty  
Four days after the conclusion of the Ottoman-Russian alliance treaty, which 
had been signed on 3 January 1799 (23 December 1798), the exchange of 
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ratifications of the treaty took place.140 Early in the morning on 7 January 1799 (27 
December 1798) the Russian ambassador Tomara and his entourage set off to the 
Porte. The ceremony of the visit repeated the typical procedures characteristic for the 
reception of the foreign diplomatic representatives.141   
 
Upon crossing the Golden Horn on the boat sent by Çavuş Başı the ambassador 
along with Councillor of the embassy Iakovlev, who carried the imperial 
ratifications, and the First Dragoman of the embassy Fonton were conveyed to the 
chamber of Kireççi Başı. There the leading figures of the Russian embassy were met 
and served round by Çavuş Başı, while the rest of the members of the Russian 
delegation were lining up. As everything was ready the ambassador Tomara, 
followed by his attendants, left the chamber and, having mounted on horse, 
proceeded at the head of his whole delegation and other Ottoman officials to the 
Porte. 
 
During the ceremony an extreme attention was to be paid to the smallest 
formalities. Thus when Çavuş Başı made a few mistakes concerning the procedure 
this incurred the great displeasure of Tomara. The first mistake was that the Ottoman 
official did not rise from his seat at the same time with the Russian ambassador when 
leaving the chamber of Kireççi Başı, and on the way to the Porte instead of following 
Tomara on his right most of the time remained behind him. At the entrance to the 
first gate of the Palace Tomara called Çavuş Başı and showed the Ottoman official 
                                                 
140 ‘Zapiska torzhestvennoi pri Porte razmeny mezhdu verkhovnym viziriem Yusuf Ziya Pasheyu i 
Gospodinom Chrezvychainym Poslannikom Tomaroyu na soyuzniy oboronitel’niy traktat 
imperatorskikh ratifikatsiy, byvshei v 27 den’ dekabria 1798 goda’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s 
Relations with Turkey. Op. 89/8.  Delo 887, f. f. 16-19. 
141 The typical description of this kind of ceremonies can be found at: İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, 
Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı (Ankara, 1988), pp. 284-86. 
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the place where the latter was to be. As the Russian ambassador and Çavuş Başı 
entered the second yard of the Grand Vizier, they were met by the First Dragoman of 
the Porte. Here Tomara complained to the First Dragoman about the behaviour of 
Çavuş Başı. On the same day the written apologies regarding the inexperienced 
Ottoman official were sent in the name of Reis-ül-Küttab to the Russian embassy.142 
 
When Tomara was accepted into the Audience Room he stopped at the stool 
prepared for him in advance. In a few minutes the Grand Vizier entered and sat on 
his place, whereupon the Russian ambassador also took his place on the stool and 
addressed the Grand Vizier with a speech. It is possible to quote here in extenso the 
text of that speech by Tomara: 
Resulting from the same rules of humanity, the mutual friendship and 
harmony between His Imperial Majesty Emperor, the Most August 
Sovereign of mine and His Majesty Sultan are confirmed today by the 
Alliance wished on both sides. The love of peace, the welfare of the 
subjects of both states and preserving of the internal quietude of this 
Empire, by fending off jointly the already opened against them malicious 
intents, constitute the foundation and the subject of this great cause, 
which is being realized now according to the general international 
practice by this last solemn custom of the exchange of the Imperial 
Ratifications. His Majesty Emperor and Sovereign of mine imposed upon 
me both the task to negotiate the Alliance and to carry out its 
Ratification. My zeal and assiduity in dealing with this matter assure 
Your Excellency in my vigilant and constant care about everything which 
could serve to the fulfilment of the mutual obligations and thus to the 
confirmation of the utmost friendship. These, I have no doubts, would 
give me the gratifying friendship and benevolence of Your Excellency.143    
 
Then, after the speech of the Russian ambassador had been translated by the First 
Dragoman of the Porte, the Grand Vizier delivered the answering speech, preserved 
                                                 
142 The Ottoman text of apology of Reis-ül-Küttab sent to the Russian embassy. AVPRI. Fond 89. 
Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 89/8.  Delo 887, L. 20. Reis-ül-Küttab found excuses in that the 
aforementioned Çavuş Başı was newly appointed and inexperienced.    
143 The original Russian text is available at: AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 
89/8.  Delo 887, f. f. 17-17 ob.  
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in the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry and given here in its French 
translation: 
L’alliance qui vient d’être conclude entre cet Empire et celui de Russie, 
d’après le désir témoigné de part et d’autre, pour s’opposer aux projets 
pernicieux de l’ennemi commun ayant établi la meilleure intelligence et 
la plus parfaite amitié entre les deux Empires. Sa Majésté le très Auguste 
et très Puissant Empereux mon très gracieux Souverain et Maitre a 
appris avec une véritable satisfaction l’arrivé des ratifications de la part 
de Sa Majésté L’Empereur de Russie son Auguste Allié. En conséquence 
Elle, s’est empressée à délivrer aussi les ratifications nécéssaires pour en 
effectuer l’echange. 
Votre conduit tranche et loyale, le zèle dont Vous avez donné, 
Monsieur L’Envoyé, des preuves non equivoques pendant tout le cours de 
Votre Mission et surtout dans les circonstances présents sont les gages 
de la bienveillance Impériale envers Votre Personne.144 
 
Upon completion of the speech of Grand Vizier the Sultan’s ratifications were 
brought to the Audience Room by Reis-ül-Küttab. The latter handed them over to the 
Grand Vizier, who, in his turn, kissed the ratifications that were bearing the seal of 
the Sultan and exchanged them with Tomara to the similar Russian ratifications 
signed by Paul I. The Grand Vizier gave the Russian ratifications to Reis-ül-Küttab 
and Tomara handed the Ottoman ratifications over to the councillor of the embassy 
Iakovlev.  
 
Following the exchange of the ratifications the Russian ambassador and the 
Grand Vizier took their places, and those present were offered the sweets, coffee, 
sherbet and fragrances. Then the Kaftan Kâhyası put on the ambassador a sable coat. 
The same sable fur coat was presented to the First Dragoman of the Porte too. The 
Councillor of the Russian embassy Iakovlev, the First Dragoman of the embassy 
Fonton and the titular councillor (tituliarnyi sovetnik) Prince Dolgorukov (the latter 
mainly because of his noble origin) were all presented the sable paw fur coats. The 
                                                 
144 Ibidem, f. f. 17 ob- 18. 
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rest of the members of the Russian delegation were given 10 ermine fur coats, 12 
sheepskin fur coats and 25 kaftans. While the distribution of the fur coats continued, 
the Grand Vizier kept talking with the ambassador, and expressed his great 
satisfaction about the friendly relations prevailing between Vice Admiral Ushakov 
and the head of the Ottoman naval squadron Kadir Bey. 
 
   When the audience ended, Tomara was seen off from the Audience Room by 
the Teşrifatçı and the First Dragoman of the Porte. At the place where the Russian 
ambassador was to mount on horse he was awaited by horse in rich harness, sent to 
Tomara as a present from the Grand Vizier. By 1 p. m. the Russian ambassador had 
already returned to his residence.        
 Table 3. The List of the presents given to the Russian Imperial Mission on behalf of 
His Majesty Sultan on the occasion of conclusion of the Defensive Alliance Treaty 
[Реестр подаркам учиненным Российской Императорской Миссии от имени 
Его Величества Султана по случаю заключения Союзного оборонительного 
Трактата] AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 89/8.  Delo 890, 
f. 30. 
 
 Piastres 
(gurushes) 
To Ambassador, A snuffbox encrusted with diamonds 
                           Various Indian and Constantinople textiles 
                            In cash 
15.000 
5.000 
30.000 
To Councillor of the embassy, Councillor of State (Statskii 
Sovetnik) Iakovlev 
                            In cash 
 
 
5.000 
To the First Dragoman, Councillor of the Chancellery Fonton 
                            In cash 
 
5.000 
To the Secretary of the embassy, Court Councillor (advornyi 
Sovetnik) Bobrov 
                            In cash 
 
 
2.500 
To Collegiate Assessor (Kollezhskii Asessor) Prince 
Dolgorukov 
                            A snuffbox decorated with roses 
 
 
2.500 
To Collegiate Assessor (Kollezhskii Asessor) Kozlov 
                            In cash 
 
1.500 
 
In total gifts and money 
 
66.500 
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Table 4. A Note of the Presents and Money distributed on the occasion of the Solemn 
Exchange of Imperial Ratifications of the Allied Defensive Treaty, made at the Porte 
between the Grand Vizier Yusuf Pasha and the Envoy Tomara on 7 January 1799 (27 
December 1798) [Записка подаркам и деньгам розданным по случаю 
торжественной размены при Порте, между верховным визирем Юсуф Пашею 
и Господином Посланником Томарою, Императорских Ратификаций на 
Союзный Оборонительный Трактат Декабря 27-го дня 1798 года] AVPRI. 
Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 89/8.  Delo 887, f. f. 22-24. 
 
7 January 
1799 (27 
December 
1798) 
1st To the Department of Çavuş Başı and 
his retinue  
Piastres 
(gurushes) 
Aspres 
(akches) 
 Duacı Çavuş 11  
Çavuşlar Emini 50  
Çavuşlar Kâtibi 
and his Çuhadars 
50 
12 
 
Kılavuz Çavuşu 
and his Yamak 
11 
7 
 
Haberci Çavuş 6  
Çavuşlar Mehter 11  
25 Çavuşes of Divan 25  
Alay Çavuşes and Baş Çavuş 15 
 
 
öbetçi Çavuşes 5  
Inner Çavuşes 15  
4 Çavuşes sent to the residence of the 
ambassador 
20 
 
 
Çavuş Başı  
Sable fur from Tobolsk № 9, valued at 325 
piastres; 20 sables from Tobolsk № 13, 
valued at 90 piastres; 20 sables from Tobolsk 
№ 15, valued at 90 piastres; snuffbox, round 
blue № 34, valued at 270 piastres 
  
Total 
 
238 " 
To the retinue of Çavuş Başı  
 
 
İç Ağas 20  
Çuhadars 20  
Şatır 
and his Odacı 
10 
4 
 
Oarsmen of the boat 21  
2nd To the Department of Teşrifatçı   
193 
Teşrifatçı Efendi 
Snuffbox, octagonal № 30, valued at 300 
piastres; 20 sables from Tobolsk № 17, 
valued at 90 piastres; 20 sables from Tobolsk 
№ 18, valued at 90 piastres; 
In cash 
 
 
 
 
 
500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teşrifat Kalfa, Kisedar 
and their Çuhadars 
250 
7 
 
60 
Çuhadars of Teşrifatçı Efendi 15  
3rd To people of Reis Efendi and his 
Department 
 
 
 
 
Kalem Mehter Başı 11  
Nöbetçi Çuhadars 10  
Mehters 6  
İç Ağas 20  
Çuhadars of Beylikçi, Divan Kisedarı, and 
Kisedar of Reis Efendi 
 
15 
 
4th To people of the Grand Vizier   
İç Ağas 15  
Eynam Ağas 15  
Kapıcıs at the first and the second gate 3  
Seyil 2  
Şatırs 6  
Perdeci 3  
Divan Haneci 2  
öbetçi Çuhadars 5  
öbetçi Mehters 4  
İskemleci Mehters 3  
Mutes 3  
Tüfenkçi and Mataracı 6  
Kaftancı of the Porte and his Yamak 15  
Kapı Kethüdas 6  
Başkapı Kethüdası 3  
Arabacıs 4  
Falakacıs 3  
Sakas of Arabacıs 2  
Musicians of the Sultan, Grand Vizier, 
Admiralty, from Demirkapı and Galata, who 
came to congratulate  
 
 
80 
 
5th To the Dragoman of 
 the Porte 
  
Watch and chain with diamonds № 45, valued 
at 1750 piastres 
 
 
 
To his people   25  
6th To the Sultan’s Stable   
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Çuhadar at the horse of the ambassador 5  
40 men at the horses of the ambassadorial 
retinue 
 
40 
 
 
Bölük Başı 6  
Guardian of caparisons 5 60 
[Eski] of the Sultan’s stable 
and his Eski Oğlan 
10 
8 
 
7th To Janissaries and their commanders   
Hassabaşı 11  
Subaşı 11  
Their Janissaries 10  
Usta 4  
Odabaşı 10  
Kâhya of Subaşı 3  
Çorbacı, who was sent with orta to the 
ambassador, so that to escort him to the Porte 
and his people 
 
100 
4 
 
Yazıcı, commanding orta on this day 20  
Janissaries of the 6th bölük 50  
8th To various ranks   
Kâhya at the quay of Tophane 3  
Çavuş at the quay of Tophane 3  
Kâhya at Vezir İskelessi 2  
Gateman at the Bahçe Kapısı 2  
Bostancı at Vezir İskelessi 1  
Kireççibaşı, in whose kiosk Çavuşbaşı 
accepts foreign ministers 
Mihmandar, appointed on this day to the 
ambassador and Mihmandar’s people 
16 
 
100 
10 
 
9th Other expenditures   
25 3-pared boats, 3 gurushes per each, ----- "" 
----- 75 
 
 
 
225 
 
 
 75 2-pared boats, 2 gurushes per each, ----- "" 
----- 150 
6 horses with rich Turkish caparisons 511  
Smaller expenditures for rent of horses and 
horse harnesses 
 
20 
 
 
34 Çuhadars, 60 paras per each 51  
13 valets, 60 paras per each 19 60 
250 sticks for the Janissaries, participating in 
the procession 
 
10 
 
The person, who delivered the horse, 
presented by the Grand Vizier to the 
ambassador 
 
 
110 
 
Total 2743 60 
                                
                                                                                         = Vasiliy Tomara 
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Table 5. The Presents of the Russian side, assigned by the Decree of the Russian 
Emperor of 10 April (30 March) 1799 to the members of the Ottoman Ministry on 
the occasion of the Allied Treaty, concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. 
AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 89/8.  Delo 891, V. S. Tomara 
to Paul I, 27 / 16 May 1799. f. f. 67-70. 
 
 Roubles 
To Grand Vizier, Ziya Yusuf Pasha 
A snuffbox № 1 
                           Two ermine furs, to be used in summer climate of 
Syria and Egypt 
 
 
17.000 
 
800 
To Kadıasker İsmet Bey 
A snuffbox № 3 
Forty sable furs from Yakutia 
 
10.000 
2.000 
To Rikâb Reisi 
A snuffbox № 2 
Sable fur 
 
10.000 
4.000 
To Rikâb Kethüdası 
A snuffbox № 17 
A watch № 41 with a chain 
 
6.000 
2.500 
To former First Dragoman of the Porte, who took part in negotiations 
and the exchange of ratifications, and currently is the Hospodar of 
Moldavia, Ypsilanti 
A snuffbox № 1 
A ring № 8 
 
 
 
4.200 
1.000 
To Âmedci Efendi 
A snuffbox № 4 
20 sable furs 
 
3.000 
800 
To Commander of the Ottoman naval squadron, Kadir Bey 
A ring with one diamond № 2 
In cash 
 
4.000 
3.000 
To Kaymakam Bekir Pasha 
A snuffbox № 5, initially assigned for Kadir Bey 
 
Not 
indicated 
5.6. Conclusions 
The arrival of the Russian Black Sea fleet to Constantinople in early September 
1798 marked the beginning of the practical Ottoman-Russian cooperation. In a 
situation, when the war with France became for the Porte not only unavoidable but, 
in fact, was already under way, both parties were to act quickly. Under the 
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circumstances, one might reasonably expect that, except Egypt, the French could 
attack the Ottoman Empire also in other places. Among the most probable targets of 
the French aggression were, in the first place, the Balkan possessions of the Porte. 
Considering that the French controlled the Central Italy and the Ionian archipelago, 
no one could be sure that they would not decide to launch an assault in the Balkans. 
At this point the interests of the Ottoman Empire and Russia coincided. While the 
Ottomans sought preserve the integrity of their territorial possessions, for St. 
Petersburg it was important not to allow any other European power to invade the 
Balkans, which were looked upon by Russia as a sphere of its own exclusive 
influence.  
 
Thus, the Russian fleet under Vice Admiral Ushakov visited the Ottoman 
capital even before the official treaty of alliance between the two empires was 
concluded. It should be noted, that the Russians were still not quite sure about the 
possible reaction of the Porte to the arrival of their fleet. Ushakov was instructed not 
to enter the Straits without getting the special guarantees of the Ottoman side that the 
Russian fleet would be allowed to return freely to the Black Sea. Moreover, the 
Emperor Paul contemplated the possibility that after the end of the Mediterranean 
campaign the Porte might close for the Ushakov’s squadron the passage through the 
Straits back to the Black Sea. All these concerns of the Russian side indicated that 
the idea of an alliance with the Ottoman Empire was considered a rather risky 
enterprise, and, surely enough, in view of the previous long confrontation between 
the two empires it simply could not be otherwise. 
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When the Russian Black Sea squadron stayed in Constantinople, Ushakov was 
admitted to the Ottoman naval docks (tersane) and also was invited to inspect the 
Ottoman fleet. On the one hand, this gesture of courtesy by the Porte might be an 
expression of respect to Ushakov, known by his successes against the Ottoman fleet 
in the previous war. On the other hand, the Ottomans had a good opportunity to 
impress the Russian guests with their latest successes in the shipbuilding. Ushakov 
himself admitted that the Ottoman war vessels in a technical sense little differed from 
the best European patterns. The only criticism of the Russian Vice Admiral was 
about the naval artillery, which he advised the Ottoman side to improve. 
 
A very important strategic location of the Ionian Islands vis-à-vis the coastline 
of the Ottoman Balkan possessions determined the decision to send the joint 
squadron, composed of the Russian and the Ottoman ships under the general 
command of Ushakov, to the Ionian Islands in order to oust the French from there. 
Considering that the the smaller islands had been defended by only modest French 
garrisons it became not that difficult for a large Russo-Ottoman squadron in a very 
short time to occupy almost all of the archipelago. Starting the Ionian campaign in 
October, by mid-November the allied forces of Ushakov one by one had captured six 
out of seven islands, except for Corfu, the biggest and the most important among the 
Ionian Islands. The military operations of this time, even though were not so 
extensive, had a very symbolycal meaning. Most probably for the first time in history 
the Ottoman and the Russian soldiers were fighting shoulder to shoulder against the 
common enemy.  
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Taking of the island of Corfu constituted the latest and the hardest part of the 
Ionian campaign. As the fortress of Corfu was well fortified and defended by a 
strong French garrison, it could not be captured at one blow. The attack on Corfu was 
delayed because of a number of difficulties, such as severe winter weather 
conditions, poor supplies deliveries and the arbitrary attitudes of Ali Pasha 
Tepedelenli, the Ottoman governor of Yanina. Thus, by the end of 1798 the allied 
squadron of Ushakov started the siege of Corfu, waiting for an opportune moment to 
launch an assault.    
 
Compelled by the force of circumstances to cooperate before their allied 
relations were officially established, the Ottoman and the Russian Empires finally 
signed an alliance treaty on 3 January 1799. This alliance became in itself an 
extraordinary event, very much surprising even for its participants. It is safe to say 
that without the French aggression in Egypt the alliance between the Porte and St. 
Petersburg most probably would have never occurred. However, General Bonaparte 
was not the only father of the Ottoman-Russian alliance. A very important in this 
respect was the death of such an odious person for the Ottomans as was Catherine II 
and the ascending to the throne of the new Russian Emperor Paul I. The change of 
the monarch in Russia paved the way for further rapprochement between the two 
states and eventually created the necessary preconditions for practical cooperation. 
Should the relations between the Ottoman and Russian Empires remain as they used 
to be under Catherine II the supposed alliance could hardly, if at all, be realised.  
 
It should also be noted that the abstract idea of an Ottoman-Russian alliance 
had been expressed independently by the officials of both states somewhat earlier 
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than the actual French attack on Egypt occurred. V. P. Kochubei, then the Russian 
ambassador at the Porte, spoke of the theoretical possibility of an alliance between 
the Sultan’s and the Tsar’s courts as early as September 1797. Reis-ül-Küttab Atıf 
Efendi considered the same idea in spring 1798. Apparently, the scheme of such an 
alliance seemed to be only a mere speculation, which was to happen just under very 
extraordinary circumstances. Nonetheless, in mid-1798, when General Bonaparte 
embarked on his Egyptian campaign, it was an extraordinary situation that arose. In a 
remarkable manner the common interests of the Ottoman Porte and the Russian 
Empire to counteract the French aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean concurred 
and led to the first alliance between the Sultan and the Tsar. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MEDITERRAEA KOT 
 
The combat deepens. On, ye brave, 
Who rush to glory, or the grave! 
Wave, Munich, all thy banners wave! 
And charge with all thy chivalry! 
(Thomas Campbell, “Hohenlinden”) 
6.1. The Capture of Corfu 
Declared at the beginning of the campaign aim to oust the French from the 
Ionian Archipelago could not be completed while the biggest island and its main 
stronghold remained under the French control. Blockade of Corfu started early in 
November 1798 as six ships under the general command of Captain Ivan 
Andreievich Selivachev1, separated by Ushakov from the joint Russo-Ottoman 
squadron, dropped anchor in the waters of Corfu. By 19 November 1798 all the main 
forces of the allied squadron under the command of Ushakov joined the siege of the 
island. Moreover, on 10 January 1799 Rear Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Pustoshkin 
brought from the Black Sea two additional ships of the line2 with 1 thousand men on 
the board.3 By mid-January 1799 a significant naval force, comprising of twelve 
ships of the line, eleven frigates and a few smaller vessels gathered at Corfu.  
 
                                                 
1 Three ships of the line (“Zakharii i Yelisavet”, “Bogoiavlieniie Gospodnie” and one Ottoman ship) 
and three frigates (“Grigorii Velikiia Armenii” and two Ottoman frigates). ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I, 1 
November (21 October) 1798’ AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1396 
(Correspondence of Ambassador Tomara with Admiral Ushakov), f. f. 86-87. 
2 “Mikhail” and “Simeon i Anna” 
3 Metaxa, Zapiski, pp. 183-85. 
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Insufficient number of auxiliary troops, needed to launch a land attack against 
the enemy, prevented Ushakov from the immediate active operations against the 
Corfu fortress. Catastrophic lack of provisions and heavy weather conditions of 
winter added to the hardships of the Russo-Ottoman naval squadron. Despite the 
respective orders from the Porte, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was in no hurry to follow the 
will of the central government and send the auxiliary troops to Ushakov’s squadron. 
The governor of Ioannina preferred to bargain both with Ushakov and the Porte, in 
order to exploit the situation to the utmost. Furthermore, behind the back of the 
allies, Ali Pasha also got in touch with General Chabot, the commander of the French 
garrison defending Corfu. At the time when the Sultan’s government was ordering 
him in vain to send the troops necessary for the capture of the Corfu fortress, Ali 
Pasha proposed General Chabot to transport all the French garrison of Corfu to 
Ancona in exchange for the control of the island.4  
 
Now when the Russo-Ottoman fleet blockaded Corfu Ali, hoping that his 
assistance was indispensable, continued to bargain with Ushakov and even refused to 
help. In reply to Ushakov’s request to send the auxiliary Albanian troops Ali Pasha 
wrote to the Ottoman Admiral Kadir Bey that one cannot capture the fortress without 
Ali’s forces and demanded that the task of taking Corfu would be delegated to him, 
along with the money to pay his troops, the artillery, and other munitions. Ali Pasha 
was not going to move on Corfu other than on condition that the orders to take it 
would be given to him.5 Finally, on seeing that sooner or later Corfu might fall into 
the hands of the allied squadron and wishing to take his part of the war spoils, the 
governor of Ioannina agreed to help. Even then, discussing with Ushakov’s delegate 
                                                 
4 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, pp. 306-7. 
5 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 16 / 5 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 414-
16.  
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(this was Lieutenant Metaxa, on 8 February 1799 sent to Ali for the second time) his 
participation in the siege, Ali Pasha tried without much success to stipulate for a 
reward of half of the enemy artillery and all smaller ships.6 Meanwhile, by the end of 
January- early February 1799 the total number of Ali Pasha’s Albanian troops that 
arrived at Corfu reached 4.250 men and Ushakov could resume the siege works.7  
 
Taking into consideration the dramatic lack of supplies for the besieging 
Russo-Ottoman troops, remaining throughout the winter on the verge of starving, one 
may guess the situation of the besieged French garrison. A Captain of the French 
army J. P. Bellaire, who happened to be among the defenders of Corfu, later was 
mentioning the hunger inside the fortress. Of all the supplies only the grain was 
stored for about six months, but the besieged had no possibility to properly mill it 
into flour. Other foodstuffs, like meat, vegetables, rice, as well as the medications, 
were very limited and soon after the beginning of the siege the garrison ran low on 
them. There was not a single one horse, mule, donkey or cat left in the city. The rats 
were being sold at the price of 3 francs per head. During the last month of the siege 
the people could not buy even the badly milled bread. It was especially difficult in 
these conditions for more than 400 sick and wounded, who had neither medications 
nor the proper nutrition.8    
 
In early February 1799 a desperate attempt to slip through the allied blockade 
and to reach the French controlled Ancona had been made by the only ships still able 
to put out to sea. On the very moonless night of the 5th/ 6th February 1799 (it was the 
first day of new Moon) the ship of the line “Le Généreux” together with brig “Le 
                                                 
6 Metaxa, Zapiski, pp. 190-91. 
7 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 111. 
8 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, pp. 363-64. 
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Rivoli” and one galley, at about ten in the evening set out to sea and, with the sails 
painted in black and driven by a favourable southern wind, in a few minutes 
managed to slip through the lines of the allied ships. Metaxa explains this by the lack 
of coordination between the Russian and the Ottoman commanders, and blames the 
Ottoman Rear Admiral Fetih Bey, who guarded the northern passage, for reluctance 
to chase the French. In words of Metaxa, the ship of Fetih Bey was the only one able 
to compete with “Le Généreux” in terms of speed, and Ushakov sent Metaxa to the 
Ottoman commander with orders immediately set sails for pursuit of the enemy. 
Fetih Bey happened to be securely sleeping in his cabin. Woken up by Metaxa, the 
Ottoman commander said that he may not persuade his aggressively disposed crew, 
which stays for a long time away from home without provisions and salaries, to 
follow the orders of the Russian Admiral. Fetih Bey added upon that that “the French 
are running away and instead of chasing them one should better blow into their 
sails”.9 This breakthrough of the French ships put the Russian Emperor out of 
temper, and consequently nobody from the squadron, except for Ushakov, was 
awarded for capture of Corfu.    
 
It was decided to start the assault on the French fortifications on 1 March 1799 
(18 February 1799 Old style). The island of Corfu is stretched for about 60 km along 
the western coast of the Balkan Peninsula, separated from the shore by a channel 
with width varying from 2 to 23 km. The main city and fortress of Corfu is situated 
in the middle of the eastern side of the island. On the land it was defended by two 
forts (Abraham and Saint Saviour) and a redoubt of Saint Roch. From the seaside the 
fortress was covered by two fortified islets lying at the mouth of the Corfu city port, 
                                                 
9 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 859; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p.111; Metaxa, 
Zapiski, pp. 186-88. 
204 
Vido and Lazaretto10, which were guarding the harbour and approaches from the sea. 
Ironically, the island of Vido, chosen as the first target of the allied assault11, had 
been also called Île de la Paix by the French. This small islet was about 1 km in 
diameter, defended by 450 men with General Piveron at command, and its only 
fortifications were 5 artillery batteries, consisting overall of about 40 guns.12  
 
On 1 March (11 Ventôse an VII) at eight in the morning, two cannon shots 
were made from Ushakov’s flagship “Sviatoi Pavel”, signalling the beginning of the 
operation. Bellaire observes that the very moment of the assault happened to be very 
convenient for the attackers, since some part of the defenders of Vido were away on 
the bigger island in search of provisions.13 All the allied squadron of 25 ships moved 
on the small islet, and more than 800 guns started bombardment. The Russian ships 
formed the first line, while the most of the Ottoman ships were kept outside, with the 
exception of the frigate commanded by Kerim Bey that remained in the first line.14 
Ushakov explained in his letter to Tomara that he intentionally ordered the Ottoman 
ships to be in the outer line in order to save them, as the Ottoman sailors acting 
slower than the Russians would dangerously expose their ships to the enemy’s 
bombardment.15 There was not a place on Vido left unploughed by the allied shells. 
Not a single tree left unharmed by the metal shower coming from the ships of 
Ushakov’s squadron. The shells were tearing up the trees by the roots and the 
splinters were bringing death to the French soldiers. After three hours of incessant 
                                                 
10 It was abandoned by the French soon after the arrival of the allied squadron arrived, on 12 
November 1798 (22 brumaire an VII). On 21 November 1798 (1 frimaire an VII) Lazaretto was 
occupied by the allied squadron that established there a hospital. Bellaire, Précis des opérations, p. 
296. 
11 Upon his arrival Ushakov called Vido the “key to Corfu”, since from here one could easily perform 
the bombardment at the most vulnerable point of the Corfu fortress. Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 151.  
12 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, pp. 325-26. 
13 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, p. 327. 
14 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 210; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 111. 
15 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 16 / 5 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 403. 
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bombardment the guns on all five French batteries were silenced, and at about eleven 
started the landing of the allied troops.16   
 
    The Russo-Ottoman troops totally numbering 2159 men landed on the island 
in three places, thus encircling the deafened by the three-hour-long bombardment 
French soldiers.17 The French, seeing hopelessness of further resistance began to 
yield themselves prisoners, though the Ottomans showed no mercy and were killing 
them immediately. Both Metaxa and Bellaire independently confirm each other’s 
accounts regarding the behaviour of the Ottoman troops. So, Metaxa mentions, that 
“the Turks having not yet reached the shore were jumping into the sea and, waist 
deep in water, holding daggers in their mouths and sabres in their hands, rushed at 
the enemy’s battery. The anger of the Turks had no limits; they were capturing the 
French alive and despite the lamenting cries “pardon”... were dragging them to the 
shore and severing their heads”18. Metaxa’s account of the events corresponds with 
that one of Bellaire. The French Captain also speaks about the instant slaughter of the 
prisoners, who fell into the hands of the Ottoman-Albanian landing party. The 
severed heads of the French were then brought to the Ottoman Admiral Kadir Bey. 
Some part of the defenders of the island, seeing the fate of their unfortunate 
comrades and wishing to avoid it, were throwing themselves into the sea trying 
desperately to reach the main island. Many of them drowned in the sea.19                      
 
                                                 
16 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, p. 328; Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 212.  
17 Tarle, Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom more , p. 165; Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 212; Miliutin, Istoriia 
voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 111.  
18 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 213. 
19 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, pp. 328-29; also see: Benedetto Maresca, Il Cavaliere Antonio 
Micheroux nella Reazione apolitana del 1799 (Napoli, 1895), p.29. 
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As a result, the Russians had to defend their French enemies from their 
Ottoman allies. According to Metaxa, the imprisoned French garrison of Vido was 
placed inside the hollow square formed by the Russian soldiers and sailors. Major 
Alexei Yurievich Gamen20, one of the commanders of the landing assault, ordered to 
shoot at those Ottomans who would try to take any French prisoner. Moreover, the 
lives of many French were saved by the Russian officers, who would give the 
Ottomans their last money in order to retrieve the prisoners from certain death.21 
Again, the memoirs of the French infantry Captain correspond with those of the 
Russian naval Lieutenant. Bellaire speaks of one Russian Major, who gave not only 
all his money, but also his watch, so that to save life of two more French officers.22 
Otherwise, most probably, the Ottoman soldiers looking for reward for the killed 
enemies would not leave alive a single person who happened to fall into their hands. 
 
By two o’clock in the afternoon the gunfire subsided and the island was under 
the allied control. About half of the French, defending the island23 were killed, 
whereas 422 men were taken prisoners. Of 21 French officers, 15 fell into captivity, 
including the commander of Vido’s defence, General Piveron.24 The assault on the 
outworks of the main fortress of Corfu, the forts Abraham and Saint Saviour, and the 
redoubt of Saint Roch took place simultaneously. As Vido was taken, all the might of 
the fleet artillery, as well as the landing troops, were turned against these 
fortifications, and by the evening the French lost all of their outworks. During the 
attacks on Vido and on Corfu the allied casualties were 45 killed and 80 wounded 
                                                 
20 About the personality of Gamen see:  Gamen Aleksei Iuryevich, Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ ( 25 
vols.; Moscow, 1914), Volume 4 “Gaag-Gerbel’”, pp. 199-200. 
21 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 213. 
22 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, pp. 329-30. 
23 The garrison of Vido, together with reinforcements later sent from Corfu, amounted to 800 men. ‘F. 
F. Ushakov to Paul I. 4 March (21 February) 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 385.  
24 Metaxa, Zapiski, p. 216. 
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among the Russians, 28 killed and 50 wounded among the Ottomans, 33 killed and 
82 wounded among the Albanians.25 Now, as the island of Vido and the outer 
fortifications of Corfu were taken, the allied artillery could easily keep the main 
fortress under fire.   
 
On the next morning, on 2 March 1799, the commandant of the fortress 
General Chabot sent his aid-de-camp Grouvel to ask for a 48-hour ceasefire, which 
was accepted by the allied side. Then, on 3 March 1799 (13 Ventôse an VII), a 
council of war was held and the defenders of Corfu arrived at the conclusion that to 
continue the defence of the fortress would be anyway hopeless.26 The garrison 
suffered from exhaustion, there was no news from the runaway ship “Le Généreux”, 
the island of Vido was lost, and the outer fortifications fell. It was decided to 
capitulate.  
 
On 3 March 1799 (20 February 1799 in Russian style and 13 Ventôse an VII 
according to the French Republican calendar) the belligerents agreed to sign the Act 
of capitulation of the fortress of Corfu, consisting of 12 articles. On the side of the 
allies the capitulation was signed by F. F. Ushakov and Kadir Bey, and the citizens 
Dufour, Varèse, J. Briche and Grouvel put their signatures on the side of the French. 
The capitulation was then ratified by Commissar General Dubois and General 
Chabot.27  
 
                                                 
25 Ibidem 
26 Bellaire, Précis des opérations, pp. 337-38. 
27 The French text of the Act of Capitulation of Corfu can be found at: Bellaire, Précis des opérations, 
pp. 338-44; For the Russian text see: Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 382-85.  
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In conformity with the terms of surrender, the French would deliver up the 
fortress together with all its artillery, provisions and other materials to the allies. On 
the day of capitulation the garrison would march out of the fortress with full honours 
of war, lay down the arms and the flags, though the officers were permitted to leave 
their individual weapons. The Corfu garrison would be freed on parole and 
transported to Toulon at the expense of the allies. All of the French soldiers were to 
take a pledge not to be at war with the Russian and the Ottoman empires, as well as 
with their other allies, for the next eighteen months. The French could keep their 
private property, while the property of the garrison, including the naval vessels, 
would be taken by the Russians and the Ottomans. General Chabot and his Staff 
Secretary had the option to be transported whether to Toulon or Ancona. Those 
inhabitants of Corfu, who would like to leave the island, were given two months to 
do that. The wounded French could stay on Corfu until their full recovery, 
whereupon they would also be transported to Toulon.  
 
On 5 March (22 February) 1799 the French garrison of Corfu surrendered. The 
joint Russo-Ottoman forces occupied Corfu and over the fortress there were lifted the 
flags of the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. On the same day Ushakov and his 
officers attended the solemn prayer service in the Orthodox Cathedral of St. 
Spiridon. The Russians were enthusiastically greeted by thousands of local 
inhabitants, waving the white flags with blue St. Andrew’s cross, which was the 
Russian naval ensign. Metaxa states that all the streets and houses were covered by 
the Russian flags. Should this fact be mentioned only by the Russian officer of the 
Greek origin there still would be some chance that the event was somewhat 
exaggerated, but Bellaire completely confirms Metaxa’s words, speaking about the 
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houses, decorated by the “Muscovite flags”.28 As for the surrendered Corfu garrison, 
in three weeks, on 28 March (17 March, Old Style) 1799 the French prisoners were 
sent to Toulon on the cruiser ship (akat) “Sviataia Irina”, brigantines “Fenix” and 
“Alexander”, and seven merchant ships, all under command of Captain Lieutenant 
Vlito.29  
 
Now when the enemy was defeated there started some misunderstandings 
between the Russian and the Ottoman commanders concerning the trophies of war. 
Ushakov explained the situation in his letter to Tomara, dated 16 March 1799 (5 
March 1799, Old style).30 Russian Admiral accused his Ottoman colleagues of being 
too selfish and avaricious about all the resources found in the fortress. Ushakov 
complained to the ambassador that he often needed a great patience in 
communication with the Ottoman naval commanders, which at times was becoming 
a sort of punishment for the Russian Admiral, making him sick.  
 
Throughout the whole campaign, wrote Ushakov, he was trying to protect the 
Ottoman ships and kept them as far as possible from real danger, all the more so that 
the Ottomans were themselves not much eager to take risks (“я их берегу, как 
красненькое яичко, и в опасность, где бы потеряли, не впускаю, да и сами они к 
тому не охотники...”).31 The further argument of Ushakov was that during the 
attack on Vido and Corfu the active part belonged to the Russian ships and their 
crews, while the Ottomans in general remained in the outer line, the majority of the 
Ottoman ships not being engaged in the direct combat. It was the Russian ships that 
                                                 
28 Metaxa, Zapiski, pp. 219-20; Bellaire, Précis des opérations, p. 346. 
29 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 859, p. 861. 
30 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 16 / 5 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 405-
407. 
31 Ibidem, p. 405. 
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received the most damage and spent more munitions (gunpowder, cannon balls and 
bombs). For example, the Russian squadron more than the Ottoman one required the 
ship timber, in order to repair the broken masts and yards. In the same way, the 
Russian squadron needed more munitions to replenish, since in combat it had spent 
more. The Ottomans, however, would not like to listen to any arguments and wished 
simply to share all resources and munitions found on Corfu equally. So, concluded 
Ushakov, when the Russian crews were taking only the necessary materials and 
munitions, the Ottomans began to complain that the Russians unjustly take 
everything. For any trifle issue one had to engage in long arguments with the 
Ottomans, which could last for five hours. In the end of his letter Ushakov asked 
Tomara to explain all this to the Porte, so that the Ottoman side would stop making 
such miserly calculations.32  
 
Similar arguments had been expressed by Ushakov in his letter to Kadir Bey, 
the commander of the Ottoman squadron.33 Asking Kadir Bey to organize with the 
Ottoman ships the patrolling of the Northern and the Southern sides of the island, 
Ushakov again emphasized the fact that the Ottoman squadron in general did not 
participate in the active operations, except for the frigate of Captain Kerim. For that 
reason the Russian ships, being damaged in the battle, required a repair and at the 
moment there were no ships in the Russian squadron able for service. Meanwhile, 
many vessels of all sorts were passing uninspected through the Corfu channel, and 
the undamaged Ottoman ships could help with patrolling of the sea. Then Ushakov, 
coming directly to the point, touched upon the subject of using and sharing the 
captured resources. Like in his letter to Tomara, Ushakov wrote to Kadir Bey that the 
                                                 
32 Ibidem, p. 406. 
33 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Kadir Bey, 27 / 16 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 436-
438. 
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Russian squadron needed more materials to repair the ships damaged in the battle, as 
well as more cannon balls and gun powder. In this situation, the claims of the 
Ottoman side to share everything equally ignored the real needs of both squadrons. 
Moreover, added Ushakov, it was also in the interests of his Ottoman allies that the 
Russian ships would be repaired.  
 
Even more serious disagreements occurred between Ushakov and the Governor 
of Ioannina Tepedelenli Ali Pasha.34 Nurturing the hope for some territorial 
aggrandizement at the expense of the Ionian Islands, Ali Pasha at the beginning of 
the campaign was not only too reluctant to help the allied squadron, but also entered 
into negotiations with the French. Moreover, Ali Pasha made the task of Ushakov’s 
forces more difficult by deliberately delaying the sending of the necessary 
reinforcements and provisions throughout the end of 1798 and beginning of 1799. 
After the capture of Corfu, however, Ali tried his best to participate in sharing the pie 
gained without his direct and active involvement. 
 
Ushakov pointed out that instead of the promised 6 - 7 thousand men Ali Pasha 
sent by early February the total of 2 – 2.5 thousand, lacking artillery and not 
supported financially. These troops eventually were used only to fend off the 
periodical raids made by the garrison of Corfu during the siege and for guard duties. 
On seeing that Ali Pasha was not going to send any additional auxiliary forces, the 
Russian Admiral decided to take the fortress from the seaside using the ships of the 
Russo-Ottoman squadron. When the assault on Vido and the outworks of Corfu 
started, the bulk of the Albanian forces of Ali Pasha refused to join the attack. On the 
                                                 
34 See: ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 16 / 5 March 1799’ Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 403-405; ‘F. 
F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 16 / 5 March 1799’ Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 414-16; ‘F. F. 
Ushakov to Kadir Bey, 23 / 12 March 1799’ Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 423-24. 
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other hand, the Albanians of Ali Pasha lend some assistance at the storming of the 
outwork of Saint Saviour35. In view of Ali Pasha’s previous and present tricky 
behaviour Ushakov did not wish by any means to accept Ali inside the fortress or to 
share with him the war trophies. The Russian Admiral proposed Kadir Bey to pay 
Ali’s troops, thank them for their service and to send them away, since after the 
capitulation of Corfu there was no need in their help any more.  
 
The indignation of Ushakov at Ali Pasha’s intentions was too obvious: “Why 
and by what right can Ali Pasha participate in the sharing and in the occupation of 
the fortresses”,36 “... as for Ali Pasha, I do not accept him to share and occupy the 
fortresses together with us [meaning the Russo-Ottoman squadron; V. M.], and he 
has no right to claim that”.37 Since the fortress was taken mainly due to the efforts of 
his own soldiers, and the Act of Corfu’s capitulation had been signed by the Russian 
and the Ottoman commanders, argued Ushakov, the participation of Ali Pasha in 
sharing the captured resources was out of question. It is interesting that the Ottomans 
themselves advised the Russian side to keep Ali Pasha away from Corfu. Kapudan 
Pasha (High Admiral and the Minister of the Ottoman Marine) Küçük Hüseyin 
Pasha, in his conversation with the Russian ambassador Tomara, said that Ali Pasha 
had always been one of the most unfaithful pashas, always was a friend of the French 
and that Ali Pasha’s troops should by no means be accepted inside the fortress of 
Corfu. Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was quite familiar with the behaviour of Ali Pasha, as 
during the siege of Vidin (against another rebellious Ottoman warlord Osman 
                                                 
35 According to Ushakov, the redoubt of Saint Saviour was attacked by not more than 200 Albanians 
and about 700 Ushakov’s men. ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 10 April / 30 March 1799’ 
Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 446.  
36 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 16 / 5 March 1799’. Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 404. 
37 Ibidem, p. 405. 
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Pazvantoğlu) it was impossible to make the troops of Ali Pasha to approach the 
fortress at a cannon-shot distance.38     
 
Ali Pasha’s impudence indeed knew no bounds. Already after the capture of 
Corfu had been completed Ali Pasha continued to “help”, sending the detachments of 
the Albanian troops in order to increase his own military presence on the island, and 
to show post factum the larger number of his forces taking part in the siege than it 
was actually at the time of assault.39 This was not, though, the biggest trick of 
Ioannina’s governor. As the fortress was taken, Ali Pasha detained for some time the 
messenger of Ushakov that would inform the Porte about this long-awaited event and 
sent instead his own messenger. The latter presented at the Sultan’s court Ali Pasha’s 
own version of the events, as if it was Ali Pasha’s forces that took both Vido and the 
redoubt of Saint Saviour, having also captured one French bombard-vessel. There 
was also the rumour that Ali Pasha was opening the messages sent to Constantinople 
from the allied squadron, thus leaving the Russian commander only guessing 
whether the original messages remained untouched after such censorship. As a result, 
the Porte learned about the fall of Corfu first from Ali Pasha’s courier whereupon the 
fur-coats were sent to Ali Pasha’s war commanders and the order was issued to grant 
Ali Pasha the French bombard-vessel, “captured” by him.40 Meanwhile, all the 
French vessels and the island of Vido were obviously taken by the Russo-Ottoman 
squadron and Ali had no relation to this victory. Ushakov was outraged.  
 
                                                 
38 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I. 12 / 1 April 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 
89/8.  Delo 890, f. 6 ob. 
39 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 16 / 5 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 415.  
40 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 10 April / 30 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, 
pp. 446-47. 
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Consequently the issue became clear and the Porte changed its decision, 
refusing Ali Pasha’s right to have any of the captured French vessels. Nevertheless, 
even then Ali Pasha continued to claim from Ushakov both the vessels and some 
trophy materials, considering and calling all these as belonging to him, Ali Pasha. He 
also tried to interfere into the affairs of the island of Santa Maura, demanding from 
its inhabitants, called by him the subjects of the Porte, a tribute of seven hundred 
piastres. In reply to Ali Pasha’s claims Ushakov agreed to transfer to Ali one smaller 
ship taken at Vido, for it was reported to belong earlier to the Ioannina Governor. All 
other claims of Ali Pasha had been turned down.41 
 
As the enemy was in the end ousted from the Ionian Islands and the archipelago 
passed under control of the allies, there came the time for awards. For the capture of 
Corfu the Sultan sent Ushakov a diamond çelenk42, a valuable decoration for 
headdress used in the Ottoman Empire as a sign of special distinction, along with a 
sable fur-coat and 1 thousand piastres. Apart from that, 3.5 thousand piastres were 
sent for distribution among other members of Ushakov’s squadron.43 The 
commander of the Ottoman squadron Kadir Bey was presented in the name of Paul I 
a diamond snuff-box.44 Finally, for successful completion of the Ionian campaign 
Vice Admiral Ushakov was given a rank of Admiral.45  
                                                 
41 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 29 / 18 May 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 517. 
42 The similar chelengk had earlier been awarded to a British Rear Admiral Horatio Nelson for his 
victory over the French fleet in the battle of the Nile (1-2 August 1798). 
43 Moskovskie Vedomosti, 25 / 14 May 1799; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p.113. 
44 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p.113. 
45 ‘G. G. Kushelev to F. F. Ushakov, 5 April / 25 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, 
p. 444. 
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6.2. Italian Campaign 
At the same time when the joint Russo-Ottoman forces of Ushakov were busy 
in the Ionian Archipelago, some 300 kilometres across the Adriatic Sea to the West 
from Corfu another member of the Second anti-French coalition was experiencing 
hard times. The royal family of the Kingdom of Naples belonged to the House of 
Bourbon, and, what is more, the Neapolitan Queen Maria Carolina was a daughter of 
the Austrian Empress Maria Theresa and a sister of the ill-fated Marie Antoinette of 
France. Quite naturally, since early 1790-s Naples found itself among the enemies of 
the French Republic. In October 1796, though, the Kingdom of Naples concluded a 
peace treaty with France.46 Along with that, on 19 May 1798 Naples signed a 
defensive treaty with Austria,47 and by the end of 1798 opted to join the Second 
coalition.48  
 
Elated by the news of Nelson’s victory at Aboukir and that of the entrance of 
the Russo-Ottoman naval squadron into the Mediterranean, the Kingdom of Naples 
hastened to break its peace with the French Republic and to use France’s difficult 
situation for its own advantage. Neapolitan army of 15 thousand men under the 
command of Austrian General Mack in November 1798 invaded the territory of the 
French-controlled Roman Republic, and on 29 November, with the King of Naples 
Ferdinand IV at the head, entered Rome. By middle of December, though, the 
                                                 
46 Georg Friedrich Martens, Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, 
de commerce, de limites, d'echange etc. (Göttingen, 1800), Vol. 6, pp. 636-39. 
47 Guillaume de Garden, comte. Histoire générale des traités de paix et autres transactions 
principales entre toutes les puissances de l'Europe depuis la paix de Westphalie (Paris, 1848-1887). 
Vol. 6, pp. 79-80. 
48 The Kingdom of Naples concluded the alliance treaties, in chronological order, with Russia (in St. 
Petersburg, 29 November 1798), Garden, Histoire générale, pp. 80-81; Britain (in Naples, 1 
December 1798), Garden, op. cit, p. 81; and the Ottoman Empire (in Constantinople, 21 January 
1799), Gabriel Noradounghian , (ed.) Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman (4 vols.; 
Paris, 1897-1903), Vol. 2, pp. 32-34. 
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Neapolitans just as hastily started to retreat.49 On 13 December the French forces of 
General Championnet retook Rome again. Eventually, the King of Naples and his 
family abandoned even their own capital and on the night of 31 December 1798 
secretly left for Sicily, seeking a refuge in the insular part of their possessions. In this 
way at the beginning of 1799 the royal court of the Neapolitan kingdom settled in 
Palermo, and in Naples at the point of the French bayonets was established 
Parthenopean Republic (23 January 1799), de facto yet another Italian client state of 
the revolutionary France.  
 
Newly created republic never enjoyed the support of the wider Neapolitan 
population. On the contrary, the mainland provinces of the Neapolitan Kingdom 
revolted against the government of the Parthenopean Republic. In addition, the 
Naples was being blockaded by the British fleet and the rather weak French forces in 
Naples could not be reinforced by Paris in view of the hostilities going on in the 
Northern Italy. In this situation Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, an authorised representative 
of the King, was sent to Calabria to incite the religious Calabrian peasantry to rise 
against the French in favour of the monarchy. On 8 February 1799 he landed on the 
other side of the Strait of Messina, and started to gather the local peasantry into his 
“army of the Holy Faith” (Armata della Santa Fede).50 In a few months this peasant 
                                                 
49 Garden, Histoire générale, pp. 83-84; Constance H. D. Giglioli, aples in 1799 (London, 1903), pp. 
83-87. Giglioli also quotes an indeed witty and satirical verse concerning the speedy flight of 
Ferdinand IV from Rome:  
Con soldati infiniti                   From his native coast 
Si mosse da’ suoi liti               With an infinite host 
Verso Roma bravando             On Rome marched swaggering 
Il re don Ferdinando                Don Ferdinand the King : 
E in pochissimi dì                    And ere many days were sped     
Venne, vide e fuggì                 He came, he saw, he fled 
50 Gutteridge, H.C. (ed.) elson and the eapolitan Jacobins – Documents Relating to the 
Suppression of the Jacobin Revolution at aples, June 1799. (London, 1903), p. XXXI. 
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army turned into a serious force to be reckoned with, although it was irregular and 
much unruly. 
 
Referring to his alliance treaty with Russia, Ferdinand IV asked Paul I to send 
some force to the Southern Italy to help free it from the French and to restore 
monarchy in Naples. The similar assistance by virtue of the alliance treaty was also 
expected to be received from the Porte. Trying to gain time Ferdinand sent his 
special messenger Chevalier Antonio Micheroux51 directly to Corfu to meet with the 
allied admirals, asking them to send a part of the allied fleet to the Italian shores as 
soon as possible. Micheroux visited Corfu twice, at the end of February – early 
March and in mid-April 1799, holding negotiations with Ushakov and Kadir Bey.52 
 
According to the report of Tomara to Paul I, the Russian Emperor as early as 15 
March issued a special instruction to his ambassador in Istanbul to persuade the 
Ottoman Ministry to send certain amount of the Ottoman troops to Italy.53 In other 
words, the initial request of the Neapolitan court concerned not specifically the 
squadron of Ushakov, but the Ottoman and Russian military help in general. In 
practice, however, it was only Ushakov’s squadron which could be immediately used 
for that purpose. Tomara pointed out this fact in his report to the Tsar, saying that 
there were certain difficulties in terms of sending a strong corps of Albanian troops 
to Italy. Such an enterprise could not be realised, not because it would be hard to 
convince the Porte, but in view of the impossibility of making sure that this measure 
                                                 
51 Antonio Micheroux was a Neapolitan ambassador in Venice until the fall of the Republic in 1797. 
52 First time Micheroux arrived at Corfu on 19 February, the second time Micheroux came on 9 April. 
Benedetto Maresca, Il Cavaliere Antonio Micheroux nella Reazione apolitana del 1799 (Napoli, 
1895), pp. 9-12, 32; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 479. 
53 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I. 27 / 16 April, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 890, f. 44. 
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would be carried out quickly. Besides, the transport ships were not enough. Tomara 
concluded that the King of the Two Sicilies, in fact, needs help to be prompt rather 
than strong. For that reason, when the Neapolitan ambassador Count Ludolf 
addressed the Porte with a request of sending an auxiliary Ottoman corps to Italy. 
Tomara supported his colleague by asking not an auxiliary corps, but suggesting that 
it would be most advisable to send to the Southern Italy the Ottoman naval squadron 
jointly with the Black Sea squadron of Ushakov, strengthened by sufficient number 
of Albanians suitable for landing operations.54  
 
It appeared not an easy task to convince the Porte into sending its naval forces 
to the Italian shores. Moreover, since the alliance treaty bound the Russian Black Sea 
squadron to protect the Ottoman state, to send Ushakov’s forces away from the 
Ottoman coastline as far as Sicily and Sardinia could spark the protests of the 
Ottoman side. Nevertheless, the Porte with the utmost reluctance agreed to send its 
squadron together with that one of Admiral Ushakov to Italy.55 As for the Russian 
side, as early as 17 March 1799 Paul I had authorised Ushakov to sail towards the 
shores of Sicily and Sardinia. In addition, in order to compensate for the absence in 
the Ottoman territorial waters of those Ushakov’s ships, which were assigned to 
move to Italy, Paul I ordered to transfer three best ships and one frigate from the 
Baltic squadron of Vice Admiral Makarov, based at the time in Portsmouth, to the 
Mediterranean.56  
                                                 
54 Ibidem, f. f. 44- 45 ob. 
55 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I. 27 / 16 April, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 890, f. 85. 
56 ‘Paul I to P. K. Kartsov, 6 April (26 March) 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 444. 
The squadron of Kartsov (the ships of the line “Isidor”, “Asia”, “Pobeda” and frigate “Pospeshniy”) 
departed from Portsmouth on 2 June 1799 and arrived at Palermo on 14 August 1799. Kartsov had 
scarcely put to the sea as there came another order of Pavel not to send Kartsov to the Mediterranean. 
Vice Admiral Makarov reported, though, that the squadron of Kartsov sailed away. Miliutin, Istoriia 
voiny 1799, Vol.3, p. 267.  
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Tomara chose not to inform the Porte about all the details concerning the 
decision of the Emperor to strengthen his naval forces in the Mediterranean with four 
ships of the Baltic fleet. The thread of Tomara’s thoughts was obvious. First, the 
Ottoman could get worried about the growing of the Russian maritime presence in 
the Mediterranean. Second, upon learning that some additional Russian ships were 
sent to help Ushakov, the Porte could reconsider its earlier decision and refuse to 
send its own fleet to the shores of Italy. The Russian ambassador slightly changed the 
key points of the issue, stating that should the absence of the ships sent to Italy for 
some unforeseen reason last rather long and in the meantime the situation require 
reinforcing the fleets remaining in the Ottoman territorial waters, in that case the 
absent ships would be changed temporarily with those from the squadron of Vice 
Admiral Makarov.57    
           
On 29 April 1799, the orders were sent from the Ottoman government to Kadir 
Bey, prescribing him to strengthen his serviceable ships’ crews with Albanians and 
to follow Ushakov towards the shores of Italy.58 Notably, the Ottoman squadron was 
sent to Italy not so much for the help to the Neapolitan kingdom as in view of the 
Ottoman state’s own interests, which were not allow the French to occupy the part of 
Italy adjacent to the possessions of the Ottoman Empire.59 The Neapolitan court, 
initially wishing to get reinforcements in form of the Albanian troops, soon rejected 
this plan, having learned from Chevalier Micheroux about the unruly conduct of the 
Albanians during the siege and attack of Corfu. Thus, in Naples (or rather in 
                                                 
57 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I. 27 / 16 April, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 890, f. f. 85-86. 
58 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I. 12 / 1 May, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 
89/8. Delo 891, f. 1. 
59 Ibidem, f. 1 ob. 
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Palermo, for the capital of the kingdom was occupied by the French) they were 
waiting for the arrival of the Russo-Ottoman squadron of Ushakov, carrying the 
landing forces.60 In order to kindle the interest of the Ottoman side in participating in 
the expedition Tomara among other things advised Ushakov at the beginning of 
campaign to guard the Ottoman forces from any kind of failure. Then, as the first 
operations of the Ottomans in Italy appear successful, this might increase the number 
of the Ottoman soldiers wishing to be appointed by the Porte to fight there.61  
 
Already in mid-April Ushakov, himself staying in Corfu, forwarded two naval 
detachments to Italy. On 13 April 1799 two Russian frigates (one of 50 and another 
of 36 cannons; Commander Sorokin), one Ottoman corvette, and one Tripolitan brig, 
along with the Neapolitan corvette “Fortuna” on which sailed Chevalier Micheroux, 
were to move towards Brindisi. The squadron of Sorokin carried 250 Russian 
soldiers, large number of armed marines, and 10 field guns on its board.62 Another 
detachment, consisting of one Russian schooner (Captain Maksheev) and four 
Ottoman gunboats sailed to Otranto.63  
 
The letter of the President of the Province of Lecce Don Tommaso Luperto, 
dated 19 April 1799 and also signed by the Sicilian Consul General in Corfu Don 
Leonardo Grattagliano, sent to the Russian embassy in Istanbul, explains some 
circumstances of the presence of the Russo-Ottoman naval forces in the Italian 
                                                 
60 Ibidem, f. 2. 
61 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I. 27 / 16 April, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 890, f. f. 96-97. “... Пишу я к Вице-Адмиралу Ушакову, дабы он назначаемые ныне 
Портою турецкие войска при начальном оных употреблении сколько возможно предостерег 
от какой-либо неудачи. Когда же первые подвиги турков в Италии будут успешны то сие 
заохотит к следованию туда и других чрез то неминуемо умножится охотниками число войск 
Портою ныне назначаемое”. 
62 Maresca, Cavaliere Antonio Micheroux, p. 63. 
63 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 862; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 480-81.     
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waters in mid-April 1799. So, according to Tommaso Luperto, Brindisi passed under 
the allied control on “last Wednesday”, which should be 17 April 1799. At the 
appearance of the allied fleet (obviously, this refers to the squadron of Sorokin) the 
French fled, even leaving their tables just prepared for dinner untouched. The escape 
was so fast that they had no time to take away any money gathered from the local 
inhabitants. The French garrison of Brindisi nailed the cannons, dumped the powder 
into the sea and ran away to Barletta.64 Relying on information provided by Luperto, 
the fleet of Sorokin stayed a few days in Brindisi, for the President of the Lecce 
Province was about to leave from Otranto to Brindisi, where he had been waited by 
the Russian commander (fra momenti parto per Brindisi ovemi attende il 
Comandante Russo).65 Then Sorokin returned to Corfu, to get there additional 
reinforcements for his squadron. He arrived at Corfu on 24 April 1799, and was sent 
by Ushakov again to Brindisi, this time joined by two more Russian frigates, a 
schooner, five Ottoman gunboats and a Neapolitan frigate.66 By early May Sorokin 
was back in Brindisi.67   
 
 Also, as it was mentioned before, one Russian schooner and four Ottoman 
gunboats were sent to Otranto.68 Clearly it was these ships (cinque legni, quattro 
turchi ed un russo) seen by Tommaso Luperto in Otranto in mid-April. Luperto 
addressed the Ottoman commander Ahmet (Acmet il Capitano), asking him to stay in 
                                                 
64 ‘Letter of Don Tommaso Luperto, the President of the Province of Lecce. 19 April 1799’ AVPRI. 
Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 891, f. f. 9-10; The fact that the French fled 
having nailed their cannons, is mentioned also by Tomara in his report to the Tsar: ‘V. S. Tomara to 
Paul I. 12 / 1 May, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 891, f. 2 
ob.  
65 ‘Letter of Don Tommaso Luperto, the President of the Province of Lecce. 19 April 1799’ Ibidem, f. 
10. 
66 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 863. 
67 Miliutin gives the date of Sorokin’s arrival to Brindisi as 4 May 1799, Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, 
Vol. 3, p. 265; The same event at Arkas is said to happen on 7 May 1799. Arkas, Deistviia 
Chernomorskogo flota, p. 863.  
68 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 481. 
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Otranto with his ship and 200 men. Captain Ahmet accepted the request of Luperto, 
though wanted the latter to write to Kadir Bey.69 This explains, why Ushakov in his 
dispatch to Sorokin dated 18 April 1799 speaks of a schooner of Captain-Lieutenant 
Maksheev and only three Ottoman gunboats, instead of four, sent to reinforce the 
squadron of Sorokin.70 The fourth Ottoman gunboat, that one of Captain Ahmet, 
apparently should have stayed in Otranto. Other ships proceeded from Otranto to 
Brindisi to join Sorokin. 
 
To maintain order, Sorokin left Captain Lieutenant Maksheev with one 
schooner in Brindisi and on 10 May 1799 continued his way along the coast, moving 
to the North. On 14 May Sorokin came to Bari and landed there a force of 150 men 
with 4 field guns.71 After staying for three days in Bari, Sorokin continued his way, 
having left behind the frigate “Sviatoi Nikolai” (Commander Marin). In a few days 
“Sviatoi Nikolai” joined the squadron again.72 On 17 May, in the evening, Sorokin 
dropped the anchor near Barletta, left there frigate “Sviatoi Grigorii Velikiia 
Armenii” (Commander Shostak) and sailed to Manfredonia, to take it on 19 May.73 
Now the littoral being occupied, Sorokin at the suggestion of Micheroux decided to 
send a detachment of his marines further inland.74 
 
On 20 May there were landed 390 men with 4 fieldguns under the command of 
the Russian officer of Irish descent Captain Lieutenant Henry Baillie, or, as he was 
                                                 
69 “Ho pregato Acmet il Capitano per rimanere qui col suo legno e 200 uomini. Ha aderito 
gentilmente alle mie preghiere, ma ha voluto che io ne scrivessi, come fò di corrispondenza, a codesto 
Generale Kadir Bey...” ‘Letter of Don Tommaso Luperto, the President of the Province of Lecce. 19 
April 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 891, f. 9.   
70 ‘F. F. Ushakov to A. A. Sorokin, 18 / 7 April 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 481. 
71 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 482. 
72 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 863. 
73 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 483. 
74 ‘A. A. Sorokin to F. F. Ushakov, 29 / 18 May 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, p. 5. 
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called in Russia, Genrikh Genrikhovich Baillie. The Russo-Ottoman detachment was 
accompanied by Micheroux.  Baillie marched without delay on Foggia, and on the 
next day entered it.75 At this point Sorokin established communication with Cardinal 
Ruffo, the leader of the Neapolitan irregular peasant army, fanatically devoted to the 
Church and Monarchy, as much uncontrollable as it was numerous (about 30 
thousand men)76. It was decided to join forces of Baillie (strengthened up to 511 men 
and 6 fieldguns) with those of Cardinal Ruffo at the town of Ariano, halfway in 
between of the Adriatic coast and Naples. The group of 84 Ottoman soldiers 
commanded by Captain Ahmet, the same which stayed in Otranto at the request of 
Don Tommaso Luperto, also arrived to Ariano.77 All the allies gathered in Ariano by 
5 June, and in three days continued their march on Naples.78 
 
   The territory held then by the Parthenopean republic was in practice reduced 
to the city of Naples and only a few other towns. The Neapolitan countryside had 
always been a mainstay of monarchism, while in Naples proper the Republican and 
French troops remained in the city fortresses of Castel Nuovo, Castel dell’Ovo and 
Sant’ Elmo. In addition, the smaller French garrisons were in Capua (25 km north of 
Naples) and Gaeta (about 80 km northwest of Naples, along the Tyrrhenian coast). 
When still in Foggia, Micheroux received information that the number of the French 
remaining in Naples was very scarce. In the castle of Sant’ Elmo there were from 
300 to 800 men, and, aside from that, in the vicinity of the city operated the mobile 
column of 200 men. 400 French soldiers stayed in Capua and 200 in Gaeta.79 
                                                 
75 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 483; Excerpt from report of Admiral Ushakov to Paul I dated 
31 / 18 May 1799. Moskovskie Vedomosti, 31 / 20 July 1799. 
76 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 473. 
77 Maresca, Il Cavaliere Antonio Micheroux, p. 171. 
78 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 485; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 863. 
79 Maresca, Il Cavaliere Antonio Micheroux, p. 132. 
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Moving through Avellino (about 45 km northeast of Naples) and Nola (20 km 
northeast of Naples) and having taken Portici (8 km southeast of Naples) the joint 
Russo-Ottoman-Neapolitan forces on 13 June 1799 came up to the capital of the 
Neapolitan kingdom. In the vanguard of the allied army marched the detachment of 
Captain Baillie, consisting of 600 men and 6 field guns.80 At this point other royal 
militias occupied Salerno (45 km southeast), Teano (40 km northwest) and Sessa 
(about 45 km northwest).81 The battle for the city and in the city continued 
throughout 13-15 June 1799. During these days Naples became a scene of anarchy, 
witnessing horror, lootings and endless bloodshed. Unruly peasant mobs of Cardinal 
Ruffo, as well as 80 Ottoman soldiers of Captain Ahmet could not be stopped from 
looting of the city.82  
 
The last remnants of the Republican forces of Naples took shelter in the three 
fortresses, which were situated within the limits of the city, namely Castel Sent’ 
Elmo (the French garrison of General Méjan), Castel Nuovo and Castel dell’Ovo 
(both defended by the Neapolitan republicans). On 16 June 1799 the allies started to 
prepare for the siege of the last strongholds of the French republicanism in the 
Southern Italy. Quite soon, the garrisons of Castel Nuovo and Castel dell’Ovo 
capitulated, on condition that the defenders would come out with all military honours 
and then they would be transported to Toulon, the Italian republicans were 
guaranteed the personal safety. The treaty of capitulation was signed by the French 
                                                 
80 There were initially 511 men in Baillie’s detachment, and consequently Baillie received 
reinforcement of 95 men. Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.3, p. 324.   
81 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 622; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 863. 
82 Maresca, Il Cavaliere Antonio Micheroux, p. 195. 
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on 21 June, by Cardinal Ruffo, the Russian and the Ottoman representatives on 22 
June, and by the representative of the British side, Captain Foote, on 23 June.83  
 
On the next day after the capitulation had been signed, the squadron of a British 
Rear Admiral Nelson (14 British and 4 Portugal ships) arrived to the Bay of 
Naples.84 Nelson demanded unconditional capitulation and refused to recognise the 
concluded treaty. At the orders of Nelson all the republicans were arrested and the 
trials and executions lasted in Naples for weeks. Also, continued the siege of Sent’ 
Elmo, the last fortress of Naples remaining in the hands of the French,.85 In July 
1799 the Neapolitan kingdom was completely cleared of the French. To maintain 
order on the streets of the city, the troops of Captain Baillie remained all the summer 
of 1799 in Naples.86    
   
On the other side of the Apennine Peninsula, near Ancona and along the 
Adriatic coast, operated another part of the allied Russo-Ottoman forces of Ushakov. 
Upon the request of the Austrian government through the Russian ambassador in 
Vienna, communicated in early April 1799 to Ushakov, the allied fleet was to watch 
over the main French base in the Adriatics, the port of Ancona. Besides, Ushakov’s 
forces were expected to guard the sea communications in the area in order to assure 
the supply lines of the Austrian armies in the Northern Italy.87  
 
                                                 
83 Tarle, Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom more, p. 206. 
84 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, pp. 626-27. 
85 ‘The report of Ushakov to Paul I, dated 6 July / 24 June 1799’, about the operations near Naples has 
been published in: Moskovskie Vedomosti, 29 / 17 August 1799. 
86 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, pp. 868-69. 
87 ‘A. K. Razumovskii to F. F. Ushakov, 3 April / 23 March 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 
2, pp. 439-40; Also see: ‘A. V. Suvorov to F. F. Ushakov, 3 April / 23 March 1799’ Mordvinov, 
Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, p. 441.  
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Ushakov ordered Rear Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Pustoshkin88 to go patrol the 
Adriatic Sea and blockade Ancona.89 For this mission Pustoshkin was given 6 
Russian and 5 Ottoman ships: 3 ships of the line (two Russian: “Sviatoi Mikhail”, 
“Simeon i Anna”; and one Ottoman of Captain Ibrahim), 4 frigates (two Russian: 
“Navarkhiia Vozneseniie Gospodnie”, “Kazanskaia Bogoroditsa”; and two Ottoman, 
Captains Zeynel and Süleyman), one Ottoman corvette (Captain Hüseyin) and three 
dispatch vessels (two Russian and one Ottoman). Moreover, the squadron of 
Pustoshkin was joined by one Portuguese vessel on which some members of the 
House of Bourbon were to be transported to Trieste. While the whole squadron was 
to move towards Ancona, two Russian frigates (“Navarkhiia Vozneseniie 
Gospodnie” and “Kazanskaia Bogoroditsa”) received special orders to follow and 
protect the Portuguese ship until its mission would be completed. On 12 May 1799 
Pustoshkin sailed off from Corfu.90 In a few days the Russo-Ottoman naval forces 
appeared in the coastal waters of Ancona.91 After his arrival Pustoshkin attempted to 
send a parlementaire to demand the surrender of the fortress, but the French would 
not allow him to approach.92 At this point the only more or less significant event 
became the capture of a courier ship “La Constance” sailing under the Spanish flag 
by an Ottoman vessel from Pustoshkin’s squadron in the vicinity of Ancona on 17 
May 1799.93  
                                                 
88 P. V. Pustoshkin was soon, on 20 May 1799, promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral. Tarle, Admiral 
Ushakov na Sredizemnom more, p. 210; I. Sokolov, Pustoshkin Pavel Vasilievich. Russkii 
biograficheskii slovar’ (25 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1910), Volume 15 “Pritvitz-Reis”, pp. 147-48. 
89 ‘F. F. Ushakov to P. V. Pustoshkin, 9 May / 28 April, 1799’ Materialy dlia istorii russkogo flota 
(MIRF) (17 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1865-1904), Vol. 16, pp. 360-61. 
90 Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol.1, pp. 485- 86; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, pp. 864. 
91 Mangourit, a French official who happened to stay in Ancona during the siege, says that the Russo-
Ottoman fleet appeared on 17 May 1799 (28 Floréal an VII). Michel-Ange-Bernard Mangourit, 
Défense d’Ancone (2 vols.; Paris, 1802), Vol. 1, p. 125; ‘P. V. Pustoshkin to A. V. Suvorov, 22 / 11 
May 1799’  Report about the arrival of the squadron of Vice Admiral Pustoshkin to Ancona. 
Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, pp. 4-5.  
92 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 486. 
93 Mangourit, Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 1, p. 137; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 864. 
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In order to make a reconnaissance of the enemy’s positions and to replenish the 
fresh water supply the squadron of Pustoshkin on 23 May 1799 at ten in the morning 
raised the anchor and tried to make a probative landing about 9,5 kilometers (6 
miles) to the north of Ancona. The 200 men of the landing party of Captain 
Chebyshev were driven back with the loss of a few men.94 Then the attempt of 
landing of 600-men strong Russo-Ottoman detachment was made on 25 May at Fano 
(about 50 km along the coast to the north of Ancona), also brought no positive results 
for the allies.95 Thereupon, Pustoshkin decided to restock his supplies in Porto 
Quieto in Istria and on 6 June 1799 returned to blockade Ancona again.96 
   
By this time Pustoshkin learned that the Austrian forces advancing from the 
north took hold of Ravenna, Cesenatico and Rimini (respectively, about 140 km, 115 
km and 90 km north of Ancona), while Pesaro (a sea port, situated at about 60 km 
north of Ancona) was taken by the local Italian rebel forces of 33-year old General 
Lahoz. For that reason on 10 June 1799 Pustoshkin decided to disembark at Pesaro a 
landing party of 200 men (100 Russian grenadiers and 100 Ottomans) with three 
cannons, under command of Major Alexei Yurievich Gamen, one of the commanders 
of the allied assault on the Island of Vido during the Ionian campaign, who only 
three weeks ago celebrated his 26th birthday.97 The landing was to be covered by the 
Ottoman corvette of Captain Hüseyin and Russian brig of Lieutenant Makar 
Ivanovich Ratmanov, then, like Major Gamen, also only 26 years old and 
                                                 
94  Mangourit, Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 1, p. 146. 
95 Mangourit, Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 1, pp. 147-48. 
96 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 486; Excerpt from report of Admiral Ushakov to Paul I dated 
5 July / 24 June 1799. Moskovskie Vedomosti, 28 / 17 August 1799.  
97 Gamen Aleksei Iuryevich, Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ (25 vols.; Moscow, 1914), Volume 4 
“Gaag-Gerbel’”, p. 199; Gamen Aleksei Iuryevich, Voennaia entsiklopediia (18 Vols.; St. Petersburg, 
1911-1915), Vol. 7, p.171. 
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consequently the person whose name would be immortalised on the world’s 
geographical map at least four times in three different oceans, the Arctic, the Pacific 
and the Indian.98  
 
In Pesaro the Russo-Ottoman detachment joined forces with the rebels of 
General Lahoz and on 12 June at six in the morning marched on Fano, where arrived 
at noon. The attack was supported by the fire from the sea, made by the brig of 
Lieutenant Ratmanov, the Ottoman frigate of Captain Zeynel, and a few smaller 
vessels. By 3 p.m. the French abandoned the fortress of Fano. During the battle, 
according to the report of Major Gamen, the Russian troops had no casualties at all, 
while among the Ottomans there were 1 killed and 4 wounded.99 Gamen in his 
another report to Pustoshkin also mentioned that at the entrance into the town the 
Ottomans together with the locals pillaged some houses, which belonged to the 
Jacobins. At that, it was the locals who were the driving force of the marauding, 
stopped at the orders of the Russian commander.100          
 
Then Pustoshkin sent to Major Gamen the new reinforcement of 130 Russians 
and 50 Ottomans with 1 cannon, commanded by Lieutenant (poruchik) Apollonov, 
                                                 
98 Four years after the Ushakov’s Italian campaign Ratmanov would take part in the first ever Russian 
around-the-world sailing expedition of Captain Lieutenant Adam Johann Ritter (Ivan Fedorovich) von 
Krusenstern (1803-1806), in capacity of a senior officer on the frigate “Nadezhda” (Hope). Nowadays 
the name of Ratmanov can be found on the world’s geographical map at least four times. First, the 
Russian island of Big Diomede, also known as Ratmanov Island, is situated in the very middle of the 
Bering Strait on the Russian-American border and is the easternmost point of Russia. Second, there is 
the Cape of Ratmanov on the Pacific coast of the Island of Sakhalin. Third, there is also the Cape of 
Ratmanov on the Yuzhny Island of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago in Arctic Ocean. Fourth, the 
easternmost point of the French island of Kerguelen in the Southern Indian Ocean also bears 
Ratmanov’s name, Cap Ratmanoff. About the personality of Ratmanov see: Ratmanov Makar 
Ivanovich, Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ (25 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1910), Volume 15 “Pritvitz-Reis”, 
pp. 496-97; Ratmanov Makar Ivanovich, Voennii Entsiklopedicheskii Leksikon (14 vols.; St. 
Petersburg, 1837-1850), Vol. 11, pp. 102-104. 
99 ‘A. Iu. Gamen to P. V. Pustoshkin, 13 / 2 June 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, pp. 12-
13. 
100 ‘A. Iu. Gamen to P. V. Pustoshkin, 14 / 3 June 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, p. 13. 
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and ordered to move from Fano further towards the town of Senigallia (about 30 km 
north of Ancona). On 18 June Senigallia was taken as well. The casualties of the 
Russo-Ottoman force were 3 killed (2 Russians and 1 Ottoman) and 18 wounded (14 
Russians, including Captain Chebyshev and 4 Ottomans).101 Mangourit in his 
memoirs calls attention to the rampant violence on the part of the allied troops, and 
in particular the Ottomans, practised against the civilian population of Senigallia. 
Executions for cooperation with the French, lootings, rapes and torturing were 
especially intense in the Jewish quarter.102  
 
Pustoshkin was ready with the help of the Italian troops of Lahoz to tighten the 
blockade around Ancona, both from the sea and land. At this very point, however, he 
got the orders from Ushakov to return to Corfu. On 21 June 1799 to the astonishment 
of the besieged French the squadron of Pustoshkin took from the shore all of the 
landing force of Gamen (250 Russian grenadiers and 180 Ottomans), raised the 
anchor and sailed off.103 Mangourit, when writing about this, says that for some 
unknown reason the Russo-Ottoman squadron on 22 June 1799 (4 Messidor an VII) 
evacuated Senigallia and moved towards the south.104 
 
Because of the news that the large French fleet of Admiral Bruix, consisting of 
19 ships of the line, 7 frigates and 6 smaller ships departed in May 1799 from Brest 
to the Mediterranean, and considering the possibility that the French fleet would join 
forces with the Spanish one, Ushakov ordered all his squadrons to gather again in 
                                                 
101 Excerpt from report of Admiral Ushakov to Paul I dated 5 July / 24 June 1799. Moskovskie 
Vedomosti, 28 / 17 August 1799. 
102 Mangourit, Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 1, pp. 206-207.  
103 ‘P. V. Pustoshkin to the Vice President of the Admiralty Board (Admiralteistv-Kollegiia) G. G. 
Kushelev, 20 / 9 June 1799’  Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, p. 25; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 
1799, Vol.1, p. 488. 
104 Mangourit, Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 1, p. 212. 
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Corfu. The squadron of Pustoshkin came to Corfu on 26 June and Sorokin, who 
operated at the shores of the Southern Italy, arrived two days later, on 28 June.  
 
By July 1799 Ushakov’s forces gathered completely (not counting the squadron 
of Count Voinovich, which on 7 July was sent to continue the blockade of Ancona), 
as the squadron of Captain Lieutenant Vlito, which was carrying the French prisoners 
taken in Corfu to Toulon, returned on 24 July.105 Quite soon, though, the Russian and 
the Ottoman ships once again appeared at the shores of the Neapolitan kingdom. This 
time it was not just smaller squadrons, but the whole Russo-Ottoman allied fleet at 
the head with Ushakov and Kadir Bey which had departed from Corfu on 4 August 
1799 and moved to the Sicily, except for 2 Russian ships (“Bogoiavleniie” and 
“Sviataia Troitsa”), 2 Ottoman frigates and 2 Ottoman corvettes, which remained on 
Corfu for repair.106 
 
On 14 August 1799 the whole Ushakov’s squadron came to Messina. The 
Russian part of the allied fleet consisted of 6 ships of the line (“Sviatoi Pavel”, 
“Mikhail”, “Zakharii”, “Simeon i Anna”, “Maria Magdalina”, “Sviatoi Piotr”), 3 
frigates (“Grigorii”, “Mikhail”, “Nikolai”) and 4 smaller dispatch ships (aviso). The 
Ottoman squadron included 4 ships of the line, 3 frigates, 1 corvette and 1 kırlangıç. 
Apart from this, the squadron of the Baltic ships under the command of Vice 
Admiral Kartsov (the ships of the line “Isidor”, “Asia”, “Pobeda” and frigate 
“Pospeshniy”), sent earlier from Portsmouth to the Mediterranean, arrived on 15 
August at Palermo. Kartsov informed Ushakov that the alarm about the appearance 
in the Mediterranean of the squadron of Admiral Bruix proved to be exaggerrated, 
                                                 
105 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 866. 
106 ‘F. F. Ushakov to N. D. Voinovich, 5 August / 25 July 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 
3, pp. 80-81; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.2, p. 435.  
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and it became known that Bruix went back to Brest and thus that there were no actual 
threat of encounter with the united Franco-Spanish large naval force.107    
 
From Messina Ushakov sent a part of his ships to the Ligurian Sea, to patrol the 
shores of Genoa and Livorno, and another squadron of the allied ships was to be sent 
to Naples to help the detachment of Captain Lieutenant Baillie, which still remained 
there. At this time the Ottoman crews refused to be detached from the main fleet and 
sent on any distant missions. As a result, Ushakov had to dıspatch only the Russian 
ships. Three Russian frigates (“Nikolai”, “Mikhail”, “Grigorii Velikiia Armenii”) of 
Captain Alexander Andreievich Sorokin went to Naples, and Vice Admiral Pavel 
Vasilievich Pustoshkin with two ships (“Mikhail”, “Simeon i Anna”) and two 
dispatch vessels (aviso) sailed to cruise near Genoa and Livorno.108 
 
The rest of the allied fleet, including the Ottoman squadron, late in August 
moved to Palermo, where it arrived in the first days of September.109 Among the 
ships, which came to Palermo, there were 4 Russian ships of the line (“Sviatoi 
Pavel”, “Zakhariy i Yelizaveta”, “Sviatoi Piotr”, “Maria Magdalina”), one Russian 
dispatch ship (“Panagia Apotumengana”), while the Ottoman squadron of Kadir Bey 
                                                 
107 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 22 / 11 August, 179’. AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with 
Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 895, f. f. 74-75. 
108 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.2, p. 435-36; Along with the mentioned Russian ships, Ushakov 
planned to send to Genoa also one Ottoman ship and two Ottoman frigates. See: ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. 
S. Tomara, 22 / 11 August, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 
895, f. 74 ob.; ‘P. V. Pustoshkin to A. V. Suvorov, 10 September / 30 August 1799’ (A report about 
the arrival of Pustoshkin’s squadron to Livorno). Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, pp. 118-19.  
109 According to the letter of F. F. Ushakov, written to Tomara on 22 August 1799, the allied fleet 
departed for Palermo on that very day, i. e. on 22 August: ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 22 / 11 
August, 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 895, f. 74 ob. 
Arkas says that the fleet left Messina on 31 August: Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 869. 
The day of arrival is more or less the same in different sources: 1 September (Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 
1799, Vol.2, p. 436; Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, p. 118; Moskovskie Vedomosti, 14 / 2 
November 1799) or 2 September (Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 869). In view of the fact 
that the distance by sea between Messina and Palermo is about 200 km it is most probably that the 
date provided in the letter of Ushakov is more reliable than that given by Arkas. So, the date of 
departure from Messina and arrival to Palermo should be 22 August 1799 and 1 September 1799. 
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consisted of 4 ships of the line, 3 frigates, one corvette and one kırlangıç. As the 
Ottoman crews refused to be sent to the Ligurian Sea or Naples, the bulk of the Kadir 
Bey’s squadron by the early September 1799 was lying at anchor in Palermo, apart 
from those two Ottoman frigates and two corvettes that remained for repair on Corfu 
as well as one ship (Captain Zeynel) and one corvette (Captain Mustafa) that had 
sailed with Voinovich to Ancona.  
 
Having arrived in Palermo, Ushakov was planning to go on 11 September to 
Malta, still not taken and besieged by the allies. However, upon the request of the 
Neapolitan government and personally King Ferdinand IV, who on 5 September 
visited Ushakov’s flagship,110 Ushakov decided to sail towards Naples, in order to 
take the capital of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, where the situation was still 
uneasy, under control.111 Yet, at the very point of departure, the Ottoman crews 
refused to move any further and demanded from their commanders to return to 
Constantinople. The argument was that the expedition continues longer than usual 
and that during this time the families of the Ottoman sailors have to live in want and 
misery. The revolt had started already in Messina, but then the crews had been 
persuaded to continue expedition on condition that they would remain with the main 
fleet and would not be sent on any specific and distant missions.112 Furthermore, as it 
is clear from the report of Tomara to the Tsar, the Ottoman sailors might have been 
promised that the crews would be changed within a month.113 
 
                                                 
110 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.3, p. 598. 
111 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to A. V. Suvorov, 12 / 1 September, 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, 
p. 120. 
112 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 13 / 2 September 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, p. 
121.   
113 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 27 / 16 September 1799’. AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with 
Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 895, f. 64 ob. 
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In Palermo the Ottoman crews mutinied once again, and this time it became 
impossible to make them to change their minds. The mutiny was triggered by a 
serious conflict, the reasons of which are still yet unclear, that took place on 8 
Sepetember 1799114 between the Ottomans and the local inhabitants of Palermo. 
Ushakov reported, that in the fight there were 14 killed, 53 wounded and up to 40 
missing Ottomans.115 At the same time Tomara in his report to Paul I spoke about up 
to 400 killed and wounded Ottomans.116 Following the clash with the Palermitans, 
one part of the Ottoman squadron, being supported by Vice Admiral Patrona Bey, 
decided to sail back home.117 The Commander of the Ottoman fleet had no other 
option as to write to Ushakov about the reasons of his departure, asking the Russian 
Admiral to give him some written document testifying that Kadir Bey left Palermo 
by force of circumstances and not upon his own wish.118 Ushakov visited the flagship 
of Kadir Bey and tried himself to persuade the Ottoman sailors to stay, though to no 
avail.119 On 12 September in the morning the Ottoman squadron raised anchor and 
sailed away from the harbour of Palermo. Ushakov with only Russian ships left, in 
two days set out to Naples.120 
 
Having sailed as far as about 60 miles (96,5 km) off from the Sicilian coast, 
Kadir Bey managed to persuade his squadron to return and the whole night the 
Ottoman ships were going back to Palermo. On the next morning, though, it 
                                                 
114 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.2, p. 438. 
115 ‘F. F. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, 13 / 2 September 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, p. 
121. 
116 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 12 / 1 October 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 896, f. 1ob. 
117 Ibidem. 
118 ‘Kadir Bey to F. F. Ushakov, 11 September / 31 august 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 
3, pp. 119-20. 
119 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.2, p. 439. 
120 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to A. V. Suvorov, 12 / 1 September, 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, 
p. 120; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.2, p. 439. 
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appeared that two ships were missing. It was decided to look for those ships, and 
finally they were found as the Ottoman fleet came on 19 September to Corfu. By 
then, the majority of the crew had already abandoned the ships and had run away to 
the Albanian shore.121 Thereupon the fleet of Kadir Bey received the orders to return 
to the Dardanelles and Constantinople.122 It is worth of attention that the crews of the 
Ottoman fleet upon their arrival to the capital not only stayed unpunished for mutiny, 
but were even rewarded by the Sultan who sent them one hundred “Venetian purses”, 
or 50 thousand piastres.123            
 
At the same time when the bulk of the Ottoman navy returned back home and 
the main body of the Russian ships of Ushakov sailed to Naples and the Ligurian 
Sea, it should be remembered that the smaller Russo-Ottoman squadron was still 
operating in the Adriatic Sea near Ancona. As already said earlier, the allied 
squadron of Pustoshkin sent in May to Ancona by the end of June was recalled back 
to Corfu. Soon after Pustoshkin having gathered all his ships and landing troops 
sailed on 22 June 1799 away, the French in a few weeks reoccupied the towns taken 
by the Russo-Ottoman forces in May-June. In early July the French were again in the 
surrounding towns of Senigallia, Fano, Fossombrone (about 60 km to the northwest 
of Ancona) and Macerata (35 km to the south of Ancona).124    
 
 Quite soon, though, the Russian and the Ottoman ships appeared near Ancona 
again to continue the blockading of the city and patrolling of the Adriatic Sea. On 7 
                                                 
121 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, pp. 869-70. 
122 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 12 / 1 October 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 896, f. 1ob; ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to A. R. Vorontsov, 11 November 1799’ Arkhiv kniazia 
Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 1881), Vol. 20, pp. 282-84. 
123 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 28 / 17 December 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Relations of Russia with 
Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 896, f. f. 42-42 ob. 
124 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 615. 
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July Ushakov sent to Ancona Commander Count Marko Ivanovich Voinovich, at the 
head of 4 frigates (3 Russian, “Kazanskaia Bogoroditsa”, “Navarkhiia”, “Soshestviie 
Sviatogo Dukha” and 1 Ottoman (Captain Zeynel), 1 Russian brig and 1 Ottoman 
corvette (Captain Mustafa), with total crews of 1200 Russians and 300 Ottomans.125 
Voinovich arrived at Ancona on 23 July, left there one Russian frigate (“Soshestviie 
Sviatogo Dukha”) and one Ottoman corvette, and then sailed along the coast in 
search for a suitable place for descent. Here Voinovich learned that Senigallia and 
Fano once more fell into the hands of the French.126    
 
On 25 July 1799 Voinovich disembarked near Pesaro the detachment of 430 
sailors and soldiers (280 Russians and 150 Ottomans) with 5 cannons, under the 
command of Captain Sytin. This force was joined by 200 locals with 2 canons and by 
40 Austrian hussars. At night the allied troops moved on Fano, and at dawn on 26 
July started an assault on the town. The naval squadron supported the attack by the 
artillery fire from the seaside. In two days Fano capitulated.127 The casualties of the 
allied force were 64 men (Russians: 16 killed, 26 wounded; Ottomans: 7 killed, 15 
wounded).128 Thereafter, on 2 August, the Voinovich with frigate “Navarkhiia” and 
one Ottoman frigate (one Ottoman corvette was left to blockade Ancona) proceeded 
to Senigallia129, whereas the landing party (reinforced and consisting now of 387 
Russians and 160 Ottomans, plus 200 men of local militia and 6 cannons) was 
transferred under command of Commander Thomas Messer (like Baillie, a British 
                                                 
125 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.1, p. 616; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, pp. 866-67. 
126 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799,Vol.1, p. 616; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 874. 
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naval officer in the Russian service, called Foma Fomich by Russians)130 and 
marched towards Senigallia on land. The French left the town without fighting and 
retreated to Ancona.131 
 
The siege of Ancona proper began on 12 August, when the city was encircled 
both from the land and the sea. The garrison of the Ancona fortress, commanded by 
General Jean-Charles Monnier, consisted partly of the French and partly of the 
Italian troops of the Cisalpine Republic, numbering up to about 3 thousand men. All 
fortifications and artillery batteries of Ancona had up to 700 pieces of cannonry. As 
for the allies, their forces consisted of the Russo-Ottoman detachment of 900 men of 
Messer along with around 6 thousand of irregular Italian militia of General Lahoz 
that took up positions on the seven batteries erected in the vicinity of the city and 
equipped with 30 cannons of heavy calibre taken to the shore from the ships. Apart 
from that, upon the request of Lahoz, Voinovich sent him additionally from the 
Russo-Ottoman squadron 112 Russians and 60 Ottomans (commanded by Lieutenant 
Papastavro, and since 18 August by Lieutenant Ratmanov).132    
  
In the morning on 18 August about 40 French soldiers approached the 
advanced posts of the Italian militias and made it known that about 500 men, 
unsatisfied with their present situation, decided on the next night to surrender to the 
allies under the veil of a sortie from the fortress. Suspecting some ruse de guerre and 
trying to be on the safe side, Voinovich again strengthened the detachment of 
Ratmanov with 130 men (60 Russians and 70 Ottomans). In the early morning hours 
                                                 
130 Additional biographical information on Messer is available at: G. A. Leer (ed.) Entsiklopediia 
voennykh i morskikh nauk (8 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1883-1895), Vol. 5, p. 141; Voenniy 
Entsiklopedicheskiy Leksikon (14 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1837-1850), Vol. 8, pp. 613-14. 
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132 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 2, pp. 448-49. 
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of 18 August the French did make a sortie, drove back the picquets of Italian 
militiamen, but to their surprise were stopped by the reinforced Russo-Ottomans and 
had to retreat to the fortress. During this action the allied casualties were 50 killed 
militiamen, and the Russo-Ottoman detachment of Ratmanov lost 6 killed. 
Consequently the French sorties occurred almost every night, the most serious of 
these took place on 27 August when 11 Russians and 6 Ottomans were killed, as well 
as 6 Russians and 2 Ottomans were wounded.133 Lieutenant Ratmanov reported well 
on the fighting qualities of the Ottomans in his diary, saying that  
“in this memorable war our the most faithful and the most zealous allies 
were the Turks... Was it a sortie or a combat, they always tried to 
facilitate the task of our soldiers and fearlessly attacked the enemy. I was 
in command of them for 69 days and every day I was assured in their 
devotion to the Russians. In general, the Turks had blind obedience to 
me”.134  
 
The siege of Ancona continued thus throughout August and September. Twice the 
commander of the Russo-Ottoman squadron Voinovich proposed the French garrison 
to surrender. The letter addressed to the commandant of the fortress General 
Monnier, dated 21 September 1799, was handed over to the French on 27 September 
1799. Voinovich pointed out that any further resistance would only bring new deaths 
and new hardships, and in view of the French defeats in the Northern Italy would be 
in any case futile.135 The short response of the French general was that “l’intention de 
la garnison et la mienne est de se défendre jusqu’à extinction”.136 
 
                                                 
133 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 2, p. 450. 
134 “... в достопамятную войну сию самые верные и самые усердные союзники наши были 
турки. Командуя ими 69 дней, я каждый день испытывал их в приверженности к русским. 
Делелась ли вылазка, перепалка- во всех случаях они старались облегчить наших и с 
неустрашимостью стремились на неприятеля... Вообще турки имели ко мне слепое 
послушание.” Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 3, pp. 604-5. 
135 The text of Voinovich’s letter to General Monnier has been in extenso given at: Mangourit, 
Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 2, pp. 55-56.  
136 Mangourit, Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 2, p. 56. 
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By the end of September – early October 1799 near Ancona appeared the 8 
thousand Austrian corps of General Frölich, which came from the Northern Italy. 
Frölich himself came to the walls of Ancona on 14 October. The arrival of the 
significant allied force would normally presuppose the speedy fall of the fortress, but 
in fact it brought only serious disagreements among the allies. For about one month 
the Austrians were negotiating with the garrison of Ancona secretly from their allies. 
Fröhlich preferred, much to the anger of the Russian commander, to use the fruits of 
more of the siege made by the Russo-Ottoman force and to conclude on 13 
November 1799 a capitulation with the French only in the name of Austria, without 
ever mentioning the Russians or the Ottomans.137 Voinovich was just post factum 
informed about this and was sent the final text of capitulation, made on the most 
favourable terms for the French garrison. The French were allowed to leave the 
fortress with all properties and all military honours, drums beating and the colours 
flying, and to march by land to France.  
 
As the French came out of Ancona on 14 November, Fröhlich occupied the 
fortress with the Austrian troops and refused to let the Russians and the Ottomans in. 
Voinovich in his turn ordered Lieutenant Ratmanov to sail towards the quayside of 
Ancona and raise at dawn the Russian and the Ottoman flags. Also, the commander 
of the landing troops Commander Messer was to enter the fortress, to occupy guard 
positions and to raise the Russian and the Ottoman flags there. Ratmanov carried out 
the orders, while Messer’s troops were not accepted inside the fortress.  
 
                                                 
137 The text of capitulation is available at: Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 3, pp. 612-17; Mangourit, 
Défense d’Ancone, Vol. 2, pp. 170-82. 
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On the next morning an event occurred, which seriously damaged the relations 
between the allies and precipitated Russia’s withdrawal from the Second coalition. 
The Austrians at the order of Fröhlich by force hauled down the Russian and the 
Ottoman flags, and raised the Austrian ones. At that the Russian guardsmen were 
disarmed and one Russian officer, Lieutenant Tsamutali, was arrested.138 To the 
protests of the Russian side General Fröhlich answered that according to the 
capitulation concluded with the French garrison the fortress, the city and the quay 
were surrendered solely to the Austrian troops.  
 
The Russians and personally Ushakov had no other option but to report about 
the behaviour of the Austrian General to the Emperor Paul I. By the end of the year 
Russia would leave the Second coalition and the squadron of Ushakov would get the 
orders to return to the Black Sea ports. On the other hand, Paul I was quite satisfied 
with his Ottoman allies, and two Ottoman naval commanders participating in the 
siege of Ancona were granted special presents for their services by the Russian 
Emperor. Captain Zeynel was sent a gold watch, whereas Captain Süleyman was 
presented a saber.139 
 
With the final departure of the Ottoman fleet from Palermo on 12 September 
1799 and the end of the siege of Ancona in mid-November 1799, the heyday of the 
Russo-Ottoman joint military operations in the Mediterranean was over. The force of 
Ushakov, reduced to only the Russian ships, still remained at the shores of Italy but 
its further operations were to be conducted without the Ottomans.  
 
                                                 
138 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 2, p. 459; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 879-80. 
139 ‘The Highest Rescript to Admiral F. F. Ushakov, 29 / 18 December 1799’ Materialy dlia istorii 
russkogo flota (MIRF) (17 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1865-1904), Vol. 16, p. 410. 
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On 19 September Ushakov came to Naples and disembarked there the 
detachment of 818 men under Colonel Skipor and Lieutenant Balabin. Immediately 
the Russians, along with a Neapolitan force of 1500 men, began to prepare for the 
march on Rome, controlled by the French and the pro-French government of the 
Roman Republic. However, soon the news came that the British naval commander 
Troubridge had already accepted the capitulation of the garrison of Rome on the 
most favourable conditions for the French on 27 September. Troubridge, who was in 
Naples when Ushakov arrived there, hastened to sail to Civita Vecchia (80 km 
northwest of Rome) and behind the back of Ushakov opened negotiations with the 
French before the Russian troops could approach Rome. The French, not even 
considered to be prisoners of war, were transported on the British ships back to 
France with all military honours and with the war booty in a few days.140  
 
Upon receiving the news of what had been done by Troubridge, Ushakov at 
first wished to recall his troops, but then at the request of Cardinal Ruffo agreed not 
to cancel the march on Rome. On 11 October 1799 the Russians under Colonel 
Skipor for the first time in history entered the Eternal City. After staying in Rome for 
about one month, the Russian detachment was ordered by Ushakov to return to 
Naples, where it came back on 16 November.141 The squadron of Ushakov (7 ships, 
one frigate and 8 smaller vessels) left Naples on the last day of 1799 and was already 
on its way to Malta when in Messina on 2 January 1800 was received the order of 
Paul I, prescribing Ushakov to take all the Russian troops still remaining on Corfu 
                                                 
140 Tarle, Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom more, pp. 216-17; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 2, 
pp. 441-42. 
141 N. D. Kallistov, ‘Flot v tsarstvovaniie imperatora Pavla’ Istoriia Rossiiskogo flota (Moscow, 
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241 
and return to the Black Sea ports. So, instead of Malta Ushakov on 8 January 1800 
sailed off from Messina to Corfu.142 
6.3. Republic of Seven Islands in the Ottoman-Russian Relations 
The Seven Islands Republic, as is known, appeared in the wake of the joint 
Russo-Ottoman naval expedition that took place within the framework of the Second 
anti-French coalition. The Convention of 2 April (21 March)143 1800, which had 
been concluded between Russia and the Porte, stipulated the establishment of an 
autonomous republic on the islands, guaranteed by the Russian and the Ottoman 
empires. As it was agreed by both sides, the Ionian Islands were to be placed under 
the formal suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan whereas the position of the principal 
guarantor of the rights and territorial integrity of the newly created republic was 
delegated to the Russian Tsar.144 In this way, in the maelstrom of the European 
coalition wars of the late 18th- early 19th centuries the precedent of the creation of the 
first Greek state in the modern European history occurred. 
 
Regarding highly important strategic location of the Ionian islands it is 
advisable to recall the famous and often quoted words of General Bonaparte, who yet 
in summer 1797 wrote to the Directory from his headquarters in Milan that the 
islands of Corfu, Zante and Cefalonia are of more interest for France than even the 
whole of Italy, and the possession of the Ionian Islands would enable France either to 
                                                 
142 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, pp. 883-84; Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 2, p. 501. 
With that, some Russian ships were still remaining in Italy. Three frigates under Sorokin stayed for 
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relates to the Julian calendar, or, for the French documents, the French Republican calendar.  
144 Konventsiia, zakliuchennaia v Konstantinopolie mezhdu Rossiyeyu i Portoyu Ottomanskoyu o 
Respublike sed’mi soiedinennykh ostrovov. PSZRI, Vol. XXVI, № 19336, columns 88-92.  
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support the existence of the Ottoman Empire or to take its share as the latter would 
fall apart.145 By the time when Bonaparte was writing these lines the French troops 
had already de facto occupied the former Venetian islands, and finally the Ionian 
Islands passed under the French rule in accordance with the Franco-Austrian peace 
treaty, signed on 17 October 1797 near the village of Campo Formio (nowadays 
Campoformido) in the North-Eastern Italy.  Having taken over the islands France 
received a convenient base for its naval forces as well as a strategic foothold for 
possible attack on the Balkan possessions of the Ottomans. The Ionian Islands were 
chosen as the immediate aim of the Russo-Ottoman naval expedition, and were 
eventually cleared from the French on 3 March (20 February) 1799, the date of the 
capitulation of the fortress of Corfu.146 
 
Upon the successful completion of the Ionian campaign Admiral Ushakov with 
the bulk of his joint Russo-Ottoman force stayed on Corfu from March through July 
1799. Now when all the military objectives had been accomplished, the Russian 
Admiral was also to take care of a great number of organisational issues, from now 
on concerning not only the current needs of his own squadron but relating to nothing 
less than the establishment of the provisional Ionian government and defining the 
principles of the future political existence of the islands. Until the Russian and the 
Ottoman governments continued their debates upon the fate of the Ionian 
                                                 
145 General Bonaparte to the Executive Directory of the French Republic, 16 Aug. 1797 (29 
Thermidor an V). Correspondance de apoléon Ier (Paris: Henri Plon et J. Dumaine, 1859). Vol.3, № 
2103, p.235. Word for word the future Emperor, and at the time a talented and successful General, 
wrote the following: “Les îles de Corfu, de Zante et de Céphalonie sont plus intéressantes pour nous 
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l’Italie à l’Empereur et garder les quatre îles, qui sont une source de richesse et de prospérité pour 
notre commerce. L’Empire des Turcs s’écroule tous les jours; la possession de ces îles nous mettra à 
même de le soutenir autant que cela sera possible, ou d’en prendre notre part”. 
146 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 1, p. 112.  
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archipelago, Ushakov appeared in a situation when it was necessary to take practical 
decisions on the spot.  
 
For the purpose of keeping the civil peace and stability one of the first actions 
of Ushakov after the capture of Corfu was to proclaim general amnesty. On 4 March 
1799 the joint proclamation of Ushakov and Kadir Bey, issued both in Italian and 
Greek, guaranteed all the inhabitants the full pardon for cooperation with the French, 
and the respect for their religion and private property.147 At the orders of the Russian 
commander a constituent assembly consisting of 15 members, termed a Senate, 
convened at Corfu in May and drafted a project of a Constitution, known as the 
“Ushakov Constitution”. The final version of the project of Constitution had been 
approved on 27 May 1799 and was distinctive by giving suffrage to both the nobility 
and the commoners (those meeting the income qualification requirements).148 One 
had to wait, though, what kind of decision regarding the future of the Ionian Islands 
would be taken by the Russian and the Ottoman governments. In the meantime, the 
squadron of Ushakov left Corfu on 4 August 1799 and sailed off to Messina to 
continue the campaign in Italy.    
 
Before the Ionian campaign of the Russo-Ottoman naval forces was completed 
the allied governments necessarily were to discuss the future political status of the 
isles. The negotiations on this question started as early as October 1798 when the 
Porte proposed three alternative solutions. These were to transfer the isles to some 
secondary state (what could mean only the Kingdom of Naples); to establish an 
                                                 
147 Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deiatel’nost’ F. F. Ushakova, p. 132. 
148 Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deiatel’nost’ F. F. Ushakova, pp. 139-40. For a detailed account of 
this Constitution and the circumstances of its creation see the chapter ‘F. F. Ushakov I ionicheskaia 
konstitutsiia 1799 g.g. in: Stanislavskaia, Politicheskaia deiatel’nost’ F. F. Ushakova, pp. 127-80. 
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aristocratic republic (like that of Ragusa, bound by nominal vassalage to the Ottoman 
Sultan, but having an independent self-administration and enjoying the right to 
conduct its own foreign policy); to organise the administration of the isles on the 
model of the Danubian principalities dependent from the Ottoman Empire.149 As 
regards these solutions the preferences of the Sultan and the Tsarist government were 
rather different.  
 
Whereas in St. Petersburg spoke in favour of the establishment of an 
aristocratic republic on the islands, on the shores of the Bosporus it would be more 
preferable to see the Ionian islands in the status similar to that of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, i. e. in a vassal tributary relationship to the Porte, with the right of the 
latter to appoint the rulers of these dependent territories at its own discretion. By a 
long established tradition, the hospodars of the Danubian principalities were chosen 
among the narrow group of rich Greek families of the Ottoman capital, closely 
associated with the Sultan’s court, the so called Phanariotes (named after the district  
of Phanar (Fener) in the European part of Constantinople). As the practice of the 
Danubian principalities showed, such appointments were a serious source of corrupt 
practices and had led to the enrichment of the Ottoman ruling elite by means of 
bribes on the part of the contenders to the position of the hospodar. Sure enough, as 
indicated by Tomara,150 the idea to turn the Ionian islands into yet another milch cow 
for the Ottoman treasury and some particular high-ranking officials appeared the 
                                                 
149 J. L. McKnight, Russia and the Ionian Islands, 1798-1807. The Conquest of the Islands and Their 
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most inviting for the Porte, as well as had its zealous supporters among the Greek 
elite of Constantinople. 
 
Aside from that, during the negotiations became clear the wish of the Sultan’s 
government to include the island of Santa Maura (Lefkada) into the Ottoman borders.  
The line of argument of the Ottoman side was that this island is so close to the 
mainland that it should be considered rather a part of the continent than a separate 
island and for that reason excluded from the Ionian archipelago. The Ottomans also 
thought it possible not to count the islands of Cerigo (Kythira) and Cerigotto 
(Antikythira) among the Ionian Islands for being too remote from the rest of the 
archipelago. In regard to these issues the Russian ambassador V. S. Tomara had to 
have special discussions in Constantinople, striving to secure the incorporation of the 
mentioned islands into the future Ionian state.151 As far as the Ottoman government 
was concerned, the Russian unwillingness to accept the idea of establishment on the 
Ionian Islands of a principality, which would be dependent to the Porte on the model 
of Moldavia and Wallachia, brought about the growing discontent with Russia 
among some of the Ottoman officials. The muted grumbling in Constantinople 
concerned the big sums of money spent to upkeep the Russian naval squadron in the 
Mediterranean and the participation of the Ottoman navy in the military operations in 
Italy, for which the Porte was not likely to get any tangible advantages.152 
 
                                                 
151 ‘V. S. Tomara to F. F. Ushakov, 23 / 12 June 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with 
Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 892, f. f. 63-63 ob.  
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The course of negotiations and their tension153 can be judged by the fact that 
the final Russo-Ottoman Convention about the Ionian Republic had been signed only 
on 2 April (21 March) 1800. It was the approach of the Russian side, which 
eventually prevailed. St. Petersburg, as mentioned previously, advocated the 
autonomy for the Ionian Islands, under the Ottoman suzerainty and the Russian 
guarantorship. The nominal dependence of the newly created Republic of the Seven 
Islands on the Sultan lied only in the fact that it was to pay Constantinople years a 
fixed sum of 75 thousand piastres for every three.154 The Ionian vessels gained the 
right to fly their own flag155, and the Republic could open its own consulates in the 
Ottoman Empire.156 As for the Ionian coast on the mainland, the so called Venetian 
Albania, it passed under the direct rule of the Porte, by conforming all the rights of 
the local Christian population, which was of the mixed Slavic-Greek origin.157 
 
Along with the negotiations of the political future of the Ionian Islands that 
lasted for more than a year the Russians and the Ottomans were also to agree upon 
the issue of garrisoning the fortress of Corfu. As the allied Russo-Ottoman squadron 
of Ushakov during the Ionian campaign occupied the islands of the Ionian 
archipelago one by one, the Russian commander left on each island a mixed garrison 
of equal, even if very small, number of the Russian and the Ottoman soldiers. 
Regarding the fortress of Corfu, right after the French capitulation it was garrisoned 
only by Russians, while the Ottoman forces stayed outside the fortress walls. The 
                                                 
153 The twists and turns of negotiations as well as the internal affairs of the Ionian Islands at this time 
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Ottoman Rear Admiral (Patrona) Şeremet Bey was appointed the governor of the city 
of Corfu, though these duties were de facto performed by Lieutenant Colonel 
Skipor.158 After the departure of all of the squadron to Italy in early August 1799, the 
overall military command passed to Captain A. P. Aleksiano, the commander of 
“Bogoiavleniie Gospodnie”, one of the two Russian ships that remained on Corfu for 
repair. Besides, for the same reason two Ottoman frigates and two Ottoman corvettes 
were also left on Corfu.159 Meanwhile, the negotiations over the garrison for Corfu 
finally resulted in the agreement that the number of the garrison troops would be 700 
Russians and 700 Ottomans. Ambassador Tomara especially instructed Ushakov that 
the Ottomans should not be accepted inside the fortress other than together with the 
same number of Russians.160 In addition, the regiment of Lieutenant General Mikhail 
Mikhailovich Borozdin161, appointed to serve as the guard at the Neapolitan court 
and consisting of 1656 men, 8 cannons and 200 horses, arrived at Corfu on 27 
November 1799.162 Waiting for departure to Naples, Borozdin assumed the post of 
the commandant of the Corfu fortress.163 
 
Throughout the summer of 1799, as long as the navigation season in the Black 
Sea allowed, the Ottoman capital was witnessing on a regular basis the arrival of the 
Russian transport ships, loaded with provisions and other necessary materials for 
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Ushakov’s squadron, stationed on Corfu. The archive of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry in Moscow contains a portfolio with correspondence of the ambassador 
Tomara and the captains of the transport ships of the Black Sea fleet, which were 
visiting Constantinople during the mentioned period. If summarized, the information 
provided in the reports of the Russian captains could be presented in the following 
table:   
Table 6. The Russian transport ships that arrived at Constantinople in summer 1799. 
AVPRI. Fond 90. Constantinople Mission. Op. 90/1. Delo 1399. Correspondence of 
Ambassador Tomara with commanders of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet 
[Переписка Томары с командующими судов Черноморского флота], f. f. 51-93.  
Date of arrival Name of the ship Cargo 
29/18 May 1799 Schooner N2, commander 
Lieutenant Mikhayla Minitskii 
Not indicated, most 
probably the dispatch 
vessel 
12/1 June 1799 Schooner N2, commander 
Lieutenant Mikhayla Minitskii 
Not indicated, most 
probably the dispatch 
vessel 
16/5 June 1799 Frigate “Sviatoi Nikolai” Provisions: oil, meat, 
peas, cereals 
17/6 June 1799 Transport vessel “Pospeshnyi” Provisions: Peas, cereals, 
oil, wine, biscuits, malt, 
vinegar, salt  
24/13 June 1799 Transport vessel “Grigorii” Munitions: Bombs and 
cannon balls for the High 
Porte; 
Provisions: Biscuits 
Other: Ship ropes 
(The commander asks to 
pick up his load, for he 
has to return to Nikolaiev) 
1 July /20 June 
1799 
Scow (gabare) “Platon” Provisions: Wine, peas, 
oil, cereals (buckwheat, 
millet, peeled barley), 
butter, meat in salt 
Other: Clothes, soles for 
shoes 
Munitions: cannon balls, 
grapeshot 
27/16 July 1799 Transport vessel “Grigorii” Munitions: Bombs and 
cannon balls for the High 
Porte; 
Provisions: Biscuits 
Other: Ship ropes 
(the Register is almost 
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identical to that of 24 
June) 
4 August / 24 
July 1799 
Scow (gabare) “Iosif”, commander 
Captain-Lieutenant [Os]okin 
Provisions: Wine, peas, 
oil, cereals (buckwheat, 
millet, peeled barley) 
Clothing: Red cloth, white 
cloth, canvas, buckles, 
ribbons, lacings, ties, hats, 
buttons 
Other: whetting stones, 
sheet lead, candles, 
hammers, spades, needles, 
thimbles, crowbars, bit-
braces, chisels, pincers, 
saws, nails, writing paper, 
chalk, pencils  
Books: Gospels, Apostles, 
Prayer-books  
Munitions: Bombs, 
cannon balls, grapeshot 
(of various calibres)   
12/1 August 1799 Transport vessel “Grigorii”, 
Captain-Lieutenant Iazykov 
Munitions: bombs, cannon 
balls 
Provisions: biscuits 
“Delivered to the Turks on 
the merchant ship the 
bombs, the cannon balls 
and biscuits” 
25/14 August 
1799 
Schooner N2, commander 
Lieutenant Mikhayla Minitskii 
Not indicated, most 
probably the dispatch 
vessel 
 
By the end of 1799 the Emperor Paul I, disillusioned with his British and 
Austrian allies after the numerous examples of their much insulting for Russia 
conduct, decided to leave the Second coalition and recall from Europe all his troops.  
At the beginning of 1800 the army of Suvorov, heretofore operating against the 
French in the Northern Italy and Switzerland, marched back to Russia.164 The 
squadron of Admiral Ushakov, which throughout 1799 had also been engaged in 
hostilities against the French in the Adriatics and Italy, was ordered to leave the 
Mediterranean and return to the Black Sea ports.  
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As mentioned earlier, in accordance with the order of Paul I, dated 4 December 
(23 November) 1799 and received by Ushakov on 5 January 1800, the Russian 
Admiral on 8 January left Messina and moved to Corfu, where he arrived on 19 
January.165 Also in January, but somewhat earlier than Ushakov, the newly appointed 
Ottoman representative Kapıcı Başı Mustafa Ağa, with 250 Ottoman soldiers arrived 
in Corfu.166 Judging by the letters of Ushakov written to Tomara, the relations 
between the Russian Admiral and the Ottoman official from the very beginning were 
not too cordial. Mustafa Ağa had been accused of showing little respect to his 
Russian allies and personally to Ushakov. According to the Russian Admiral, after 
all his attempts to maintain good relations with the Ottoman official, Mustafa Ağa 
still knew no gratitude. Despite the fact that the Ottoman troops were admitted inside 
the fortress and Mustafa Ağa was given the house prepared and always preserved for 
Ushakov, while Ushakov took a modest house outside the walls of the fortress, the 
Ottoman official reported to the Porte explicitly false and defamatory information 
about the Russians. When asked by Ushakov, Mustafa Ağa answered that he was 
writing his report hurryingly and did not make yet all the necessary enquiries about 
the situation on the island.  
 
Among the complaints of Mustafa Ağa, which incurred the displeasure of the 
Russian Admiral, were those concerning the belated allocation of a house for the 
Ottoman representative and the alleged confiscation by the Russians of all the 
cannons in the fortress. Ushakov in his turn reported, that Mustafa Ağa was 
demanding the best house in the fortress, that the house he was eventually given was 
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kept for Ushakov until his arrival at Corfu, and for that reason could not be given to 
the Ottoman official earlier. As for the cannons of the Corfu fortress, according to 
Ushakov, the Russians did not take anything except for some cannons to change the 
broken ones.167 The petty misunderstandings between the Russian and the Ottoman 
commanders continued, when Mustafa Ağa did not stand up at Ushakov’s departure 
after their audience or demanded the Russian squadron to fire a salute on the 
occasion of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan.168            
 
In no time the patience of Ushakov seemed to be exhausted, as he wrote to 
Tomara that “this man (i.e. Kapıcı Başı Mustafa Ağa) appears to be bribed by 
someone in order to bring about the troubles and upset the friendship”.169 Regarding 
the demand of Mustafa Ağa for the Russians to fire a salute on Ramadan, Ushakov 
commented it in this way: “his various incongruous demands make me believe that 
he is insane”.170 In the end, Ushakov asked Tomara to report about the behaviour of 
Mustafa Ağa to the Porte so that the latter would send someone with more delicate 
manners.171 What is more, the majority of the Corfiotes were in general much 
dissatisfied with the stay of the Ottoman troops on the island. Finally, it was agreed 
that the Ottoman part of the Corfu garrison would consist of 300 men and any 
additional Ottoman troops would not be supported at the expense of the local 
population.172  
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Two weeks after his return to Corfu, on 1 February 1800, Ushakov received 
new orders from the Tsar, prescribing him to remain on the Ionian Islands and patrol 
the waters of the Central Mediterranean as a precaution against the possible escape of 
General Bonaparte from Egypt.173 The two battalions of Borozdin in the meantime 
left Corfu. On 15 March 1800 they embarked on the squadron of Captain Pustoshkin 
and in four days were landed on the Italian soil in Otranto, in order to serve as the 
palace guard of the Neapolitan King Ferdinand IV.174 Soon after the forces of 
Borozdin departed from Corfu, the Russo-Ottoman Convention of 2 April 1800 
established the autonomous Republic of the Seven Islands. 
 
Since the siege of Malta continued (it surrendered only on 4 September 1800) 
and the rumours of its fall proved to be false, Paul I on 3 June 1800 confirmed his 
earlier orders for Ushakov to sail with all his fleet back to the Black sea ports. 
Ushakov thus charged the squadrons of Pustoshkin, Kartsov, Sorokin and Voinovich, 
still operating in the Mediterranean waters, to return to Corfu. The former two 
arrived on 11 June and 14 June respectively, while the latter two could not come on 
schedule and stayed for some more time in Italy. At the council of war gathered by 
Ushakov, which took place on 13 July 1800, it was decided to leave the two 
battalions of Borozdin together with three frigates of Captain Sorokin in Naples. 
Likewise, on the island of Corfu of all the Russian naval and land forces were left 
only 170 artillerymen and engineers under Lieutenant Colonel Hastfer, appointed a 
commandant of the Corfu fortress.175 On 16 July 1800 Ushakov sailed off from 
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Corfu. After about one month stay in the Ottoman capital the squadron of Ushakov 
returned to Akhtiar (Sevastopol) on 7 November 1800.176 
 
In the next 1801 year, already during the new reign of Alexander I, at the 
meeting of the State Council that took place on 15 June it was decided to recall the 
last remaining Russian troops on Corfu and in Naples.177 By the summer of 1801 
there were no more Russian troops on the Ionian Islands. More than that, after France 
had signed the peace treaty with Russia (on 8 October 1801)178 and the preliminary 
peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire (on 9 October 1801),179 it, according to special 
Russian-French secret convention, also became the guarantor of independence of the 
Ionian state along with Russia. This convention stipulated that no foreign troops 
should stay on the isles.180 In this way, after the Russian Commander in Chief in fact 
wielded the highest administrative authority on the isles during 1799-1800, St. 
Petersburg lost for a while any interest in the Ionian Islands. 
 
The withdrawal of the Russian troops from Corfu resulted in an increased 
anarchy. Majority of population showed openly antagonistic feelings to the Ottomans 
and thus was much displeased at the fact that the isles were placed under the 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The opinion of Uzunçarşılı that supposedly the 
majority of the population of the Republic of the Seven Islands wished to be under 
the Ottoman protectorate while Russia was supported only by a “group of Jacobines” 
                                                 
176 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 2, pp. 505-506.  
177 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol. 3, pp. 656-57. 
178 Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX - nachala XX века. Dokumenty Rossiiskogo Ministerstva 
Inostrannykh Del (Hereafter – VPR) (Moscow, 1960), Vol. 1, pp. 95-97.  
179 Gabriel effendi Noradounghian, Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman (Paris, 1900), 
Vol. 2, pp. 47-48. 
180 ‘Russian-French Secret Convention. 10 October (28 September) 1801. Article 9’ VPR. Vol. 1, pp. 
98-101.  
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181 seems to be at least quite debatable. Apparently, the Ottoman suzerainty was 
supported only by a narrow circle of noblemen, who like the Ottomans were seeking 
the establishment of the state system close to that of the Danube principalities, while 
the majority of the insular population was certainly more sympathetic to their 
Russian coreligionists. 
 
The inhabitants formed among themselves various parties of pro-French, pro-
British and even pro-Ottoman orientation. To restore the internal order on the isles 
Alexander I at the beginning of 1802 took a decision to deploy the Russian corps 
under Lieutenant General Borozdin, which was then staying in Naples, on the Ionian 
Islands again.182 Alongside with that, Count Mocenigo was appointed the special 
Russian representative at the Republic of the Seven Islands, , with respective 
instructions. Particularly noteworthy are the closing words of Alexander I addressed 
to Mocenigo, about the wish of the Russian monarch that his troops “were on the 
Ionian Islands as less as possible and could in the short term return through the Black 
Sea to Russia”.183 
 
As the documents show, neither immediately after the conquest of the islands 
nor later did Russia express any wish by all means to retain the islands under its 
control, contrary to the usual views of the traditional Turkish historiography. So, 
                                                 
181 “...Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti halkı iki kısma ayrılmıştı. Bunların çoğu Osmanlıların himayesini 
istiyorlar ve Yakubin taifesi de Rusların emellerine hizmet eyliyorlardı” İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, 
Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti. Belleten, 1 (1937), p. 635.  
182 ‘Alexander I to V. S. Tomara. 14 / 2 January 1802’ VPR. Vol. 1, pp. 167-68; ‘Alexander I to V. S. 
Tomara. 27 / 15 February 1802’ VPR. Vol. 1, pp. 175-76.    
183 ‘Alexander I to G. D. Mocenigo. 12 March / 28 February 1802’ VPR. Vol. 1, p. 182 (French 
original); p. 184 (Russian translation).  
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Uzunçarşılı believed that Russia, under every pretext, sought to prolong its stay on 
Corfu in order to increase its influence on the Republic of the Seven Islands.184  
 
In view of Karal, another outstanding Turkish historian, after the threat of the 
French aggression had been averted there was no point left in keeping friendship 
with Britain and Russia. On the contrary, the Porte had another task now, which was 
“to free its territories (apparently, Karal refers here also to the Ionian Republic that 
remained under the formal suzerainty of the Sultan; V. M.), occupied by the friendly 
powers”.185 Of the two main allies of the Ottomans, Russia deployed its forces on the 
Ionian Islands and Britain continued to occupy Egypt even after the French withdrew 
their forces from there. For certain, one cannot deny the secret and then open 
discontent of the Ottomans about the deployment  of the two Russian grenadier 
battalions, which heretofore stayed in Naples under command of General Lieutenant 
Borozdin, and since September 1802 were again, commanded now by Colonel 
Fiodor Viktorovich Nazimov186, deployed on the Ionian Islands.187 Once again, after 
less than a year the Russian garrison appeared on Corfu. Here is the list of the officer 
staff of the two composite grenadier battalions, staying at Corfu by 1 February (20 
January) 1803: 
Table 7. The List of the Staff and Company Officers, serving at the two composite 
grenadier battalions, which stay at Corfu. 1 February (20 January) 1803. Russian 
State Military Historical Archive (Российский Государственный Военно-
Исторический Архив), Moscow. (Hereafter RGVIA). Fond 1. Chancellery of the 
War Ministry. Op. 1, Volume 1, Delo 470, f. f. 7-7 ob. 
The Battalion of Colonel azimov 
                                                 
184 “...muhtelif bahanelerle Rusların Korfoda ikametlerini uzatmak istemeleri pek aşikâr olarak yeni 
cumhuriyet üzerindeki nüfuzunu arttırmak içindi” Uzunçarşılı, Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti, p. 637. 
185 “Babı-âli için mevzubahis mesele dost devletlerin işgalinde bulunan toprakları kurtarmak... idi”. 
Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-i Humayunları (Ankara, 1999), p. 81. 
186 Nazimov was granted the rank of Major General on 28 May 1803. Additional information on F. V. 
Nazimov is available at: Slovar’ russkikh generalov, uchastnikov boevykh deistvii protiv armii 
Napoleona Bonaparta v 1812-1815 g.g. In: Rossiiskii arkhiv, Vol. 7. (Moscow), 1996, pp. 487-88. 
187 A. L. Shapiro, Sredizemnomorskiie problemy vneshnei politiki Rossii v nachale XIX v. 
Istoricheskie zapiski, (Moscow, 1956), Vol. 55, pp. 266-67. 
256 
The Commander of the battalion, Colonel 1 
In the companies of the Astrakhan’ Grenadier Regiment 
Colonel 1 
Captains and Staff Captains (Shtabs-Kapitans) 2 
Lieutenants (Poruchiks) 4 
Sub-Lieutenants (Podporuchiks) 2 
Ensign (Praporshchik) 1 
In the companies of the Yaroslavl Musketeer Regiment 
Major 1 
Captain 1 
Lieutenants (Poruchiks) 5 
Sub-Lieutenants (Podporuchiks) 1 
At the Artillery squadron, Lieutenant of Artillery (Artillerii Poruchik) 1 
The Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Zagel (Цагель) 
In the companies of the Noteburg Musketeer Regiment 
The Commander of the battalion, Lieutenant Colonel 1 
Major 1 
Staff Captain (Shtabs-Kapitan) 1 
Lieutenants (Poruchiks) 4 
Sub-Lieutenant (Podporuchik) 1 
In the companies of the Vyborg Musketeer Regiment 
Major 1 
Staff Captains (Shtabs-Kapitans) 2 
Lieutenants (Poruchiks) 4 
Attached to this battalion, from the Musketeer Regiments of Fertsch, Rebinder and 
Miloradovich 
Staff Captain (Shtabs-Kapitan) 1 
Lieutenant (Poruchik) 1 
Ensign (Praporshchik) 1 
At the Artillery squadron 
Sub-Lieutenant of Artillery (Artillerii Podporuchik) 1 
In both battalions 
Sub-Doctors (Podlekar’s) 3 
 
In the meantime the political crisis in Europe was escalating again, and the 
strategic importance of the Ionian Islands once more increased. The Peace of 
Amiens, concluded in March 1802 between Great Britain and France with its 
satellites, proved short-lived and in May 1803 London and Paris again resorted to the 
“last argument of politics”. The possibility of a French landing in the mainland 
Greece appeared not only quite real, but was even expected. This assumption time 
and again can be seen in the copious Russian diplomatic documents of the time.188 In 
                                                 
188 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to A. R. Vorontsov. 26 / 14 June 1803’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (Мoscow: 
Mamontov, 1881), Vol. 20, pp. 292-94; ‘A. R. Vorontsov to A. Ia. Italinskii, 28 / 16 May 1803’ VPR, 
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this respect the only conclusion made by the Russian side was that the Ottoman 
Empire was in no position to counter a potential aggression by the French and in 
order to protect the domains of the Sultan one had to increase the number of the 
Russian forces on the Ionian Islands.  
 
It is worthy of note that both France and Russia were trying to present 
themselves in the eyes of the Sultan as the true friends and defenders of the Ottoman 
Empire, at the same time seeking to frighten the Ottomans respectively with the 
Russian or the French threat. Definitely, neither side could know for sure about the 
exact intentions of the others, and therefore to trust each other. As it has been 
mentioned before, the Russian diplomatic documents of this time are full of 
comments about the necessity to preserve the Ottoman Empire from destruction. A 
good example of such views may serve the in-depth report of A. A. Czartoryski to 
Alexander I, dated 29 / 17 February 1804.189 It was the preservation of Ottoman state 
that was seen the first priority task, and only in the case when despite all the efforts 
the Ottoman Empire would anyway appear on the verge of disintegration, one was to 
be ready for its partition. 
 
For the Ottomans, who could only speculate about the possible aims of their 
potential enemies and allies, both the Russian and French threat looked very real and 
it was not that easy to define which one of the two threats should be taken more 
seriously and what in fact should be expected.  Equally, in words of Shapiro, “the 
                                                                                                                                          
Vol. 1, p.433; ‘A. R. Vorontsov to G. D. Mocenigo. 9 September (28 August) 1803’ VPR, Vol. 1,pp. 
513- 17; ‘A. R. Vorontsov to A. Ia. Italinskii’ VPR, Vol. 1, pp. 530- 31; ‘Report of A. R. Vorontsov. 
24 / 12 November 1803’ Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva (Hereafter – 
SIRIO), (St. Petersburg, 1891), Vol. 77, pp. 410-17; ‘A. R. Vorontsov to S. R. Vorontsov. 2 December 
(20 November) 1803’ VPR, Vol. 1, p. 557.  
189 ‘А. А. Czartoryski to Alexander I. 29 / 17 February 1804’ VPR, Vol. 1, pp. 619-27.  
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Tsarist government did not know for sure whether it would have to defend Turkey 
from Bonaparte’s aggression or to fight with it as an ally of Bonaparte.”190 In both 
cases, however, its Ionian foothold was gaining for St. Petersburg more and more 
importance. For the Porte, on the contrary, the presence of the Russian fleet and the 
Russian troops in the Mediterranean objectively remained a source of constant and 
growing concern. 
6.4. Conclusions 
Throughout the whole winter of 1798-1799 the allied squadron of Ushakov 
continued to besiege the last stronghold of the French on the Ionian Islands, which 
was the fortress of Corfu. Due to the lack of the auxiliary troops and provisions, the 
direct assault was being delayed. The Russian and the Ottoman ships only blockaded 
Corfu from the sea, patrolling all the approaches to the island. The internal crisis of 
the Ottoman Empire and ineffectiveness of the Ottoman state apparatus had largely 
influenced the siege. 
 
In many respects the will of the central Ottoman government, which promised 
Ushakov the help of the local Ottoman pashas from the Balkan mainland with the 
troops and provisions was simply ignored in the provinces. The Ottoman governor of 
Yanina Ali Pasha Tepedelenli exercised the real authority in the area and did not 
hurry to follow the orders of the Porte. Looking exclusively how to use the situation 
to his own advantage, Ali Pasha was continuously bargaining with the Porte, 
Ushakov and even had the secret negotiations with the French. All these 
                                                 
190 Shapiro, Sredizemnomorskiie problemy, p. 277; A. L. Shapiro, Kampanii russkogo flota na 
Sredizemnom more v 1805-1807 g.g. Dissertatsiia na soiskaniie uchenoi stepeni doktora istoricheskikh 
nauk. [Sine Loco], 1951. pp. 117-18.   
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circumstances, aggravated by the severe winter conditions, had seriously impeded 
the siege of Corfu. Only in early March 1799, after three and a half months of 
blockading, the French garrison of Corfu capitulated. Thus, the initial task of the 
joint Russo-Ottoman naval expedition was accomplished.  
 
Regarding the whole campaign, it did not end with the capture of the Ionian 
Islands. Quite soon, the struggle with the French brought the Russians and the 
Ottomans further to Italy, where the subordinates of Ushakov and Kadir Bey 
continued to fight together against their enemies. In late April- early May 1799, upon 
the requests of the governments of the Kingdom of Naples and the Austrian 
Habsburg monarchy, Ushakov sent two mixed Russo-Ottoman squadrons to the 
Italian shores. The first one was to land a smaller detachment in the Southern Italy 
and the second one was to operate in the North, in the vicinity of Ancona, which 
remained the main French base in the Adriatics.  
 
It was with the utmost reluctance that the Porte agreed to send its naval forces 
together with those of Admiral Ushakov191 to Italy. Being concerned in the first place 
about the security of its own sea coastline, the Porte deemed it risky to send its naval 
forces far away from the Ottoman territorial waters. Moreover, even the departure of 
the Russian warships might result in complaints by the Porte, since according to the 
terms of the alliance treaty the Russian ships were to defend the Ottoman Empire 
and, for that reason, were not supposed to sail away from the Ottoman shores. 
However, there was also the other side of the coin. If the French would contemplate 
an aggression against the Balkans, Italy objectively could serve a good springboard 
                                                 
191 For the capture of Corfu Ushakov was granted the rank of Admiral 
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for such an attack. In this way, the best interests of the Porte suggested that the 
French should not be allowed to occupy the part of Italy adjacent to the possessions 
of the Ottoman Empire. So, the Ottoman warships and their crews once again joined 
the Russians in order to meet the common enemy. 
 
Towards the end of summer 1799 the mixed Russo-Ottoman forces, together 
with the Italian militia, were operating both in the Southern and the Northern Italy. 
The landing detachment of Henry Baillie (about 500 men), which in mid-June fought 
its way through to Naples, was strengthened by a group of 84 Ottoman soldiers 
commanded by Captain Ahmet. Equally, the naval squadrons twice sent by Ushakov 
to blockade the port of Ancona in the north, consisted of both the Russian and the 
Ottoman warships. As the successes achieved by the allied forces around Ancona in 
May-June appeared to be in vain after Ushakov temporarily had recalled all his 
forces back to Corfu, the squadron of Voinovich was sent in early July to resume the 
active operations in the area. The squadron of Voinovich consisted of four Russian 
and two Ottoman warships with total crews of 1200 Russians and 300 Ottomans. 
Therefore, the Russian and the Ottoman soldiers continued to fight side by side now 
on Italian soil.    
 
As far as the main forces of the allied squadron are concerned, Ushakov and 
Kadir Bey came from Corfu to Sicily in late August. At this point the Ottoman 
crews, complaining about the unusually long duration of their expedition, revolted 
and demanded from their commanders to return to Constantinople. The situation was 
aggravated by a quarrel between the Ottomans and the locals of Palermo, which 
ended in serious human losses on both sides. Despite the attempts of Ushakov and 
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Kadir Bey to persuade them to stay, the mutinous Ottoman sailors in mid-September 
1799 chose to sail back home. Kadir Bey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman 
fleet had no other choice but to yield to the demands of his subordinates. Such a 
departure of the Ottoman fleet became yet another manifestation of the anarchy 
prevailing in the Ottoman Empire. It also marked the end of the joint Ottoman-
Russian military operations in the Mediterranean.  
 
Nevertheless, despite that the Ottoman fleet so unpredictably left the Russian 
squadron of Ushakov, the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia stayed 
unharmed. Also, the Ottoman-Russian relations were in no way influenced by the 
incident in Ancona, when the Austrian General Fröhlich insulted the honour of both 
the Ottoman and the Russian flags. While many times complaining about their 
Austrian allies, the Russian officers, in particular Captain Lieutenant Metaxa and 
Lieutenant Ratmanov, emphasized that the Ottomans were “the most faithful and the 
most zealous” allies of Russia, sharing all the hardships of war with their Russian 
comrades-in-arms.   
 
After the end of the campaign, however, the disagreements between the 
Russians and the Ottomans started to grow. These included the debates over the 
sharing of the spoils of war, garrisoning the fortresses and the future political status 
of the Ionian Islands. The final Russo-Ottoman Convention about the Ionian 
Republic had been signed only on 2 April (21 March) 1800, that is, one and a half 
year after the start of the Ionian campaign. At the same time, it is safe to say that the 
birth of the Republic of the Seven Islands became possible only due to the alliance 
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between the Porte and St. Petersburg in the wake of their joint military operations 
against France. 
 
Contrary to the suspicions of the Ottomans and the British, Paul I did not 
express a pronounced intention, no matter what, to keep the Ionian Islands under his 
direct control. Corfu and other islands of the archipelago were looked upon by the 
Russian Emperor only in view of his struggle with the French, as a convenient 
strategic foothold enabling Russia to counteract the French advances in the 
Mediterranean and the Balkans. When Paul cut ties with his Austrian and British 
allies and began improving his relations with France, the further interest of the 
Russian Emperor in the Ionian Islands was gone. Paul ordered all his forces in the 
Mediterranean to return back home. In July 1800 Ushakov sailed off from Corfu, and 
by the summer 1801 there were no more Russian troops on the Ionian Islands. 
 
Quite soon, however, Russia would restore its military presence in the Ionian 
archipelago. Considering the precarious peace of Amiens and the eventual 
resumption of war in Europe the importance of the Ionian Islands had been once 
again recognized in St. Petersburg. In September 1802 the Russian troops appeared 
on the Ionian Islands for the second time, and in late 1803-early 1804, after the threat 
of the French aggression against the Balkan domains of the Sultan re-emerged, St. 
Petersburg began the active reinforcement of its positions on Corfu. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DYAMICS OF OTTOMA-RUSSIA RELATIOS 
THROUGHOUT 1799-1805 
 
Nam tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet. 
(Quintus Horatius Flaccus, “Epistulae”, 
 Liber I, Epistula 18, versus 84) 
7.1. The ways of the Ottoman-Russian cooperation, 1799-1800 
At the turn of the 19th century the Ottoman Empire appeared in serious decline 
and the extreme exhaustion of the Ottoman state afforded ground for speculations by 
many foreign diplomats that it was, actually, on the verge of crumbling. On 27 
January 1799 the Russian ambassador in Constantinople V. S. Tomara reported to 
the Tsar that “the day before yesterday the Vidin affair1 finally ended, with 
Pazvantoğlu and his associates being amnestied...”2 It was not a secret, that the term 
“amnesty” was used to cover the inability of the central authorities to cope with the 
rebellious pasha. In the same report Tomara mentioned another and very interesting 
fact concerning the depth of the crisis in the Ottoman finances. By the end of January 
1799 the state treasury owed the troops half a year’s salary and was empty. 
Respectively, the leading statesmen had lent the treasury 800 purses, of which the 
                                                 
1 The military expedition of the central government against the rebellious governor of Vidin Osman 
Pazvantoğlu, which lasted throughout 1798, yet to no effect. 
2 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 27 / 16 January 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 887, f. 36 ob. 
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Grand Vizier and Mühürdar Yusuf Ağa each lent 250 purses, the Defterdar and 
Çelebi Mustafa Efendi gave 150 purses.3  
 
Furthermore, the corruption pervaded the Ottoman state apparatus up to its 
highest levels and truly became a scourge to the whole Empire. The Russian 
ambassador, for example, when describing the personality of the Reis-ül-Küttab Atıf 
Efendi was mentioning in particular that “Reis Efendi is a good-minded man and he 
is quite determined in the present political system of the Porte, but he is also a 
bribetaker to the bone, like all other Turks.”4 In this respect Tomara pointed to a 
rather colourful detail. In exchange for kind treatment of the French prisoners of war 
Atıf Efendi was taking bribes from the Spanish charge d’affaires, and returned to the 
latter one false coin found in the purse recently received from the Spanish diplomat.5 
 
In terms of taking bribes the Grand Vizier never lagged behind his 
subordinates. Thus, in order to release the French prisoners of war kept in gaol in 
Syria and Cyprus for 250 purses (125 thousand piastres), the head of the Ottoman 
government demanded from the Reis-ül-Küttab to issue and send the respective 
firmans. Atıf Efendi, seething with resentment against the Grand Vizier, repeated the 
whole story to the dragoman of the Russian embassy Fonton, enquiring whether 
Fonton had some acquaintances among those French prisoners. Upon receiving the 
positive answer, the Reis-ül-Küttab proposed to write to them, so that they 
                                                 
3 Ibidem, f. 37 ob-38; Zapiska Konstantinopol’skikh vestei i razglashenii. January 1799. Ibidem, f. 47 
ob. 
4 “Реис Эфенди есть человек благонамеренный и весьма тверд в нынешней политической 
системе Порты; но интерессант до крайности как и прочие турки”. V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 27 
/ 16 July 1799. Ibidem, Delo 893, f. 48. 
5 Ibidem. 
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additionally pay for firmans, “because the dishonest Vizier would not give me even a 
single purse of those taken by him”.6 
 
In regard to the personality of Atıf Efendi, his chronic alcoholism could not be 
a blessing for the Ottoman state affairs as well. In August 1799 it was reported to the 
Sultan that his Reis-ül-Küttab began to drink more than earlier and while being drunk 
he was telling the servants about all state secrets. Yusuf Ağa defended Atıf from the 
latter accusation and the Sultan ordered to communicate to Atıf that, should it appear 
above him to give up drinking completely, he was allowed to drink no more than two 
cups of wine per day. Atıf Efendi himself admitted that he was unable to quit 
drinking.7 
 
In his conversation with the dragoman of the Russian embassy, Fonton, the 
Reis-ül-Küttab recognised, though just once and much unintentionally, that the 
Ottoman Empire was indeed in a state of the extreme exhaustion. In response to the 
reprehension of Fonton that the Porte not only forgave Pazvantoğlu, but also 
complied with all his demands, the Ottoman official passionately remarked, “Does 
the ambassador not know about our pitiable situation? It is so grave and desperate, 
that even if your Paul I himself happened to rule over us he would anyway have to 
appeal to Pazvantoğlu and would concede to him as we did”.8 This confession is all 
the more valuable that it was made by one of the highest Ottoman statesmen. 
Otherwise there was nothing new or something special about it. The affair with 
Pazvantoğlu quite clearly demonstrated the poor situation of the Ottoman state before 
the whole Europe. The Russian ambassador in London wrote in summer 1801 to his 
                                                 
6 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 12 / 1 September 1799’ Ibidem, Delo 895, f. 15. 
7 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 26 / 15 August 1799’ Ibidem, Delo 894, f. f. 82 ob - 83. 
8 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 27 / 16 October 1799’ Ibidem, Delo 896, f. f. 59 – 59 ob. 
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brother, “...tout le monde voit, que la Porte est dans une decadence absolue, que 
toutes ses provinces sont en insurrection et que depuis 8 ans elle ne peut pas 
soumettre Passavan-Oglou”.9 
 
In March 1800 Tomara was seriously considering the possibility of an 
imminent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, stating that it was going to fall not 
so much because of the external aggression as because of its own internal foes and 
problems. The first and foremost of these was the “excessive weakening of the head 
against the limbs”.10 According to Tomara’s views, Russia in this situation should 
remain faithful to its allied obligations, yet it was also the time to make a plan 
regarding the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire, in order to be ready for any 
kind of events in the future.11 That the Ottoman state could collapse was not only the 
vision of the ambassador alone, as is clear from the instructions of Paul I to Tomara, 
dated 8 August 1800. Tomara was informed that upon his request he was sent two 
packet-boats to provide uninterrupted correspondence with Russia, and should the 
situation require (“in case of the extremely bad turn of affairs, which would lead to 
the downfall of the Sultan’s rule and the throne”), Tomara could use the mentioned 
packet-boats for his own departure from Constantinople.12 
 
It stands to mention that the French aggression in Egypt took place at the 
background of the impotence of the Ottoman central government to effectively 
control the situation in the provinces. The landing of the Bonaparte’s expeditionary 
                                                 
9 ‘S. R. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, 14 / 2 August 1801’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (Moscow, 
1876), Vol. 10, pp. 118-19. 
10 ‘V. S. Tomara to F. V. Rastopchin, March 1800 (no date)’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations 
with Turkey. Op. 89/8, Delo 924, f. 17. 
11 Ibidem, f. f. 21- 21ob. 
12 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 8 August (27 July) 1800’ AVPRI, Fond 180. The Embassy in 
Constantinople. Op. 517/1, Delo 1, f. 116. 
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force in Egypt, as well as the French occupation of the Apennine Peninsula and 
especially of the Ionian archipelago, gave room for serious concerns not only in 
Constantinople but also at many European courts. The French advances in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the prospect of a French landing in the Balkans brought 
Great Britain, Austria, Russia, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Ottoman 
Empire together into the same coalition. 
 
At this point Russia sought to preserve the integrity of the possessions of the 
Sultan, trying to contain the growing threat posed by the French republican armies to 
the rest of Europe and favouring an idea to have a “weak neighbour” on its southern 
borders. It should be mentioned that the proposition to help the Ottoman side with a 
squadron of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet came from Paul I even before the 
occupation of Egypt, and the joint Russo-Ottoman squadron of Vice Admiral 
Ushakov sailed off to its Mediterranean destination long before the official alliance 
treaty had been concluded. 
 
Along with the aid by its naval forces, Russia at the request of the Porte did 
send to the Ottomans a certain amount of the artillery munitions. As early as August 
1798, i.e. before the arrival of the Russian naval squadron to Constantinople, Çelebi 
Mustafa Efendi through the agency of the dragoman of the Russian embassy Fonton 
addressed Tomara with a request to sell the Porte from the Russian Black Sea 
munition depots the bombs and the cannon balls.13 This request was repeated once 
again in mid-September14, when Ushakov while staying with his squadron in the 
Ottoman capital observed the Ottoman fleet and the Constantinople dockyards. The 
                                                 
13 ‘V. S. Tomara to Chancellor A. A. Bezborodko, 13 / 2 August 1798’ AVPRI, Fond 89. Russia’s 
Relations with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 880, f. f. 52 -53. 
14 ‘V. S. Tomara to Chancellor A. A. Bezborodko, 12 / 1 September 1798’ Ibidem, f. f. 82 -82 ob. 
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Russian Admiral in general praised the qualities of the Ottoman ships, yet found the 
artillery and the cannon balls unsatisfactory.15 Also, the Porte asked the Russian side 
to send three foundrymen, who would be the experts in production of the bullets and 
bombs, three foundrymen of the cannons and two minemen. All of them were to be 
cognizant in all the technological processes relating to the production of the cannons, 
cannon balls, bombs and mines, and be skilled in construction of the respective 
foundries.16  
 
Pursuant to the two requests of the Porte, of 13 August and 12 September, the 
Russian Emperor issued the decree17 ordering to provide the Ottoman side with all 
necessary materials, that is the bombs, the cannon balls, rifles, gunpowder, anchors, 
etc. In terms of the realization of this project, however,  arose the two main 
difficulties. The first was the non-conformity of the artillery calibres, for the 
Russians used for this purpose the poods (one pood = 16,380496 kg) and pounds 
(one Russian artillery pound = 0,4914 kg) whereas the Ottomans measured their 
artillery calibres in okkas (1 okka = 1,2828 kg).  
 
The second problem related to the question who would be dealing with the 
whole issue in practice. Tomara, apparently unwilling to take additional 
responsibilities, suggested the Ottomans that the most common and convenient way 
(obviously, in the eyes of the Russian ambassador and not for the Porte) to transport 
the needed materials from Russia would be to entrust the practical realization of the 
                                                 
15 ‘F. F. Ushakov to Paul I. 17 / 6 September 1798’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 2, pp. 98-100. 
16 A Note of Çelebi Mustafa Efendi to the Russian government (in French translation). Attached to the 
letter of V. S. Tomara to Bezborodko, 27 / 16 November 1798. AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations 
with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 881, f. 103. 
17 This decree was issued on 10 September 1798, i.e. two days before the Porte addressed Tomara for 
the second time. ‘V. S. Tomara to Chancellor A. A. Bezborodko, 13 / 2 August 1798’ Ibidem, Delo 
900, f. f. 16 -18. 
269 
project to some contractor. Regarding the Ottomans, they in the similar situations, as 
Tomara himself pointed out, were not used to have business dealings with the 
contractors. Usually it was the ambassador of the country, addressed by the Ottoman 
government, who was expected to organize everything.  
 
As Tomara was not inclined to deal with all the smaller details of this specific 
issue and referred to the usual practice of other European countries, the Ottomans in 
February 1799 addressed the British embassy asking to find them a contractor. The 
Porte was promised the help of the representative of the British Levant Company 
Peter Tooke. Now it was the turn of the Russian ambassador to be anxious. Tomara 
was aware, that should the British succeed to provide the Porte with the Russian war 
materials it wanted, the Ottomans would be grateful to Britain, and Russia, instead, 
would lose its present positions at the Ottoman government. In that case largely 
because of Tomara’s torpor the Ottomans might, justly enough, regard Russia as an 
unreliable partner, who even while helping still secretly was opposing the 
improvement of the Ottoman arms.18 
 
In early March 1799 Tomara did everything to prevent the British contractor 
Tooke from the successful accomplishment of his mission. The ambassador insisted 
in the letters written to the Chancellor A. A. Bezborodko and the Vice President of 
the Admiralty N. S. Mordvinov that the materials requested by the Porte should be 
provided directly, without the services of Tooke. Otherwise there was serious threat 
that the British would augment their influence in Constantinople at the expense of the 
                                                 
18 Ibidem, f. 17 ob; ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 27 / 16 May 1799’ Ibidem, Delo 891, f. f. 33ob -34 ob. 
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Russian side.19 In order to avoid misunderstandings about the artillery calibres, 
Tomara received in May 1799 from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Vilim Petrovich von Desen (Fondezin)20 the samples of 
the bombs and cannon balls, one for each of the nine models ordered by the Porte. 
The ambassador then presented the samples to the Ottoman side, so that it could 
estimate the exact amount necessary for each calibre.21 
 
Finally on 29 May the first installment of the Russian cannon balls and bombs 
was brought to Constantinople. Though in general these did not correspond to the 
needed calibres, the total cargo was re-loaded to another ship and further transported 
to Acre, where the British troops had a shortage of munitions. The unloading of the 
Russian shells, according to the observation of Tomara, “favourably impressed the 
common people, which were looking with amazement at the help provided by 
Russia, blaming at the same time their own government for the failures also in this 
field”.22 In his respective report to the Emperor Tomara attached the register of the 
Russian munitions sent for the Porte: 
Table 8. The register of the bombs and cannon balls sent by the Office of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleets on the schooner № 2, 21 May 1799 
[Ведомость бомбам и ядрам присланным при сообщении из Конторы главного 
командира Черноморских флотов на Шкуне № 2 от 10-го мая 1799]. AVPRI. 
Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 892, f. 19.  
Item Amount 
The bombs of 2 ½ poods 170 
The cannon balls of 1 pood 887 
--------- // --------- of 15 pounds  178 
--------- // --------- of 10 ¾ pounds 270 
--------- // --------- of 6 pounds 9.818 
                                                 
19 ‘V. S. Tomara to Chancellor A. A. Bezborodko, 13 / 2 August 1798’ Ibidem, Delo 900, f. f. 17 -18; 
V. S. Tomara to N. S. Mordvinov, early March 1799,  no exact date. Ibidem, f. 29.  
20 On V. P. Von Desen’s biography see: Dezin fon, Vilim Petrovich. Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ 
(25 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1905), Volume 6 “Dabelov-Diad’kovskii”, pp. 167-71. 
21 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 27 / 16 May 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. Op. 
89/8. Delo 891, f. f. 33 ob-34. 
22 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 12 / 1 June 1799’ Ibidem, Delo 892. f. f. 15-15 ob. 
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--------- // --------- of 3 pounds 16.093 
 
On its way back the schooner of Lieutenant Minitskii, which brought the 
abovementioned artillery shells, took the samples given by the Porte. The Black Sea 
authorities were instructed by Tomara not to send any munitions in case when the 
Russian bombs or cannon balls would not correspond to the Ottoman samples.23  
 
Throughout the spring and early summer of 1799 Tomara, encouraged by the 
relating orders24 of Paul I, continued his attempts to push aside the British contractor 
Tooke from participation in delivering the Russian munitions to the Ottoman Empire. 
In the end, the Kapudan Pasha announced to Tooke in July that there was no need 
anymore for the earlier ordered items, and demanded from him to return the money 
he received from the Porte as a downpayment. The only thing which the Porte 
allowed Tooke to deliver were eight anchors, urgently needed at the time.25 Yet 
Tomara wished to take away from the British even that modest token of their 
involvement in the issue. The ambassador was asking the Commander-in Chief of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet Admiral von Desen (Fondezin) to deny at any pretext the 
request of the eight anchors, should it be made by the British contractor, even if those 
anchors were in fact available. Perfectly obvious, Tomara advised the Russian naval 
authorities never to reveal the British that the real reason for the refusal was the letter 
of the Russian ambassador in Constantinople. As to the anchors, they were to be 
directly delivered to the Ottomans together with other munitions.26  
 
                                                 
23 ‘V. S. Tomara to the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, 12 / 1 June 1799’ 
Ibidem, f. 35. 
24 The order of Paul I to Tomara, dated 20 / 9 June 1799 prescribed the ambassador “to arrange the 
delivery to the Porte in such a way so that the English would have nothing to do with it”. Mentioned 
in the report of Tomara addressed to the Emperor: ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 27 / 16 July 1799’ Ibidem, 
Delo 893. f. 67. 
25 Ibidem, f. f. 67 ob-68. 
26 ‘V. S. Tomara to Admiral Von Desen (Fondezin), 27 / 16 July 1799’ Ibidem, f. f. 71-71 ob.  
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One can say with reasonable confidence that in general the relations between 
Constantinople and St. Petersburg were moving forward in a positive way. If what 
was reported to Tomara in July 1799 by his paid agent was true, some of the 
Ottoman officials were speaking positively of the behaviour of their Russian allies 
while discussing among themselves the European politics.27 Russia indeed was 
seeking to preserve at this time good relations with the Ottoman Empire. In 
particular, St. Petersburg finally agreed to reconsider the issue of the new Trade 
Tariff, which for years remained one of the principal stumbling blocks in the 
relations between the two states. The old tariff was based on the prices fixed at the 
level of 1783, and the Ottoman side throughout 1790-s continued its fruitless 
attempts to press for the Russian recognition of the fact that the customs duties paid 
by the Russian merchants should be calculated according to the real prices instead of 
those greatly outdated and mentioned in the Ottoman-Russian Commercial treaty of 
1783. 
 
On 22 August 1799 the Ottoman and the Russian empires signed the 
Convention on the Trade Tariff28 and specified the new list of goods as well as the 
amount of customs duties paid for each specific type of goods included in the list.29 
In the same way as before, the tariff was established at the rate of 3 %, but on the 
basis of the current prices of the day. The new trade tariffs were to come into effect 
when other European powers would also accept them. It was also agreed that the 
trade tariffs should be renewed every twelve years. 
                                                 
27 Zapiska konstantinopol’skikh vestei i razglashenii.  July 1799. Ibidem, f. 60 ob. 
28 The Russian text of the Convention: Ibidem, Delo 894, f. f. 58-60; the Ottoman text of the 
Convention: Ibidem, f. 56; the French text of the Convention: Ibidem, f. f. 76-77 ob. Also, it was 
published at: Konventsiia o postanovlenii novogo Tarifa dlia torgovli Rossiiskikh poddannykh v 
Turetskikh oblastiakh. PSZRI, Vol. XXV, № 19077, 1830, pp. 756-57. 
29 The comprehensive list of the trade items and the amounts of customs duties in Russian: Ibidem, f. 
f. 62-75; in Ottoman: f. 57. 
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The weakness of the Ottoman central government by the end of the 18th 
century became so manifest that the close downfall of the House of Osman seemed 
quite possible for many foreign observers. Following the French aggression in Egypt 
the concerns about the future of the Ottoman state and the fate of its possessions 
increased. The Russian authorities seriously contemplated the prospects of the 
disintegration of the Ottoman state, though in view of the shift of the balance of 
power in Europe earnestly sought to prevent it. On many occassions during this 
period St. Petersburg proved that regarding the Ottoman Empire it preferred the 
politics of the maintenance of the ‘weak neighbour’ on Russia’s southern borders. 
Apart from conclusion of the defensive alliance and sending the Black Sea squadron 
to help the Porte, Russia also cooperated with the Ottomans by sending the latter 
various artillery munitions. Additionally, the old Trade Tariff of 1783 had been 
finally reconsidered in accordance with the wishes of the Ottoman side.        
7.2. Russia and the Porte, 1800-1803  
In the autumn of 1799 the Second coalition was already on its last legs. At the 
same time when the Ottoman-Russian relations at least in some points were 
gradually turning for the better, the controversies between Russia and its British and 
Austrian allies were increasingly growing into an open conflict. The Ancona 
incident, when at the order of Austrian General Fröhlich the Russian and the 
Ottoman flags were forcefully hauled down and replaced by the Austrian one, 
became the last straw for Paul I. The Russian Emperor took a decision to recall all 
his troops from Europe, and both the army of Suvorov and the naval squadron of 
Ushakov received the respective orders. So, in January 1800 Suvorov’s army, 
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heretofore fighting with the French in the Northern Italy and Switzerland, moved 
back to Russia.30 The squadron of Ushakov spent the winter of 1799-1800 on Corfu 
and eventually departed from there on 18 July 1800.31  
 
The Porte was informed in detail about the dissatisfaction of St. Petersburg 
with Austria on 16 November 1799, when Tomara met with two Ottoman officials, 
Ismet Bey and Reis-ül-Küttab Atıf Efendi, in the house of the latter. At the 
conference, which lasted for three hours, the Russian ambassador explained the 
position of his government regarding the court of Vienna. Tomara pointed out that 
the actions of Austria indicated that it openly ignored the interests of its allies and 
was all the time preoccupied exclusively with its own territorial aggrandizement in 
the Northern Italy and elsewhere. Reis Efendi agreed with Tomara, telling that 
according to some rumours, which became known to the Porte, the Austrian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Baron von Thugut frequently had secret conferences with the 
Spanish ambassador in Vienna. Apparently, the main subject of these meetings was 
the separate peace the Austrians planned to conclude with the French Republic 
behind the backs of their allies.32  
 
On 2 December Tomara once again met with Ismet Bey and Atıf Efendi. The 
Ottoman officials expressed on this occasion their thoughts regarding the behaviour 
of the Austrian court. Atıf told Tomara that the separate peace of Austria with France 
would certainly affect all other participants of the anti-French coalition. First, the 
restoration of the monarchy in France would become virtually impossible. Second, in 
                                                 
30 ‘A. V. Suvorov to Paul I, 22 / 11 January 1800’ Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.3, pp. 641- 42. 
31 Miliutin, Istoriia voiny 1799, Vol.2, p. 505. 
32 Zapiska svidaniia poslannika Tomary s turetskimi upolnomochennymi Ismet Beyem i Reis 
Efendiyem v dome poslednego. 16 / 5 November 1799. AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with 
Turkey. Op. 89/8. Delo 897, f. f. 65-73 ob.   
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case when the French would have one enemy less it would be much more difficult 
for the allies to come to terms with them. The Reis-ül-Küttab made an interesting 
proposition to pay the Austrians back in their own coin, enquiring whether it would 
be possible to find a way of opening the separate negotiations with the French behind 
the back of Austria. Then, in view of the Ottoman minister, the French would 
become more unyielding in their negotiations with Vienna.33  
 
Tomara notified the Ottoman side that the Russian troops were recalled from 
Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands, yet preferred not to tell about the same orders 
sent to Ushakov. The ambassador explained in his report to the Emperor why it was 
important, in his opinion, to disguise for the time being the decision to withdraw all 
Russia’s naval forces from the Mediterranean. Tomara argued that because of the 
winter weather the navigation in the Black Sea usually stopped towards the end of 
November, and for that reason the squadron of Ushakov would anyway stay in the 
Mediterranean at least until the spring. Furthermore, the Russian ships for the 
moment were scattered all over the Mediterranean (Corfu, Ancona, Naples and 
Genoa) and it would take time to gather all of them. Thus even if Tomara would 
immediately inform the Ottomans about Pavel’s orders to Ushakov, this would not 
tell on the actual position of the Ushakov’s squadron in the next four or five months. 
At the same time, there was no doubt that the Porte, if learned that the Russian fleet 
sails back home, would feel abandoned and betrayed. This could also make the Porte 
consider the alliance treaty with Russia to be broken, what in its turn might result in 
the Ottoman rapprochement with France and Austria.34 
 
                                                 
33 Zapiska soobshcheniia sdelannogo turetskimi polnomochnymi Ismet Beyem i Reis Efendiyem 
chrezvychainomu poslanniku Tomare na svidanii 21 noyabria 1799. Ibidem, f. f. 124-125.  
34 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 5 December (25 November) 1799’ Ibidem, f. f. 116-122. 
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It was essential, in Tomara’s judgement, not to tell the Porte at this point the 
whole truth about the recall of the Ushakov’s squadron. Tomara personally addressed 
Ushakov, asking the latter to keep secret, for a while, the orders of St. Petersburg to 
his squadron to return to the Black Sea.35 The ambassador proposed to explain to the 
Porte the forthcoming departure of the Russian fleet by the urgent need of repair 
works, using the pretext that the reparation of the ships could not be done in the ports 
of the Ottoman Empire because of the lack of the necessary construction timber. In 
this respect Tomara even ordered the newly arrived councillor Chistiakov to reject all 
the Ottoman timber as defective, when Chistiakov would make the respective 
observations together with the Porte’s official. Tomara also addressed Ushakov, 
advising him to write to the Kaymakam Pasha. Ushakov was recommended to 
present the situation with the departure of the Russian squadron in line with 
Tomara’s instructions, so that the Ottoman side would have no other choice but agree 
that the majority of the Ushakov’s ships needed to be repaired and should return to 
the Black Sea. Tomara emphasized the utmost secrecy of the issue, reminding 
Ushakov that everyone on the squadron should think that they sail back to the 
Russian shores only for repair and would be back in the Mediterranean again.36 
 
The attempts of Tomara to soften the reaction of the Porte at the news about the 
withdrawal of the Ushakov’s fleet once more indicate at the Russian interest to 
preserve good relations with the Ottoman Empire. Instructed to inform the Porte 
                                                 
35 ‘V. S. Tomara to F. F. Ushakov, 5 December (25 November) 1799’ Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, 
Vol. 3, pp. 204-205.  
36 ‘V. S. Tomara to Paul I, 20 / 9 December 1799’ AVPRI. Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 898, f. f. 18-18 ob; ‘V. S. Tomara to F. F. Ushakov, 18 / 7 December 1799’ Ibidem, f. 
f. 24-25.  
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about the reasons of the growing Russo-Austrian and Russo-British antagonism37, 
Tomara was on any occasion to assure the Ottomans in the unchanging friendship of 
the Russian Emperor towards the Ottoman state. Paul I even went so far as to think at 
the possibility of the Russo-Ottoman alliance against Austria. 
 
At the very beginning of 1800 the Russian government learned that the 
Austrians through their internuncio Baron Herbert were intriguing at Constantinople 
against Russia, planning to draw the Porte on their side by the promise of the Ionian 
Islands and “a few villages in Banat”. Tomara was ordered to counteract the Austrian 
internuncio and, should it be necessary, to tell the Porte that if the court of Vienna 
would continue its present politics the Ottoman Empire might declare war on Austria 
and to “gratify itself by taking back the territories lost after the Peace of Belgrade”. 
In that case the Porte would be supported by the Russian Emperor.38  
 
The last year of the 18th century witnessed further deterioration in relations of 
St. Petersburg with Austria and Great Britain. In late April of 1800 Paul I recalled his 
ambassadors in London (Semion Romanovich Vorontsov) and in Vienna (Stepan 
Alexeievich Kolychev), on 25 April and 29 April respectively.39 On the other hand, 
after the coup of 18 Brumaire (9 November 1799) in France the Russian Emperor 
could be assured that the French revolution, so hated by him, ended. At the 
background of the Russo-Austrian and the Russo-British disagreements started a 
                                                 
37 The project of instruction to the extraordinary envoy and the plenipotentiary minister at 
Constantinople Tomar, confirmed by Pavel, prescribing to inform Turkey the motives for the 
termination of the war with France [Проект рескрипта чрезвычайному посланнику и 
полномочному министру в Константинополе Томаре, апробованный Павлом, с распоряжением 
о сообщении Турции мотивов прекращения войны с Францией]. December 1799. Confirmed on 
13 December 1799. Ibidem, Delo 317, f. f. 1-6 ob. 
38 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 15 / 4 January 1800’ Ibidem, Fond 180. The Embassy in Constantinople. 
Op. 517/1. Delo 1, f. f. 1-2.  
39 Mordvinov, Admiral Ushakov, Vol. 3, p. 637. 
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certain Russo-French rapprochement. In February there were allowed the 
commercial relations of the Russian merchants with France.40 On the international 
arena Paul I assumed the policy of non-interference, though towards the end of 1800 
the anti-British sentiments of the Russian monarch led him to an open conflict with 
Great Britain and brought about the celebrated project of the Russo-French 
expedition to India. 
 
In point of fact, throughout 1800 the Second Coalition ceased to exist. One of 
the most notable battles of this year took place on 14 June 1800 at the village of 
Marengo in Piedmont. It resulted in the decisive victory of the French army of 
General (and by then also the First Consul) Napoléon Bonaparte over the Austrians. 
The Northern Italy once again fell into the hands of the French. Another key event of 
the year became the fall of Malta, which surrendered to the British on 5 September.  
 
Instead of returning the island to the Maltese knights, as it was expected by 
Paul I, the British kept Malta for themselves and raised their own flag over Valetta. 
The Russian Emperor, who was at the same time the Grand Master of the Order of 
Malta, took it as a personal insult tantamount to the declaration of war. The 
estrangement between Russia and Great Britain was also reflected in instructions to 
the Russian embassy at Constantinople. On 12 October 1800 Paul I ordered Tomara 
to sever all contacts with the British ambassador.41 Another instruction of the 
Russian Emperor to Tomara, dated 7 November 180042, contained a detailed 
                                                 
40 O razreshenii torgovykh cnoshenii s Frantsiyeyu. 19 / 8 February 1800. PSZRI, Vol. XXVI. № 
19746, pp. 524-25. 
41 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 12 October (30 September) 1800’ AVPRI, Fond 180. The Embassy in 
Constantinople. Op. 517/1. Delo 1, f. f. 132. 
42 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 7 November (26 October) 1800’ Ibidem, f. f. 140-43.  
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description of Pavel’s views on the international politics of Great Britain, in very 
strong terms accusing the British of ambitions for world domination. 
 
Paul I prescribed Tomara to watch closely the British, “whose excessive efforts 
and designs to lay hands on the world commerce, and, in order to preserve it, to gain 
the exclusive domination on the high seas, almost daily ... give evidence that all other 
nations, which have the sea commerce and the naval forces, should definitely expect 
from this power any kind of oppression.”43 The Russian Emperor further pointed out 
that when even if now the Britain was acting “with impudence” against all the 
neutral flags on the seas, controlled by its fleets, the British aggressiveness would all 
the more increase with the new annexations and the appearance of the British naval 
forces in the new places, heretofore not yet controlled by them.  
 
For that reason, according to Paul I, Egypt necessarily constituted the main 
object of the British aggressive designs. The annexation of Egypt would bring the 
Britain the numerous advantages arising both from natural wealth of this country and 
the Egypt’s strategic geographical location, which would help to establish the 
domination in the Mediterranean, the Black and the Red seas. In this respect the 
British control over Malta, the first-class naval base, would open the way for the 
British to strengthen their positions in Egypt. Should the British occupy Egypt, 
argued the Russian Emperor, they would become the masters of the whole commerce 
of this part of the world. In words of Paul I, the Britain would not spare anything to 
reach this first and foremost objective. Accordingly, Tomara was instructed to warn 
the Porte about this British threat, for “Egypt in the hands of the English may 
                                                 
43 Ibidem, f. 140. 
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become the nest, which would produce for the Porte the similar predators; in all its 
actions this nation pursues only its own profit”.44 As an example, Tomara was to 
remind the Ottoman government about India, where the British through using “any 
means which greediness may suggest to the human mind”45 managed to gain 
exclusive commercial privileges. In the end, the Ottomans were advised by the 
Russian Tsar to keep a watchful eye on Egypt.46    
 
Meanwhile the conflict of the Russian Emperor with Britain was growing. On 4 
December 1800 Paul I ordered to stop the payments of the Russian subjects to the 
British creditors and all the British goods in Russia were sequestered.47 One more 
point, which sparked the anger of many European countries against Britain, was the 
British violation of the rights of the neutral flag. Under the pretext of the blockade of 
the French trade the British navy claimed the unlimited right of arresting and 
searching any commercial ship (droit de visite), even though she was flying the 
neutral flag. Such an attitude was damaging the trade of all neutral European nations 
and bringing immense advantages solely to the Britain. On 16-18 December 1800 at 
the initiative of Paul I, with the aim to protect the neutral commerce from the raids of 
the British Royal Navy, Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia signed the 
Declaration of the armed neutrality. Great Britain, in its turn, considered the 
proclamation of the League of the armed neutrality as a declaration of war.  
 
                                                 
44 Ibidem, f. 141 ob. 
45 Ibidem, f. f. 141-141 ob. 
46 “Правительство турецкое недремлющим оком да стережет Египет”. Ibidem, f. 142. 
47 Ob ostanovlenii platezha dolgov anglichanam i o sekvestre angliiskikh tovarov v lavkakh i 
magazinakh. 4 December (22 November) 1800. PSZRI, Vol. XXVI, № 19660, p. 396. This decree was 
annulled on 18 May 1801, two months after the violent death of Paul I. Ibidem, № 19857, pp. 625-
626.    
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 Angry with Austria and Britain, Paul I remained satisfied with his Ottoman 
allies. Tomara was to call attention of the Ottoman government to the fact that Russia 
had never planned to annex the Ionian Islands and that all Russian troops were 
ordered to leave the Ionian archipelago.48 In September 1800 Pavel proposed the 
Sultan to conclude a secret and separate convention on the mutual guarantee of the 
Russo-Ottoman borders. Apart from the respective instructions given to Tomara49, 
the Tsar sent a personal letter to the Ottoman monarch along with a present of the fox 
fur coat.50 The Russian ambassador at Constantinople had instructions to make his 
communication with the Porte as much sincere as possible, and to inform the 
Ottoman side about all political matters, which Tomara himself would manage to 
learn about.51        
 
Like many times before, Tomara in the end of November 1800 was ordered 
once again to assure the Porte in the friendship of Russia. The Russian Emperor 
reiterated that it was up to the Ottoman side “to use My (i. e. Paul’s) propositions 
made earlier, and to remain forever in the alliance, which is so happily connecting 
us”.52 Just as at the beginning of the year, in late November Paul I contemplated the 
possibility of the joint Russo-Ottoman war against Austria. The instructions to 
Tomara contained the following passage: “Should I be forced to bear arms against 
the tricky Austrian House, then the Porte may, counting on my army and its strength, 
                                                 
48 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 20 / 9 February 1800’ AVPRI, Fond 180. The Embassy in Constantinople. 
Op. 517/1. Delo 1, f. f. 3-4. 
49 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 3 September (22 August) 1800’ Ibidem, f. 122-122 ob.; Regarding this 
convention Tomara started negotiations, stopped by the Russian government after the death of Paul I. 
See: E. D. Verbitskii, ‘K voprosu o blizhnevostochnoi politike Rossii na rubezhe XVIII i XIX vekov 
(O proekte russko-frantsuzskogo soyuza I razdela Ottomanskoi imperii F. V. Rostopchina’ In: 
Kolonial’naia politika I natsional’no-osvoboditel’noie dvizheniie (Kishinev, 1965), p. 181. 
50 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 6 September (25 August) 1800’ Ibidem, f. 124. 
51 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 9 September (28 August) 1800’ Ibidem, f. 128. 
52 ‘Paul I to V. S. Tomara, 25 / 13 November 1800’ Ibidem, Fond 89. Russia’s Relations with Turkey. 
Op. 89/8. Delo 318, f. 7 ob. 
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to use this opportunity in order to return everything what had been taken from it, as 
well as to possibly gain the new lands”.53 
 
Along with the official politics of the Russian government at this time to 
preserve the Ottoman Empire there existed also the projects suggesting the partition 
of the latter in alliance with other leading European powers. As the relations with 
Vienna and London increasingly deteriorated, the then Vice Chancellor and the Head 
of the College of Foreign Affairs Count Fiodor Vasilievich Rostopchin composed a 
memo54 concerning the overall foreign policy strategy of the Russian state in the 
changed circumstances. It proposed to change the system of Russia’s foreign 
alliances completely and instead of alliance with Britain and Austria to achieve 
reconcilement with France.  
 
One of the main consequences of this turn in the Russian foreign policy would 
be also the change of the attitude towards the Ottoman Empire. Rostopchin put 
forward the idea of partitioning the Sultan’s domains jointly with France, Austria and 
Prussia. Furthermore, the Ottoman state was compared to a “desperately sick, whom 
his doctors would not dare to tell about his being at the point of death”55. It was in 
the memo of Rostopchin when the ‘sick man’ allegory, later widely used throughout 
the 19th century, appeared for the first time.56 In accordance with Rostopchin’s plan 
Russia was supposed to take Romania, Bulgaria and Moldavia; Austria would annex 
                                                 
53 “Если бы я доведен был до поднятия оружия на коварный Дом Австрийскийб тогда Порта 
считая на ополчение мое и на силу онаго может воспользоваться сим случаем для возвращения 
под свою державу всего у ней похищенного, и присвоения может быть новых земель”. Ibidem, 
f. f. 7 ob-8. 
54 F. V. Rostopchin, Zapiska grafa F. V. Rostopchina o politicheskikh otnosheniyakh Rossii v 
posledniie mesiatsy pavlocskogo tsarstvovaniia. Russkii arkhiv, 1878. Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. 103-10. 
55 Rostopchin, Zapiska, p. 104. 
56 Rostopchin Fiodor Vasilievich. Russkii biograficheskii slovar’ (25 vols.; Petrograd, 1918), Volume 
17 “Romanova-Riasovskii”, p. 250. 
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Bosnia, Serbia and Wallachia. Prussia, even though not sharing directly any part of 
the Ottoman lands, was to be offered the Hannover electorate together with the 
Bishoprics of Paderborn and Münster in compensation. The last but surely not the 
least point was that France would take Egypt, while Greece together with all islands 
of the Aegean archipelago would be made an autonomous republic, in the same 
fashion as the Ionian Islands, and to be placed under the joint protectorate of all four 
powers participating in the partition.57 On 14 October 1800 this memo was signed by 
Paul I.  
 
Obviously the existence of such a memo, and in particular its endorsement by 
the Emperor, seems to be a clear-cut manifestation of the expansionist intentions of 
Russia. However, as Kleinman and especially Verbitskii point out, the memorandum 
of Rostopchin was expressing only one of the two approaches regarding the Russian 
politics towards the Ottoman Empire.58 Verbitskii, who did a specific research on the 
Rostopchin’s memo, makes the point that it is more important to speak about the 
practical implementation of the Russian foreign politics at that time. In fact, the 
given memo even though it was signed by Pavel did not influence the Russian 
foreign policy agenda at the end of 1800 – early 1801. Still further, the real politics 
of Russia as regards the Ottoman state within the given period was precisely the 
opposite of that one proposed by Rostopchin.59  
 
 Verbitskii calls attention to the fact that Rostopchin suggested the partition of 
the Ottoman Empire together with Austria. This necessarily presupposed the Russo-
                                                 
57 Rostopchin, Zapiska, p. 109. 
58 Kleinman, Russko-turetskii soyuz, pp. 22-23; Verbitskii, K voprosu o blizhnevostochnoi politike, 
pp. 171-73. 
59 Verbitskii, K voprosu o blizhnevostochnoi politike, p. 173.  
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Austrian rapprochement, which in reality did not take place. Throughout 1800-1801 
the government of Paul I continued to be hostile towards Austria.60 In this respect the 
point of Verbitskii apparently may be strengthened by the previously mentioned 
ideas of the Russian Emperor about the possibility of the Russo-Ottoman joint 
military actions against Austria, mentioned in his instructions to Tomara. Moreover, 
Rostopchin himself, and what is particularly notable in spite of his own views, was 
prescribing Tomara in January 1801 to reassure the Sultan in Russia’s loyalty and the 
readiness to stay on guard of the integrity of the Ottoman state.61  
 
Paul I, indeed, wished to conclude peace with France and on 16 January 1801 
Stepan Alekseievich Kolychov was sent as the Russian official representative to 
Paris, authorized to conduct the peace negotiations with the French government. The 
instructions given to Kolychov, however, never mentioned any partition of the 
Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, at his negotiations with the First Consul, 
Kolychov was prescribed to speak all the time in defence of the Porte and to demand 
the withdrawal of the French troops from Egypt.62 After his arrival to Paris on 6 
March 1801 the Russian representative during his conferences with the French 
Foreign Minister, the celebrated and notorious Talleyrand, never even tried to reach 
an agreement with France at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. In the proceedings 
of the conference of 14 March 1801 the Ottoman Sultan had been referred to as “ami 
et allié” of the Russian Emperor.63  
 
                                                 
60 Verbitskii, K voprosu o blizhnevostochnoi politike, p. 173. 
61 Verbitskii, K voprosu o blizhnevostochnoi politike, p. 182. 
62 Verbitskii, K voprosu o blizhnevostochnoi politike, p. 182. 
63 Proceedings of the conference of 14 March 1801. SIRIO, Vol. 70, p. 57. 
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One of the main stumbling blocks at the negotiations, as could be expected, 
became the question of the French evacuation of Egypt. Paris argued, however, that 
to take Egypt away from France would mean to deprive it of the only means of 
successful struggle against the British might on the high seas.64 According to the 
observations of Kolychov, France, beyond all doubt, had secret plans against the 
Ottoman Empire and hoped to make Russia to accept those plans. The First Consul 
was constantly making allusions to the Porte, whose existence was “very 
precarious”.65 It was thus the French, who, as Kolychov pointed out, tried to “set 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire at loggerheads with one another, in order to take 
possession of Egypt”66. Nevertheless, the project of Rostopchin had never been 
communicated to the French, and all propositions of Paris to discuss the future of the 
Ottoman Empire were being declined by the Russian side.67   
 
In the meantime, while the Franco-Russian negotiations were going on in Paris, 
a palace coup d’état took place in St. Petersburg. On 23 March 1801 the Emperor 
Paul I was murdered by the plotters and his son, Alexander I, acceded to the Russian 
throne. Even though the new reign brought many changes in the Russian domestic 
and foreign politics, the Russian attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire remained the 
same as during the time of Pavel. The instructions to Kolychov by the new Emperor 
made it clear that Alexander I was going to keep all Russia’s allied obligations 
regarding the Porte and would insist on the French evacuation of Egypt.68  
 
                                                 
64 ‘A Note of Talleyrand to the Russian government, 11 April 1801’ Ibidem, pp. 111-13. 
65 ‘S. A. Kolychov to F. V. Rostopchin, 25 / 13 March 1801’ Ibidem, p. 80. 
66 ‘S. A. Kolychov to the Court, 13 / 1 April 1801’ Ibidem, p. p. 113-14. 
67 ‘S. A. Kolychov to F. V. Rostopchin, 25 / 13 March 1801’ Ibidem, pp. 79-81. 
68 ‘Alexander I to S. A. Kolychov, 28 / 16 April 1801’ Ibidem, p. 133. 
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In this way during the end of 1799 and early 1801 the practical politics of 
Russia towards the Ottoman Empire did not change much, with St. Petersburg 
regularly defending the Porte on the international arena and seeking to preserve the 
Ottoman state in its present situation of Russia’s ‘weak neighbour’. At the same time 
the Rostopchin’s project, though it was not realized or even taken as a practical 
guidance for Russian foreign policy, indicated that the old expansionist ambitions of 
the Catherinian times were still alive among some part of the Russian policymakers. 
 
Soon after his accession to the throne the new Russian Emperor Alexander I 
clarified the main principles of his foreign policy in instructions issued to the 
ambassadors at Paris, Berlin and Vienna. In summer 1801 the envoy to Paris 
Kolychov upon his own request was replaced by Arkadii Ivanovich Morkov. On 9 
July 1801 the Tsar signed the instruction for Morkov69, who was departing to France 
in order to continue the peace negotiations started by his predecessor. In the part 
relating to the Ottoman Empire there was not the slightest hint indicating at the wish 
of the Russian government to arrange with the French about the partition of the 
Sultan’s domains. Alexander I noted that all projects of conquest and territorial 
aggrandizement should be alien to a ruler of such a vast empire like his own. At the 
same time the Russian monarch unambiguously spoke about his firm intention not 
only to keep peace with the Porte, but to preserve the state, “the weakness and bad 
administration of which both make a precious pledge of security”70. Almost in the 
same expressions were composed the instructions of Alexander I to A. I. Krudener71 
                                                 
69 ‘Alexander I to A. I. Morkov, 9 July / 27 June 1801’ SIRIO, Vol. 70, pp. 201-22. 
70 “Dont la faiblesse et la mauvaise administration est un gage précieux de sécourité”. Ibidem, pp. 
216-17. 
71 ‘Alexander I to A. I. Krudener, 17 / 5 July 1801’ VPR. Vol. 1, pp. 42-54.  
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and A. K. Razumovskii72, the Russian ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna 
respectively. 
 
Speaking about the ‘preservation’ of the Sultan’s domains necessarily meant 
that according to the Russian point of view there was, or at least appeared to be, a 
certain threat to the existence of the Ottoman Empire. As seen from the reports of 
Tomara, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople perceived such a threat in the 
increased attempts of France to restore its former influence at the Porte, along with 
the spread of the pernicious French propaganda among the Ottoman Balkan subjects. 
The difficult internal situation of the Porte and the whole range of the problems it 
experienced some years earlier did not change much. The weakness of the Ottoman 
state even before its own subjects, let alone other foreign powers, by observations of 
Tomara was “making the Porte very coward” and one could expect that this country 
“would forget the general truths and would act according to the temporary 
impressions”73. In other words, this meant that the Russian ambassador was afraid 
that the Ottomans at some point might give up to the French diplomatic pressure. In 
that case this could lead to the annexation of some part of the Ottoman territory by 
France, or to the Franco-Ottoman rapprochement and alliance, in both cases these 
were the last things Russia would like to see. 
 
The newly appointed Russian ambassadors in their first general instructions, 
summarizing the main principles of the Russian foreign policy, by mid-1802 
continued to receive the unchanged descriptions of the official position of St. 
Petersburg towards the Porte. The focal point of it was “to try always to keep our 
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present relations and to care sincerely about the affairs of Turkey”74. According to 
the trustworthy information, known to the Russian government, France intended to 
“annex the best provinces of the Turkish Empire”. It was expected that having not 
achieved this aim for a number of reasons, the First Consul would start trying to 
draw the Ottomans over his side. Then, there was a possibility that the Porte would 
join the French, “with imprudence, quite typical for the ignorance of the Turks”75. In 
this way, the Russian diplomacy had specific orders not only to keep good relations 
with the Porte, but even to save the Ottomans from themselves and from their own 
‘imprudence’. To put it differently, after signing with France a peace treaty76 St. 
Petersburg was still determined to counteract those activities of the French 
diplomacy, concerning the Ottoman Empire. 
 
Russian fears of the French threat to the integrity of the Ottoman state were not 
unfounded. Throughout summer-autumn 1802 the First Consul of the French 
Republic Citizen Bonaparte constantly remarked in all his conversations with the 
Russian ambassador Morkov that the Ottoman Empire was about to fall. Even more, 
Bonaparte considered such a collapse unavoidable and thought aloud in the presence 
of Morkov that one day it would be necessary “to gather up the Ottoman Empire’s 
debris”77. As to France, it would not make any objections against the partitioning of 
the Ottoman territories by Russia and Austria, if only France would also be given its 
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own part of the Ottoman legacy.78 In Morkov’s opinion, the ideas of the First Consul 
about the Ottoman Empire, on many occasions expressed during the meetings with 
the Russian ambassador, could be twofold. First, these could be the trap designed to 
discredit Russia in the eyes of the Porte. Second, Bonaparte might be trying to 
prepare the actual invasion into the Ottoman lands.79 Obviously, there was yet 
another option, when the French government could pursue the both purposes all at 
once. The spread of the French revolutionary propaganda in the Balkans, mainly 
among the Greek subjects of the Sultan, was also troubling St. Petersburg. The 
Russian ambassador in France reported in April 1802 that there were many allegedly 
philosophical, but in fact revolutionary books, which were translated into Greek in 
Paris  and which had been or were to be sent to the Morea and to the islands of the 
Aegean archipelago.80   
 
Another source for the concerns of the Russian government was the secret 
relations between France and Osman Pazvantoğlu, the Governor of Vidin and one of 
the most influential and virtually independent Ottoman warlords. St. Petersburg was 
calculating that “the unknown resources, which Pazvantoğlu was always finding 
during his long rebellions against the Porte” unambigously indicated to the support 
given to him by France.81 All the more suspicious was the presence in Paris of two 
inhabitants of Vidin, emissaries of Pazvantoğlu, who arrived in Paris under the guise 
of handling their own business matters.  
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Notably, in October 1802 these two emissaries addressed the Russian 
ambassador with propositions from their master to act together with Russia against 
the Porte. The suspicions of the Russian side only rose, for there was no obvious 
reason why did Pazvantoğlu send his agents to Paris instead of addressing the 
Russian consul general in Jassy. More logical explanation, as the Foreign minister A. 
R. Vorontsov reasoned in his dispatch for Tomara, would be that the emissaries of 
Pazvantoğlu stayed in Paris for the secret negotiations of the Governor of Vidin with 
the French government.82 Apparently, the separatist inclinations of Pazvantoğlu 
could become a very powerful instrument in the French Near Eastern policy. Tomara 
thus received the respective instructions, prescribing him to watch over all activities 
of the French in the Levant and to keep on convincing the Porte in the strongest 
terms that it was in its own interests to have the closest alliance with Russia.83 
 
Not Russia alone, but all leading European powers jealously watched each 
other to make certain that neither of them would get the decisive influence on the 
shores of the Bosphorus. The Porte, however, was careful enough not to burn its 
bridges neither with Paris nor with St. Petersburg or London. Following the Franco-
Ottoman peace treaty, signed on 25 June 1802 in Paris, the Ottomans at last found 
themselves in an official state of peace. Despite that the Porte still felt threatened on 
every side. The aggressive intentions against the Ottoman Empire were mutually 
ascribed by the European powers to each other, and the worst was that any of such 
accusations, from the Ottoman perspective, could well be true. Only the open or 
hidden rivalry among Russia, France, Britain and Austria remained the best 
guarantee for the existence of the Ottoman state. In this way, it was unlikely that the 
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Reis-ül-Küttab was insincere when he told Tomara that the Porte was afraid of 
France, that Bonaparte in Europe reckoned only with Russia and Britain, and that the 
Porte firmly intended to adhere to its alliance with the two latter powers.84 
 
By the beginning of 1803 the situation did not change. Morkov, the Russian 
ambassador at Paris, still reported about the allusions of the First Consul about the 
close downfall of the Ottoman Empire. Like before, Morkov each time was 
instructed to make it clear to Bonaparte that Russia was not going to take part in any 
aggressive projects directed against the Porte.85 Morkov was to tell the French side 
that the Russian Emperor “was satisfied with his lot, which the providence had 
assigned to him, and did not wish to aggrandize it neither at the expense of the Porte 
nor any other part”. For that reason Russia “would not indifferently watch some 
other state increasing its possessions at the expense of the Ottoman Porte”.86 As is 
seen from the dispatches of the Russian Foreign Minister and the State Chancellor 
Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov to Morkov, the Russian government preferred at 
the moment not to engage into any serious international conflicts, but would 
resolutely oppose any attempt of aggression against the Sultan’s domains.   
 
Even more informative was the personal dispatch of Alexander I, dated by 1 
February 1803 and sent to the ambassador in London Semion Romanovich 
Vorontsov, the brother of the State Chancellor.87 The Emperor stated that all he 
wished was the preservation of peace. The geographic location of Russia, argued 
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Alexander, made it vulnerable for the foreign attack from only one side, and one 
could be perfectly sure about all the rest of the Russian borders. Russia was not to be 
afraid of any aggression, and at the same time it did not need to seek war. In this 
respect Russia could not worry at all about the European affairs, and the most 
rational policy for Russia would be to stay tranquil and to care about its own internal 
prosperity. Though the vague hints of the First Consul of France regarding the 
invasion of the Ottoman Empire were never transformed into the formal offer on that 
subject, Alexander I asserted that he would not agree on the partition of the Ottoman 
state, which he believed to be the most advantageous neighbour for Russia.88  
 
On the same day the State Chancellor A. R. Vorontsov also sent a dispatch to 
his brother, similar in its content with that of the Emperor.89 One of the main points 
of this despatch was that the constant wars waged during the rule of Catherine II, 
notwithstanding the fact that they were triumphantly concluded, in fact exhausted 
Russia, especially due to the serious loss of manpower. St. Petersburg urgently 
needed peace in order to focus on a broad program of domestic reforms, conceived 
by the new Emperor.90 In this situation Russia would prefer to have on its borders the 
weak Ottoman Empire, rather than wilfully to allow its destruction.91 For the time 
being the best solution which could be achieved in regard of the Ottoman state, from 
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the Russian point of view, would be the mutual Franco-British guarantee of the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, supported by other main European powers.92 
 
Obviously enough, the presence of a weak neighbour state on the Russian 
southern borders could be welcomed in St. Petersburg only on condition that it would 
be under the exclusive influence of Russia, and not some other strong European 
power. Ideally, the Russian government would like to achieve the complete control 
over the actions of the Porte, so that the latter would consult the Russian ambassador 
on any matters relating to its foreign policy. Even without that, the influence of 
Russia at the Porte during this time was quite profound. On many occasions the Reis-
ül-Küttab was addressing the Russian ambassador, asking and following his 
advices.93 For instance, in March 1803 Andrei Iakovlevich Italinskii, who replaced 
Tomara94, succeeded in making the Porte refuse to admit to its service a French 
engineer. Nevertheless the Russian Foreign Ministry still remained unsatisfied that 
the Ottomans were trying to hide their negotiations with the mentioned French 
engineer.95 Such a behaviour of the Ottoman government indicated that the bonds of 
the alliance between St. Petersburg and Constantinople were, after all, not that 
cordial. Italinskii, when writing to S. R. Vorontsov, accepted that “the Turks are 
afraid of us, and for that reason they often have doubts about our friendship”.96 
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When it comes to the Ottoman government, after the peace with France it 
sought to stay away from any armed conflicts. On 29 May 1803 the Sultan sent a 
personal letter addressed to the Russian Emperor, expressing his wish to keep the 
allied relations both with Russia and the Britain. Selim III also suggested Alexander I 
to make joint efforts in order to reconcile Paris and London, and in this way to 
preserve peace and avoid the new large-scale European war.97 In the context of the 
Europe of the early 19th century this would be surely an extremely difficult task. By 
the time when this letter was written, the war between France and the Britain 
resumed. The answer of the Russian emperor to Selim III, dated 28 July 1803, stated 
that despite the attempts of the Russian diplomacy the war, unfortunately, had 
already started. Alexander I once again assured in his friendly feelings towards the 
Ottoman state, and stressed his intention to defend the integrity of the Sultan’s 
possessions.98  
 
As the contradictions between Paris and London resulted in the renewal of the 
war in May 1803, the apprehensions about the potential French attack on the Balkan 
possessions of the Ottoman Empire started to grow. The control of the Apennine 
Peninsula by the French armies would give a superb opportunity for invasion in 
Morea or Albania. In this respect the importance of the Ionian archipelago, and of the 
Russian garrison stationed there, increased once again. Not just the Ottoman, but also 
the Russian government appeared very alarmed at the prospect of the French 
aggression.  
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The Russian ambassador at Constantinople Italinskii was ordered to inform the 
Ottoman side about these considerations of his government.99 It was admitted as an 
indisputable fact that if the French armies would land in the Balkans and take 
Rumelia, the Ottoman state most probably would cease to exist. Italinskii himself 
reported that the Porte simply had not any means to counter the hypothetical French 
attack. In words of the Russian ambassador, should at least 12 or 15 thousand French 
troops invade Morea or Albania “then nothing would save the Porte from complete 
destruction”.100 Italinskii continued, that the European provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire were infested with bandits, the prestige of the Sultan because of his 
childlessness was very low among his own people, and that the Ottoman ministers 
were in discord with each other, all of them pursuing their own interests rather than 
the interest of their state.101              
 
Towards the end of the year the suspicions about the intentions of the First 
Consul kept growing.102 The foreign Minister of Russia A. R. Vorontsov was sure 
that the French troops, which were staying in October 1803 in the port of Taranto in 
Southern Italy, would try to land in Albania.103 In November A. R. Vorontsov 
reported in detail the same concerns in his memorandum to the Emperor.104 In order 
to prevent the still expected threat of the French aggression in the Balkans105, 
Alexander I decided in mid-December 1803 to increase his forces in the Ionian 
Republic. 
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7.3. The Reinforcement of the Russian garrison on Corfu, 1803-1805 
Starting from the end of 1803 the number of the Russian forces on Corfu was 
steadily increasing. On 15 December 1803 Alexander I issued the order to send 
reinforcements to the Russian troops already stationed in the Ionian Republic. In two 
months, on 18 February 1804, the naval squadron of Captain Leontovich (3 frigates: 
“Krepkii”, “Pospeshnyi”, “Ioann Zlatoust” and one transport vessel “Grigorii 
Velikiia Armenii”) departed from Akhtiar (Sevastopol), heading for Corfu and 
carrying the battalion of Colonel Papandopulo, which consisted of about 1200 men 
(874 infantrymen, 221 artillerymen and 67 marines).106 Apart from that, 30 eighteen-
pound guns were as well taken aboard. In mid-March the Deputy Foreign Minister 
Czartoryski informed of the soon arrival of these reinforcements the Russian 
diplomatic representative on the Ionian Islands G. D. Mocenigo.107 The battalion of 
Papandopulo came to Corfu on 26 March 1804.108 In special dispatch to Mocenigo 
Alexander I made it clear, that the expenses for the maintenance of all the Russian 
troops in the Republic of Seven Islands would be covered by Russia and the Ionian 
government would not have to devote any of its limited resources to the support of 
the Russian military contingent.109   
 
In addition to the already mentioned battalion of Papandopulo, Aleksander I on 
24 March 1804 ordered Admiral Marquis de Traversay, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Black Sea Fleet, to send to Corfu the new reinforcements, including Sibirskii 
Grenadier Regiment (Major General Bahmetev the Third), Vitebskii Musketeer 
                                                 
106 ‘Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet Marquis de Traversay to the Deputy Minister of the 
Navy P. V. Chichagov, 21 / 9 February 1804’ Materialy dlia istorii russkogo flota (MIRF) (17 vols.; 
St. Petersburg, 1865-1904), Vol. 17, pp. 440-41. 
107 ‘A. A. Czartoryski to G. D. Mocenigo, 20 / 8 March 1804’ VPR, Vol. 1, pp. 658-59. 
108 Shapiro, Kampanii russkogo flota, pp. 130-31. 
109 Alexander I to G. D. Mocenigo, 1 March (18 February) 1804. VPR, Vol. 1, p. p. 627-28. 
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Regiment (Major General Musin-Pushkin), the 13th Chasseurs Regiment (Major 
General Prince Viazemskii), the 14th Chasseurs Regiment (Major General Stetter), 
and two artillery companies of the 6th Artillery Regiment (Colonel Buchholz and 
Major Ivanov the First). After the arrival on Corfu all Russian naval and land forces 
were to be placed under the general command of Mocenigo.110 
 
Throughout the summer 1804 the transportation of the abovementioned troops 
continued. Major General Bahmetev the Third with his troops (Sibirskii Grenadier 
Regiment, part of the 13th Chasseurs Regiment, a company of the 6th Artillery 
Regiment) on 22 June arrived at Corfu.111 On 16 June 1400 men of Vitebskii 
Musketeer Regiment were embarked on the ships in Akhtiar and also moved towards 
Corfu.112 In the end of June the commander of the Vitebskii Musketeer Regiment 
Major General Musin-Pushkin reported that one Sub-Lieutenant (podporuchik) died 
of disease on the way to Constantinople. What can be inferred from this report, sent 
directly from Constantinople, is that on 29 June 1804 the Vitebskii Musketeer 
Regiment stayed in the close vicinity of the Ottoman capital.113 On 10 July 1804 
from Akhtiar to Corfu sailed off the 14th Chasseurs Regiment of Colonel Stetter and 
one company of the 6th Artillery Regiment of Colonel Buchholz, embarked on the 
                                                 
110 ‘The Highest Decree to Admiral Marquis de Traversay, 24 / 12 March 1804’ MIRF, Vol. 17, pp. 
446-48. 
111 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomoskogo flota, p. 894; Also: ‘Major General Nazimov to the Emperor 
Alexander I. 12 July (30 June) 1804’ RGVIA. Fond 26. Campaign Chancery of His Imperial Majesty 
[Военно-походная канцелярия Е.И.В.]. Op. 152, Delo 234. Reports to the Emperor for the period 
from 28 / 16 April to 28 / 16 August 1804 [Донесения Государю Императору с 16.04 по 
16.08.1804], f. 341. 
112 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomoskogo flota, p. 894. 
113 ‘Major General Musin-Pushkin to the Emperor Alexander I, 29 / 17 June 1804’ RGVIA. Fond 26. 
Campaign Chancery of His Imperial Majesty [Военно-походная канцелярия Е.И.В.]. Op. 152, Delo 
234. Reports to the Emperor for the period from 28 / 16 April to 28 / 16 August 1804 [Донесения 
Государю Императору с 16.04 по 16.08.1804], f. 143. 
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ship “Mariia Magdalina” and the frigate “Sviatoi Mikhail”.114 In four days, on 14 
July, Colonel Stetter reported to the Emperor that his troops arrived on that day at 
eight in the morning to the Küçükdere roads in Constantinople.115 
 
On 19 July the Russian Corfu garrison was again augmented by two battalions 
of the 13th Chasseurs Regiment of General Major Prince Viazemskii came.116 
Another battalion of the 13th Chasseur Regiment, under command of Major Zabielin, 
was embarked in Odessa (Odesa) on the frigate “Grigorii Velikiia Armenii” on 21 
August.117 Major Zabielin attached to his report regarding the embarkation the full 
roster of the battalion:  
Table 9: The Roster of the battalion of Major Zabielin, of the 13th Chasseurs 
Regiment, showing the number of the enlisted military ranks, embarked on 21 / 9 
August 1804 on the frigate “Grigorii Velikiia Armenii” [Ведомость 13-го 
егерского полка имени моего о числе состоящих в оном батальоне воинских 
чинов амбаркировавшихся на фрегат Григорий Великия Армении]. RGVIA. 
Delo 236. Reports to the Emperor for the period from 5 June (24 May) to 17 / 5 
September 1804 [Донесения Государю Императору с 24.05 по 5.09.1804], f. 405.  
Ranks umber 
Major 1 
Captains 3 
Staff Captains (Shtab-Kapitans) 2 
Lieutenants (Poruchiks) 6 
Sub-Lieutenants (Podporuchiks) 4 
Battalion Doctor 1 
Corporals (Unter-ofitsers) 33 
Musicians 9 
Privates 378 
Workmen 9 
Medical Assistant (Feldsher) 1 
Barbers 6 
                                                 
114 ‘The Commandant of Akhtiar, Colonel Muratov to the Emperor Alexander I, 11 July (29 June) 
1804’ Ibidem, Delo 236. Reports to the Emperor for the period from 5 June (24 May) to 17 / 5 
September 1804 [Донесения Государю Императору с 24.05 по 5.09.1804], f. 402. 
115 ‘Colonel Stetter to the Emperor Alexander I, 14 / 2 July 1804’. Ibidem, Delo 234. Reports to the 
Emperor for the period from 28 / 16 April to 28 / 16 August 1804 [Донесения Государю 
Императору с 16.04 по 16.08.1804], f. 288. 
116 ‘Major General Prince Viazemskii to the Emperor Alexander I. 21 / 9 July 1804’ Ibidem, f. 359.  
117 ‘Major Zabielin to the Emperor Alexander I. 21 / 9 August 1804. Ibidem, Delo 236. Reports to the 
Emperor for the period from 5 June (24 May) to 17 / 5 September 1804 [Донесения Государю 
Императору с 24.05 по 5.09.1804], f. 404; ‘Odessa Military Governor Duc de Richelieu to the 
Emperor Alexander I, 22 / 10 August 1804’ Ibidem, f. 568.   
299 
Hospital attendants 4 
Priests 2 
Carters (Fuhrleits) 6 
Provost (Profos) 1 
Officers’ servants (Denshchiks), 
official 
 
17 
Officers’ servants (Denshchiks), from the officers’ own serfs 2 
Recruits, brought by Lieutenant (poruchik) Ladogoskii to man the 13th 
Chasseurs Regiment 
43 
 
In total 528 
Besides, teenagers not included in the ranks, of whom it was reported 
to His Imperial Majesty 
5 
 
 
The abovementioned battalion of Major Zabielin came to its final destination on 30 
September.118 
 
By the beginning of autumn 1804 the transportation of the Russian troops to 
Corfu, in accordance with Alexander’s decree of 24 March, was finished. In 
September at Corfu arrived Major General Roman Karlovich Anrep119, appointed the 
commander of the Russian land forces in the Ionian Republic.120 Throughout the 
summer of 1804 four naval squadrons, including those of Captain Saltanov (ships of 
the line “Paraskeva” and “Simeon and Anna”), Captain Baillie (ships of the line 
“Asiia” and “Troitsa”, plus three merchant vessels), Captain Messer (ships of the line 
“Varakhail” and “Pobieda”), and Captain Maksheiev (ship of the line “Mariia 
Magdalina” and frigate “Mikhail”) were also sent to Corfu.121 These ships 
transported to Corfu 5610 men. The total number of the Russian forces deployed in 
the Ionian Republic throughout 1804 increased from 1.200 to about 8.000 men.122     
 
                                                 
118 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomoskogo flota, p. 895. 
119 More biographical information on R. K. Anrep is available at: Voenniy Entsiklopedicheskii 
Leksikon (14 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1837-1850), Vol. 1, p. 428. 
120 Shapiro, Kampanii russkogo flota, p. 134. 
121 Ibidem 
122 Ibidem, p. 165. 
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The dispatch of the Russian to the Ionian Islands continued in 1805. On 23 
January the squadron of the Baltic ships (ships of the line “Ratvyzan” and “Sviataia 
Ielena”, frigate “Venus” and sloop “Avtrol”) under command of the then 29-year-old 
Captain Commodore (Kapitan-Komandor) Alexei Samuilovich Greig123 came to 
Corfu from Kronstadt.124 It should be mentioned that upon his arrival Greig found on 
Corfu the squadron of the Black Sea ships (one ship of the line and three frigates), by 
his own words, in rather poor condition (en très mauvais état).125 In May 1805 it was 
decided to send to Corfu additional reinforcements, consisting of 4 musketeer 
regiments, which were the Kolyvanskii Musketeer Regiment (Major General 
Zherdiuk, quartered in Khorol, Poltava Province), the Kozlovskii Musketeer 
Regiment (Major General Maksheiev, quartered in Olviopol (nowadays Pervomais’k, 
Mykolayiv Oblast, Ukraine)), the Alexopolskii Musketeer Regiment (Major General 
Loveika, quartered in Nemirov), the Nizhegorodskii Musketeer Regiment (Major 
General Khitrovo, quartered in Odessa), and a company of the 6th Artillery Regiment 
(commanded by Major Kuleshov, quartered in Kherson). Moreover, the 
Pereiaslavskii Dragoon Regiment (Major General Zass) and one Cossacks regiment 
were also assigned to the Ionian Islands. The total number of the forces to be sent to 
Corfu included (the table is taken from RGVIA)126:  
Table 10: The Russian troops assigned for Corfu in May 1805. 
12 Infantry battalions 8.640 men 
5 Dragoon squadrons 969 men 
2 Artillery companies 612 men 
                                                 
123 More biographical information on A. S. Greig is available at: Slovar’ russkikh generalov, 
uchastnikov boevykh deistvii protiv armii Napoleona Bonaparta v 1812-1815 g.g. In: Rossiiskii 
arkhiv, (Moscow, 1996), Vol. 7, pp. 368-69. 
124 ‘A. S. Greig to S. R. Vorontsov, 15 / 3 March 1804’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 
1881), Vol. 19, p. 431; Arkas, Deistviia Chernomoskogo flota, p. 899.  
125 ‘A. S. Greig to S. R. Vorontsov, 15 / 3 March 1804’ Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (40 vols.; Moscow, 
1881), Vol. 19, p. 432. 
126 On transportation of four regiments and an artillery company again to Corfu [Об отправлении в 
Корфу вновь четырех полков и артиллерийской роты]. 21 / 9 May 1805. RGVIA. Fond 1. 
Chancellery of the War Ministry. Op. 1, Delo 889, f. 5; Alexander I to Admiral Marquis de Traversay, 
May 1805, Secretly. Ibidem, f. f. 8-10 ob. 
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1 Cossacks regiment 500 men 
In total, together with non-combatants 
Excluding the carters (fuhrleits) 
10.721 men 
10.479 men 
 
Obviously, the initial plan to send also the Dragoon and the Cossacks regiments was 
eventually cancelled. In his instructions dispatched to the commander of the Russian 
forces on Corfu Major General Anrep, Alexander specifies that he sends four 
musketeer regiments (Kolyvanskii, Kozlovskii, Alexopolskii and Nizhegorodskii) 
along with one company of the 6th Artillery Regiment, with light cannonry.127 Apart 
from that, the Russian government decided to send 4.000 old rifles with bayonets, for 
arming of the Ionian local militia.128 
 
  In pursuance of the orders, the transportation of the new reinforcements to 
Corfu started on 23 July 1805, when from Ochakov were sent the Kozlovskii 
Musketeer Regiment and a company of the 6th Artillery Regiments,129 which 
included: 
Table 11. The Record of the ranks and members of the Kozlovskii Musketeer 
Regiment and the artillery company, which were sent to Corfu [Ведомость о числе 
чинов и служителей Кощловского мушкетерского полка и артиллерийской 
роты отправленных на судах в Корфу]. RGVIA. Fond 1. Chancellery of the War 
Ministry. Op. 1, Delo 889, L. 152.   
Ranks Kozlovskii 
Regiment 
Artillery 
company 
In total 
Major General 1 - 1 
Staff officers (Shtab-ofitsers) 5 1 6 
Company officers (Ober-ofitsers) 50 5 55 
Corporals (Unter-ofitsers) 120 20 140 
Privates 1768 213 1981 
Priest 1 - 1 
In total 1945 239 2184 
 
                                                 
127 ‘Alexander I to Major General Anrep, 23 / 11 May 1805’ Ibidem, f. 13. 
128 ‘To Major General Anrep, 6 August (25 July) 1805, Secretly’ Ibidem, f. f. 164-65. 
129 ‘Marquis de Traversay to the War Minister S. K. Viaz’mitinov, 24 / 12 July 1805’ Ibidem, f. 151. 
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On 1 August, the Kolyvanskii Musketeer Regiment was embarked on the ship 
“Pavel” and also headed to the Mediterranean.130 The roster of the Kolyvanskii 
regiment had been attached by the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet 
Marquis de Traversay to his report to the War Minister S. K. Viaz’mitinov: 
 Table 12. The Record of the ranks of the Kolyvanskii Musketeer Regiment, the 
regimental train and personnel, sent on the ship “Pavel” to Corfu [Ведомость о 
чинах Колыванского мушкетерского полка, полковом обозе и экипаже, 
отправленных на корабле Павле в Корфу]. RGVIA. Fond 1. Chancellery of the 
War Ministry. Op. 1, Delo 889, f. 174-174 ob. 
Ranks umber 
Commander, Major General 1 
Majors 3 
Captains 2 
Staff Captains (Shtabs-Kapitans) 3 
Lieutenants (Poruchiks) 6 
Aid-de-camps 4 
Treasurer 1 
Sub-Lieutenants (Podporuchiks) 5 
Ensigns (Praporshchiks) 6 
Corporals (Unter-ofitsers) 65 
Musicians and drummers 37 
Privates 799 
Non-combatants 
Priest 1 
Doctor 1 
Subaltern personnel (izhnikh chinov) 64 
Officers’ servants and servants (Denshchikov i slug) 48 
Privates under arrest 3 
In total 1.049 
The transported regimental train: 
Boxes with tents 6 
Treasury wagon [Fura s kaznacheistvom] 1 
Treasure chest [Yashchik s kaznoi] 1 
Regimental medicine chest 1 
Also the regimental munitions and the soldiers’ baggage 
 
Along with the aforementioned troops there was the decision to strengthen the 
Russian forces on Corfu with cavalry. The Smolenskii Dragoon Regiment (Major 
General Hamper, quartered in Karasubazar, and two Cossack regiments (those of 
                                                 
130 ‘Marquis de Traversay to the War Minister S. K. Viaz’mitinov, 5 August (24 July) 1805’ Ibidem, f. 
173.  
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Sulin the Sixth and Platov the Third, quartered respectively in Slobozia and 
Rashkov) were sent the Emperor’s orders to be ready for departure.131  
 
However, on 2 September 1805 Admiral Traversay received the new 
instructions, informing him that the Emperor rescinded all the previous orders 
concerning the transportation to the Ionian Republic of the following regiments, 
which instead of being sent to Corfu now were to stay in Russia: the Kolyvanskii, the 
Kozlovskii, the Alexopolskii and the Nizhegorodskii Musketeer regiments, together 
with all assigned to them artillery, as well as the Smolenskii Dragoon and two 
Cossack regiments. The Commander of the Black Sea Fleet was ordered to stop any 
embarkation of the troops which were not yet sent. Only if some part of the infantry 
battalions already departed the rest was to be also sent to Corfu, in order to keep the 
full battalions.132  
 
In two weeks Marquis Traversay was again given the new instructions stating 
that the decision not to send the troops assigned for Corfu was once more 
reconsidered. All the necessary works regarding the embarkation were to be 
continued, yet still these troops were to stay in the home ports and wait until further 
orders.133 As for the forces that were already on Corfu, by order of Alexander I on 14 
October 1805 all of them (Sibirskii, Vitebskii, Kolyvanskii and Kozlovskii 
Musketeer regiments, the 13th and the 14th Chasseur regiments with artillery 
companies, and 1000 Albanians under command of Major General Anrep) left the 
Ionian Islands and were transported by the naval squadron of Captain Commodore 
                                                 
131 ‘Alexander I to Marquis de Traversay, 27 / 15 August 1805’ Ibidem, f. 189. 
132 ‘Adjutant General Liven to Marquis Traversay, 2 September (21 August) 1805’ Ibidem, f. f. 206-
206 ob. 
133 ‘Alexander I to Marquis de Traversay, 16 / 4 September 1805’ Ibidem, f. f. 216-216 ob. 
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Greig to Sicily (Syracuse). Then, on 9 November the Russian troops were landed in 
Naples, with the mission to defend the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies from the 
Napoleonic France. Quite soon, though, took place the ill-fated for the forces of the 
anti-French coalition battle of Austerlitz (2 December 1805), which made Alexander 
to withdraw his troops from the Kingdom of Naples and once again, by the January 
1806, redeploy them on the Ionian Islands.134 Along with the land forces, in 
September 1805 the Russian government sent the squadron of Vice Admiral Dmitrii 
Nikolaievich Seniavin, consisting of 5 ships of the line, one frigate and two brigs 
from the Baltic Sea to Corfu.135 Upon his arrival to the Ionian Republic (30 January 
1806) Seniavin was to assume the command over all Russian land and naval forces 
in the Ionian Republic.136  
 
The fact was that the significant strengthening of the Russian forces on the 
Ionian Islands could be explained in different ways, and the French representatives in 
Constantinople tried to present this situation in a light favourable for their own 
purposes, as a proof of the aggressive intentions of the Russian side. Karal when 
speaking on the Ottoman foreign policy preferences notes that after the French threat 
was over and the French troops were removed from Egypt the Ottomans started to 
feel the friendship of the allies as a burden as well as to seek rapprochement with 
France.137 On the other hand, the Sultan’s government was certainly aware of the 
worth of all the promises made by Napoléon, as the memory of the Egyptian 
expedition remained too fresh to be forgotten. For that reason the Ottomans were in 
no haste to break with their Russian allies. 
                                                 
134 Arkas, Deistviia Chernomorskogo flota, p. 901. 
135 Z. Arkas, Prodolzheniie deistvii Chernomorskogo flota s 1806 po 1856 god. Zapiski Odesskogo 
Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei (ZOOID), 1867 (6), p. 368. 
136 Tarle, Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom more, pp. 263-64. 
137 Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları, pp. 81-82.  
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When it comes to the considerations of the Russian government about its 
politics concerning the Ionian Islands, and, in a wider context, the Balkans, a number 
of instructions sent to G. D. Mocenigo138 bring to light the real dilemma faced at this 
time by St. Petersburg. For one part, the primary task to oppose the French advance 
in the area determined the true wish to preserve the Ottoman Balkan possessions 
under the sovereignty of the Sultan and to prevent them from falling into the hands of 
a stronger European power. In order to counter the French propaganda among the 
Greeks and the Southern Slavs, the Russian government thought it expedient to use 
the traditional affection felt by the Balkan Orthodox people for Russia as a means of 
its own influence. At the same time, though at the moment St. Petersburg was 
concerned with safeguarding the Ottoman Empire from the possible and even 
expected encroachments of the Napoleonic France, this would certainly have aroused 
the suspicions of the Porte if handled without the necessary cautiousness. 
Furthermore, the Russian statesmen kept in mind that the fact of the common 
religion with the Ottoman Orthodox subjects, which was kind of a universal trump 
card, could be always useful in implementation of some other plans as well, and not 
necessarily of a defensive character.  
 
For that reason, the instructions to the Russian diplomatic representative in the 
Republic of Seven Islands were looking somewhat paradoxical, i. e. to use the 
traditional Russian influence among the Orthodox Balkan peoples with the aim to 
preserve the Balkans for the Ottoman Empire. St. Petersburg tried to pursue a two-
                                                 
138 ‘A. R. Vorontsov to G. D. Mocenigo, 9 September (28 August) 1803’. VPR. Vol. 1, pp. 513-17; 
‘A. R. Vorontsov to G. D. Mocenigo, 17 / 5 December 1803’ Ibidem, pp. 577-84; ‘A. A. Czartoryski 
to G. D. Mocenigo, 12 August (31 July) 1804’ Ibidem, Vol. 2, pp. 110-13.  
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fold strategy of both keeping the sympathies of the Balkan Christians and searching 
to defend the Ottoman possessions from the expected French aggression.  
 
The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Czartoryski wrote to Mocenigo 
that he “should carefully avoid anything what could discredit us before the Porte, as 
it is important for us to be on friendly terms with it and not to be in a hurry to give 
the last impetus to our devoted parties in Greece”. Regarding the “trump card” of the 
Orthodox Balkan peoples, it was deemed necessary to “prepare everything and adjust 
the machine in such a way that it could be used for realization of any plan or 
decision, which the events would make us to prefer (Italics are mine; V. M.)”.139 For 
sure, it was a tremendous challenge to the professional skills of the Russian 
diplomats to avoid discrediting themselves both in the eyes of the Orthodox Ottoman 
subjects and the Ottoman government at the same time.         
7.4. The Porte: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 1804-1805 
In the wake of the growing French advances in Europe one common objective 
shared by both the Ottoman and Russian governments was to prevent the potential 
French attack on the Balkan domains of the Sultan. With this end in view the 
substantial reinforcement of the Russian garrison on Corfu started at the beginning of 
1804. Neither St. Petersburg nor the Porte, each for its own reasons, wished to see 
the French armies marching across the Balkans.  
 
From the Ottoman perspective, any involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the 
war would pose a grave threat to its very existence. Despite the assurances of the 
                                                 
139 “…de preparer tout et de monter la machine de manière qu’elle puisse se prêter également à tel ou 
tel autre plan et décision que les événements nous obligeront de préférer”. VPR. Vol. 2, p. 111. 
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French in their friendly dispositions towards the Porte, the hypothetical French 
landing in Morea or Albania could mark the beginning of the dissolution of the 
Ottoman state. Lacking the necessary resources for the protection of its borders, the 
Sultan’s government depended on whatever support it could get from other European 
powers, which were equally interested to block the spread of the French influences in 
the Balkans. In practice this meant the necessity to maintain cooperative relations 
with Russia and Great Britain. On the other side of the coin, the Porte had no luxury 
to deteriorate its relations with France, all the more that it could never be sure that 
the Russians or the British were not preparing some clandestine anti-Ottoman 
designs of their own. The Sultan’s government thus found itself in an embarrassing 
position, which required keeping the delicate balance in their relations with all 
rivalling European parties.  
 
As far as the stance of the Russian government regarding the Ottoman Empire 
is concerned, it was outlined by the new Foreign minister of Russia (de facto, 
formally the title of the Foreign minister was retained by the retired A. R. 
Vorontsov140) Adam Jerzy Czartoryski in his memorandum addressed to the Tsar and 
dated 29 February 1804.141 In view of Czartoryski, the Ottoman Empire was on the 
verge of collapse. Along with the downfall of the Ottoman state Russia would lose 
all those recent commercial and political benefits it managed to get from the Porte as 
a result of the Ottoman-Russian alliance of 1799 and the general weakness of the 
Ottoman state edifice. The Ottoman current position of a weak and quiet neighbour 
of Russia, together with the advantages enjoyed by the Russian Black Sea commerce, 
                                                 
140 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I. Political Attitudes and the 
Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825 (Berkley, 1969), p. 111.  
141 ‘A. A. Czartoryski to Alexander I, 29 / 17 February 1804’ VPR, Vol. 1, pp. 619-27; This 
memorandum has also been published at: SIRIO, Vol. 77, pp. 486-98. 
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provided a good reason for Russia to bend every effort in order to preserve the 
Ottoman Empire. In this way the anticipated French aggression in the Balkans would 
be deemed highly dangerous not only for the Porte, but also for Russia, and regarded 
by St. Petersburg as a direct intrusion into its own sphere of interests. By defending 
its practical interests, however, Russia would also throw its weight behind the 
Ottoman territorial integrity.   
 
Aside from that, Czartoryski specified three much undesirable for St. 
Petersburg situations, when Russia might lose all its present strategic advantages. 
First, this could happen as soon as the Ottoman Empire would recover its former 
strength. Second, when the Ottoman Empire, intimidated by the French, would enter 
into an alliance with them. Third, when some European power (apparently France) 
would capture the Black Sea Straits and Constantinople. The first option seemed very 
unlikely, and Czartoryski himself was almost sure that the Ottoman state would 
sooner or later fall apart. As regards the prospective extension of the French 
influence to the shores of the Bosporus, whether through the alliance with the Porte 
or as a result of the direct conquest, Russia was by all means to oppose it. 
 
Rendering support to the Ottomans presented an obvious dilemma for the 
Russian government. By defending the Ottoman Empire St. Petersburg risked 
jeopardising its special relations with the Orthodox subjects of the Porte. Czartoryski 
argued that to abandon the Greeks would mean to neglect the future. The Russian 
minister pointed out that the Ottoman government, “in view of its geographic 
location, keeping in mind its old scores with us and because of the prejudices of its 
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religion may before long become our enemy once again”.142 In that case the pro-
Russian sympathies of the Balkan Orthodox people would be crucial. To keep its 
image of the main protector of the Ottoman Orthodox subjects and to assure the 
safety of the Ottoman borders were thus the two tasks St. Petersburg had necessarily 
to combine in its foreign policy. The solution of this dilemma could be found, 
according to Czartoryski, only if Russia would promise the Greeks to advocate their 
interests before the Porte. In requesting concessions from the Porte for the Ottoman 
Orthodox population, Russia could also help the Ottoman government to avoid the 
domestic crisis and therefore consolidate its own positions.  
 
The primary aim of St. Petersburg in spring of 1804, as is clear from the 
Russian diplomatic correspondence of the time, remained to safeguard the Sultan’s 
domains, or rather Russia’s own influence there, from any encroachments from 
outside. The Russian government thought it possible to make use of its historical and 
religious bonds with the Balkan peoples, in order to defend the Ottoman Empire.143 
Alongside with that, the downfall of the Ottoman state seemed still almost 
unavoidable and for St. Petersburg it was equally important to be prepared to such a 
disastrous event. Russia could not “afford some other power to gain a foothold in this 
country (meaning the Ottoman Empire; V. M.)”144 and for that reason, even though 
secretly, was to consider the possible consequences of the downfall of the Ottoman 
Empire beforehand.145  
 
                                                 
142 ‘A. A. Czartoryski to Alexander I, 29 / 17 February 1804’ VPR, Vol. 1, p. 621 (French original), p. 
625 (Russian translation). 
143 ‘A. A. Czartoryski to S. R. Vorontsov, 9 March (26 February) 1804’. Ibidem, p. 631 (French 
original), p. 635 (Russian translation). 
144 ‘A. A. Czartoryski to G. D. Mocenigo, 20 / 8 March 1804’ Ibidem, p. 654 (French original), p. 656 
(Russian translation). 
145 Ibidem.  
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Following the execution of the Duke d’Enghien on 21 March 1804 the 
European war grew even more intense. The great impact of this event was felt not 
only in Europe but also in Russia. On 17 April 1804 a special meeting of the State 
Council took place, which discussed the further Russian stance regarding France.146 
Though no final decision was taken, it was clear that Russia was slowly drifting 
towards the new anti-French alliance with Great Britain.             
 
In the growing conflict of the leading European powers the position, which 
would be taken by the Ottoman government, gained special importance. While the 
Porte sought to stay neutral at all costs, the French, Russian and British diplomatic 
agents pressed the Porte to join the side of their governments. The First Consul of 
France Napoléon Bonaparte sent in March 1804 a personal letter to Selim III, 
delivered to the Sultan by Citizen Jaubert on 28 April 1804.147 Bonaparte reassured 
the Sultan in his amicable intentions towards the Ottoman Empire and denied any 
attempts on the part of France to take possession of Egypt or Greece.148 The Sultan 
received Jaubert in a friendly way, telling the French envoy that Bonaparte was his 
friend and emphasizing the wish of the Ottoman side to keep those old-established 
cordial relations that existed earlier between the Ottoman Empire and France. The 
answer of the Sultan to Bonaparte was prepared on 18 May 1804. Selim III again 
expressed his benevolent dispositions to France, informing the First Consul that the 
rumours of the imminent French invasion of the Balkans had had no effect upon 
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him.149 By an interesting twist of fate, on that very day, that is, on 18 May 1804, 
Citizen Bonaparte was proclaimed the Emperor of the French Napoléon I.  
 
The issue of the official recognition of the new imperial title of Napoléon 
Bonaparte by the Porte gained special political importance immediately after the 
news of the Bonaparte’s new title reached Istanbul by mid-June 1804. The Ottomans 
found themselves between a rock and a hard place in the true sense of the word. The 
French, on the one side, expected the Ottoman Empire to prove all its previous 
assurances of friendship towards France and to recognise Napoléon Bonaparte as the 
Emperor. At the same time the Russians and British, stressing the allied character of 
relations between their courts and the Porte, insisted that the Ottomans should not 
recognise the imperial title of Bonaparte. 
 
On 29 June 1804 the French ambassador Brune demanded the absolute 
recognition of Napoléon as the “Emperor and Padishah”.150 At his meeting with the 
Reis-ül-Küttab Brune argued that the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was 
addressed by the Porte as “Imperador” and the Russian Tsar was termed as 
“Padishah ve Imperador”. For that reason Napoléon had to be addressed in the same 
way as Alexander I, since Napoléon was also the Emperor just like Alexander. The 
Ottoman official gave an evasive reply, explaining that the Porte would recognise 
Napoléon as “Padishah” (for the Kings of France were formerly recognised by the 
Porte as “Padishahs” ) but recognition of the title of “Emperor” should be postponed 
until the respective decision of the “concerned courts”.151 Even so, the Ottoman 
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government was in no haste to use officially either of the mentioned titles. On 20 
September 1804 the Reis-ül-Küttab put it clear to Brune that the Ottoman Empire 
according to the 4th article of the Ottoman-Russian alliance treaty of 3 January 1799 
cannot recognise Napoléon as Emperor without consulting with the Russian side. 
This answer of the Porte to the French diplomatic representative made the Russian 
ambassador Italinskii feel triumphant.152 
 
Towards the end of September Brune became determined to obtain a 
favourable settlement of the issue of recognition of Bonaparte’s imperial title. The 
Ottoman side, though, still was providing the French ambassador with only vague 
hints and evasive replies.153 In the first days of October 1804 Brune resorted to an 
ultimatum, declaring that he would leave Constantinople if the Porte would not soon 
recognise Napoléon as the Emperor. The answer of Reis-ül-Küttab was hardly 
encouraging for Brune, “This would be arranged, if God permits”. Coquelle wittily 
remarked that God in this affair was the Russian ambassador.154 
 
Brune requested his passports on 4 October 1804,155 by this measure hoping to 
persuade the Ottomans to accept his demands. However, the Porte was also under 
serious pressure from the Russian and the British ambassadors. On 8 October 1804 
Italinskii sent a warning note to the Ottoman government, stating that the Ottomans 
were to choose between their Russian and British allies or France.156 Among other 
things the Russian note contained a hidden threat, mentioning the exclusive naval 
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preponderance of Britain and the large armed forces of Russia situated along the long 
Russo-Ottoman frontier. The note implied that in case when the Porte would “forget 
how it was indebted to both its allies”, the considerable naval and land forces of the 
Russian and British courts that were now friendly, could turn hostile to the Ottomans. 
Moreover, Italinskii reminded that should the Porte recognise the imperial title of 
Napoléon, the Russian government might also recall its ambassador from the 
Ottoman capital.157 In fact, the note of Italinskii was nothing else than ultimatum, 
requiring from the Ottomans an overt and quick reply. 
 
Until the very last moment Brune wished to believe that the Porte would give in 
as a result of his demarche in the end. Nevertheless, all attempts of the French 
ambassador proved useless. The gloomy autumn days simply dragged on without 
much change in the attitudes of the Porte. The Ottomans clearly preferred not to 
upset their relations with France, yet at the same time feared to rouse the anger of 
Russia and Britain. On 9 December 1804 Brune gathered the French notables of 
Constantinople and informed them of his imminent departure, most probably still 
keeping a secret hope of winning the issue. In three days, as no reaction on the part 
of the Ottoman authorities followed, Brune left Constantinople and stopped at the 
place known as Kağıthane, a few miles from the Ottoman capital (nowadays one of 
the city districts in the European part of Istanbul). At this point the messenger of the 
Grand Vizier came to Brune, asking the latter to return to the building of the French 
embassy and wait for the Porte’s decision a bit more. Brune replied that he would 
wait where he was. 
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Again, the Russian diplomacy had to interfere. On 15 December 1804 Italinskii 
sent his yet another note to the Ottoman government.158 The Russian ambassador, 
combining reprimands and the hidden threats, voiced his concern at the latest 
behaviour of the Porte. While the Ottomans were in no position to enter into a 
conflict with Russia, Brune had no other choice but finally to leave Constantinople 
without the coveted Ottoman recognition of Bonaparte’s imperial title. Italinskii 
wrote jubilantly to S. R. Vorontsov, the Russian ambassador in London, that his 
“labours and troubled thoughts” of last four months at last brought the results. On 18 
December 1804 Brune, this time decidedly, proceeded to Adrianople.159  
 
The success of the Russian diplomacy in preventing the Ottoman recognition of 
Napoléon as Emperor displayed that St. Petersburg still had strong positions at the 
Porte. During the summer of 1804, in parallel to the discussions about Napoléon’s 
imperial title, there emerged an idea of renewal of the allied treaty between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire. It is difficult, if not impossible, to define which state made 
the initial proposition to renew the alliance.  
 
The head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Czartoryski wrote to S. R. Vorontsov 
that, in order to reassure the Porte as regards the Russian reinforcements of Corfu 
unceasing from the beginning of the year, the ambassador Italinskii only in passing 
mentioned the possibility of the alliance renewal. The Ottoman side, however, took 
the words of Italinskii more seriously than it was expected, and on 29 June 1804 
made a statement that it accepted the Russian proposal to start negotiations about the 
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renewal of the Ottoman-Russian alliance.160 Thus from the Ottoman point of view it 
was the Russians who first suggested the idea to renew the allied treaty of 1799. As 
for the Russian diplomatic sources, as well as later Russian historical literature, they 
hold that it was the Ottomans who asked Russia for the alliance renewal. 
 
According to Verbitskii, the Ottomans were expressing the idea to renew the 
alliance with Russia as early as the 2nd half of 1802. The similar propositions were 
repeated by the Porte also in 1803. The principal aim of this manoeuvre, in 
Verbitskii’s view, was to conceal the recent changes in the Ottoman foreign policy 
and to reduce the discontent of the allies.161 When in June 1804 the Ottomans 
informed Russia that they were ready to discuss the alliance renewal, this issue had 
been given a careful consideration by the Russian government. The two dispatches of 
Czartoryski, which were sent in late August to the Russian ambassadors in 
Constantinople and London162, shed light on the attitude of St. Petersburg to the 
question under discussion. 
 
Czartoryski specified that the alliance with the Porte, in fact, was advantageous 
exclusively for the Ottoman side, while for Russia it was in large measure a burden. 
Militarily, let alone the anarchy of its state apparatus, the Ottoman Empire could 
provide the allies no real help and, even more, would hamper their war operations, 
the hardships experienced by the Russian troops on Corfu being an example of 
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that.163 Furthermore, the equivocal position of the Porte towards the allies could not 
escape the keen eye of the Russian government. Though the Ottomans were at 
present inclined to keep their allied relations with Russia and Britain, St. Petersburg 
was aware of the secret Ottoman sympathies for France. The head of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry wrote to S. R. Vorontsov, that one could never be sure about the 
sincerity of the Porte, which may switch camps at the most critical moment.164  
 
In view of Czartoryski, if Russia had to carry the burden of the alliance for the 
sake of the common cause, caring about the defence of the crumbling Ottoman 
Empire, it had also to think of getting some rewards. Russia could not afford keeping 
its hands tied by the alliance with the Porte gratuitously (ne pas se lier gratuitement 
les mains).165 For that reason the allied treaty, as it had been signed in 1799, did not 
meet the Russian interests and had to be reconsidered. Italinskii was enjoined to 
inform the Reis-ül-Küttab that before starting to discuss the alliance renewal the 
Russian side would like to consult with the British and ask for their opinion about the 
new treaty. In regard to the negotiations with the Porte, Italinskii would have the 
necessary instructions on the subject as soon as the reply from London would be 
received.166 
 
On 23 September 1804 Alexander I signed the secret instruction167 for Nikolai 
Nikolaievich Novosiltsev, who was to be sent to London with a special mission of 
preparing the ground for the British-Russian alliance, one of the most important links 
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of the prospected third anti-French coalition. By and large, in the instruction of 
Alexander as regards the Ottoman Empire one sees the same arguments that were 
earlier stated by Czartoryski in his memo to the Tsar in February. The Ottoman 
Empire was to be protected to the utmost. Only in the last resort, should the existence 
of the Ottoman state in Europe appear impossible Russia and Britain were to think 
about the future of the Ottoman European possessions. In the meantime, the 
protection of the Ottoman Empire was seen as one of the main tasks of both the 
Russian and the British courts.168    
 
In addition to his instructions Novosiltsev was given a project of the new treaty 
of alliance with the Porte, which he had to discuss with the British cabinet. The two 
key clauses that St. Petersburg planned to include into the renewed treaty concerned 
the employment of the Russian troops in the Danubian principalities and the 
extension of the rights of the Ottoman Christian subjects. According to the treaty 
project, the Russian troops (20 thousand men) were to occupy Moldavia and 
Wallachia in order to come faster to the aid of the Ottomans in case of the French 
landing on the Adriatic coast. One more specific condition suggested that the 
Ottoman Christians were to be granted the same civil rights that were enjoyed by the 
Muslims. The difference in the status of the Christian and the Muslim subjects of the 
Sultan was to be reduced only to the payment of kharaj. As regards the Britain it 
would be given one of the Ottoman ports in Morea, where it could deploy some of its 
battleships and 4 or 5 thousand men. Also, with the view of protection of Egypt the 
draft of the treaty stipulated the deployment of the British forces in Alexanderia.169 
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The special envoy of Alexander I arrived in London in November 1804. At his 
meeting with the British Prime Minister Pitt Novosiltsev tried to convince the latter 
that Russia had no secret designs regarding the Ottoman Empire and sincerely 
wished to preserve it. On the other hand, the further argument of Novosiltsev added a 
tinge of ambiguity to his words. The Russian envoy stated that the Tsar did not 
entertain any plans of territorial acquisitions at the expense of the Porte. However, 
even if Russia had such plans, why should England, the best friend of Russia, be 
alarmed?170 Eventually, after long negotiations in London an Anglo-Russian alliance 
was signed on 11 April 1805. Apart from that, on 6 November 1804 the declaration 
about the joint operations against France had been concluded between Russia and 
Austria. In part concerning the Ottoman Empire both St. Petersburg and Vienna 
mutually guaranteed the integrity of the Sultan’s domains.171  
 
On 29 December 1804 the Russian ambassador at Constantinople Italinskii was 
sent the respective instructions to start the negotiations with the Ottomans about the 
renewal of the alliance treaty. The author of the instructions, Czartoryski, pointed out 
the three main objectives Russia sought to reach by renewing the alliance. These 
were, first, to tie the Porte closer to Russia and to prevent the Ottoman 
rapprochement with France; second, to assure the Ottoman participation in the anti-
French coalition; third, to acquire the right to intervene on behalf of the Ottoman 
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Christian subjects in order to facilitate their existence within the Empire. All the 
three points, noted Czartoryski, were exactly what the Porte would try to elude.172   
 
The draft treaty confirmed in St. Petersburg along with the instructions was to 
be taken as a basis for the new agreement. The preliminary exchange of opinions on 
the subject between Italinskii and the Reis-ül-Küttab Mahmud Râif Efendi173 took 
place on 6 February 1805.174 Then, on 28 February 1805, at the residence of the Reis-
ül-Küttab the parties gathered for the first conference175, at which Italinskii met with 
Mahmud Râif Efendi and another high ranking Ottoman official, the Rumeli 
Kazaskeri Ismet Ibrahim Bey.176 The latter two were to represent the Ottoman side at 
the negotiations.  
 
Italinskii handed over the text of the Russian project to the Ottoman 
plenipotentiaries, though told them that he was yet unprepared to discuss the contents 
of the secret articles. At the next two conferences, held on 18 March and 15 April the 
two sides negotiated the approval of the regular articles of the treaty, confirmed by 
the Sultan towards the end of April.177 These were of a general character, outlining 
the principles of the alliance, the scope and the type of the allied aid, the mutual 
guarantee of the territorial possessions as well as the smaller details like sharing the 
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war booty or the rules for saluting between the allied naval squadrons. The treaty was 
to be valid for 9 years.178   
 
Only after that Italinskii informed the Porte about the essence of the secret part 
of the treaty and presented the projects of the first two secret articles.179 At this point, 
following the incident of Anaklia180 and the arrival of the special French envoy 
Jaubert with the letter from Napoléon to the Sultan, the negotiations were suspended. 
Furthermore, one of the principal Ottoman negotiators, Ismet Bey, fell ill, while the 
Grand Vizier Kör Yusuf Ziyaüddin Pasha181 on 24 April 1805 was replaced by 
Bostancıbaşı Hafız Ismail Pasha.182 
 
The envoy of Napoléon Jaubert arrived at Constantinople in mid-April 1805.183 
He had to deliver the Sultan the letter written by the French Emperor personally to 
Selim III.184 The letter was a sample of the strong anti-Russian verbiage. “Have you 
ceased to reign? How can you stand that Russia gives you laws?” were the opening 
phrases addressed to the Sultan. Napoléon argued that 15 thousand Russian men on 
Corfu could not be a serious threat for France and thus were deployed there with an 
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obvious intention to use them against the Ottomans. The Russian battleships passing 
through Constantinople and carrying the Russian troops one day may attack the 
Ottoman capital and put an end to the Ottoman Empire. Napoléon stated that Reis 
Efendi was betraying the Sultan, as did half of the Divan, bribed by Russia. The real 
friends of the Ottoman Empire were France and Prussia. It was the Russians who 
were the real enemies, for they wished to dominate the Black Sea and that aim could 
not be achieved without capturing Constantinople. What is more, the Russians were 
the Orthodox Christians, like the half of the Sultan’s subjects. In the end Napoléon 
proposed Selim III to reconsider the system of his alliances, or otherwise Napoléon, 
who has “never been a weak enemy”, may turn against the Sultan. The letter was 
handed over to Selim on 2 May 1805.185     
 
As one could expect, the Russian ambassador Italinskii immediately after 
learning about the mission of Jaubert sent his protest to the Porte.186 Though 
composed in a friendly manner, the note of Italinskii contained a veiled threat. The 
Ottomans were recommended to read the previous note of Italinskii, presented to the 
Porte on 15 December 1804 on the occasion of the negotiations about the recognition 
of Napoléon’s imperial title. Like then, the Russian ambassador pointed out that the 
results of the indignation of the Tsar could be disastrous for the Ottoman Empire. 
Being threatened by both Paris and St. Petersburg, the Porte once again preferred to 
take a mid-way. On 21 May 1805 the envoy of Napoléon was given the Sultan’s 
reply, written in general polite expressions, but neither recognising the Napoléon’s 
imperial title nor mentioning politics in any way.187 
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The Ottoman-Russian negotiations about the renewal of the defensive treaty 
were resumed in June, by the discussion of the first two secret articles. However, the 
conferences that were held on 6 June and 15 June brought no results. The articles, 
which were discussed, incurred the displeasure of the Porte, for they stipulated not 
only the conclusion of the Ottoman-Russian defensive alliance but also the 
participation of the Ottoman Empire in the anti-French coalition. As for the 
Ottomans, they would like to conclude only a defensive alliance, but were not willing 
to join the broader coalition what would eventually involve them into a war with 
France. Only on 30 June 1805 the parties signed the 1st secret article, emphasizing 
the exclusively defensive character of the treaty.188 The direct participation of the 
Ottomans in the anti-French coalition was not mentioned. Instead, the Porte was to 
act jointly (fera cause commune) with its ally, the Russian Emperor. On 8 July the 
2nd secret article was signed, stating that while inviting other European states to join 
the anti-French coalition the Russian Emperor was to inform them that the Ottoman 
Empire would act jointly with Russia. In other words, the formal Ottoman 
participation in the anti-French coalition was excluded. 
 
Then on the same day, on 8 July 1805, the first dragoman of the Russian 
embassy Joseph Fonton handed over the drafts of the 3rd and the 4th secret articles to 
Mahmud Râif Efendi. Upon seeing them, the Reis-ül-Küttab was astonished and 
demanded the text of the rest of the articles.189 The two articles, which were actually 
the most important for the Russian side, the 3rd and the 8th, appeared unacceptable for 
the Porte. The former was about the deployment of the Russian armed forces on the 
territory of the Danube principalities and the latter proposed to establish the equal 
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social status for the Christian subjects of the Sultan with the Muslims. The hopes of 
the Russian side to include both articles in the final text of the treaty were connected 
with the person of Mahmud Râif, who was under the influence of the pro-Russian 
agent Dimitrios Moruzi. However, on 14 August 1805 Mahmud Râif was replaced 
on his post by Ahmed Vasıf. The Russian diplomacy considered this replacement as 
a measure directed against the Russian influence in Constantinople. The official 
justification given by the Ottoman side, however, was the delay in signing the allied 
agreement. In the end, the two most essential for Russia secret clauses were rejected 
by the Porte without even being discussed. All efforts of Italinskii to influence the 
decision of the Ottomans proved useless.190 On 23 September 1805 the renewal of 
the Ottoman-Russian defensive treaty had been signed, though the most cherished by 
Russia clauses had been omitted.191  
 
Undoubtedly, both states viewed the idea of the renewal of the Ottoman-
Russian defensive alliance from completely different perspectives, and by 
concluding the treaty each party sought to gain its own specific advantages. Puryear 
and Ismail have little reason to claim that the Ottoman Empire “gave in to Russia’s 
insistent demand to renew the alliance”192, or that “the Ottomans ... yielded to 
pressure and renewed their alliance with Russia”.193 First, it is not that clear who first 
made the proposition to start the negotiations about the treaty renewal. Even though 
Italinskii might have mentioned the abstract idea to renew the alliance, technically it 
was the Ottomans who in June 1804 approached the Russian ambassador with a 
message that they were ready to negotiate. Also, in view of the fact that the two most 
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important for Russia clauses were not included in the final text of the treaty, one may 
hardly argue that the Ottomans “yielded to the Russian pressure”. Finally, it is 
possible to say that both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, each in its own way, 
derived certain benefits from the renewed treaty. 
 
As far as Russia is concerned, the defensive alliance with the Ottoman Empire 
was a certain guarantee that the Porte in the near future would not join the French. 
Russia retained its garrison on Corfu and its battleships still enjoyed the right of the 
free passage through the Black Sea straits. In this way St. Petersburg assured its 
strategic positions in the Balkans, having at its disposal the necessary means to 
prevent the hypothetical French expansion in the area. Furthermore, in case of war 
with France the Russian land and/or naval forces would be supplied at the cost of the 
Porte. Though according to the treaty it would be the side receiving the military help 
that was to provide the allied troops with provisions, in practice only Russia could 
send its army/fleet to the help of the Ottomans and not the other way around.  
 
For all that, the renewed allied treaty with the Ottoman Empire was far from 
what was initially expected by the Russian government. St. Petersburg attached 
special importance to the clauses, which had been eventually flatly rejected by the 
Porte, concerning the deployment of the Russian troops in the Danube principalities 
and the granting of the equal with the Muslims social status to the Ottoman Christian 
subjects. Why these two clauses could be so important for Russia? One should 
remember that the Russian government along with the declared aim to preserve the 
Ottoman Empire was also taking into account the possibility of its disintegration. The 
downfall of the Ottoman Empire seemed to be quite real should a large-scale 
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European war start in the Balkans. While trying to convince the Ottomans that the 
entrance of the Russian troops in Moldavia and Wallachia was essential in order to 
defend the Sultan’s possessions from the French attack, St. Petersburg necessarily 
had to consider another scenario. Clearly, in case of the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire it would be much easier for the Russian troops deployed in the Danube 
principalities to take over the Ottoman European possessions and to prevent them 
from being occupied by other European powers.  
 
Regarding the draft of the secret article stipulating the changes in the social 
status of the Ottoman Christians, the maintaining of its image as the successful 
protector of the Orthodox coreligionists could lately well be converted by St. 
Petersburg into the sympathies and practical support of the Orthodox Ottoman 
population. This might give Russia serious advantages as compared to other 
European powers in the contest over the Balkans, which might ensue as a result of 
the disintegration of the Ottoman state.  
 
When it comes to the Ottoman Empire, by renewing the allied treaty with 
Russia it secured its borders against the possibility of a sudden French invasion. The 
Ottomans also smoothed over their relations with St. Petersburg and obtained at least 
a certain guarantee that Russia would not put at risk its present privileged positions at 
the Porte and would not attack, contrary to the continuous warnings the French were 
making to the Sultan’s government. Furthermore, the Russian demands about the 
change of status for the Ottoman Christians were not accepted and the Porte managed 
to stay away from participating in the anti-French coalition. In this way, on the one 
hand, by having renewed its alliance with Russia the Ottoman Empire remained on 
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relatively good terms with its northern neighbours. On the other hand, the Ottomans 
succeeded not to damage their relations with France irrevocably.    
7.5. The Two Empires on the Road to War 
Despite the renewal of the treaty of alliance the relations between the Porte and 
St. Petersburg were far from being cloudless. In view of the Ottoman government, 
the alliance with Russia was to be tolerated as a certain guarantee against the 
unpredictability of the future. It defended the Ottomans both from the potential 
aggression of the Napoléonic France and the wrath of Russia. Considering the deep 
internal crisis in the Ottoman Empire, the Porte was in no position to wage war on 
anyone at this time. Thus, the Ottoman government in the autumn of 1805, just in the 
same way as before, preferred to remain an outside observer of the major European 
conflict between France and the forces of the anti-Napoléonic coalition. As one of 
the Ottoman state officials confessed, an ideal situation for the Porte would be when 
the French and the allies would continue to annihilate each other, leaving the Porte 
alone.194  
 
The above quote suggests that the Ottoman Empire, after all, was not that much 
happy about its alliance with Russia. The Porte did not wish to see its Russian allies 
to be victorious and, on the contrary, wished them to exhaust their strength. No 
doubt, the preponderant Russian influence, confirmed in the clauses of the treaty of 
alliance, was seen by the Ottomans as an annoying and dangerous burden to be got 
rid of. The Porte would not be able to remove it without the help of some other 
powerful European state. In practice, such a state could only be France. On the other 
                                                 
194 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to A. A. Czartoryski, 30 (18) November 1805’ VPR, Vol. 2, p. 641 (French 
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hand, the recent successful French expansion all over the European continent was 
making Paris a dangerous ally as well. 
 
After the decisive French victories over the Austrian and Russian armies at 
Ulm (16-19 October 1805) and Austerlitz (2 December 1805), in accordance with the 
Franco-Austrian Peace of Pressburg (26 December 1805), France gained Istria and 
Dalmatia. While the Russian forces on Corfu were supposed to prevent the descent 
of the Napoléonic armies in the Balkans, the French acquired the Balkan provinces 
of Austria without firing a shot. Napoléon became a next door neighbour of Sultan 
Selim. The Ottoman government hastened to reconsider its official attitudes towards 
France. In January 1806 the Grand Vizier sent an official letter to Napoleon, 
recognising the latter’s imperial title.195    
 
St. Petersburg was likewise to decide which line of foreign policy should be 
adopted in regard to the Napoléonic Empire in view of its ever growing military and 
political might. Austerlitz and the Peace of Pressburg created a completely new 
situation in Europe. The balance of power was switching to France. Austria was 
destroyed, and the French were now controlling Italy and the Adriatic coast of the 
Balkans. France could more effectively exert its influence upon the Ottoman Empire. 
It was the time for Russia to start worrying about its positions at the Porte, put at 
danger by the recent French progresses. 
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All previous Russian politics towards the Porte in its very essence consisted of 
retaining full and unrivaled control over the Ottoman government. Extremely 
revealing in this respect is a passage from a memorial of Czartoryski, written in early 
January 1806:  
...We had to have Turkey solely at our disposal. One had to try to 
increase our influence on this state, having removed all rivals in such a 
way that the Porte would not follow anybody else’s will or politics, but 
ours.196  
 
From now on, however, the Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire was to be 
shared by France and, in Italinskii’s opinion, it could not be otherwise.197 After the 
French armies gained a foothold in the Balkans, a number of scenarios, much 
undesirable for Russia, were to be counted with. Should the French decide to destroy 
the Ottoman Empire or to make it their ally, the Russian ambitions to dominate the 
area would be seriously threatened.  
 
When the Porte in its politics was gradually drifting towards France, Italinskii 
had no other choice but to resort to the new assurances of friendship combined with 
the veiled threats. The Russian ambassador at Constantinople continued to frighten 
the Porte with a possible French expansion and to promise the Russian protection of 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Italinskii was instructed to warn the Ottomans 
that by rejecting the Russian advices they risked to lose their state quite soon. The 
Porte would be recommended to reinforce its fortresses in Bosnia and Serbia, since 
the French attack might be expected there. Apart from that, the Ottoman government 
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would be advised to “win the hearts” of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, in order 
to prevent them from joining the French.198 In this way, St. Petersburg hoped to 
reconcile its allied relations with the Porte and the alleged Russian mission of 
protecting the Orthodox coreligionists.  
 
Furthermore, the Russian ambassador was to make it clear that the unfortunate 
outcome of Austerlitz by no means influenced the positions or the strength of Russia 
and that his government would always be able to defend the Porte. On the other 
hand, the Ottomans were threatened that Russia might reconsider its friendly 
attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire, if the Ottomans would “neglect their true 
interests” and “yield to the will of France”.199 At the same time, the power of the 
words of the Russian ambassador was already not like it used to be earlier. Italinskii 
was probably more than anybody else aware that the time of the strong and exclusive 
influence of Russia at the Porte remained in the past. 
 
On 4 February 1806 Italinskii delivered a note to the Porte, trying to prevent 
recognition of the imperial title of Bonaparte. He argued that even if the Ottomans 
recognize Bonaparte as the Emperor of France, this would not guarantee the Ottoman 
state from destruction. If the main point of the Ottoman side was the fear of the 
French might and the common border with France in the Balkans, the Porte should 
mind that Russia was also a mighty neighbour, bordering the Ottoman Empire both 
on land and on sea.200 Nevertheless, all these attempts were to no avail. In a week, on 
12 February, the Sultan sent a letter to Alexander I, coldly informing that the Porte 
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agreed to recognize the imperial title of Bonaparte.201 By the end of February 
Italinski already did not exclude the possibility that the Ottoman submissiveness to 
Napoléon might lead to war between Russia and the Porte.202      
 
At this time the naval base on Corfu remained a serious tool of the Russian 
influence in the Mediterranean. Transferred for a short period (October- November 
1805) from Corfu to Naples, the Russian troops of General Boris Petrovich Lacy203 
soon after the battle of Austerlitz were ordered to return to to the Black Sea.204 The 
instructions of Alexander I, dated 6 December 1805, prescribed Lacy to leave on 
Corfu only the smaller part of forces, which he would deem sufficient for garrison 
duties.205 The squadron of Vice Admiral Dmitrii Nikolaievich Seniavin, which was 
sent from the Baltic Sea to Corfu in September 1805, received similar instructions. 
Seniavin, who was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of all Russian land and naval 
forces in the Ionian Republic, was ordered on 26 December 1805 by Aleksander I to 
proceed to the Black Sea, since the presence of his squadron in the Mediterranean 
“became unnecessary”.206 
 
When Lacy came to Corfu in mid-January 1806, the Pressburg peace treaty 
made the French the masters of the whole Dalmatian coast.207 The hasty decision of 
the Tsar now looked to be very much outdated, as it was putting at danger the 
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Russian positions on Corfu. Seniavin arrived by the end of January 1806 and was yet 
unaware of the last Tsar’s orders.208 Seniavin addressed Lacy with a request to leave 
the larger part of the Russian troops on Corfu, trying to persuade the latter how 
important it would be for retaining the Russian hold on the Ionian archipelago.209 
Thus Lacy before his departure to Odessa reported the Tsar that he decided to leave 
on the Ionian Islands the following troops: the Kozlovskii, the Kolyvanskii and the 
Kurinskii Musketeer regiments, the 13th and the 14th Chasseurs regiments, defense 
battalion of Major Popandopolo and two artillery companies. Among those forces 
that were to sail off to Odessa were the Sibirskii and the Vitebskii Musketeer 
regiments (eventually, the Vitebskii regiment also remained on Corfu), one battalion 
of Alexopolskii Musketeer regiment and two companies of the 6th Artillery regiment 
(in fact, there had been sent one and a half artillery company).210  
 
The new instructions of Alexander I, which in view of the consequences of 
Pressburg nullified the earlier decision to remove the major part of the Russian forces 
from Corfu, were issued only on 15 February 1806211 and did not find Lacy. The 
transports carrying Lacy with his troops departed from Corfu on 28 February 1806212 
and arrived in Odessa on 13-15 April 1806.213 
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The bulk of the Russian force, however, was still remaining in the Ionian 
archipelago. Making reference to the materials of the Central State Archive of the 
Russian Navy in St. Petersburg, Shapiro estimates the number of the land force, 
which remained on Corfu under Seniavin by the beginning of 1806 as more than 12 
thousand men214: 
Regiments Number of enlisted men Commander 
Kozlovskii Musketeer Reg. 1528 Major General 
Maksheev 
Kolyvanskii Musketeer Reg. 1601 Major General 
Zherdiuk 
Vitebskii Musketeer Reg. 1765 Major General Musin-
Pushkin 
Kurinskii Musketeer Reg. (2 
battalions) 
1230 Major General 
Nazimov 
The 13th Chasseurs Reg. 1149 Major General Prince 
Viazemskii 
The 14th Chasseurs Reg. 1154 Major General Stetter 
Composite battalion of 2 
companies of the 1st 
Maritime Reg. 
 
699 
 
Colonel Voiselle 
Defense battalion of Corfu 
(including 62 men on the 
islands of Cerigo and Paxos) 
 
622 
Commander of the 
Kurinskii Regiment 
Major General 
Nazimov 
Artillery companies 433 Major Kuleshov 
Russian troops in total 10 181  
The Legion of the light 
riflemen  
1964 Major General 
Popandopolo 
In Total 12 145  
 
Of these forces in late February 1806 the Vitebskii, the Kozlovskii and the 
Kolyvanskii Musketeer regiments, one battalion of the Kurinskii Musketeer 
regiment, the Defense regiment of Major General Popandopolo, the 13th Chasseurs 
regiment, five detachments of the Legion of the light riflemen together with one ond 
a half company of the 6th Artillery regiment (about 10 thousand men) stayed on 
Corfu; two companies of the Kurinskii Musketeer regiment, two companies of the 
14th Chasseurs regiment, a squad of the Defense artillery company (about 500 men) 
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on Santa Maura; one company of the Kurinskii Musketeer regiment, one battalion of 
the 14th Chasseurs regiment, a squad of the Defense artillery company (about 500 
men) on Cefalonia; one company of the Kurinskii Musketeer regiment, six 
companies of the 14th Chasseurs regiment, a squad of the Defense artillery company, 
one detachment of the Legion of the light riflemen (about 1 thousand men) on Zante; 
a squad of the battalion of Major General Popandopolo (14 men) on Paxos; a squad 
of the battalion of Major General Popandopolo (48 men) on Cerigo; a squad of the 
Kurinskii Musketeer regiment (14 men) on Ithaca.215 Apart from the land troops, the 
Russian naval forces in the Ionian archipelago by February 1806 included 10 ships of 
the line, 5 frigates, 5 brigs, 4 brigantines, 1 schooner, one vessel without type and 12 
gunboats.216 The crews of the Russian fleet amounted to 7908 seamen, mariners and 
gunmen, having in total 1154 guns.217  
 
The forces of Seniavin were not only keeping the Ionian Islands under the 
Russian control, but they managed to occupy a few strategic points along the eastern 
littoral of the Adriatic Sea. Of these the most important was the former Venetian 
town of Cattaro (Kotor) situated in the most secluded part of the much indented inlet 
of the Adriatic Sea. After 1797 Cattaro became Austrian, and according to the 
Pressburg treaty was to be transferred to the French along with other Dalmatian 
possessions of Austria.  
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For the reason that the allies dominated the sea and because of difficult coastal 
terrain the French armies by the end of February 1806 still did not reach the Bay of 
Cattaro and the place remained under Austrian control. The majority of Cattaro’s 
inhabitants, the Orthodox Christian Slavs, were very much unsatisfied at the prospect 
of the French rule. In that case the British and Russian blockade of the Mediterranean 
trade routes would undermine the commercial well-being of the local community, 
which was largely dependent on the foreign sea trade. Thus when in late February 
1806 the Russian squadron of Captain Baillie arrived in Cattaro, it was even 
welcomed by the locals. Neither did Russians have any problems with the Austrian 
authorities. On 5 March 1806 General Ghislieri, the Austrian Commandant of 
Cattaro known for his anti-French attitudes, surrendered the place to the Russians 
without struggle.218 Consequently, the Russian navy also occupied the Dalmatian 
islands of Lissa (presently Vis, Croatia) and Curzola (presently Corčula, Croatia) on 
30 March and 10 April respectively.219  
 
In this way, a very complicated situation came about. Due to the Treaty of 
Pressburg Austria was to submit its Adriatic coast to the French. The area of Cattaro, 
however, without any resistance was handed over to the Russians. The Russian side 
explained the occupation by the fact that formally the territory of Cattaro already did 
not belong to Austria, but to France. Since Russia was at war with France, the 
Russian troops had the right to enter and occupy the French territories whenever it 
would be possible. As for the Austrians, they did not have the right to occupy Cattaro 
anymore. Austria was not at war with them and thus the Austrian troops were not 
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obliged to defend the French possessions against the Russian attack.220 Be that as it 
may, Seniavin gained a firm foothold on the Adriatic coast, which would be 
surrendered by Russia to the French not otherwise than at the negotiating table at 
Tilsit in July 1807. 
 
In truth, the Russian military presence in the Mediterranean, including the 
positions newly acquired by the Seniavin’s forces on the mainland, were the source 
of serious concern not only for the French, but also for the Ottomans. Despite 
whatever declarations of friendship were made by St. Petersburg, the Porte in view of 
its past experience had good reasons not to put much trust in Russia. Hardly the 
Sultan Selim, his statesmen or the ordinary Ottoman people could be bursting with 
joy while watching the Russian warships constantly go to and fro through the Black 
Sea Straits in the close vicinity of the Ottoman capital. It was more fear than 
anything else that made the Porte still clinging to its alliance with St. Petersburg. 
That the Ottomans had certain fears in regard to Russia can even be seen from the 
instructions issued to Italinskii in early March 1806. The Russian ambassador was 
enjoined to keep persuading the Ottomans that it was France to be feared of, and not 
Russia.221  
 
The Russian government, well aware that its influence at the Porte was 
gradually waning after the recent French successes, continued to pose itself as the 
most caring ally of the Ottomans. Italinskii was to assure the Porte that the sole 
object of the Russian forces on Corfu was the defence of the Ottoman Empire against 
Napoléon and that, for that reason, the right of passage for the Russian warships 
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through the Straits would remain indispensable.222 As a protective measure against 
the French invasion the Russian ambassador advised the Porte to reinforce the 
frontiers, to prepare armament depots in Rumelia and to keep an observation army 
near Adrianople (Edirne) and Sofia.223 Also, ostensibly in order to save the Ottomans 
from grave complications in their relations with France, St. Petersburg had softened 
its stand on the issue of the recognition of the imperial title of Bonaparte.224 It should 
be noted that the latter step in fact had already no practical meaning, since the Porte 
had recognised Bonaparte as the Emperor of the French. The official news of this 
recognition reached the Russian capital on 7 March 1806.225  
 
While assuring the Porte in its friendly dispositions, St. Petersburg had to 
consider the possibility of further anti-Russian actions of the Ottoman government 
and to think of what could be done should things go wrong. This also holds true for 
the Porte. Both sides, distrusting each other, kept in mind that it would be better to be 
prepared against all hypothetical or real war emergencies. The mutual distrust only 
aggravated the situation.  
 
By early March 1806 St. Petersburg learned about the Ottoman military 
preparations on the Russian border, consisting of the reinforcement of the frontier 
fortresses of Khotyn and Ismail.226 Such a move on the part of the Ottomans was the 
sign that the Porte felt the support of France and made the Russian government to 
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think of appropriate responsive actions.227 Apparently, it was not so much the 
Ottoman attack (the reinforcement of the fortresses, after all, is a defensive measure) 
as the threat of losing its heretofore unbound political influence at the Porte that 
alarmed the Tsarist government. Czartoryski in his memorandum written for 
Alexander I proposed to send orders to the General-in-Chief of the Dniester army to 
be ready at any moment to enter Moldavia and Wallachia, saying that “the fear is the 
only means that may have an effect on the Turks in such cases”.228 The idea of 
entering the Russian troops into the Danube principalities remained at the time one of 
the most effective means Russia still could use on the Porte.  
 
After the recognition of the imperial title of Bonaparte the next anti-Russian 
step which could be expected by St. Petersburg from the Porte was the opening of 
negotiations about the closure of the Straits for the Russian ships. Should the Porte 
decide to touch upon this issue, Italinskii was recommended to use a direct threat. 
The Russian ambassador was to remind the Porte that it was risking to come into 
conflict with such a mighty naval power as Britain. Russia, even though much 
regretting to break the allied bonds with the Ottoman Empire, would be obliged to 
support Britain.229  
 
No assurances of the Reis-ül-Küttab Vâsıf Ahmed Efendi to the Russian 
ambassador of the Ottoman wish to preserve the alliance with Russia230 could hide 
the increasing hostility towards Russia among the Ottomans. The British ambassador 
Arbuthnot at this time “had heard that the Council of Ministers had discussed 
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whether the time were advantageous for Turkey, in conjunction with France, to 
undertake war on Russia”.231 In view of Arbuthnot, the Ottoman side delayed its 
decision in favour of war only through fear of a British naval attack. In mid-March 
1806 the British ambassador hastened to support his Russian colleague, warning the 
Ottomans that any hostile acts against Russia would also be considered as a threat to 
the interests of Great Britain.232 As the influence of the Russian and the British 
ambassadors at the Ottoman capital was gradually declining, the pressure of joint 
Russo-British threats on the Ottomans only increased. 
 
As early as 6 March 1806 Italinskii had an audience at the Porte, where he 
expressed all the recent Russian discontents with the Ottoman government. These 
consisted of the Porte’s refusal to renew its alliance with Britain; the recognition of 
the imperial title of Bonaparte without getting the preliminary Russian approval; the 
secret Ottoman overtures with the French; the military preparations in the close 
vicinity of the Russian frontiers; and the obstacles to the Russian trade in the 
Ottoman Empire.233 The Russian side continuously emphasized that it was ready to 
protect the Sultan’s domains from any foreign aggression, whenever possible 
speaking about the impending French threat. It was solely for this aim that Russia 
was keeping 100 thousand men on its border with the Ottoman Empire.234 No one 
except Russia, however, could guarantee the Porte that these forces could not be used 
also for other purposes.  
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The Russians demanded from the Porte to remain faithful to its alliance with 
Russia and to decline any propositions of Napoléon, save for the already resolved 
issue about the imperial title. Italinskii was instructed by his government to tell the 
Ottomans that the military preparations in the principalities should be stopped. If the 
Porte would continue its military preparations in the Danube area, or change in any 
way the status of Moldavia and/or Wallachia, the Russian troops might receive the 
order to enter the Danubian principalities.235 The Russian occupation of Moldavia 
and Wallachia in this case would be undertaken not with the aim to conquer the 
country, but exclusively to defend the Ottoman independence threatened by the 
French.236 Hardly this alleged Russian care about the Ottoman independence and the 
Ottoman interests could be appreciated by the Sultan and his ministry. At the time 
the only remaining sure means of the Russian influence on the Ottomans, as the 
Russian officials themselves admitted, was fear. In general terms, except for the 
threat of possible occupation of the principalities, the Russian demands were 
presented to the Porte in the note of Italinskii, dated 31 March 1806.237     
 
Pressed on both sides, the Sultan’s government kept assuring the Russian 
ambassador in its intentions to preserve the current friendly relations between the 
two empires. Italinskii in early April 1806 reported that the Porte sent everywhere 
the firmans to the effect that the rumours about the approaching war with Russia 
would be stopped. The foundation of a warcamp in Ismail was cancelled, and the 
governor of this fortress was reprimanded. The earlier orders concerning the supply 
of provisions from Moldavia to Ismail had also been cancelled. The repair works in 
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the fortresses of Khotyn and Bender were very much insignificant and lacked 
sufficient financing.238 Italinskii was positive, that among the members of the 
Ottoman government the majority, and above all Sultan Selim himself, would prefer 
to remain on good terms with Russia.239 The most telling argument against the 
Ottoman entrance into war was a very grave situation of the Ottoman state. For that 
reason Italinskii was inclined to believe the assurances of the Ottoman statesmen, 
though pointed out that the whole picture at any time could be changed.240 
 
Probably more than anything else, the Ottomans would have liked to avoid 
being involved in the current conflict of the great European powers. Unfortunately 
for the Porte, under the circumstances this was absolutely impossible. The issue 
about the passage of the Russian war vessels through the Black Sea Straits had 
clearly shown that there was no in-between. The Ottomans were to make their choice 
whether in favour of Russia or the Napoléonic France. Should the Porte continue to 
keep the narrows open for the Russian fleet, this would explicitly mean an unfriendly 
act towards France. On the other hand, should the Ottomans close the the Straits, 
even though under the pretext of their wish to observe strict neutrality, this time it 
would be a move unambiguously hostile to Russia. 
 
The Porte was in a state of uncertainty, though the pendulum of its foreign 
policy had long before swung in favour of the French. On 26 April 1806 the Russian 
ambassador was presented a note of the Sultan’s government241, where the Ottomans 
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were asking the Russian side to cease sending its war vessels through the Dardanelles 
and Bosporus. Both in the note and in a conversation of the Reis-ül-Küttab with the 
first dragoman of the Russian embassy Fonton, the Porte argued that the passage of 
the Russian ships through the narrows violated the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire 
and might bring about the war with France.  According to the Ottoman point of view, 
due to the end of the military operations in Italy it was not necessary any more to 
maintain a large garrison on Corfu. As for the Ottoman-Russian defensive alliance, 
the 4th secret article of the treaty stipulated the free passage for the Russian war 
vessels only in case of the common defensive war of Russia and the Ottoman Empire 
against France. As one might have expected, the Russian side rejected all the 
Ottoman arguments, stating that the company in Italy did not end, and there still 
existed the threat of the French invasion in Sicily and in the Balkans. Thus, the 
Russian troops on Corfu were protecting Albania and the Republic of the Seven 
Islands, and their presence there was also in the interests of the Porte.242  
 
The Ottomans did not risk insisting on their demands, when on 24 June 1806 
the Russian brig “Jason”, destined for Corfu, arrived in Istanbul. Italinskii declared 
that if the Porte would prefer to oppose the passage of the Russian brig, it would 
have to employ force and that it was up to the Ottoman side to think of the 
consequences of such an act of violence. The similar situation occurred when the 
Russian frigate “Kildiun” arrived in Istanbul on 23 July 1806. The Ottoman ministers 
yielded to the Russian ambassador, stating that their requests to cease the passage of 
the Russian ships were only of a friendly character, because they were afraid of the 
French reprisals.243 Despite the fact that its fear of Russia had largely diminished244, 
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the Porte simply did not dare yet to finally sever relations with its deadly allies from 
the North. 
 
In the meantime, on 20 May 1806 the Ottoman ambassador Seyyid Abdurrahim 
Muhib Efendi arrived at Paris.245 The official audience of Muhib Efendi with 
Napoléon took place on 5 June 1806 at the Tuileries Palace.246 In addressing 
Napoléon as the Emperor, Muhib Efendi formally confirmed the recognition of the 
imperial title made by the Porte. It was a matter of time before the French 
ambassador again appeared on the shores of the Bosporus.247 Appointed on 2 May 
1806248 the ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, General Horace Sébastiani would 
soon start out on his journey to Constantinople. 
 
By mid-June 1806 Italinskii openly wrote to S. R. Vorontsov that there was no 
doubt that the Ottomans hated Russia and waited with impatience for an opportunity 
to break relations with it. Such favourable circumstances might occur, in the view of 
the Ottoman government, when Napoléon would open hostilities against Russia in 
Poland. Meanwhile the Porte continued the war preparations using as a pretext the 
disorders in Serbia. As for the French, they would try to subdue the Ottoman Empire 
whether through an alliance or a conquest. Italinskii thought that in this dangerous 
situation the Russian and the British courts, in order to be still shown “proper 
respect” by the Ottomans, should act in concert and not otherwise than by using 
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fear.249 Expecting the arrival of the newly appointed French ambassador Sébastiani, 
Italinskii believed that the crucial moment was coming. Very soon it was to be 
decided which side, Russo-British or French, would get the upper hand at the Porte. 
Italinskii remarked with regret that in all probability France would win.250 
Nevertheless, Russia was not going to give up, as a last resort intending to use both 
threats and its influence among the Orthodox Ottoman subjects.251    
 
The commitment of the Russian government to continue its struggle with 
France even more clearly appeared after Alexander I had refused to ratify the project 
of a Franco-Russian peace treaty, signed in Paris by the special Russian diplomatic 
representative Pierre Oubril on 20 July 1806.252 While the instructions given to 
Oubril in St. Petersburg253 specified among the principal Russian demands the 
evacuation of Dalmatia by the French and the guarantees of independence to 
Denmark, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, the final version of the treaty contained 
only the mutual Franco-Russian guarantee of independence of the Ottoman Empire 
(Article 6). Instead, Russia was to seriously weaken its positions in the 
Mediterranean by ceding to the French the Bay of Kotor (Bocca di Cattaro) and 
reducing the garrison of Corfu to 4 thousand men. The Russian refusal to ratify the 
treaty allowed the French side to use this fact later in its anti-Russian propaganda at 
the Porte, arguing that St. Petersburg did not wish to guarantee the Ottoman 
independence. 
 
                                                 
249 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to S. R. Vorontsov, 13 / 1 June 1806’. Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova (Мoscow: 
Mamontov, 1881), Vol. 20, pp. 311-13. 
250 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to S. R. Vorontsov, 28 / 16 June 1806’. Ibidem, pp. 313-14. 
251 ‘A. A. Czartoryski to Alexander I, 29 / 17 June 1806’ SIRIO, Vol. 82, p. 391-92. 
252 The text of this failed treaty has been published at: VPR, Vol.3, pp. 226-28 (French version), pp. 
229-31 (Russian version).   
253 ‘A. A. Czartoryski to P. Ia. Oubril, 12 May (30 April) 1806’ Ibidem, pp. 134-36 (French original), 
pp. 136-37 (Russian translation).  
344 
On 11 July 1806 the new Russian Foreign minister Gotthard von Budberg254 
presented at the first meeting of the Military Council of Russia255 his report about the 
general political situation in Europe and how it was related to Russia.256 As regards 
the Ottoman Empire, Budberg pointed out that this state, which was “weak, 
disorganised and split by the warring factions”, would not be able to extend its 
existence without the aid of a strong European power. While for a long time it was 
Russia which had been protecting the Porte, after the Treaty of Pressburg and the 
French acquisition of Dalmatia the Ottomans obviously changed their foreign 
political preferences. The Porte was behaving ever more hostile towards Russia. 
Thus, for the moment, the pressing task for St. Petersburg would be not to allow the 
Ottomans to act according the wishes of Bonaparte.257     
 
Considering the increased possibility of a conflict with the Ottoman Empire the 
Tsarist government thought it necessary to prepare its naval and land forces for war. 
At the second meeting of the Military Council, which took place on 17 July 1806, the 
Deputy Minister of Navy Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov noticed that Russia had only 
7 ships of the line and 3 frigates on the Black Sea at the moment, while the Ottoman 
Black Sea fleet consisted of 23 ships of the line, 21 frigate, 10 corvettes and a few 
lesser vessels. Thus, the Russian Black Sea ports remained unprotected against the 
superior naval forces of the Ottomans.258 
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Chichagov saw two ways to solve the problem, which were either to increase 
the Russian naval presence in the area or to divert the Ottoman fleet from there. 
Saying that the Russians had 9 ships of the line and 5 frigates in the Mediterranean, 
and 14 ships of the line and 10 frigates in the Baltic Sea, Chichagov proposed to 
transfer all of the ships of the line from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Should 
the Ottomans not allow these ships to pass through the Straits, one could consider it a 
declaration of war. In order to be prepared for such a course of events, it was 
necessary to send 7 ships of the line from the Baltic fleet to the Mediterranean. This 
measure would make the Ottomans also to transfer to the Mediterranean a large naval 
force from the Black Sea. In this way, the Russian Black Sea coast could be 
guaranteed from an Ottoman attack.259 
 
Equally, the Russian land troops were to be prepared to enter the Danubian 
principalities, should the situation require it. Late in July 1806 St. Petersburg sent a 
special diplomatic agent Konstantin Konstantinovich Rodofinikin260, who was 
instructed to stay as a private person in Jassy under the pretext of illness and to 
gather strategic information that might be useful for the Russian Military command 
on the Moldavian border. Alexander I enjoined Rodofinikin to learn about the 
number of the Ottoman forces in the frontier area, the condition and the garrisons of 
the Ottoman frontier fortresses, the personal qualities of the Ottoman commanders, 
the military supply depots, where the latter were situated and how abundant they 
were. It was also important to know about the local Ottoman landlords, their forces 
and whether they would support the Porte in case of war.261 
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Moreover, Rodofinikin was to find out how much provision and forage would 
be available in the principalities for the Russian troops in the event of their entrance 
into Moldavia and Wallachia. Rodofinikin was ordered to maintain contact with the 
commanders of the Russian troops on the border, informing them about all the recent 
movements of the Ottoman forces and all kinds of reinforcements being made by the 
Porte. As could be expected, the Russian government did not forget about the 
possibility to use its influence among the Ottoman Orthodox subjects. Should the war 
with the Ottomans start, Rodofinikin was to try bringing the Serbs on the Russian 
side.262 
 
Preparing its naval and land forces for war, St. Petersburg tried to show that 
this was done exclusively in the interests of the Porte, in order to protect the Ottoman 
state from the French aggression.263 Without doubting for a moment that they knew 
the Ottoman interests better than the Ottomans themselves, the Russians demanded 
from the Porte to abide by its obligations under the Ottoman-Russian allied treaty of 
1805. Only in this case, according to the official Russian position, Russia could help 
the Ottomans to save their state from destruction. In fact, St. Petersburg was prepared 
to defend the Ottoman Empire only as long as the Porte would remain in a great 
measure a Russian puppet. Otherwise, if the Ottomans would decide to join forces 
with the French, St. Petersburg “with extreme regret” retained the right to employ the 
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Russian forces in order to oblige the Porte “to respect and to fulfil its obligations 
towards the imperial court”.264 
 
Even though the Porte was explaining to the allies its military preparations by 
the fear of the French, the friendly exchange of the ambassadors between 
Constantinople and Paris in summer 1806 showed the contrary. As a matter of fact, 
the Ottomans had good reasons to be afraid of Russia, in view of the presence of the 
large Russian army on the Ottoman borders, the Russian naval base on Corfu, the 
Russian war vessels passing through the Straits, and the threats of the Russian 
ambassador. The belief of both the British and the Russian ambassadors in 
Constantinople, Arbuthnot and Italinskii, was that the Ottoman military preparations, 
in the first place, were directed against Russia, that the Porte had already decided 
upon war and was only awaiting the arrival of the new French ambassador General 
Horace Sébastiani.265 
 
On 22 August 1806 Sébastiani arrived in Constantinople.266 The first and 
foremost aim of Sébastiani would be not only to convince the Porte that Napoléon 
intended to strengthen and consolidate the Ottoman state, but to secure the military 
alliance of Paris with the Ottomans. Under the circumstances this would mean 
nothing else but war against Russia and Britain. The envoy of Napoléon was to 
dispel the last remaining doubts of the Ottoman government about entering into war 
with Russia. Among the practical tasks awaiting Sébastiani in Constantinople was to 
achieve the closure of the Straits for the Russian ships, including those Greek 
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merchant vessels sailing under the flag of Russia; to help the Porte to reinforce its 
fortifications against Russia, to subdue the Georgians and to restore the absolute 
Ottoman authority over Moldavia and Wallachia.267 
 
It is notable that the instructions of Napoléon to his ambassador ended with the 
words that the French Emperor did not wish the partition of the Ottoman Empire, 
even if he would be offered three quarters of it.268 Aiming to emphasize the amicable 
intentions of France, these words also showed something else. In fact, this meant that 
the French Emperor might not be satisfied by controlling some part of the Ottoman 
Empire and thus sharing it with somebody else, but preferred to control all of it. The 
same was true for Russia. In declaring itself the champion of the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire, St. Petersburg, first of all, sought to retain its exclusive influence in 
the Ottoman European provinces. As a result, the rivalry of the major European 
powers objectively diminished the threat of partition of the Ottoman state. 
 
On 24 August 1806, only a couple of days after the arrival of Sébastiani to 
Constantinople, the Porte decided to take a fateful decision that eventually would 
lead the Ottomans to a war with Russia. Alexander Moruzi (Mourousis) and 
Constantine Ypsilanti (Ypsilantis), the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia known 
for their pro-Russian sympathies, were deposed.269 In their stead the Porte appointed 
as the Hospodars the supporters of the pro-French party Scarlat Callimachi and 
Alexander Suzzo (Soutzos). To what extent the arrival of the new ambassador of 
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Napoléon influenced the decision of the Porte is not clear, as the Ottomans had 
announced about this step earlier.270 
 
Italinskii in his report, sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry on 23 August 1806, 
i.e. one day before the deposition of the Hospodars had been officially proclaimed, 
informed that the decision in this respect had already been taken, even though kept in 
secret. By this time Sébastiani told the Porte that he brought the letter of Napoléon, 
advising the Sultan to dismiss the Hospodars of the Danubian principalities for being 
the traitors bribed by Russia and spying against the Ottoman state.271 In a way, this 
was true. One week after the deposition of the Moldavian and Wallachian Hospodars 
the Russian ambassador complained that he was instantly deprived of a very 
important source of valuable information, and thus became completely ignorant 
about what was going on in the Ottoman government.272 As Italinskii explained it, 
the Ottoman ministers thought it important to dismiss the Hospodars before the letter 
of Bonaparte would be officially submitted to the Porte, in order to retain the prestige 
of the Ottoman Empire.273 
 
Since both Ypsilanti and Moruzi assumed their posts in 1802, the deposition of 
the Hospodars became an outright violation of the Hatt-i Şerif of 1802274 regulating 
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the status and the privieleges of the Danubian principalities. That document had been 
issued by Selim III at the urging of the Russian ambassador on 24 September 1802 
and stipulated that the Hospodars should remain on their posts for the fixed term of 
seven years. During this time the Porte had no right to dismiss the Hospodars unless 
they commit a proven crime. In that case the Ottomans were obliged to inform the 
Russian ambassador and only after the latter agrees the Hospodars could be deposed 
before the fixed seven-year term.275 
 
Italinskii was not surprised at the news of the deposition of the Hospodars. In 
view of the later behaviour of the Porte, starting from December of 1805, the Russian 
ambassador observed the “deviations in the policy, which the Porte had the temerity 
to afford”276 and expected such a step by the Ottoman government. Italinskii was 
positive that no representations or admonitions could help to successfully influence 
the Porte. According to Italinskii, the only means to be efficiently used in this 
situation was the brutal force, as he was repeating it many times before. For this 
reason, the ambassador expressed an opinion that it was necessary to promptly issue 
orders for the Russian troops on the Dniester to enter into the principalities and to 
oust the newly appointed pro-French Hospodars or their representatives.277 
 
A few days after the deposition of the Hospodars the Russian ambassador, quite 
expectedly, delivered a strong protesting note to the Ottoman government.278 
Obviously, Italinskii did not have enough time to get the instructions relating to the 
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last events in the Danubian principalities. His note, dated 28 August 1806, was 
ordered to be prepared earlier, in view of other numerous discontents of St. 
Petersburg with the Porte. The deposition of the Hospodars only hurried the 
ambassador to hand the note over to the Sultan’s government.  
 
Among other complaints presented by Italinskii to the Porte were the 
difficulties faced by the Russian merchants in the Ottoman lands; the refusal of the 
Porte to renew its alliance with Britain; the Ottoman requests to stop the passage of 
the Russian ships through the Straits, as well as the transportation of the Russian 
troops to the Ionian archipelago. The Russian ambassador pointed out at the 
violations of the following treaties concluded earlier between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire: the Trade treaty (1783), the Alliance treaty (1798 and 1805), the 
Convention about the Ionian Islands (1800) and the Hatt-i Şerif concerning the 
Danubian principalities (1802). 
 
Italinskii demanded from the Porte to reconsider its policy once more and to 
fully observe all its treaty obligations towards Russia. Apart from that, Italinskii 
wished the departure of the newly appointed Hospodars to the principalities to be 
cancelled. In order to be more convincing, the Russian ambassador called the 
attention of the Ottoman ministers to the fact that a huge Russian army was being 
gathered on the Dniester. These forces, in words of Italinskii, would always be ready 
to give assistance to the Ottoman Empire, though could be used also in order to make 
the Ottoman government to carry out its commitments to the Russian Imperial 
Court.279 
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By early September 1806 it became clear that the war in all likelihood could 
not be avoided. The only question remaining was when it would start. As the 
dispatches of the Russian Foreign Ministry sent at this time to Italinskii show, St. 
Petersburg was under no illusion about the consequences of the ultimatum, which the 
Russian ambassador was instructed to deliver to the Ottoman government. If the 
Porte would not agree to satisfy the Russian demands to restore the former rulers of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, Italinskii was to leave Constantinople with all the 
personnel of his mission. Only the first dragoman of the embassy, Fonton, would 
stay in capacity of the Russian Charge d’Affairs.280 At the same time, Italinskii 
received yet another instruction prescribing him to take measures in order to protect 
the embassy archives and his own property, as there was almost no doubt that the 
reply of the Porte would be either equivocal or negative.281 Equally, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Russian army on the Dniester General Ivan Ivanovich Michelson282, if 
he would learn about the departure of Italinskii from Constantinople, was instructed 
to move his troops closer to the Dniester and be ready to cross it as soon as he would 
get the respective orders.283 
 
As to the Ottoman side, it obviously had made its strategic choice and only 
sought to gain time in order to be better prepared for war. The Ottoman officials, in 
the first place the Baş Tercüman Constantine Hangerli and the Reis-ül-Küttab Vâsıf 
Efendi, tried to persuade the Russian ambassador that the recent actions of the Porte 
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were caused by the general chaos in the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman wish to be 
protected from the dissatisfaction of the French. The outward friendliness of the 
Ottomans did not make Italinskii to change his opinion that only the demonstration 
of force could make the Porte to accept the Russian demands.284 Despite his friendly 
conversations with Hangerli and Vâsıf Efendi, Italinskii argued that it was the actual 
deeds of the Porte, and not the words, which should be taken into account.285 
 
The French ambassador was doing his best to widen the breach between St. 
Petersburg and the Porte. When the news about the non-ratification of the Franco-
Russian peace treaty by the Tsar reached Constantinople on 6 September 1806, 
Sébastiani used it in his anti-Russian propaganda at the Porte. Sébastiani argued that, 
since the treaty stipulated the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Corfu and 
guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the nonratifiaction of the 
treaty meant the Russian refusal to guarantee the Ottoman independence.286 On the 
same day Sébastiani passed to the Porte a note demanding to close the Straits to the 
Russian ships, having declared that he would leave Constantinople should even one 
Russian vessel pass through the narrows. However, after this declaration the Russian 
corvette “Pavel” still passed from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.287  
 
Just like Italinskii, Sébastiani among his methods of persuasion used outright 
threats. On 16 September 1806 once again addressing the Porte with a demand to 
close the Straits, Sébastiani argued that if the Russian vessels may freely pass the 
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Bosporus, then the French armies in Dalmatia should be given a permission to 
proceed through the Ottoman territories up to the Russian borders on the Dniester. 
The strong French army in Dalmatia, in words of Sébastiani, could be used to defend 
the Ottoman Empire against Russia and Britain, but could be as well deployed 
against the Porte.288 It is worthy of note that both Italinskii and Sébastiani in their 
communication with the Porte used the same carrot and stick policy, which was even 
formulated in the similar expressions. The Ottomans were proposed to choose the 
friendship of a great European power or to face the consequences of its wrath. 
 
In six days after Sébastiani demanded from the Porte to close the Straits, on 22 
September 1806, it was the turn of Italinskii to threaten the Porte with the possible 
results of the Russian and British dissatisfaction. Italinski urged the Porte to give him 
a reply for his earlier note of 28 August. For 25 days the Ottomans kept silence, 
using as a pretext the illness of the Reis-ül-Küttab and in fact trying to gain time. The 
Russian ambassador was not original in his argumentation. Italinskii told that he 
knew about the threats of Sébastiani and assured the Sultan that they were 
groundless, since both Russia and Britain were able to protect the Ottoman Empire 
from Napoléon. It was with this aim that the Russian army of about 120 thousand 
men had been gathered on the Dniester. However, if the Ottomans would comply 
with the French demands, then Russia and Britain would be forced to start hostilities 
against the Ottoman Empire.289 
 
In accordance with the orders received from his government, on 29 September 
1806 Italinskii delivered to the Porte an ultimatum, informing the Ottoman side that 
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he had instructions to leave Constantinople if the Hospodars would not be restored, 
and if the Porte would not comply with all its treaty obligations towards Russia.290 In 
their reply, which was delivered to the Russian ambassador on 1 October 1806, the 
Ottomans held that the Russian demands concerning the Straits infringed the 
principle of the Ottoman neutrality. As for the deposition of the Hospodars, they 
were justly removed from their offices.291 Upon the interference of the British 
ambassador Arbuthnot, though, the immediate conflict was delayed. At the 
conference with Arbuthnot, on 5 October 1806, the Ottomans proved ready for 
further negotiations about the key issues of the renewal of their alliance with Britain, 
the passage of the Russian ships through the Bosporus and the deposition of the 
Hospodars. Italinskii agreed to stay for a while in Constantinople, though refused to 
depart from his instructions.292 
 
On 12 October 1806 the Porte proposed Italinskii through the first dragoman of 
the Russian embassy Fonton instead of the public restoration of the Hospodars to 
depose the newly appointed Hospodars and in concert with the Tsar to choose the 
new ones. Italinskii declined the Ottoman proposal as an attempt to delay the final 
solution of the issue. Once again the Ottoman side was threatened that the Russian 
ambassador along with the whole personnel of the embassy would leave 
Constantinople, if the demands about the restoration of the Hospodars would be 
unsatisfied.293       
 
                                                 
290 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to the Ottoman government, 29 / 17 September 1806’ Referred at: Ibidem, p. 330. 
291 Puryear, apoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 107; Shupp. op. cit., p. 159. 
292 Shupp The European powers, pp. 159-61. 
293 ‘A. Ia. Italinskii to Reis-ül-Küttab Galib, 13 / 1 October 1806’ VPR, Vol. 3, pp. 341-42 (French 
original), pp. 342-343 (Russian translation).  
356 
Arbuthnot advised the Ottomans to yield to the Russian demands and to restore 
the Hospodars. Otherwise the Russian troops would, no doubt, cross the border and 
Britain would have to support them. On 12 October 1806 the Ottoman government 
convened for a special meeting to discuss what should be done with the Russian 
ultimatum.294 Apparently, to wage a war against a long-time enemy in order to 
recover former possessions to the north of the Black Sea would in itself be a very 
attractive option for the Porte. Some of the Ottoman statesmen were determined to 
take vengeance on Russia and for that purpose supported the French. On the other 
hand, the “pro-allied” party in the Ottoman government called attention to the fact 
that the Ottoman Empire was not ready yet to throw the gauntlet to St. Petersburg. 
Furthermore, the fear of war against Russia and Great Britain at the same time 
remained a serious constraining factor on the Ottoman ambitions. The Ottoman 
ministers, influenced by both the French and the Allies, were consulting for a few 
days. In the end the Ottoman side agreed to comply with the Russian demands. On 
16 October 1806 Constantine Ypsilanti and on 17 October 1806 Alexander Moruzi 
were reinstated as the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia respectively.295   
 
However, even though the Hospodars were restored, it was almost generally 
believed on both sides of the Dniester that the approaching war could not be avoided. 
The Porte, as the restoration of the Hospodars showed, was afraid of the prospect of 
entering a war with Russia and the Great Britain at the same time. On the other hand, 
the Sultan’s government was under serious pressure from the common people, the 
Muslim clergy (ulema) and the French ambassador Sébastiani, which were pushing 
the Porte to war. In this way, the restoration of the Hospodars could be nothing else 
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than an attempt to gain time before the start of hostilities. The news of the French 
decisive victory over the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstädt (14 October 1806) 
only increased the influence of the pro-French party in Constantinople. The peace 
between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires grew ever more precarious. 
 
From the Russian point of view, the simple restoration of the Hospodars 
already could not recover the former unbounded Russian influence at the Porte. For 
that reason the last step of the Ottoman government did not make St. Petersburg to 
abandon the intention to occupy the Danubian principalities. At the moment the only 
way to pacify the Russian side would be to return to the earlier friendly relations 
between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires. In the language of St. Petersburg this 
meant to make the Ottoman government an obedient instrument of the Russian will 
and to completely eliminate the French influence at the Porte. Since it was obviously 
impossible, Russia had no other option but to restore the “friendly relations” with the 
Sultan’s court by force. In the situation when the Ottoman government in fact never 
was a sincere ally of St. Petersburg and tended to prefer the alliance with France, in 
words of the Russian Foreign Minister Budberg, it would be better for Russia to have 
an open conflict with the Porte rather than anyway to keep constantly the troops on 
the Dniester.296 Apart from exerting pressure on the Porte, the occupation of the 
Danubian principalities was also to ensure the Russian side the strategic advantages 
at the beginning of the war.   
 
                                                 
296 ‘A. Ia. Budberg to A. Ia. Italinskii, 27 / 15 November 1806’ Ibidem, pp. 387-89 (French original), 
p. p. 389-90 (Russian translation). 
358 
Thus on 28 October 1806,297 despite that the Hospodars of Moldavia and 
Wallachia were reinstated, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army on the 
Dniester General Michelson was ordered to cross the Dniester and to occupy 
Moldavia.298 Already knowing about the restoration of the Hospodars, the Russian 
government still confirmed its earlier orders regarding the occupation of the 
Danubian principalities on 4 November and 8 November 1806.299 It was not enough, 
in view of St. Petersburg, to reinstate the pro-Russian Hospodars in their offices. 
Until the Porte satisfies other Russian demands, which were to keep the Black Sea 
Straits open for the Russian fleet, to renew the Ottoman alliance with the Great 
Britain and to sever all relations with the French, the Russian troops were to stay in 
the Danubian principalities.300 
 
Towards the end of November and in December the Russian troops occupied 
the fortresses of Khotyn (27 November)301, Yassy (28 November)302, Bender (6 
December)303, Akkerman (13 December)304, Kilia (21 December)305 and Bucharest 
(25 December).306 The only fortress unoccupied by the Russians remained Ismail. In 
about one and a half month the Russian troops took the key fortified positions in 
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Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia under their control, for the most part without 
the resistance of the Ottomans. 
 
While the Russian troops of Michelson were occupying the principal fortresses 
of the Danubian principalities, Italinskii was at a loss what to say to the Ottomans 
about the recent events going on in Moldavia and Wallachia. Addressed by the First 
Dragoman of the Porte Hangerli, who asked the Russian ambassador to explain the 
occupation of Khotyn, Italinskii honestly replied that he did not know the reasons of 
it. Though, should it be war, it would be officially declared to the Ottoman 
government. On 13 December 1806 Italinskii wrote to the Foreign Minister Budberg, 
asking the ministry to clarify the situation.307 The belated instructions for Italinskii 
regarding the occupation of the fortresses of Khotyn and Bender did not contain 
anything new. The Russian ambassador was to assure the Porte in friendly intentions 
of the Russian side, to explain that the occupation of the fortresses was a temporary 
measure and that the Tsar was ready to return to the Sultan the Ottoman flags taken 
in the fortresses.308 The die was already cast, though. On 24 December 1806 the 
Porte sent an official declaration of war to the Russian embassy. Next day Italinskii 
and the whole personnel of the Russian embassy embarked on a British ship and left 
Constantinople.309 St. Petersburg and the Porte once again appeared to be at war with 
one another.  
 
The war between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires ended the eight years 
period of the Ottoman-Russian alliance. Despite the long record of wars between the 
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two empires throughout the whole 18th century, their alliance showed that at times 
unthinkable cooperation of the Russian Tsar and the Ottoman Sultan was still 
possible. Nevertheless, in trying to defend the Ottoman Empire from the French 
aggression Russia in the first place sought to preserve its own exclusive influence in 
the Balkans. The cooperation between the Tsar’s and the Sultan’s courts guaranteed 
the independence of the Ottoman state only in capacity of an obedient Russian ally. 
To preserve the weak neighbour on its southern borders seemed the best solution for 
St. Petersburg, as it could secure and enjoy all those advantages, which it was 
impossible to gain earlier by many wars, as a result of the alliance with the Porte. 
Understandably, Russia could not afford seeing the domination of some other strong 
European power in Constantionople. 
 
As for the Ottomans, they felt equally threatened on all sides, and obviously 
could not get rid of feeling of a constant danger lurking in the North. Neither could 
the Ottoman government calmly observe the Russian war vessels going to and fro 
through the Straits in close vicinity of the Sultan’s capital, tolerate the continuous 
interferences of the Russian ambassadors on behalf of the Danubian principalities 
and the Ottoman Christian subjects, and see the large Russian armed forces kept on 
the Ottoman borders. Wider Ottoman population, including many highest officials 
and especially the Muslim clergy, wished war with Russia in order to get revenge for 
former defeats and territorial losses, should they be allowed such an opportunity. 
Thus, the French anti-Russian propaganda appeared to be much successful among 
the Ottoman people.     
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The Russian wish of absolute control over the Ottoman foreign and domestic 
politics; the French intentions to restore the former influence of Paris in the Ottoman 
Empire and to use the Porte against Russia; the Ottoman eagerness to get rid of the 
burden of the alliance with Russia and, if possible, to return the territories that were 
lost in the previous war with Russia- all these led to a new armed conflict between 
St. Petersburg and the Porte.      
7.6. Conclusions 
During the first years of the Ottoman-Russian alliance, at the background of the 
growing antagonism between St. Petersburg on the one side and Austria and the 
Great Britain on the other, the relations between the Russian and the Ottoman 
Empires continued to be quite friendly. It is worthy of note that Paul I was so 
enraged with the Austrians that in late 1799, and then once again towards the end of 
1800, he even contemplated an interesting idea of an anti-Austrian alliance between 
Russia and the Porte. The Russian Emperor thought it possible to promise the Porte 
the Russian aid in restoring the former Ottoman territorial possessions lost to Austria. 
Moreover, Paul I was ready to help the Ottomans to secure some new territorial gains 
at the expense of the Habsburg monarchy. While such a fancy idea of the Russian 
Emperor appeared to be nothing more than a mere speculation, the cooperation 
between St. Petersburg and the Porte was not only limited to the joint military 
operations of their fleets in the Mediterranean, but also had some other dimensions.  
 
So, the Russian side at the request of the Ottomans delivered to Constantinople 
various ammunition supplies from the stocks of the Black Sea Admiralty. These 
included the bombs, the cannon balls, the rifles, the gun powder, the anchors, etc. In 
362 
seeking to preserve at this time good relations with the Porte, Russia also agreed to 
sign on 22 August 1799 the new Ottoman-Russian Convention on the Trade Tariff. 
Thus, a very important issue that for a long time continued to be a stumbling block 
between the two empires had been finally resolved. This did not mean, of course, that 
the mutual distrust and suspicions ceased to exist and the relations of the Tsar’s and 
the Sultan’s courts turned exceedingly cordial. However, both the Russian and the 
Ottoman Empires demonstrated that they could cooperate and under the current 
circumstances were far from wishing to embark on a war against one another. 
 
Even though in late 1800 appeared the notorious memo of the Head of the 
College of Foreign Affairs Count F. V. Rostopchin, containing an idea of the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire in concert with other leading European powers and 
being covered with the critical remarks of Paul I, this document did not influence in 
any way the practical politics of St. Petersburg towards the Porte. As a matter of fact, 
it showed that the spirit of aggressive designs of the previous reign was still alive 
among the highest classes of the Russian ruling elite. At the same time, the 
Rostopchin’s memorandum was expressing only one of the two approaches to the 
politics of St. Petersburg regarding the Ottoman Empire. It did not conform to the 
official political program of the Russian government concerning its relations with the 
Porte, which was currently based on the principle of maintaining a “weak 
neighbour”. 
 
The Russian wish to preserve the territorial integrity of a weak and controllable 
Ottoman state remained the same both during the reign of Paul I and after his death, 
when the Russian throne was ascended by Paul’s eldest son Alexander. That St. 
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Petersburg did not intend to discuss any propositions with regard to the partition of 
the Ottoman Empire was made clear by the Russian diplomatic representatives in 
Paris S. A. Kolychov and A. I. Morkov, during their negotiations with the French 
government in 1801 and 1802 respectively. Following the resumption of war in 
Europe in 1803, the Russian apprehensions about the potential French attack on the 
Balkan possessions of the Sultan once again increased. For that reason in mid-
December 1803 the Tsar decided to reinforce the Russian garrison on Corfu, what 
necessarily raised the suspicions of the Porte. It is hard to say which government, the 
French or the Ottoman, was in fact more alarmed by the Russian military presence in 
the Mediterranean. 
 
From the Ottoman point of view, any war would be fatal to the Empire and any 
leading European power posed a potential threat to the Sultan’s possessions and even 
the very existence of the Ottoman state. Under the circumstances, it was important to 
stay on good terms with all big European powers and at the same time to think of 
possible means of defence against all of them. While the Porte exerted itself to avoid 
being involved into the ongoing all-European war, the Ottoman capital continued to 
witness the rivalry of the French, Russian and the British diplomacies trying to lure 
the Ottomans to their side. The issue of recognition of the imperial title of Napoléon 
Bonaparte well illustrates the difficult situation in which the Porte found itself in, 
facing the opposing demands of the French on the one hand and the Russians and the 
British on the other. In the end, by late 1804 the Russo-British influence in 
Constantinople outweighed the French one and the imperial title of Napoléon for the 
time being remained unrecognised by the Porte. 
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At the same time, when the issue about the recognition of Napoléon’s imperial 
title was at its high, there emerged an idea to renew the Ottoman-Russian alliance. 
Though it is not so clear who was the initiator of the negotiations about the alliance 
renewal, both St. Petersburg and the Porte regarded it as a good opportunity to 
achieve their own specific goals. While for Russia it was important to retain its 
influence at the Porte, the Ottoman government thought of nothing else but how to 
protect the possessions of the Sultan from the encroachments of both the French and 
the allies. Rather long period of negotiations, which started in February 1805 and 
ended only in September of the same year, showed that the parties, after all, had 
serious disagreements as regards their vision of the renewed alliance. The final text 
of the treaty did not include the two most cherished by the Russian side clauses 
concerning the deployment of the Russian troops in the Danubian principalities and 
the guarantee of the equal rights to both the Christian and the Muslim Ottoman 
subjects. For that reason, it is not appropriate to say that by renewing its alliance with 
Russia the Porte yielded to the Russian demands.  
 
Through signing this treaty both Russia and the Ottoman Empire partly 
achieved their aims. St. Petersburg retained its military presence on Corfu, could still 
enjoy the right of the free passage through the Black Sea straits and was assured that 
at least formally the Porte remained its ally. The Porte protected itself against 
possible French attack and at the same time managed to avoid joining the anti-French 
coalition, the deployment of the Russian troops in the Danubian principalities and 
giving the equal rights to the Christian subjects of the empire. Thus, the Ottomans 
succeeded both to smooth their relations with Russia and to stay on relatively even 
terms with France. 
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After the French successes at Ulm and Austerlitz, followed by the Franco-
Austrian Peace of Pressburg, the European balance of power had noticeably shifted 
to France. As regards the Balkan region, occurred what the Russians and the 
Ottomans were afraid of and what was supposed to be prevented by the Russian 
garrison kept on Corfu. According to the Pressburg treaty the French acquired Istria 
and Dalmatia and in this way without firing a shot became neighbours of the 
Ottoman Empire. The French influence at Constantinople began to grow, while that 
one of Russia and Britain appeared to be in decline. In January 1806 the Ottomans 
hastened to recognise Napoléon Bonaparte as the Emperor of the French.  
 
Fear remained the only means which, in opinion of the Russian ambassador 
Italinskii, could still have effect on the Ottomans. Along with the usual assurances of 
the Russian friendship Italinskii kept reminding the Ottomans that it would be in the 
best interests of the Porte not to incur the wrath of Russia. Following the occupation 
of Cattaro by the forces of Seniavin St. Petersburg gained an additional trump card to 
be used both against the French and the Porte. In point of fact, the Ottomans were 
indeed frightened at the prospect of war with Russia and Britain at the same time. On 
the other hand, should the circumstances allow it, the Ottomans had many reasons to 
desire such a war. 
 
The deposition of the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia in late August 
1806 became an overt step towards war. The arrival of the new French ambassador 
Horace Sébastiani to Constantinople only strengthened the positions of the war party 
in the Ottoman government. Even though the ultimatum of Italinskii and the 
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mediation of the British ambassador Charles Arbuthnot seemed to be successful in 
persuading the Porte to reinstate the dismissed Hospodars, the war could not be 
avoided. St. Petersburg was well aware that the restoration of the Hospodars was 
only an attempt by the Ottomans to gain time in order to be better prepared for war, 
and that the former Russian influence anyway could not be restored. Thus, despite 
the news that the Hospodars were reinstated, the Russian army on the Dniester was 
still ordered to cross the Ottoman border and to occupy the principalities. As a 
logical and well expected result of this move, came the declaration of war to Russia 
made by the Porte in late December 1805.               
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CHAPTER VIII 
COCLUSIO 
 
 
 
This study has investigated the special time in the history of the Ottoman-Russian 
relations, which witnessed a short-lived cooperation between the Sultan’s and the Tsar’s 
courts in the wake of the growing French advances in Europe and especially in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. It seemed advisable to limit the scope of the study by the years 
1792 to 1806, which marked respectively the end and the beginning of the two Ottoman-
Russian wars. It was during this inter-war period that the two empires, much 
unexpectedly for both, faced the necessity to cooperate and even to conclude a defensive 
alliance. In view of the long record of the previous and later sanguinary encounters 
between the Russian and the Ottoman empires, the episode of their rapprochement that 
led to military and diplomatic cooperation appears to be of particular interest. 
 
The purpose of the current study was to reveal the main tendencies in the Ottoman-
Russian relations during the last decade of the 18th century and at the beginning of the 
19th century. Another specific point was to determine how the first ever alliance between 
the Russian and the Ottoman empires became possible, to look into the situation of its 
origin, the practical implementation and the implications for the European politics at the 
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time of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Furthermore, this research was 
to analyse the circumstances under which the Ottoman-Russian rapprochement and the 
defensive alliance of 1799, renewed by both sides in 1805, ended in yet another 
Ottoman-Russian war.  
 
In the present work it has been shown that after the Peace of Jassy the Ottoman and 
the Russian empires appeared to be in search of a modus vivendi, which would enable 
both sides to avoid further confrontation. For different reasons each party was very 
much interested in preserving peace. At the same time the shared distrust and the fresh 
memories of the recent wars brought about a situation when both the Ottomans and the 
Russians felt insecure about the intentions of the opposite side and thus were bound to 
keep preparing for war even while seeking peace. So, during the first years after the 
Peace of Jassy the Porte and St. Petersburg were balancing on the brink of war. It was 
the fact that neither of the two could afford fighting, which, much to the chagrin of the 
French diplomacy, in all probability saved the Ottoman and the Russian governments 
from a new conflict.  
 
A certain thaw in the relations between the two empires became possible after the 
death of the Empress Catherine II. The news about the death of the former nemesis of 
the Ottomans was received in Constantinople with great joy. The accession to the throne 
of the new Russian monarch, Catherine’s unloved son Paul I, had a positive impact on 
the Ottoman-Russian relations. Paul I made it clear that he was not going to embark on 
the aggressive anti-Ottoman projects of his mother, being rather engaged in the massive 
internal reforms. While the growing belligerence of the French Republic was seriously 
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disturbing the European governments, including the Porte, the relations of the Ottomans 
with Russia appeared improved. As early as September 1797, the Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople V. P. Kochubei even assumed the possibility of an alliance between St. 
Petersburg and the Porte. Somewhat later, in spring 1798, the same idea was considered 
by Reis-ül-Küttab Atıf Efendi. 
 
It is noteworthy that Paul I proposed his military aid to the Ottomans long before 
the actual French attack on Egypt took place. Already when the massive preparations of 
a huge French naval squadron were going on in Toulon, the Russian ambassador was 
ordered to contact the Porte on this matter. However, the Ottoman side was in no haste 
to accept the Russian aid, and agreed to receive the Black Sea squadron under Vice 
Admiral Ushakov only after the news about the French occupation of Egypt reached 
Constantinople. In such a way, it was the Egyptian expedition of Napoléon Bonaparte 
that caused the military cooperation and the eventual alliance between the Porte and 
Russia. Nevertheless, despite the French aggression in Egypt such an alliance might 
have never occurred without the necessary prerequisites for it, which evolved earlier. 
Such were the general Ottoman-Russian rapprochement towards the late 1790-s and the 
change of monarch in Russia. Furthermore, at the moment the interests of both the 
Ottoman and the Russian governments appeared very much the same and lied in 
preventing the French advances in the Balkans and in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
 
By signing the treaty, both Russia and the Porte benefited from it in their specific 
ways. The Ottoman Empire, weak and affected by serious internal crisis, received an 
urgent aid amid the ongoing war with France. As to Russia, it gained without firing a 
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shot what otherwise could not be reached in all Ottoman-Russian wars throughout the 
whole 18th centuries. From now on St. Petersburg enjoyed an unprecedented influence at 
the Porte and acquired the right of a free passage through the Black Sea straits for the 
Russian war vessels. It should be noted that this latter condition was granted to Russia 
only for the duration of the current war. Accordingly, the Russian government had no 
obvious reasons to put at risk the advantages of its present position and wish something 
else than preserving the Ottoman Empire as a weak and controllable neighbour.  
 
During the time under discussion Russia pursued in regard to the Ottoman Empire 
a policy of a “weak neighbour”. Even though in late 1800 appeared the notorious 
memorandum of F. V. Rostopchin, which suggested partition of the Ottoman Empire 
and which had even been signed and approved by Paul, it did not provide the basis for 
the Russian official policy towards the Porte. On the contrary, the instructions to the 
Russian ambassadors abroad time and again underlined the wish of St. Petersburg to 
maintain the integrity of the Ottoman state. In fact, it was the Russian own privileged 
position that the Tsar’s government sought to preserve. Until the Ottoman Empire would 
remain weak, and be in many respects a puppet of the Russian court consulting on the 
matters of its foreign policy with the Russian ambassador, St. Petersburg preferred not to 
share its influence at the Porte with some other strong European power. 
 
On the other hand, the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire was expected by 
many. Thus, such a possibility, even though largely undesirable, was also necessarily to 
be taken into account by the Russian government. It was extremely important for Russia 
to make the most use of the situation, should the downfall of the House of Osman 
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become an inevitable reality. In that case the special relations between St. Petersburg 
and the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan would appear as an additional trump card at the 
disposal of the Russian diplomacy. For that reason, Russia could not and did not intend 
to abandon its image of the main protector of the Ottoman Orthodox Christians.  
 
The alliance with the Ottoman Empire presented a serious dilemma for St. 
Petersburg. The Tsar’s government found itself in a very complicated situation when it 
was at the same time to stay on guard of the Ottoman integrity and to keep friendly 
relations with the actually or potentially separatist Orthodox peoples of the empire. The 
idea of Czartoryski to find a solution through promising the Ottoman Orthodox peoples 
to advocate their interests before the Porte, which would make Russia an intermediary 
between the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan and the Ottoman government, despite its 
seeming consistency could not completely resolve the existing problem. 
 
After the French had been defeated and ousted from the Ionian Islands and Egypt, 
the solidarity of the Ottoman and the Russian interests, in large part, ceased to exist. 
From then on, the Ottomans would prefer to stay out of the continued European conflict, 
wishing both belligerent parties to exhaust each other. However, the Porte remained 
under the constant pressure of the diplomatic representatives of all leading European 
powers. Under such circumstances it was almost impossible for the Ottomans to keep 
their neutrality. As the issue about the recognition or, rather, non-recognition by the 
Porte of the imperial title of Napoléon Bonaparte in 1804 has shown, the foreign 
political decisions of the Ottoman government were much dependent on the international 
conjuncture. The Porte would not dare to stand against the joint demands of the Russian 
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and the British ambassadors and did not recognise Napoléon as the Emperor of the 
French. Moreover, the Ottomans started negotiations about the renewal of the alliance 
treaty with Russia, which was finally signed in September 1805. The renewed treaty 
became rather a compromise guaranteeing both signatories a certain stability of their 
relations in the near future.  
 
Following the victories of Napoléon at Ulm and Austerlitz, when the international 
conjuncture changed in favour of France, the Ottoman capital also witnessed the 
increase of the French influence. At the beginning of 1806 the Ottomans recognised 
Napoléon’s imperial title, while their relations with Russia were gradually deteriorating. 
In spring 1806 the Ottomans expressed their discontent at the passage of the Russian war 
vessels through the Black Sea straits. Heretofore hidden Ottoman belligerency and the 
seeking of revenge against Russia grew more manifest. Already in summer 1806 the 
Russian ambassador Italinskii was convinced that the fear remained the only means of 
influence that Russia could still use on the Porte.  
 
The deposition of the pro-Russian Hospodars in Moldavia and Wallachia became a 
symbolical move on the part of the Porte, testifying the Ottoman intention to get rid of 
the Russian influence. With the arrival of the French ambassador Horace Sébastiani in 
late August 1806 the Porte’s resolution to reconsider its relations with Russia only 
gained an additional boost. The spectre of war cast a growing shadow over the Ottoman-
Russian frontiers. Despite the fact that due to the mediation of the British ambassador 
the Porte agreed in the end to revoke its previous decision and to restore the Hospodars, 
the Russian troops on the Dniester were given orders to enter the Danubian 
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principalities. The contradictions were much more serious than the deposition or 
restoration of one or another Hospodar. 
 
Owing to the recent raise of the French power in Europe the Ottoman hopes to take 
revenge upon Russia for all previous grievances gained a new life. In this respect the 
reinstatement of the Hospodars was for the Ottomans nothing else than an attempt to buy 
time. For Russia, and this was well understood in St. Petersburg, the fact that the Porte 
restored the Hospodars did not mean that in the same way the earlier Russian influence 
at the Porte could also be easily restored. With the entrance of the Russian troops into 
the Danubian principalities the die was cast. The outbreak of a new Ottoman-Russian 
war became a matter of time.  
 
Thus, the findings of this study suggest that the Ottoman-Russian rapprochement 
in late 18th- early 19th centuries passed through several stages. It started when following 
the Peace of Jassy (1792) both the Ottoman and the Russian states for many practical 
reasons felt an obvious necessity to stay in peace with one another. Even though mutual 
hatred and distrust prevailed, and the war preparations were seen as the essential means 
to guarantee its own security from a sudden attack, neither Russia nor the Porte were in 
position to embark on war. However, as the secret activities of the ambassadorial 
mission of M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov showed, Catherine II was not going to refuse 
from her earlier anti-Ottoman projects. Gathering of the detailed intelligence information 
on the Balkans by the Russian military experts included in Kutuzov’s delegation 
unmistakably indicated which area was considered in St. Petersburg as a hypothetical 
war theatre.  
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It was only after the death of Catherine II, who remained a formidable nemesis of 
the Ottomans throughout her long reign, that some thaw in the Ottoman-Russian 
relations became possible. The new Russian Emperor Paul I made it clear that he would 
not pursue the aggressive politics of his mother as regards the Ottoman Empire. Towards 
the end of 1790-s the Ottomans had much more reasons to be worried not about the 
behaviour of their Russian neighbours but about the growing belligerence of the French 
Republic. In all likelihood the started thawing in relations of the Sultan’s and the Tsar’s 
courts would have never led to their eventual defensive alliance if it were not for the 
Egyptian expedition of General Bonaparte.  
 
The Ottoman-Russian defensive alliance, concluded on 3 January 1799 marked the 
highest point of military and diplomatic cooperation between St. Petersburg and the 
Porte. Throughout the duration of the Mediterranean anti-French campaign this alliance 
was meeting the interests of both countries. For the first time in history the Ottoman and 
the Russian soldiers were fighting on the same side, both in the Ionian archipelago and 
in Italy. Moreover, there was also fixed the heretofore unbelievable precedent of the 
delivery of munitions from the Russian Black Sea Admiralty to the Ottoman side. One 
of the most tangible results of the Ottoman-Russian cooperation became the birth of the 
Republic of the Seven Islands. Thus, in a way, the Ottoman Empire assisted in the 
creation of the first independent Greek state of modern time. 
 
On the other hand, the Ottoman-Russian alliance was not and could not be a strong 
durable partnership. After the common aim to oust the French from the Ionian Islands 
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and Egypt had been accomplished, the Ottoman government began to feel it as a burden. 
The growing estrangement between the Sultan’s and the Tsar’s courts eventually led to 
the final breach in relations and war. The declared Russian concerns about the integrity 
of the Ottoman state did not make the Porte happy. The disagreements about the future 
political status of the Ionian Islands, the Ottoman apprehensions at seeing the Russian 
war vessels sailing in the vicinity of the Sultan’s palace, the Russian interference into the 
domestic affairs of the Porte on the side of the Orthodox Ottoman subjects did not add to 
the friendly feelings towards Russia both among the Ottoman ruling elite and the 
common people. Apart from that, the continuous endeavours of the French diplomacy to 
kindle the smouldering Ottoman wish of revenge on Russia in course of time and largely 
due to the French successes in Europe grew increasingly effective. The crisis around the 
issue of the deposition of the Hospodars of the Danubian principalities became the last 
and the most outward manifestation of the fact that the short-lived period of the 
Ottoman-Russian rapprochement and alliance was over. 
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